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Kevin M. Hollenbeck 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
Student loans are instrumental in broadening access to post-
secondary educational opportunities. For many individuals who want 
to develop their own human capital but who otherwise do not have 
the means, loans serve as an important supplement to governmental or 
institutional grants in making educational investments affordable and 
increasing the educational attainment of the population. The availabil-
ity of student loans thus has great value for individual students and the 
country as a whole. 
However, the burgeoning volume of debt and repayment difficul-
ties that many people now experience have created a vigorous debate 
on whether public policy should further intervene in student loan trans-
actions. In economic terms, do the benefits exceed the costs? As with 
many public policy issues, answering that question is not straight-
forward. Close examination of the data on cumulative debt, number 
and characteristics of borrowers, types of institutions, and repayment 
dynamics raises almost as many questions as it answers. In alignment 
with its mission of investigating the underlying dynamics of the labor 
market, a component of which is the educational preparation of the 
workforce, the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research orga-
nized a conference on student loans to catalyze careful and informed 
analysis of this understudied, but increasingly important, public policy. 
This volume includes the papers that were presented at the conference, 
held in Ann Arbor at the University of Michigan in October 2013.1 The 
Spencer Foundation and the Education Policy Initiative at the Univer-
sity of Michigan Ford School of Public Policy cosponsored the event. 
1 
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2 Hershbein and Hollenbeck 
THE CONFERENCE BEGINS: MEASURING DEBT BURDENS 
Much publicity has focused on the size of outstanding student debt, 
which has surpassed $1 trillion. However, this aggregate number taken 
out of context can obscure, rather than enlighten, the policy debate. 
Measuring debt is complicated and can be done in different ways. 
Sandy Baum’s chapter brings attention to several of them. She starts by 
examining trends in total student loan debt, number of borrowers, and 
average balances. In the case of average balances, the denominator mat-
ters, as the average could be over all students or over the students who 
borrow. Interestingly, the former has declined over the past two years. 
Further, student borrowers may be pursuing undergraduate or 
graduate education. Baum documents that both the levels and growth 
trends in per-student loans are much greater for graduate students than 
for undergraduates. She suggests that if public policy is to address loan 
availability or terms for students, it must certainly treat these two types 
of students differently. Finally, Baum compares nonfederal with federal 
loans. Both the volume and percentage of students taking out private 
loans have essentially halved since their peak in the 2007–2008 aca-
demic year. 
Baum concludes by suggesting that the most pressing public policy 
concern is for students who may have unmanageable debt levels—in 
her analyses, these tend to be independent students, students attending 
for-profi t institutions, and African American students—and to institute 
income-dependent repayment programs that shift risk from students to 
taxpayers. 
Meta Brown, Donghoon Lee, and colleagues at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York document in Chapter 3 trends in aggregate student 
debt and repayment vis-à-vis other forms of debt. Drawing on a longitu-
dinal database of consumer credit reports that covers the entire country, 
they show that total education debt tripled between 2004 and 2012, 
and that it was the only major source of debt (among mortgages, credit 
cards, auto loans, and home equity lines of credit) that increased during 
the Great Recession. Commensurate with that finding, they note that 
the fraction of individuals with education debt and the average balance 
per borrower both grew unabated between 2004 and 2012. Some of 
this increase was due to more people pursuing education, but some of 






it was also due to interest accumulation from low repayment and high 
delinquency during the recession. 
When Lee at al. examine repayment, they find that as of the end 
of 2012, 17 percent of borrowers are behind on their student loan pay-
ments by 90 or more days, surpassing credit card debt in the highest 
delinquency rate. The situation is even more dire for borrowers who 
are in active repayment (and not in deferment or forbearance): 31 per-
cent of these borrowers are delinquent by 90 or more days. The rise in 
student debt and difficulty in repayment may have crowded out access 
to other forms of credit, the authors surmise, documenting that other 
debt—especially mortgages—fell sharply from 2005 to 2012 for young 
student loan borrowers. 
REASONS FOR GROWTH 
Undeniably, student debt—however you measure it—has been 
increasing over the past two decades, but it has not been growing at 
the same rate for all students, or even all graduates. Brad Hershbein 
and Kevin Hollenbeck in Chapter 4 address the questions of where in 
the entire distribution of college graduates has debt grown, when was 
it growing, and what factors, if any, can explain it. Using data from 
the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study for individuals who 
earned bachelor’s degrees, they find that debt—contrary to popular 
belief—grew faster over the 1990s than over the 2000s, with the sharp-
est increase occurring between 1996 and 2000. They also find that the 
increase that did occur between 2000 and 2008 was mostly concentrated 
in the top fourth of borrowers and was entirely due to private loans. 
Using statistical decomposition techniques, the authors find that 
increases in tuition and fees and the expected family contribution (a 
proxy for ability to pay) can explain most of the increase in borrowing 
in the early 1990s and in the 2000s. The surge in borrowing in the late 
1990s, however, is not explained by costs or other observable factors. 
Instead, the chapter suggests that this growth was due to the introduc-
tion of new loan products, particularly unsubsidized Stafford Loans and 
private loans. 
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Chapter 5 by Elizabeth Akers, Matthew M. Chingos, and Alice M. 
Henriques also attempts to explain the surge in student debt over the last 
20 years and looks at distributional changes. However, their analyses 
rely on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF) and cover the entire American population, not just 
recent bachelor’s graduates. Akers, Chingos, and Henriques reach 
general conclusions that extremely large debt burdens are exceptional 
cases, and that rising educational attainment—in particular, graduate 
education—explains part of the increase in aggregate debt balances. 
They also find that tuition increases are perhaps the largest explana-
tory factor for increased debt, but that changes in behavior, such as 
greater substitution of debt for out-of-pocket financing of postsecond-
ary expenses, also have contributed to the increase. 
Akers, Chingos, and Henriques also review a number of recent 
studies on the return to higher education and note that the extent to 
which the increase in debt burdens is leading to financial hardship is an 
unresolved question. 
STUDENT BORROWING AT FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS 
As noted by Baum in Chapter 2, one of the groups of students most 
likely to have unmanageable debt consists of individuals who attended 
for-profit institutions. Stephanie Riegg Cellini and Rajeev Darolia focus 
on these students in Chapter 6. Their analyses suggest that relatively 
high and rising tuition coupled with relatively low student financial 
resources are likely to be the key factors that explain the elevated debt 
levels of for-profit students relative to students in other higher educa-
tion sectors. Costs and borrowing patterns in the for-profit sector are 
similar to those found in four-year nonprofit institutions; however, 
unlike the nonprofit sector, tuition hikes were not offset by increases in 
institutional grants. 
Cellini and Darolia pose an interesting question: What motivates 
students to attend for-profit institutions? For the most part, character-
istics and educational aspirations of students attending for-profits are 
similar to those for students attending two-year, nonprofit (public or 
private) institutions and who have relatively low levels of debt. Yet the 








financial burdens and loans that the for-profit students bear are most 
similar to those for students in four-year, nonprofi t institutions. 
IMPACT OF BANKRUPTCY NONDISCHARGEABILITY 
A unique feature of student loans is their presumptive non-
dischargeability in bankruptcy. For many years, this feature was limited 
to government or nonprofit-originated loans. Xiaoling Ang and Dalié 
Jiménez in Chapter 7 look at the impact of congressional legislation 
in 2005 that amended bankruptcy laws to make private student loans 
nondischargeable as well. (Unlike federal student loans, private loans 
take into account the credit risk of the potential borrower.) The authors 
suggest that this change in the law has three theoretical implications. It 
should have, other things equal, 1) increased the volume of private stu-
dent loans; 2) increased the “riskiness” of the borrowers (i.e., decreased 
their average credit score); and 3) decreased the interest rate charged to 
borrowers. 
In fact, the analyses by Ang and Jiménez indicate a very large 
increase in the volume of private loans originated after 2005, which 
they attribute primarily to the law change. The credit score of borrowers 
skewed toward the lower end of the distribution, although the mean did 
not change appreciably. Finally, the average interest rate of private loans 
at four-year undergraduate institutions increased by 35 basis points. The 
fi rst two fi ndings confirm the theoretical hypotheses; however, the third 
finding is opposite of what was expected. While this result received 
ample discussion at the conference, it remained a puzzle. 
DEFAULT AND REPAYMENT BEHAVIOR 
Chapter 8 by Lance J. Lochner and Alexander Monge-Naranjo 
examines default and repayment behavior over the 10 years follow-
ing graduation for individuals who earned a bachelor’s degree. These 
authors note that outcomes are not as simple as the binary case of 
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repayment or default that is often the focus of media stories and credi-
tors, including the federal government. In particular, they analyze 
five outcomes: 1) the fraction of undergraduate debt still outstanding; 
2) default; 3) nonpayment (default, deferment, or forbearance); 4) frac-
tion of debt in default; and 5) fraction of debt in nonpayment. They 
relate these outcomes, at both 5 and 10 years after graduation, to indi-
vidual and family background, college major, postsecondary institution 
characteristics, amount borrowed, and postschool earnings. Of these 
variables, they find the most important ones explaining repayment 
outcomes are the amount borrowed and postschool earnings. Perhaps 
surprisingly, college major and institutional characteristics are not cor-
related with repayment behavior once the other factors are accounted 
for, and among the individual and family characteristics, the only vari-
able that consistently matters is race. As with Baum’s chapter, Lochner 
and Monge-Naranjo’s study reveals that African Americans have sig-
nificant repayment difficulties relative to all other ethnic/racial groups, 
even after controlling for many other variables. 
A somewhat surprising finding in Chapter 8 is that many borrow-
ers who enter a nonpayment status eventually return to good standing. 
Over half of the individuals in default five years after graduation are in 
“repaying/fully paid” status five years later; and almost three-quarters 
of individuals in deferment or forbearance five years after graduation 
are in good standing five years later. The authors conclude that policy 
strategies that focus exclusively on short-term default, without consid-
ering rehabilitation, may be too narrow. 
LONG-TERM OUTCOMES 
In addition to causing difficulty for repayment, increased student 
loan burdens may affect other life-cycle behaviors of young adults as 
they enter careers or family formation. In Chapter 9, Dora Gicheva and 
Jeffrey Thompson look at long-term household financial stability. Isolat-
ing the causal impact of student loans on future behavior is problematic 
because the same set of factors that influence student loan behavior may 
also influence the type of education pursued, academic success, and 
later earnings. The authors employ an instrumental variable strategy 








to get around this problem. In particular, they use the national average 
amount borrowed per full-time equivalent student when an individual 
was 17 years old to predict that individual’s borrowing amount.2 
Gicheva and Thompson look at four indicators of fi nancial stabil-
ity after age 30: 1) being denied any type of credit, 2) late payments on 
loans, 3) bankruptcy, and 4) homeownership. In analyses that control 
for several demographic characteristics and local economic conditions, 
the authors find that borrowing amounts are positively related to bank-
ruptcy and negatively related to homeownership and making on-time 
payments, with especially strong results for individuals who failed to 
complete college. 
LOAN AVERSION 
Public perception and the data agree: more and more students are 
taking on more and more debt. In an interesting twist of emphasis, how-
ever, Sara Goldrick-Rab and Robert Kelchen examine loan aversion in 
Chapter 10. They begin by noting that aversion may include individu-
als who have a distaste for borrowing, but it also may include students 
who lack information about loans or students who were not offered loan 
opportunities in their financial aid packages. In looking at data from a 
sample of more than 600 first-time undergraduates at Wisconsin public 
institutions who received a Pell Grant and from which the actual loan 
package offered was observable, the authors note several fi ndings that 
accord with intuition and prior evidence, but they also point out several 
results that may seem surprising. 
In particular, Goldrick-Rab and Kelchen find that the following 
characteristics are associated with greater propensity to turn down an 
offered loan: Southeast Asian ethnicity, greater parental education, 
lower net prices and less institutional prestige, family background with 
less financial strength, longer time horizons of the student, planning 
to work part-time while in college, and higher levels of social capital. 
They also document differences in loan aversion rates between survey 
data (student responses) and administrative data (college records), and 
these differences also vary across subgroups of students. 
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Goldrick-Rab and Kelchen’s analysis further finds a lack of cor-
relation between financial knowledge and borrowing behavior. While 
this may suggest that increased financial education of students, as some 
researchers and policymakers have proposed, may not substantively 
change students’ borrowing behavior, the authors caution that their 
sample of low-income, Pell Grant recipients may not generalize to all 
undergraduate students. 
THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDES: SPECIFIC 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three chapters in the book have specific policy prescriptions, all 
touching on the issue of how to improve loan repayment. In Chapter 
11, Lauren Asher and Debbie Cochrane, along with their coauthors at 
The Institute for College Access and Success (TICAS), offer specific 
recommendations in four areas: 1) consolidation and simplifi cation of 
federal loans, 2) streamlined repayment options, 3) improvements in 
loan counseling, and 4) strengthened consumer protections. They advo-
cate that the federal government offer a single undergraduate student 
loan with no fees, a low in-school interest rate, and a fixed rate in repay-
ment that cannot rise much beyond the rate paid by current borrowers. 
In terms of repayment, the authors present a “Plan for Fair Loan 
Payments” for all federal borrowers that calls for affordable payments 
based on income, family size, and total federal debt, and that offers 
forgiveness after 20 years of payments. They recommend rigorous loan 
counseling before students commit to borrowing, not just at entrance 
and exit. Finally, the authors have a number of suggestions in the area 
of consumer protection, particularly in the area of collections. 
Susan Dynarski and Daniel Kreisman also present a specific plan 
for an income-based repayment system, which they label “Loans for 
Educational Opportunity.” (Chapter 12 contains an abbreviated version 
of their paper, which was originally commissioned by The Hamilton 
Project. See Note 1.) They document four facts about student loans and 
future earnings: 1) a moderate level of debt for the typical student bor-
rower, 2) a high payoff to a college education, 3) high rates of default 






on typical loans, and 4) higher rates of default among young borrowers. 
They argue that in light of these four facts there is not a debt crisis, but 
rather a repayment crisis. 
Under their Loans for Educational Opportunity proposal, payments 
would be automatically deducted from borrowers’ paychecks, similar 
to the payroll tax for Social Security. Instead of paying off loans during 
a fixed, 10-year period, borrowers would have up to 25 years, although 
they could opt to pay down the loan more quickly. Dynarski and Kreis-
man suggest that this system will reduce the administrative costs of the 
current student loan system. The chapter also addresses how their pro-
posed system would work for self-employed individuals or those who 
become unemployed. 
In Chapter 13, Jason Delisle, Alex Holt, and Kristin Blagg examine 
how a loophole in the federal government’s Pay As You Earn (PAYE) pro-
gram for student loans can affect graduate and professional students. The 
authors show that for many of these students, there is a level of borrowing at 
which increasing the loan balance has no impact on the amount of total re-
payments under PAYE because of the program’s loan forgiveness bene-
fit; the authors call this borrowing level the “no marginal cost threshold.” 
If a borrower could predict this threshold with certainty, then she would 
have an incentive to increase the size of her loan because doing so 
would essentially be costless. 
Using data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 
and the American Community Survey, Delisle and his coauthors esti-
mate that the majority of graduate and professional student borrowers 
will borrow more than the no marginal cost threshold. This suggests 
that PAYE effectively functions as a form of tuition subsidy. The most 
significant levels of subsidization occur in conjunction with the Public 
Service Loan Forgiveness program, in which loans are forgiven after 
only 10 years of payments if the borrower qualifies under a public ser-
vice job. As a remedy for the unintended level of subsidy, the authors 
propose that the period of repayment before forgiveness be lengthened 
or that the amount that can be forgiven be capped. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conference exceeded expectations. The papers presented there 
and included in this volume represent the most current research and 
knowledge about student loans and repayment. The conference agenda 
included comments from discussants and general discussion after each 
of the papers was presented. We thought that the discussants’ comments 
and the general discussion added great value to the papers. We thank the 
discussants, who are listed at the end of this volume, for their thought-
ful insights. We hope this volume serves as a valuable reference for 
researchers and policymakers who seek a deeper understanding of how, 
why, and which students borrow for their postsecondary education; 
how this borrowing may affect later decisions; and what measures can 
help borrowers repay their loans successfully. 
We also thank our cosponsors, the Spencer Foundation and the 
Education Policy Initiative at the Ford School of Public Policy. The 
opportunity to convene a community of scholars has furthered our 
collective insights of the behaviors of students who are attempting to 
finance their investments in higher education. 
Notes 
1. Chapter 12 has an abbreviated version of the Dynarski and Kreisman paper, which 
was originally commissioned by The Hamilton Project. The full paper may be 
accessed from http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/THP_ 
DynarskiDiscPaper_Final.pdf. 
2. As might be expected at a conference with a number of economists participating, 
much discussion took place around the validity of this instrument. 





The Evolution of Student 
Debt in the United States 
Sandy Baum 
Urban Institute 
The conversation about student debt in the United States has 
descended into an alarmist focus on the aggregate amount of education 
debt (over $1 trillion by some estimates); on stories about individual 
students who borrowed excessively and are struggling to repay in a 
weak labor market; on a comparison between credit card debt (which 
has fallen quite a bit in recent years) and education debt (which has not); 
and on fears of a “student loan bubble” that might follow the path of the 
housing bubble. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan said recently that 
the student loan “crisis” has grown so large that it poses “a threat to the 
American dream” (Porter 2013). 
It’s time to take a step back to examine the role of debt in financing 
postsecondary education, the path over time in postsecondary participa-
tion and the accompanying student borrowing, and the basic arguments 
underlying debt financing of postsecondary education and the govern-
ment’s role in the system. The sections that follow examine some of the 
perspectives on student loan data that can alter the picture that emerges. 
Is outstanding debt or annual borrowing more meaningful? Should non-
borrowers be included in average debt figures? Does the path of total 
borrowing tell the same story as the path of borrowing per student? 
Should we focus on all postsecondary students or only on undergradu-
ates? The goal is not to choose the optimal data on which to rely, but 
to elucidate the different information emerging from different choices 
about what to measure. 
11 







Perhaps the most commonly cited student debt figures are those 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Table 2.1 reports out-
standing household debt of various types from the third quarter of 2003 
to the third quarter of 2013. Education debt grew from $250 billion in 
2003 to $610 billion in 2008 and to $1.03 trillion in 2013. There is no 
doubt that this represents rapid growth worthy of attention, but several 
other facts from these data are also relevant. 
• Education debt increased from 3 percent to 9 percent of out-
standing household debt over the decade. This is a significant 
change, but mortgage debt is 70 percent of the total, and home 
equity revolving credit is another 5 percent. Widespread default 
on student loans could be a real problem, but even if the gov-
ernment did not hold the vast majority of this debt, the eco-
nomic impact would obviously be on a different scale from the 
collapse of the housing market. 
• Credit card debt increased by 24 percent between 2003 and 
2008 but fell by 22 percent over the following five years, end-
ing the decade $21 billion (3 percent) below its 2003 level. (See 
Table 2.2.) 
• Outstanding education debt increased by 68 percent between 
2008 and 2013—less than half the rate of growth between 2003 
and 2008. (See Table 2.2) 
Perhaps more fundamental is the question of whether the new focus 
on outstanding student loan debt is the best way to understand the risks 
facing credit markets; the economy; or past, current, and future students. 
Outstanding debt per borrower has not grown nearly as much as 
total outstanding debt. Enrollment in postsecondary education has 
increased rapidly in recent years, and the number of borrowers retiring 
their debt each year is significantly smaller than the number incurring 
debt for the fi rst time. 
Figure 2.1 shows the real growth in total outstanding education 
debt relative to the growth in the number of borrowers with debt and the 
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Table 2.1  Outstanding Household Debt, 2003:Q3 to 2013:Q3 (in billions of dollars and as a percentage of total 
household debt) 
2003 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Mortgage ($) 5.18 6.21 6.91 8.05 8.93 9.29 8.94 8.61 8.40 8.03 7.90 
Home equity 0.27 0.43 0.54 0.60 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.64 0.57 0.54 
revolving ($) 
Auto ($) 0.68 0.75 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.74 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.85 
Credit card ($) 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.82 0.86 0.81 0.73 0.69 0.67 0.67 
Student ($) 0.25 0.33 0.38 0.45 0.53 0.61 0.69 0.78 0.87 0.96 1.03 
Other ($) 0.48 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.30 
Total ($) 7.56 8.83 9.79 11.11 12.13 12.68 12.28 11.84 11.66 11.31 11.28
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Mortgage (%) 69 70 71 72 74 73 73 73 72 71 70 
Home equity 4 5 6 5 5 5 6 6 5 5 5 
revolving (%) 
Auto (%) 9 9 8 7 7 6 6 6 6 7 7 
Credit card (%) 9 8 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 
Student (%) 3 4 4 4 4 5 6 7 7 8 9 
Other (%) 6 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013a). 
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Table 2.2  Percentage Changes in Outstanding Household Debt, 
2003–2013 
2003–2008 2008–2013 
Mortgage 79 −15 
Home equity revolving 157 −23 
Auto loan 18 4 
Credit card 24 −22 
Student loan 146 68 
Other −14 −26 
Total 68 −11 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013b). 
Figure 2.1  Total Outstanding Student Debt, Number of Borrowers with 
Outstanding Debt, and Average Balance, Relative to 2005 
Fourth Quarter, 2005–2012 
2005:Q4 2006:Q4 2007:Q4 2008:Q4 2009:Q4 2010:Q4 2011:Q4 2012:Q4 
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fourth quarter of 2012. Total outstanding debt was 124 percent higher in 
constant dollars at the end of 2012 than it had been eight years earlier. 
In contrast, average balances increased by 33 percent (in 2012 dollars), 
while the number of borrowers rose by 66 percent. The number of bor-
rowers increased much more rapidly than the average amount borrowed 
from 2007 through 2010 but did not increase between 2010 and 2011, 
when average balances continued to grow. 
Outstanding balances include debt that was incurred many years 
ago as well as recent borrowing, borrowing by both students and par-
ents, and borrowing by both undergraduate and graduate students. The 
accrual of unpaid interest, penalties, and other charges also add to the 
total outstanding debt. 
Solutions for relieving the strains of student debt should certainly 
include borrowers with old debts who are struggling, and many policy 
proposals ignore these people. However, developing strategies for the 
future requires a focus on recent student borrowing patterns. Striking 
a balance between concern about overdependence on debt for financ-
ing postsecondary education and welcoming increases in borrowing 
as a sign of increased participation by students with limited resources 
requires more information about borrowing patterns across students on 
different educational paths, from different socioeconomic backgrounds, 
and of different ages. 
ANNUAL BORROWING 
The year-by-year data on federal student loans are more accurate 
than either estimates of outstanding debt or the data on the total debt 
levels of students who graduate with different credentials or who leave 
school without credentials. Those data are based either on samples of 
students from surveys conducted every four years or on surveys with 
disappointing response rates completed every year by colleges and 
universities. 
Total annual borrowing, detailed in Table 2.3, has increased dra-
matically since 1970–1971, when students borrowed $7.6 billion (in 
2012 dollars) through education loan programs. Thirty years later, 
in 2000–2001, total borrowing through these programs had reached 






Table 2.3  Total Federal and Nonfederal Loans to Undergraduates, 
Graduate Students, and Parents of Undergraduate Students, 




Federal Nonfederal enrollment per FTE 
loans ($) loans ($) Total ($) (FTEs) student ($) 
1970–71 7,622 7,622 7,148,575 1,066 
1975–76 7,490 0 7,490 8,479,688 883 
1980–81 19,276 0 19,276 8,819,013 2,186 
1985–86 21,071 0 21,071 8,943,433 2,356 
1990–91 24,403 0 24,403 9,820,205 2,485 
1995–96 39,364 2,000 41,364 10,172,987 4,066 
2000–01 45,664 6,750 52,414 11,427,001 4,587 
2005–06 67,984 20,860 88,844 13,408,264 6,626 
2006–07 69,083 23,750 92,833 13,612,494 6,820 
2007–08 75,638 25,530 101,168 13,960,922 7,247 
2008–09 90,144 12,390 102,534 14,608,127 7,019 
2009–10 106,648 9,040 115,688 15,764,432 7,339 
2010–11 112,037 8,110 120,147 16,220,701 7,407 
2011–12 109,814 8,130 117,944 16,143,133 7,306 
2012–13 101,469 8,810 110,279 15,918,548 6,928 
NOTE: FTE = full-time equivalent. 
SOURCE: College Board (2013). 
$52.4 billion, and it more than doubled, to $120.1 billion, over the next 
decade. As of 2012–2013, however, annual borrowing had fallen from 
its 2010–2011 peak. 
Some of the borrowing changes are due to policy changes. For 
example, the increase from $24 billion in 1990–1991 to $41 billion in 
1995–1996 was to a significant extent the result of the introduction of 
the unsubsidized Stafford Loan program, which expanded the federal 
program from one designed only for students with documented finan-
cial need to one including all students. 
Enrollment growth is another issue. While total borrowing between 
2000–2001 and 2012–2013 increased by 110 percent in real terms, 
from $52.4 billion to $110.3 billion, borrowing per full-time equivalent 
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(FTE) student increased by 51 percent, from $4,587 (in 2012 dollars) 
to $6,928. 
The decline in both total borrowing and borrowing per student over 
the last two years may or may not signal a longer-term trend. But these 
data should serve as a caution to those who have a tendency to predict 
that when a trend is unfavorable it is likely to continue to be more and 
more unfavorable. Predictions of doom based on temporary circum-
stances generate attention-grabbing headlines. But as the economy rises 
from the depths of the Great Recession, fewer people will enroll in col-
lege as the labor market recovers, and students may borrow less as state 
tax revenues, incomes, and savings rise. Both the upward pressure on 
tuition prices and the financing strains on families and students are also 
likely to diminish to some extent. 
DEBT PER STUDENT VERSUS DEBT PER BORROWER 
Most discussions of average debt levels focus on debt per borrower, 
setting aside the significant number of college students who do not bor-
row at all, or at least do not rely on education loans. In 2011–2012, 
31 percent of bachelor’s degree recipients, 50 percent of associate’s 
degree recipients, and 34 percent of those who earned postsecondary 
certificates did not have education debt. Including these students may 
obscure some of the potential problems facing borrowers, but it paints 
a clearer picture of how students finance their education. For example, 
in 2011–2012, median debt for bachelor’s degree recipients who bor-
rowed was $26,500, and 10 percent borrowed more than $54,900. The 
median for all bachelor’s degree recipients was $16,900, and the 90th 
percentile was $44,500 (National Center for Education Statistics 2012). 
UNDERGRADUATE AND GRADUATE STUDENTS 
About 87 percent of all postsecondary students are undergraduate 
students, while the other 13 percent are graduate students who have 







already completed bachelor’s degrees. Both undergraduate and gradu-
ate students are eligible for federal student loans. First-year dependent 
undergraduate students with documented financial need may be eligible 
for up to $3,500 in subsidized loans, on which the government pays the 
interest while the student is in school. These students frequently also 
take unsubsidized loans, because the total federal student loan borrow-
ing limit is $2,000 higher than the limit for the subsidized program.1 
Since July 1, 2012, graduate students have been eligible only for unsub-
sidized federal student loans. 
Federal loan repayment options are the same for undergraduate 
and graduate debt. While most students take the default option of mak-
ing fixed payments every year for 10 years, there are also graduated 
repayment plans under which payments increase over time, extended 
repayment plans that allow smaller payments over more years and, of 
particular importance, income-dependent repayment plans. These plans 
make the amount owed dependent on the borrower’s income, limiting 
required payments to a manageable portion of discretionary income and 
forgiving remaining debt after a period of years. 
As indicated in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.2, in 2012–2013, federal 
loans per postsecondary student were $6,374. But focusing only on 
undergraduate students yields an average of $4,897, while graduate stu-
dents borrowed over three times as much. 
Graduate student debt may be an increasing problem as the gap in 
earnings between individuals with bachelor’s degrees and those with 
advanced degrees grows, leading more students to continue their stud-
Table 2.4  Average Federal Loans per FTE Student, FTE Undergraduate 
Student, and FTE Graduate Student, 1992–1993 to 2012–2013 
Federal loans per Federal loans Federal loans per 
FTE postsecondary per FTE UG FTE graduate 
student ($) student ($) student ($) 
1992–93 2,574 1,959 6,968 
1997–98 4,007 3,216 9,465 
2002–03 4,364 3,406 10,940 
2007–08 5,418 3,978 14,937 
2012–13 6,374 4,897 16,239 
NOTE: FTE = full-time equivalent. 
SOURCE: College Board (2013). 
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Figure 2.2  Average Federal Loans per FTE Undergraduate and per FTE 







NOTE: FTE = full-time equivalent. 






Average federal loans per FTE undergraduate 




ies.2 But policy responses to this issue should likely be quite different 
from those to the undergraduate debt issue. Subsidies for undergraduate 
students are critical from the perspectives of both equity and effi ciency. 
Some postsecondary education is a virtual necessity for earnings that 
support a secure lifestyle. There is broad consensus that accidents of 
birth should not prevent people from having the opportunity to access 
this education. Failing to provide access also leads to a less productive 
labor force and to greater reliance on publicly funded income support 
programs. 
The role of public subsidies for graduate education is less clear-cut. 
Certainly there are social benefits to increased educational attainment at 
this level, but anyone undertaking graduate study is already a four-year 
college graduate, and public subsidies come largely from taxpayers 
with lower incomes at the time students are enrolling, and even more 
so after they have completed their advanced degrees. Arguments for 
investing in education only if the financial returns are likely to be high 




enough to justify the expenditure are stronger in the case of graduate 
education than in the case of undergraduate education. 
There are certainly exceptions and sound arguments for some level 
of subsidy. However, the argument that graduate student debt, which is 
held by individuals who have the highest earnings potential of any seg-
ment of the population, should be addressed by public policy is much 
weaker than similar arguments about undergraduate debt. 
NONFEDERAL LOANS 
Nonfederal loans, from banks and other private lenders and to a 
lesser extent from states and from colleges and universities, may be a 
particular concern because they do not come with the repayment pro-
tections attached to federal loans. It is not easy to arrange for lower or 
postponed payments when borrowers hit difficult financial times, and 
private loans are not eligible for the federal income-dependent repay-
ment plans. Moreover, while the interest rates on federal student loans 
are limited by law, private loans frequently carry variable interest rates 
that can reach very high levels. 
Figure 2.3 shows that nonfederal borrowing almost doubled, from 
about $10.5 billion (in 2012 dollars) in 2002–2003 to $25.5 billion in 
2007–2008. As was the case in other credit markets, lending standards 
were less than rigorous. Many of the loans made during this period have 
not yet been repaid, and concerns over this outstanding debt are prob-
ably well placed. But the market collapsed in 2008–2009, and total non-
federal borrowing has been in the $8–$9 billion range since 2009–2010. 
In 2007–2008, 14 percent of undergraduates and 11 percent of 
graduate students relied on the private loan market. By 2011–2012, as 
shown in Table 2.5, those percentages had declined to 6 percent and 
4 percent, respectively (National Center for Education Statistics 2008, 
2012). Both supply and demand forces contributed to this change. The 
tightening of credit markets is evidenced in the decline from 39 percent 
to 12 percent in the share of undergraduates and from 29 percent to 
5 percent in the share of graduate students in for-profi t postsecondary 
institutions taking private loans (National Center for Education Statis-
tics 2008, 2012). But at the same time, federal loan limits for under-
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Figure 2.3  Total Nonfederal Education Loans, 1997–1998 to 2012–2013 









SOURCE: College Board (2013, Table 1). 
Table 2.5  Percentages of Undergraduate and Graduate Students Taking 
Private Loans, 2007–2008 and 2011–2012, by Sector 
2007–08 2011–12 
Undergraduate students 
Private for-profit  39  12  
Private nonprofi t four-year 25 12 
Public four-year 14 7 
Public two-year 4 2 
Total 14 6 
Graduate students 
Private for-profit  29  5  
Private nonprofi t four-year 12 5 
Public four-year 6 3 
Total 11 4 
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics (2008, 2012). 





graduates have increased, and federal GradPLUS Loans have become 
available to graduate students. 
EVALUATING EDUCATION BORROWING 
People tend to compare individuals with student loan obligations to 
those with similar earnings who do not have the same debt. It is not a 
surprise that the consumption options of former students who borrowed 
are more limited than those whose parents paid their way. But what if 
those students had not borrowed? Chances are they would not have had 
the same education, job, or earnings. The more important comparison is 
between the students’ opportunities with a college education and some 
debt and their opportunities if they did not attend college at all. 
The fact that students borrow to fund postsecondary education is 
not in and of itself a problem. The arguments for debt fi nancing for 
investments with high expected rates of return are straightforward. 
Between 2008 and 2011, the gap between the median earnings of high 
school graduates aged 25–34 and those in the same age range with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher declined from 74 percent to 69 percent for 
men and from 79 percent to 70 percent for women, but the long-term 
trend is upward. The earnings premium for men rose from 25 percent 
in 1971 to 56 percent in 1991 and to 69 percent in 2011. For women it 
rose from 43 percent in 1971 to 56 percent in 1991 and to 70 percent in 
2011 (Baum, Ma, and Payea 2013, Figure 1.6). Moreover, the earnings 
gap is larger for workers at older ages (Baum, Kurose, and Ma 2013, 
Section 6). 
Average debt levels are not alarming. The popular press notwith-
standing, the typical bachelor’s degree recipient entering the labor mar-
ket with as much as $30,000 or $40,000 in debt will not have undue 
difficulty repaying that debt out of the earnings premium from his or 
her education. But the growing number of borrowers with higher debt 
levels may struggle, even if they are reasonably successful in the labor 
market. And labor market outcomes are uncertain. Earnings levels vary 
quite a bit among people with similar levels of education, and some 
borrowers with average debt levels might face difficulties, especially if 
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they are attempting to repay their student loans over a relatively short 
10-year time period. 
The existence of income-dependent repayment options for federal 
student loans effectively changes the risk of student debt. Many of 
those with very high debt levels have at least some nonfederal student 
debt, but the new federal repayment plans shift much of the risk from 
students to taxpayers, since borrowers are not expected to repay if their 
earnings are inadequate. 
THE FEDERAL ROLE 
The logic of education debt and the manageability of average debt 
levels for typical college graduates do not diminish the very real prob-
lems facing a minority of students because they made unwise decisions 
about their investments in education; because they were, for whatever 
reason, unable to succeed in meeting their educational goals; or because 
their labor market outcomes have been less favorable than anticipated. 
As long as there is a public interest in promoting educational oppor-
tunities and attainment, and as long as the federal government is, as 
it should be, the primary source of student loans, public policy must 
address these issues constructively. 
Some of the concerns about levels of student debt are voiced in the 
form of recommendations to scale back federal student loan programs. 
One argument is that the availability of easy credit gives colleges and 
universities more leeway to raise their prices. This position also reflects 
the idea that the federal government is inappropriately encouraging stu-
dents to overborrow. 
But in the absence of ample federal credit, many students are likely 
to turn to the private loan market, which is apt to offer reasonable terms 
to students enrolled in bachelor’s degree programs at selective col-
leges who have financially secure cosigners. It is less likely to pro-
vide favorable terms to the students from low-income, first-generation 
families borrowing to finance enrollment in community colleges, or to 
low-income adults seeking credentials that will, for the first time, make 
them eligible for jobs that pay a living wage. Federal education policy 






is (or should be) designed to provide opportunities to those students 
who would otherwise fall through the cracks. 
The challenges presented by the prevalence of private student loans 
between 2002–2003 and 2007–2008 provide a reminder about why the 
federal government is involved in this market. The private market relies 
on credit histories and collateral in determining its lending terms. Stu-
dents tend to have limited credit histories, low incomes, and minimal 
assets. Many students, including those with weak future prospects, took 
private loans with high interest rates. When sufficient federal loans 
were not available to meet their needs, or when they didn’t understand 
their options, they looked elsewhere. 
In the current belt-tightening environment, suggestions about risk 
rating of federal student loans have become surprisingly common. The 
National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (2013) 
floated the idea in a recent report. Other observers have promoted pro-
grams that would modify loan terms based on either the institutions in 
which students enroll or the characteristics of the students themselves. 
Some of the suggestions are designed to protect the federal budget 
(Simkovic 2011), but others are designed to protect students against 
overborrowing. 
It is unrealistic to believe that offering high-risk students loans with 
higher interest rates is the best public policy for helping them make 
wise decisions about their educational paths. The national priority 
on assuring that students with limited means can participate in post-
secondary education requires that we make reasonable fi nancing options 
available to them. Suggestions about incorporating risk rating into the 
federal loan system generally rely on the assumption that students will 
respond to market signals and either forgo college or choose alternative 
programs and institutions when presented with unfavorable loan terms. 
Both history and the insights of behavioral economics make this seem 
unlikely.3 And while there are surely students who would be better off 
not pursuing further education than attending the institutions in which 
they enroll, dismantling the system that allows students with limited 
financial means and uncertain academic futures the chance to improve 
their prospects is not a prescription for a healthy economy or an equi-
table society. 
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WHO IS BORROWING TOO MUCH? 
There are two central questions: 1) Who are the students with the 
highest debt levels, and 2) who are the students with the least manage-
able debt burdens? These questions are not the same, since students 
who are in school for a longer time and earn higher degrees are likely 
to accumulate the most debt—and to have the earnings to repay that 
debt. Those who enroll for short periods of time and never earn creden-
tials borrow relatively small amounts but also have weak labor market 
outcomes. 
The most recent available data on aggregate debt by demographic 
and educational characteristics are for 2011–2012. That year, 23 per-
cent of bachelor’s degree recipients with debt had borrowed more than 
$40,000. The percentage with no education debt at all was 31 percent. 
But 44 percent of bachelor’s degree recipients from for-profi t institu-
tions graduated with $40,000 or more in debt, compared to 18 percent 
of those from the private nonprofit sector and 10 percent from public 
institutions. Student loan default patterns also direct attention to the 
for-profit sector, with 43 percent of FY2011 defaulters coming from 
these institutions (U.S. Department of Education 2013). The for-profit 
sector is, and should be, a particular focus of concerns about student 
borrowing. 
Comparisons of the debt levels of bachelor’s degree recipients 
with different demographic characteristics give additional indication of 
where the problems lie. Independent students borrow more than depen-
dent students. Federal loan limits are higher for independent students, 
who can now borrow up to $57,500 in Direct Loans for undergraduate 
study, compared to $31,000 for dependent students whose parents qual-
ify for PLUS Loans. Independent students are also more likely to have 
responsibilities for supporting families and less likely to have parental 
support on which to fall back. 
As Table 2.6 indicates, among 2011–12 bachelor’s degree recipi-
ents, 9 percent of dependent students and 24 percent of independent 
students accumulated more than $40,000 in education debt, with single 
independent students and those with dependents more likely to fall into 
this category than those who were married without dependents. 





Table 2.6  Percentage Distribution of Aggregate Debt Levels of 
Bachelor’s Degree Recipients by Dependency Status and 
Dependent Student Family Income, 2011–2012 
$20,001– $40,001 or 
No debt $1–$20,000 $40,000 more 
All bachelor’s 31 24 29 16 
degree recipients 
Dependent 35 27 29 9 
Less than $30,000 23 37 31 9 
$30,000–$64,999 22 30 39 9 
$65,000–$105,999 40 23 26 12 
$106,000 or more 46 23 25 7 
Independent 26 21 29 24 
No dependents, 25 22 29 24 
unmarried 
No dependents, 34 20 2 18 
married 
With dependents 24 2 30 27 
NOTE: Includes all loans ever borrowed for undergraduate education in 2011–12 and 
prior years. Does not include loans to parents of undergraduate students. 
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics (2012). 
Among dependent students, the patterns by family income level are 
not so clear. Students from higher-income families were more likely 
not to borrow at all. But among those who borrowed, those from the 
lowest-income families were most likely to borrow $20,000 or less. 
Those from families with incomes between $65,000 and $106,000 were 
most likely to accumulate debts exceeding $40,000, both overall and 
among those who borrowed. 
As Table 2.7 shows, the breakdown of graduates by sector high-
lights the reality that the students who earn their degrees from for-profit 
institutions are most likely to have high levels of debt. Within each 
sector, independent students are more likely than dependent students 
to be in this situation, and among dependent students, it is middle- or 
upper-middle-income students who are most likely to borrow more than 
$40,000 to finance their bachelor’s degrees. 
It is also notable that, as indicated in Table 2.8, within income 
groups, there are differences in debt levels by racial/ethnic groups. 
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Table 2.7  Percentage Distribution of Aggregate Debt Levels of Bachelor’s
Degree Recipients, by Dependency Status, Dependent Student 
Family Income, and Sector, 2011–2012 
$20,001– $40,001 or 
 No debt $1–$20,000 $40,000 more 
Public four-year 36 27 27 10 
Dependent 
Less than $30,000 27 39 27 7 
$30,000–$64,999 25 35 33 7 
$65,000–$105,999 47 24 23 6 
$106,000 or more 48 22 25 4 
Independent 31 25 28 16 
Private nonprofi t four-year 27 23 32 18 
Dependent 
Less than $30,000 12 37 41 10 
$30,000–$64,999 14 23 51 13 
$65,000–$105,999 27 21 31 21 
$106,000 or more 42 23 26 10 
Independent 25 20 29 26 
For-profit  13  12  32  44  
Dependent 
Less than $30,000 0 20 35 45 
$30,000–$64,999 9 10 50 31 
$65,000–$105,999 26 20 24 30 
$106,000 or more n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Independent 13 11 31 45 
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics (2012). 
Small sample sizes make it difficult to include breakdowns by sector, 
race, and income, but black students are disproportionately likely to 
enroll in the for-profit sector, while Hispanic students are overrepre-
sented in community colleges.4 Among 2011–12 black bachelor’s
degree recipients, 28 percent had at least $40,000 in debt. This com-
pares to 14 percent of white graduates, 16 percent of Hispanic gradu-
ates, and 6 percent of Asian graduates. Percentages with high debt were 
higher for independent students, with 35 percent of independent black 
bachelor’s degree recipients borrowing more than $40,000. 
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Table 2.8  Percentage Distribution of Aggregate Debt Levels of Bachelor’s
Degree Recipients, by Dependency Status, Dependent Student 
Family Income, and Race/Ethnicity, 2011–2012 
$20,001– $40,001 or 
 No debt $1–$20,000 $40,000 more 
White 33 24 30 14 
Dependent 
Less than $30,000 20 40 31 9 
$30,000–$64,999 21 30 41 7 
$65,000–$105,999 39 24 26 12 
$106,000 or more 48 21 25 7 
Independent 26 21 31 23 
Black 16 24 32 28 
Dependent 
Less than $30,000 5 36 43 16 
$30,000–$64,999 9 25 42 24 
$65,000–$105,999 25 30 28 17 
$106,000 or more 23 38 31 8 
Independent 18 18 29 35 
Hispanic 28 27 29 16 
Dependent 
Less than $30,000 25 39 31 6 
$30,000–$64,999 26 35 28 12 
$65,000–$105,999 36 23 31 10 
$106,000 or more 28 27 34 11 
Independent 28 23 28 22 
Asian 53 23 18 6 
Dependent 
Less than $30,000 51 27 19 3 
$30,000–$64,999 39 27 34 0 
$65,000–$105,999 65 18 14 4 
$106,000 or more 56 32 11 1 
Independent 55 19 13 14 
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics (2012). 
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Both differences in enrollment patterns and the reality that black 
families tend to have lower asset levels than other families with similar 
incomes make it unsurprising that even within income categories, black 
bachelor’s degree recipients have higher debt levels than members 
of other racial/ethnic groups (Shapiro, Meschede, and Orsoro 2013). 
Among dependent students, within racial/ethnic groups, it is middle-
income students rather than lower-income students who are most likely 
to accumulate high levels of debt. 
High debt levels don’t tell the whole story of at-risk borrowers, 
because for students who don’t earn bachelor’s degrees—those who 
leave school either with associate’s degrees or certificates or with no 
postsecondary credentials—earnings tend to be lower, and lower levels 
of debt can lead to unmanageable payment requirements. The 84 per-
cent of 2011–12 bachelor’s degree recipients who borrowed $40,000 or 
less are not likely to be at risk, except under unusual circumstances, and 
as Table 2.9 indicates, very few certificate holders and students who left 
school without a credential accumulated this much debt. But we know 
that those who do not complete their credentials are disproportionately 
likely to default. This pattern may be a function of factors other than 
debt to earnings ratios, including a reluctance to prioritize the repayment 
of loans that did not serve their intended purpose. But targeted efforts 
to diminish student debt problems should certainly include a focus on 
students with debt levels that do not exceed the overall average. 
ENROLLMENT PATTERNS 
Tuition and fees, as well as living costs for college students, have 
risen relative to family incomes over time, even after taking into con-
sideration the role of financial aid in reducing the net price that students 
actually pay. It is not surprising that students are relying more heav-
ily on borrowing than they did a generation ago. Student loans have 
become more easily available, and parents seem more willing to shift 
the responsibility for paying for college onto their children, but the 
increase in postsecondary participation rates across the population also 



















   
   
 
Table 2.9  Total Student Debt Levels of 2003–04 Beginning Postsecondary Students, by Credentials Earned by 
2009 (%) 
30 
$10,001– $20,001– $30,001– $50,001 or 
No debt $1–$10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $50,000 more 
Total 43 25 16 8 5 2 
Bachelor’s degree (31%) 36 12 22 14 1 5 
Associate’s degree (9%) 42 24 18 9 7 1 
Certifi cate (9%) 39 45 12 2 1 0 
No degree, still enrolled (15%) 39 27 18 9 5 2 
No degree, not enrolled (35%) 52 30 11 4 2 0 
SOURCE: College Board (2013, Figure 11C). 
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Between 2001 and 2011, the total number of postsecondary stu-
dents grew by 32 percent, from 15.9 million to 21 million. Each student 
is borrowing more on average, but the growth in debt per student has 
been slower than the growth in the number of students borrowing. In 
recent years, because of rapid enrollment growth, total federal loans 
have grown about twice as fast as federal loans per student. In other 
words, it isn’t so much that students are borrowing more, it’s that more 
students are enrolling and borrowing. 
Over the decade from 1983 to 1992, about 30 percent of recent high 
school graduates enrolling immediately in college were from families 
in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution. This percentage 
increased to an average of about 32 percent from 1993 to 2002 and to 34 
percent from 2003 to 2012. The percentage of the new college students 
whose families were in the highest fifth of the income distribution fell 
from about 28 percent between 1983 and 1992 to 25 percent from 1993 
to 2002, and to 24 percent over the most recent decade.5 More analysis 
is necessary to determine the role of the changing economic circum-
stances of college students, but it seems clear that in order to understand 
borrowing patterns over time, one should consider the demographic 
characteristics of students. 
CONCLUSION 
More students today are borrowing to finance their education than 
did a generation ago or even a decade ago, and more students are bor-
rowing amounts of money that have the potential to cause them long-
term financial difficulties. But this reality does not define a broad 
“crisis.” In order to address the very real problems of students with 
unmanageable levels of education debt, it is important to focus on the 
students who are struggling, rather than on students in general. And it is 
necessary to put education debt into the context of the investment it is 
financing and the payoff of that investment. 
Among bachelor’s degree recipients, it is not students from low-
income families who accumulate the highest levels of debt. Rather, 
independent students, most of whom are older than traditional college 
age, students who attend for-profit institutions, and African American 





students are more likely than others to accumulate high levels of educa-
tion debt. These groups of students are also those least likely to earn 
four-year degrees. Instead, many earn associate’s degrees or certifi-
cates, or leave school without a credential. Focusing on these students 
and helping them to make decisions that will more likely lead to posi-
tive outcomes is more constructive than generalized panic about student 
debt. 
Much of the hand wringing about student debt stops short of pro-
posing solutions. Viable policy solutions for these particular problems 
are much more feasible than attempts to have taxpayers cover the entire 
cost of postsecondary education, or scenarios in which the cost of pro-
viding quality education plummets. 
Income-dependent repayment programs shift a signifi cant portion 
of the risk of education debt from the student to the taxpayer, protecting 
students against unforeseen circumstances. This is critical, given the 
uncertainty involved in postsecondary investments. The recent focus 
on potential improvements to these repayment programs is welcome, 
but care must be taken to balance protecting students with misdirect-
ing subsidies and creating perverse incentives. For example, lowering 
the percentage of discretionary income required from 15 percent to 10 
percent of income exceeding 150 percent of the poverty line provides 
significant savings only to borrowers with incomes high enough for 5 
percent of discretionary income to be a measurable amount. Further-
more, limiting required payments in this way and forgiving outstand-
ing debt after 20 years, when combined with the availability of federal 
loans for graduate students up to the cost of attendance, creates an unin-
tended windfall for graduate students with very high debt levels, even if 
their earnings are far above the average for the taxpayers providing the 
subsidies (see Delisle and Hope [2012]). 
Making income-dependent repayment the default option, so that 
students would not have to have an unusual amount of information, 
complete a complicated application process, or overcome a series of 
bureaucratic hurdles in order to benefit, could solve much of the student 
loan problem. Extending eligibility to students with longstanding debts 
and limiting the amount of unpaid interest allowed to accrue are also 
important components of a policy solution. 
But such a system will not be feasible if the goal is to prevent stu-
dents from bearing a reasonable share of the costs of their own educa-
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tion. The system must be carefully designed to target subsidies at stu-
dents for whom unforeseen outcomes create unmanageable difficulties. 
It must also be combined with more effective information and guidance 
in advance of student enrollment and borrowing. 
Shifting the burden of repaying loans from students to taxpayers 
does not diminish the importance of the choices students make about 
postsecondary study or the support they get to help attain their goals. 
Many of the problems students face with overborrowing could be pre-
vented if they had more effective guidance about their options and 
their chances of success. Strategies for diminishing the problems fac-
ing future students should include improved support for students—both 
academic support and assistance with complex decisions. In addition, 
reforms of the student loan system, both in terms of regulation of the 
private market and redesign of repayment systems for federal loans, 
must ameliorate the difficulties facing those who are already in unten-
able situations as well as protecting future students. 
Headline-grabbing statements about high aggregate loan debt do 
not help the students who need our attention. We should focus on the 
debt levels of individual students, improve the policies in place to pro-
tect them against circumstances beyond their control that lead to repay-
ment problems, and provide incoming students with better information 
and advice so they don’t make poor education and career decisions or 
borrow excessive amounts. 
Notes 
1. The limit on subsidized loans for dependent students is $4,500 in the second year 
and $5,500 in the third year and beyond. The total annual borrowing limit is, in 
each case, $2,000 higher. Total borrowing for dependent undergraduates may not 
exceed $23,000 in subsidized loans and $31,000 overall. Independent students 
(and dependent students whose parents are not eligible for federal parent loans) 
have the same subsidized loan limits but higher overall limits (studentaid.ed.gov/ 
types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized). 
2. Between 2001 and 2011, the gap in median earnings between full-time working 
males aged 25–34 whose highest degree was a bachelor’s degree and those with 
only a high school diploma fell from 57 percent to 56 percent. For those with a 
master’s degree or higher, the gap grew from 94 percent to 112 percent (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2014). 
3. For a discussion of the implications of the insights from behavioral economics for 
the design of the student aid system, see Baum and Schwartz (2013). 






4. Hispanic students constitute 18 percent of the students at community colleges but 
only 13 percent of all students at degree-granting institutions. In 2010, almost half 
of all Hispanic students across the country were enrolled at community colleges. 
Black students enroll in disproportionate numbers at for-profit institutions. The 
share of black students in total enrollment at for-profit institutions (29 percent) 
was nearly twice as high as the share of black students in total postsecondary 
enrollment (14 percent) in 2010 (Baum and Kurose 2013). 
5. Calculations by the author based on the National Center for Education Statistics 
(2012). 
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Measuring Student Debt 
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Studies continue to indicate that higher education is a worthwhile 
investment for individuals (Goldin and Katz 2008) and raises the pro-
ductivity of the workforce as a whole (Moretti 2004). While the ris-
ing cost of postsecondary education has not eliminated this “college
premium,” it has raised new questions about how a growing number 
of students can make these investments (Archibald and Feldman 2010; 
Dynarski and Kreisman 2013). One solution to this problem is student 
loans, which have come to play an increasingly important role in financ-
ing higher education. Yet, in spite of its importance, educational debt 
is not well understood, partly because the currently outstanding stock 
of student debt includes loans made by both government and private 
lenders, and there exist few central repositories of information on the 
characteristics and performance of all student loans. In this chapter, we 
bring a new data set to bear on this important issue and present a brief 
analysis of the historical and current levels of student debt and how 
those debts are performing. We also briefly discuss the implications of 
student loans for borrowers and the economy. 
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DATA 
Our analysis is based on data drawn from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Consumer Credit Panel (CCP), which represents a 5 per-
cent random sample of U.S. individuals with credit files as well as all 
of their household members.1 In all, the entire data set includes anony-
mous credit files on more than 15 percent of the population, or nearly 
40 million individuals. The panel includes information from the credit 
reports for those individuals for each quarter during the last 14 years, 
and we use data for this analysis through December 2012. While the 
CCP commences in 1999, irregularities in student loan reporting prior 
to 2004 suggest dropping the 1999–2003 data, and we thus begin our 
analysis in 2004. 
The sampling exploits randomness in the last two digits of individu-
als’ Social Security numbers.2 The procedure ensures that the panel is
dynamically updated in each quarter to reflect new entrants into credit 
markets. In addition, Equifax, the data provider, matches the primary 
individual’s mailing address to all records in the data to capture infor-
mation about other members of the primary individual’s household. 
While these individuals are added to the overall CCP sample, in this
chapter we focus on the 5 percent primary sample members. 
The data set includes detailed data on individual student loans and 
individual mortgage loans, such as 
• month and year the account was opened, 
• current balance and payment status, 
• origination balance, 
• whether the account is individual or joint, 
• scheduled monthly payment, 
• narrative codes giving details of the account (such as the pay-
ment is deferred), and 
• industry code indicating the type of the servicer. 
In addition, the data set includes somewhat more aggregated data on 
individuals’ other loans, including credit cards, and auto loans, such as 
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• total number of each type of account (for example, the total 
number of credit cards); 
• credit limit on each type of account (for example, the combined
credit limit on all credit cards); and 
• total balance on each type of account in each status (for exam-
ple, the total credit card balance that is current, 30-days delin-
quent, and so on). 
More general information regarding the borrower on the credit 
report includes 
• residential location of the borrower at the census block level 
and also zipcode level; 
• birth year of the borrower; 
• indicators for whether the individual has a foreclosure or bank-
ruptcy within the last 24 months, and ever, on the report; 
• indicators for whether the individual has any accounts in collec-
tion and the amount of collection; and 
• a consumer credit score that is analogous to the well-known 
FICO score. 
The data are completely anonymous and stripped of all personal 
identifiers. Unfortunately, while the vast majority of student loan ser-
vicers report to credit bureaus, these data do not distinguish between 
private and federal loans. Outside reports suggest that private loans 
account for approximately 15 percent of aggregate student debt. 
Although a number of reports have pointed to differences in the growth, 
size, and performance of private and federal loans, this limitation of our 
data will require a focus on the total student debt burden. 
GROWTH OF STUDENT DEBT 
Between 2004 and 2012, total student debt in the United States 
nearly tripled, from $364 billion in 2004 to $966 billion in 2012 
(see Figure 3.1). Expressed in annual terms, this means student debt 
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax. 
increased by an average of 14 percent per year. As of the end of 2012, 
about two-thirds of this debt is owed by borrowers under the age of 40, 
with about one-third of the total being owed by borrowers under the 
age of 30. Americans older than 40 also have student debt, but their 
share is much smaller, with 17 percent held by borrowers in their 40s, 
12 percent held by borrowers in their 50s, and the remainder held by
borrowers 60 and older. 
Among the various types of household debt, student debt is unique. 
While balances on all other forms of household debt—including 
mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, and home equity lines of credit— 
declined during and after the Great Recession, student debt has steadily 
risen, as shown in Figure 3.2 (see Brown et al. [2013] for a discussion of 
dynamics of other kinds of household debts during the 2000s). In 2010, 
student debt surpassed credit cards to become the second-largest form 
of household debt after mortgages, whereas prior to 2008, the student 
debt was the smallest of household debts. 
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax. 
What accounts for the rapid increase of the aggregate student debt 
in this period? Our research shows that increases in number of borrow-
ers and the average debt per person equally contributed to the growth 
of total student debt. Between 2004 and 2012, the number of borrow-
ers increased by 70 percent from 23 million borrowers to 39 million 
(see Figure 3.3). In the same period, average debt per borrower also 
increased by 70 percent, from about $15,000 to $25,000. 
Note, however, that there is actually a great variation in balances 
among borrowers, as shown in Figure 3.4. Of the 39 million borrowers, 
about 40 percent have balances of less than $10,000. Approximately
another 30 percent owe between $10,000 and $25,000. Only 3.7 percent 
of borrowers have balances of more than $100,000, with 0.6 percent, or 
roughly 230,000 borrowers nationwide, having more than $200,000 of 
debt. 
With respect to the rise in the number of borrowers, Figure 3.5 
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax. 
student loans: in 2004, only about 27 percent of 25-year-olds had stu-
dent debt, while eight years later, in 2012, the proportion of 25-year-
olds with student debt increased to about 43 percent. 
There are several explanations for these increases. First, more peo-
ple are attending college, adding to the number of borrowers (National 
Center for Education Statistics 2013). Second, students are staying in 
college longer and attending graduate school in greater numbers, and 
loans to finance graduate study have become more readily available 
(Gonzales, Allum, and Sowell 2013). Third, it has become cheaper for 
parents to take out student loans to help finance their children’s edu-
cation.3 Fourth, the cost of a college education has continued to grow 
sharply during the period (College Board 2013). 
If student borrowers complete their education and quickly start 
repaying their debt, then the increase in the number of borrowers and in 
the total amount of student debt would in part be offset by the outfl ow. 
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However, as we will discuss in the next section, the repayment rate on 
student loans is low. This is because many borrowers delay payments 
through continuing education, deferrals, forbearance, and income-based 
repayment plans. Some borrowers have diffi culty making required pay-
ments, become delinquent on their debt, and ultimately default, which 
for federal loans is defi ned as falling 270 days behind on payments. In
addition, discharging student debt is very difficult; the delinquent debt 
stays with the borrower, and the high rate of inflow and the low rate of 
outflow contribute to the increase in the total student debt outstanding. 
STUDENT LOAN DELINQUENCY 
Over the past eight years there has been an increase in payment 
difficulties for student loan borrowers. The most common measure of 
inability to meet the debt obligation is the proportion of borrowers 90 
days or more past due on their payments. We refer to this as the “mea-
sured delinquency rate.” 
As of the fourth quarter of 2012, about 17 percent, or 6.7 million 
borrowers, were 90 days or more delinquent on their student loan pay-
ments; see the left panel of Figure 3.6. The measured delinquency rate is 
higher among borrowers aged 30–49 than it is among younger or older 
borrowers, which is unexpected since typically younger borrowers 
have higher delinquency rates. There was a strongly increasing trend in 
delinquency between 2004 and 2012 among all age groups, with mea-
sured delinquency rising from an overall rate of less than 10 percent in 
2004 to 17 percent in 2012. 
The measured delinquency rate on student debt is currently the 
highest of any consumer debt product, although for most of the last 
decade credit card delinquency was even higher.4 Nonetheless, the 
measured delinquency rate is somewhat misleading, and the effective 
delinquency rate on student debt (as we define below) is even higher.
As noted above, in 2012 the measured delinquency rate among the 39 
million borrowers was 17 percent. But many of the remaining 83 per-
cent in fact were not paying down their loan balances. While 39 percent 
did reduce their balance from the previous quarter by at least one dollar,
14 percent of borrowers had the same balance as the previous quarter. 
































Figure 3.6  Delinquency Rates for Borrowers Overall and for Those 
in Repayment (%) 
Age<30 Age 30–49 Age 50+ All ages Age<30 Age 30–49 Age 50+ All ages 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax. 
A full 30 percent of borrowers actually saw an increase in their balance. 
In other words, 44 percent of borrowers were neither delinquent nor 
paying down their loans. 
Those borrowers whose balances did not decline are likely not yet 
in the repayment cycle, meaning that they were either still in school, 
in deferral, or in a forbearance period delaying their regular pay-
ments. This group may also include some borrowers who participate in 
income-based repayment plans and make only small payments, which 
are often insufficient to cover the accumulated interest. In order to have 
a more accurate picture of the delinquency rate, we calculate the “effec-
tive delinquency rate” by excluding this 44 percent of borrowers not 
in repayment; the result is shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 3.6. 
This effective delinquency rate is nearly double the measured delin-
quency rate, with almost one-third of borrowers in repayment being 
delinquent on their debt. Interestingly, borrowers under 30, who pre-
viously appeared to have a lower measured delinquency rate than the 
30–49 age group, are now shown to have the highest effective delin-
quency rate. The fact that fewer of these younger borrowers are in the 
repayment cycle masks high effective delinquency rates among those 
who are. 
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax. 
It is important to note that because of the unique character of stu-
dent debt, an increasing delinquency rate defi ned either way does not 
necessarily imply that a greater percentage of new borrowers are fall-
ing behind on repayment. Borrowers who became delinquent in the 
past and remain so are included in the delinquency rate. Some may 
also default, which, again, is defi ned as being more than 270 days past 
due in the case of federal loans. Because student debt is not generally
dischargeable, even in bankruptcy, the delinquency rate may continue 
to increase even when the percentage of borrowers becoming newly 
delinquent remains constant. 
We address this issue in Figure 3.7, which depicts the proportion 
of borrowers in repayment who became newly delinquent on a quar-
terly basis. Here we see that in 2005 about 6 percent of nondelinquent 
borrowers in repayment transitioned into delinquency each quarter, on 
average. By 2012, that rate had increased to 9 percent. This confirms 
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that indeed there was an increasing trend of borrowers becoming newly 
delinquent over time. 
STUDENT DEBT’S ROLE ON THE HOUSEHOLD 
BALANCE SHEET 
An advantage of our data is that they allow us to look at all the 
liabilities on each individual’s balance sheet and to put educational debt 
and delinquencies into the broader context of household debt. In this 
section, we refer to non–student loan debt as “other debt.” 
Figure 3.8 reports on other debts for borrowers aged 25–30 in 2005 
(left panel) and 2012 (right), by their levels of student debt outstand-
ing. In 2005, the average amount of other debt held by student loan 
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borrowers aged 25–30 exceeded student loan debt, which was $18,200. 
Interestingly, there was a positive association between student debt and 
other debt, such as mortgages, credit cards, and auto loans. Borrowers 
with higher student loan balances used to have more other debt com-
pared to those with lower or no student debt. After all, student debt has 
historically been an indicator that the borrower has some level of higher 
education and thus a higher permanent income, so it is perhaps unsur-
prising to see this reflected in the balances on other debts. 
Following the general trend of household deleveraging outside of 
student debt in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Brown et al. 2013), 
other debt balances declined for all borrowers between 2005 and 2012. 
But they declined much more for borrowers with student loans, so that 
student loan borrowers now have lower other debt at around $20,000, 
on average. Meanwhile, the average student debt among student loan 
borrowers increased to $26,500 for those who were between 25 and 30 
in 2012. The decline in other debt was especially visible among those 
with high levels of student debt. As a result, the previous positive asso-
ciation between student and other debts has disappeared. 
The shift we observe is an outcome of the interplay between supply 
and demand factors, and it is difficult to disentangle them. Borrowers 
with higher student loan balances may have become less confi dent about 
their future labor market and income prospects and therefore reduced 
their demand for credit. On the other hand, lenders may have become 
more conservative in supplying loans to high-balance student loan bor-
rowers. Likely, both demand and supply factors played a signifi cant role 
in the sharp reduction in the accumulation of other debt by high student 
loan borrowers. 
Brown and Caldwell (2013) discuss the implications of student debt 
and delinquencies on access to other forms of credit such as auto and 
mortgage financing. Figure 3.9 complements that analysis. In 2005, 
many young student debt borrowers, even those with a balance of more 
than $100,000, were able to finance a home purchase. The fact that more 
of these high student loan borrowers did so than those with lower or 
no student loan balances most likely refl ects differences in income and 
higher postgraduate degree attainments (including holders of profes-
sional degrees with good labor market prospects). However, the large 
homeownership gap between high, low, and no student loan borrowers
has since declined considerably. 
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax. 
Again, it is difficult to distinguish demand and supply factors, but 
it appears likely that the sharp decline in mortgage originations among 
the high student debt borrowers in part reflects a tightening of mort-
gage eligibility, for example, through maximum debt to income ratio 
requirements. Brown and Caldwell (2013) provide further evidence of 
a decline in access to credit by student loan borrowers, showing that 
while student loan borrowers aged 25 (or 30) used to have average
credit scores comparable to those without student debt, by 2012 they 
had considerably lower average credit scores. This may be attributable 
in part to the high student debt delinquency rate. 
Delinquent student loan borrowers have (perhaps not surprisingly) 
always been much less likely—or able—to borrow for a home purchase. 
There are now many more delinquent borrowers than in 2005. In light 
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of the increasing student debt burden and the growth in the delinquency 
rate, especially among young borrowers, student debt is likely to have 
an important influence on borrowers’ use of other types of credit, par-
ticularly mortgage credit. 
Figure 3.10 addresses the association between delinquencies on 
student debt and other debt. Not surprisingly, delinquent student loan 
borrowers are more likely to also be delinquent on other debts. They are 
delinquent on 17 percent of their auto loan balances, on 35 percent of 
their credit card balances, and on 28 percent of their mortgage balances, 
and these rates are much higher compared to those with no delinquent 
student debt. 













Auto loans Credit card Mortgage 
No student debt Current student debt 90+ delinquent student debt 
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CONCLUSION 
Higher education is an important investment among younger indi-
viduals to equip them for better job prospects and higher income poten-
tial, but over the last several years it has been accompanied by a growing 
student debt burden. Total student loan balances almost tripled between 
2004 and 2012, owing to increasing numbers of borrowers and higher
balances per borrower; educational debt is now the second-largest lia-
bility on household balance sheets, after mortgages. Nearly one-third of 
the borrowers in repayment are delinquent on student debt, a fact that is 
masked by the large numbers of borrowers who are in either deferment 
or grace periods. While we do not establish causality, it appears that the 
higher burden of student loans and the associated high delinquency rate 
negatively affect borrowers’ home purchases, other debt payments, and 
access to credit. 
Notes 
The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily refl ect those of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The authors are 
grateful to Brian Cadena and Raven Molloy for helpful comments. 
1. See Avery, Calen, and Canner (2003) for a detailed discussion of the contents,
sources, and quality of credit report data. 
2. See Lee and van der Klaauw (2010) for further details about the sample design and 
content of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel. 
3. “Student Loans,” accessed February 8, 2014, http://www.fi naid.org/loans/parent 
loan.phtml. 
4. See the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s quarterly report on household debt 
and credit, where delinquency rates are reported as a percentage of outstanding 
balances rather than as a percentage of borrowers. Available at http://www.new 
yorkfed.org/microeconomics/data.html (accessed February 10, 2014). 
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Within the past 21 months, there have been almost as many major 
news articles on the topic of student debt as there were in the preced-
ing 21 years.1 Headlines have trumpeted the stories of recent graduates 
with six-figure debt levels and aggregate loan balances exceeding $1 
trillion.2 A growing number of policy organizations and Web sites have 
begun to focus and compile information on student debt.3 And, perhaps 
in response, President Obama announced in August of 2013 a major 
initiative to address rising college costs.4 Despite this increased atten-
tion on debt writ large, surprisingly little is known about how student 
debt has changed for different types of students or what factors can 
explain it. 
Yet, understanding the patterns and factors underlying debt increase 
is paramount, both for ensuring that students and their families have 
a realistic, well-informed picture of college finance, and for guiding 
policymakers toward debt-amelioration strategies for those who need 
them most. Considerable focus is spent on average debt levels because 
these are easy to update frequently, but this may be misguided. The dis-
tribution of debt is so diffuse, as we show, that changes in the mean are 
not informative for most students. For example, an increase in borrow-
ing among the top 10 percent of borrowers will increase the mean and 
total accumulated debt—numbers commonly reported—but leave debt 
levels for 90 percent of students unchanged. This may seem a conve-
nient hypothetical, but it actually closely resembles how debt evolved 
for college graduates between 2000 and 2008. In short, factors that 
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influence debt for the median borrower may be quite different from 
those that influence debt for borrowers in the highest decile. The effec-
tiveness of policy proposals meant to address “rising student debt” rests 
on how they recognize these phenomena. 
In this chapter, we use the National Postsecondary Student Aid 
Study (NPSAS) to investigate the growing student debt of college grad-
uates—those earning a bachelor’s degree. Our focus on this segment 
of students is not because other groups (graduate students, students 
with subbaccalaureate degrees, students leaving without any creden-
tial) have not experienced rising debt—they have—or because they are 
unimportant. Rather, the choice is motivated by the recent media inter-
est in college graduates and the desire to limit the analysis to a manage-
able scale.5 The data cover the period between 1990 and 2008, and our 
analysis examines the entire distribution of borrowing among gradu-
ates. In addition to documenting how the distribution has changed over 
time, for all graduates and subgroups, we employ statistical decompo-
sitions to apportion the changes by various observable characteristics, 
such as demographics, attendance patterns, incomes, and costs. Nota-
bly, the decompositions allow the role of observable factors to vary at 
different points of the distribution. 
In broad terms, our major findings are that debt profi les increased 
much more in the 1990s than in the 2000s, with the largest part of this 
increase occurring in the latter part of the decade. The growth occurred 
throughout the distribution. Between 2000 and 2008, debt increases 
were concentrated almost entirely in the top quartile of the distribution 
and at private institutions, and they stemmed largely from the expan-
sion of private borrowing. About one-third of the overall increase in 
debt at graduation between 1990 and 2008 is explained by observable 
characteristics of the students and the schools they attend. Interestingly, 
we find that observables explain more of the increase at the extensive 
margin (whether a student ever borrowed) and around the median than 
they do near the top of the distribution. Of the explained share, roughly 
half can be attributed to college costs alone, although this still implies 
that costs account for a small fraction of the total increase in borrowing. 
When we look at intermediate time intervals, observables explain 
most of the increase in borrowing—between 50 and 100 percent, or 
more—from 1990 to 1996 and 2000 to 2008. While cost structure plays 
an important role, so do other factors, and again there is a greater role 
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for unexplained factors in the upper tail of the distribution. In contrast, 
observables explain practically none of the debt increase between 1996 
and 2000, and this is true throughout the entire distribution. 
We investigate several possibilities that might show up as “unex-
plained” factors in driving debt increases in the upper tail and through-
out the distribution in the late 1990s, including movement from informal 
to formal loans, redistribution of debt from parents to students, varia-
tion in interest rates, increases in federal borrowing limits, the intro-
duction of unsubsidized loans (which are not means tested), and the 
growing market for private loans. While the first four of these appear 
to be unimportant, we find suggestive evidence that the latter two may 
play a prominent role. 
We note a number of caveats to our analyses. First, we are not able 
at this time to examine the distributional changes, if any, that occurred 
as a result of the Great Recession starting in December 2007.6 As docu-
mented by the College Board (2012a), aggregate borrowing increased 
significantly during and after this recession. A second caveat is that the 
NPSAS data contain information only on current and graduating stu-
dents. As such, they do not contain data on postgraduation labor market 
experiences or repayment information, and our chapter cannot consider 
these important outcomes. Third, while the data are quite rich in detail, 
they do not contain information on previous institutions attended (and 
the net costs thereof), so differences across students (and over time) in 
transfer behavior are not captured in the analysis. Finally, the data do 
not fully document alternative loan sources, including informal loans 
from friends and family or borrowing against existing assets. Nonethe-
less, our chapter is the first to investigate distributional changes in bor-
rowing over time and link these to changing characteristics of student 
attendance. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
data source and presents descriptive statistics and distributions from 
it. We then review the decomposition methods that are used to explain 
the reasons behind borrowing trends. The results of those decomposi-
tions are then presented, followed by a discussion of possible factors 
that could account for the unexplained portion of the decompositions. 
Finally, we offer concluding remarks. Two appendices to the chapter 
describe the data processing in detail and provide an overview of the 
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market for student borrowing, including the structure of terms and bor-
rowing limits, from approximately 1980 through today. 
THE NPSAS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The NPSAS is an approximately quadrennial survey of students 
attending Title IV institutions (those eligible for federal aid) that is con-
ducted by the National Center for Education Statistics. The nationally 
representative cross-sectional survey is designed specifically to gather 
information on how different students pay for higher education.7 It pro-
vides student-level information on financial aid provided by the federal 
government, the states, postsecondary institutions, employers, and pri-
vate agencies, along with student demographics and enrollment char-
acteristics. The restricted-use version we employ has incredibly rich 
detail, including administrative data on student financial aid programs 
merged from both the Free Application for Federal Student Aid and the 
National Student Loan Data System, the central database for all fed-
eral loans. Extensive data about family circumstances, demographics, 
education and work experiences, and student expectations are collected 
from students through an interview. 
The survey waves are reasonably consistent over time, which is 
important for our analyses of the debt burdens of graduating seniors 
from five waves: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 (the most recent 
available).8 The richness of the data is important because our goals 
are to understand why student debt is growing and for whom. Having 
cross-sections with large sample sizes and spanning almost two decades 
allows us to examine the growth in student debt over the entire distribu-
tion of college graduates. This allows far more nuanced analyses than 
are possible by examining means or population totals. (More informa-
tion about the NPSAS and how we process the data for analysis can be 
found in Appendix 4A.) 
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DESCRIPTIVE MEASURES 
Table 4.1 summarizes changes in the distribution of student bor-
rowing at graduation. There were substantial increases over the last two 
decades in both the rate of borrowing for bachelor’s degree earners and 
in the real levels of borrowing. Between 1990 and 2008, the fraction 
of graduates who borrowed increased by 13 percentage points, from 
about 55 percent to over 68 percent, with the sharpest increase occur-
ring between 1996 and 2000. 
The next panel of the table lists quantiles of borrowing for all gradu-
ates, including those who did not borrow at all, in constant dollars. Mean 
levels have more than doubled over the 18-year horizon, with more 
than $5,000 of the total $10,000 increase coming between the classes of 
1996 and 2000. Since 2000, however, average debt has increased more 
modestly. This trend of rapid debt increase over the 1990s and milder 
increases over the 2000s is apparent through at least the 75th percentile. 
Only in the extreme right tail, above the 95th percentile, has borrowing 
continued to grow as quickly as it did in the 1990s. 
The last panel shows that, among borrowers, the median level of 
borrowing more than doubled between 1990 and 2000, from about 
$10,400 to just under $22,000. However, that level remained stable 
between 2000 and 2008. On the other hand, the mean level of borrow-
ing increased between 2000 and 2008 as the individuals in the upper 
tail of the borrowing distribution significantly increased their levels of 
borrowing. Even so, while there have been media suggestions of indi-
viduals graduating with six-figure levels of debt, these data suggest that 
such instances are quite rare, as the 99th percentile of borrowers did not 
reach that level of borrowing in any of the waves (see also Kantrowitz 
[2012]). 
Table 4.1 thus illustrates two facts that are not well known in either 
the academic or popular press. First, debt at graduation increased much 
faster between 1990 and 2000 than it did during 2000 and 2008, and 
this was true throughout the distribution. Second, the increase in bor-
rowing in the later period was entirely concentrated in the top quartile; 
the bottom 75 percent of graduates of the class of 2008 had roughly the 
same debt as the classes of 2000 and 2004. These facts can perhaps be 
more directly seen in Figure 4.1, which displays the cumulative bor-





58 Hershbein and Hollenbeck 
Table 4.1  Cumulative Borrowing Statistics from NPSAS, by Wave 
1990 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Ever borrow 0.545 0.526 0.636 0.656 0.682 
Total borrowing ($000s) 
Mean 7.2 9.2 14.4 14.8 17.2 
25th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Median 1.9 2.5 10.9 11.6 13.1 
75th 11.4 17.7 24.5 23.8 26.6 
90th 20.8 25.4 34.8 36.4 42.5 
95th 27.3 30.8 42.5 47.7 52.1 
99th 48.1 44.9 60.6 65.6 85.0 
Total borrowing among 
borrowers ($000s) 
Mean 13.2 17.6 22.6 22.6 25.2 
10th 2.4 5.4 5.6 6.0 5.9 
25th 4.8 9.7 12.9 11.9 12.4 
Median 10.4 17.0 21.8 20.4 21.3 
75th 18.0 23.6 29.3 29.8 33.1 
90th 25.7 30.2 38.8 42.6 47.8 
95th 32.1 35.1 49.0 51.6 56.0 
99th 64.2 51.6 64.5 72.7 90.3 
NOTE: Statistics use population weights (of late 2013 vintage) and are for domestic 
students in the year indicated. Monetary amounts are inflated to year 2012 dollars 
using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) index from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and excludes 
loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
rowing distributions of graduates from each wave of the NPSAS in con-
stant dollars. The remainder of this chapter seeks to gain understanding 
of the factors that shifted the borrowing distribution so dramatically 
between 1990 and 2000, and the factors that shifted the upper tail of the 
distribution between 2000 and 2008. 
Our first analysis is entirely descriptive and is meant to isolate 
changes in debt among certain subgroups. We examine four of these: 
1) dependent versus independent students; 2) public versus private, 
not-for-profit institutions; 3) graduates who took four or fewer years 
to degree versus those who took five or more years; and, 4) for depen-
dent students, those whose family income is above versus below the 
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NOTE: All calculations use sample weights, are in constant (year 2012) dollars, and 
include student-level borrowing from all sources except informal loans from friends 
and family. 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
median.9 Figure 4.2 displays the cumulative borrowing distributions for 
dependent and independent students. As would be expected, the pro-
portion of dependent students with loans is smaller than the propor-
tion of independent students with loans, and the levels of borrowing are 
much smaller for dependent students in all years of the data. While the 
distributions for dependent students are qualitatively quite similar to 
the overall distributions (Figure 4.1), the distributions for independent 
students show a relatively smooth, monotonically increasing pattern 
over time. That is, each wave’s distribution (fi rst-order) stochastically 
dominates the preceding wave, which is not at all true for dependent 
students, whose debt profile in 2004 is smaller than in 2000 for the 
middle segment of the distribution. Nonetheless, both graphs show sub-
stantially larger increases in debt over the 1990s than over the 2000s. 
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SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
Figure 4.3 shows the comparison between public schools and pri-
vate, not-for-profits. It is not surprising that both the propensity to ever 
borrow and borrowing levels are greater in all time periods at the lat-
ter institutions. What is less well known is the remarkable similarity 
in the debt profiles at publics across the 2000, 2004, and 2008 waves. 
Aside from a slight increase between 2004 and 2008 in the upper tail, 
balanced by a modest decrease between 2000 and 2004 in the middle, 
the distributions almost lie on top of one another. Although much has 
been made of the decline in state-level appropriations to public univer-
sities during the Great Recession (Lewin 2013), these appropriations 
had actually fallen by about 15 percent per full-time equivalent student 
between 2000 and 2004, and they still remained below 2000 levels at 
the start of the recession (College Board 2012b, Figure 12B; Quinterno 
and Orozco 2012, Figure 6). Despite these reductions (and concomitant 
tuition increases), debt of graduating students changed little, especially 
relative to the large increases over the 1990s. On the other hand, while 
debt also increased little over the 2000s for the bottom 60 percent at 
privates, it increased substantially for the top 40 percent, with the size 
of increase rising with the distribution quantile. Above the 80th percen-
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Figure 4.3  Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate 
Subgroups, Sector
































SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
tile, the debt increase between 2000 and 2008 was comparable to that 
between 1990 and 2000. 
Turning to Figure 4.4, we look at debt distributions by time to 
degree, although data limitations restrict the analysis to the 1996 and 
later waves. Students who take longer to finish accumulate more debt, 
almost mechanically, and as in the previous groups, debt increases 
faster between 1996 and 2000 than it does over the following eight 
years. However, for students who graduate on time, debt actually fell
between 2000 and 2008 through the 80th percentile while rising, often 
considerably, above that quantile. Among the students who took longer, 
debt increased modestly but monotonically throughout the distribution. 
Finally, we compare dependent bachelor’s degree recipients by 
family income in Figure 4.5. In general, borrowing levels are not that 
dissimilar across the income groups; although students from wealthier 
families have more resources, they also tend to graduate from more 
expensive schools. The standard pattern of fast debt increases during 
the 1990s is present here, but the most striking trend is that this increase 
is mostly concentrated between 1990 and 1996 for the lower-income 
group and (more than) entirely concentrated between 1996 and 2000 
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Figure 4.4  Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate 
Subgroups, Time to Degree 


































SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
Figure 4.5  Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate 
Subgroups, Income of Dependents

































SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
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for the upper-income group. A related point is that for the latter time 
period the borrowing rate increased only mildly for the poorer students; 
however, it increased by 25 percentage points, from 30 percent to 55 
percent, for wealthier students. Taken together, these trends imply that 
changing factors between 1996 and 2000 had a disproportionate impact 
on student borrowers whose family incomes were above the median 
and affected borrowing at all levels, not just the top. 
A few themes from these comparisons stand out. First, the large 
increase in debt that occurred throughout the distribution between 
1990 and 2000 (Figure 4.1) is common to all the subgroups examined, 
suggesting that behavioral or policy differences, and not composition 
effects, are more likely to be the prime suspect. Second, “traditional” 
graduates (dependents who finish on time) experienced debt increases 
over the 2000s only in the top portion of the distribution, while “nontra-
ditional” students’ debt increases were more uniform. 
The next section describes the decomposition methods we employ 
to systematically unpack changes in the empirical distributions. 
DECOMPOSITION TECHNIQUES 
To examine the factors behind increases in borrowing, we employ 
three different econometric decomposition techniques: 1) Oaxaca-
Blinder, 2) semiparametric reweighting, and 3) recentered influence 
functions. While the first of these techniques is common in the litera-
ture, it is not suitable for decomposing statistics other than the mean. 
The second and third techniques, while not as well known, allow for the 
decomposition of the entire distribution of borrowing. Below we briefly 
describe each of these techniques, including strengths and weaknesses. 
Oaxaca-Blinder 
This technique, independently published by Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973), linearly decomposes the average difference in outcomes 
across groups into differences in observable characteristics and differ-
ences in structural factors. Formally, let Yi=Xi βi+ εi for i = A,B. Then 
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(4.1)     
 
The left-hand term represents the average difference between groups A
and B. The first term in braces on the right shows the difference in aver-
age observables between the groups, multiplied by a common or refer-
ence coeffi cient vector, β. Since Xi is observable for both groups, this 
component is considered to be what is “explained” by observables. The 
second term in braces is the difference between the group-specifi c coef-
ficient vector and the reference coefficient vector, scaled by the observ-
ables, for both groups. Since deviations from the reference coefficient 
are generally not known, this component is considered to be structural 
or “unexplained.”10 It is common in many economic applications (nota-
bly, wage discrimination) to set the reference coefficient β* to the esti-
mates of either βB or βA. In this case, one of the terms in the second pair 
of braces drops out, and the “unexplained” portion is the (scaled) devia-
tion of one group’s estimated coefficient vector from the other’s.11 In 
other cases, the reference coefficient is set to a weighted average of βA 
and βB, in which the weights depend on the application (see Jann [2008] 
for an overview). 
In practice, Oaxaca-Blinder (O-B) decomposition is straightfor-
ward to implement. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are per-
formed on groups A and B, separately, and Equation (4.1) is calculated 
using estimates of βA and βB from these regressions. The technique thus 
permits detailed decompositions that allow the contribution from each 
element of Xi (or β) to be estimated, as well as their sum. It is worth 
noting, however, that the εi terms cancel out as a result of the expecta-
tions operator (and the standard OLS assumptions). For this reason, 
O-B decomposition is valid only for the conditional mean function. 
In this chapter, we use the O-B decomposition to investigate 
changes in the extensive margin of having ever borrowed at the time 
of college graduation as well as mean borrowing levels. Our choice of 
reference coefficients is the set from the earlier time period in the com-
parison, although we consider the sensitivity of our results to other sets 
of base coefficients. 
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Semiparametric Reweighting 
Proposed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) in their analysis 
of changes in the wage distribution, this technique reweights observa-
tions from one group so that the joint distributions of the Xi are simi-
lar for both groups. By dealing with the joint distributions of the Xi , 
this reweighting technique overcomes the linearity restriction of O-B 
and allows the construction of a counterfactual distribution, not just the 
counterfactual mean. Thus, quantiles and other distributional statistics 
such as variances or Gini coefficients can be compared.12 
Semiparametric reweighting is implemented by performing a logit 
or probit regression on the pooled sample, with the dependent variable 
being equal to one if an observation is in group A and equal to zero 
if it is in group B.13 The right-hand-side variables include all the ele-
ments of X, and in some cases interaction terms as well. Fitted values, p̂,
from this regression are used to construct propensity weights, 
 
, for 
group B; weights for group A are set equal to one. If data are sample 
weighted, the propensity weights can be multiplied by the sampling 
weights to create composite weights. Distributional statistics for the 
two groups can be compared by using these composite weights for each 
group. 
We employ this approach to compare the cumulative distributions 
of borrowing across time periods while controlling for the joint distribu-
tion of observables. However, a shortcoming of the reweighting is that 
it does not easily allow attribution to a specific (marginal) component of 
X. While it is possible to perform the reweighting multiple times, leav-
ing out one element of X each time, to isolate the contribution of that 
particular X element on the borrowing distribution, doing so is some-
what cumbersome and tedious for a nontrivially dimensioned vector of 
X. This drawback motivates the third decomposition technique. 
Recentered Infl uence Functions 
This technique, suggested by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009), is 
an extension of O-B for statistics beyond the mean, particularly uncon-
ditional quantiles. For any quantile q, define the recentered influence 
function (RIF) as 
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where Yq is the value of Y at quantile q, f(Yq) is the density of Y at q
and needs to be estimated, and 1(Y ≤ Yq) is an indicator function that 
equals one if, for a given observation, Y is less than or equal to Yq and 
zero otherwise. Note that RIFq takes on only two values determined by 
whether Y exceeds Yq. The RIF has the interesting property that E[RIFq] 
= Yq.14 Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) show that performing O-B on 
the RIF can recover decompositions at the unconditional quantiles of Y. 
While it is easy to estimate Yq in a sample, it is more challenging 
to estimate f(Yq). The density is commonly estimated using kernel den-
sity methods, and these are somewhat sensitive to bandwidth choices, 
particularly for distributions, like those for cumulative borrowing, that 
are not unimodal and roughly symmetric. On the other hand, the simi-
larity to O-B allows the marginal contribution of specific elements of 
X to be analyzed much more easily than in the case of semiparametric 
reweighting. 
The Observables 
The usefulness of each of the decomposition methods depends on 
the set of observed variables. Fortunately, the NPSAS data are espe-
cially rich. In addition to core demographics such as age, dependency 
status, sex, ethnicity, and marital status, the set of controls include par-
ents’ education, the student’s state of permanent residence, the region 
of the school, whether the student is in state, whether attendance is full 
or part time and full or part year, the type of institution attended, a set of 
majors, and whether the student changed schools during the last year.15 
In addition to these variables, all of which are binary or categorical, 
we include a quartic in expected family contribution (EFC) interacted 
with dependency status, a quartic in list tuition (or cost of attendance), 
a quartic in grants, and full interactions of the cost and grant measures.16 
We have chosen to include costs and grants with interactions separately, 
instead of a simple polynomial in net cost (e.g., tuition less grants) 
because the former approach is more flexible and allows behavioral 
considerations (such as a response to nominal instead of net prices) 
while still nesting the more traditional assumption of net cost.17 
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Despite this detail, the data are not quite ideal. The cross-sectional 
design of NPSAS limits what is observed about attendance history. 
While it would be useful to know the cost, financial-aid structure, and 
attendance intensity for all years before graduation, we see only the 
final year and must use these data as a proxy for the entire undergradu-
ate experience. Subject to this caveat, summary statistics of these vari-
ables, by wave, are presented in Appendix Tables 4C.1 (for continuous 
measures) and 4C.2 (for categorical measures). We will often refer back 
to these measures in our discussion of the decomposition results. 
DECOMPOSITION RESULTS 
Oaxaca-Blinder and Ever Borrowed 
We first seek to explain the sharp increase in the propensity of hav-
ing ever borrowed that occurred between 1996 and 2000. As this is 
a binary outcome, and we are interested in the mean change, we use 
Oaxaca-Blinder and focus across different time intervals that span the 
borrowing spike. In each of the time intervals, the reference coefficients 
are set equal to those from the earlier period. The composition effects 
thus capture changes in the joint means of the observables, assuming 
that the relationship between the observables and borrowing was the 
same in the later period as it was in the earlier period. This implies that 
decompositions with different starting periods are not strictly compa-
rable, but they may still be informative. For ease of presentation, we 
group the observable variables into seven more aggregate categories: 
1) age and dependency status; 2) sex, marital status, and ethnicity; 
3) both parents’ education level (including missing); 4) state of perma-
nent residence, region of school, and in-state status; 5) institutional sec-
tor, attendance intensity, and major; 6) EFC; and 7) tuition and grants 
and interactions.18 The first panel of Table 4.2A looks at the 1990–2000 
time period, during which the borrowing rate increased by 9 percentage 
points. The decomposition shows that about 4 percentage points (45 
percent) of the increase was due to observable factors, with most of the 
effect concentrated in EFC (the mean of which fell in this time period) 
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Table 4.2A  Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions of Ever Borrowed, Using Tuition 
1990–2000 1990–2008 1996–2000 1996–2008 
Mean difference (percentage points) 9.03 (1.40) 13.64 (1.42) 10.99 (2.02) 15.60 (2.05) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.27 (0.33) −0.81 (0.44) −0.09 (0.39) 1.12 (0.79) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.86 (0.49) 0.99 (0.55) 0.85 (0.52) 1.27 (0.65) 
Parental education −0.42 (0.30) −0.43 (0.46) 0.98 (0.69) 1.31 (0.93) 
Location, in-state status −1.01 (0.67) −1.75 (0.66) 0.41 (0.83) 0.49 (0.87) 
School sector, attendance, major −0.01 (1.99) 0.68 (1.09) 1.75 (0.69) 0.86 (1.05) 
Expected family contribution 1.09 (0.28) 0.64 (0.41) −1.08 (0.84) −2.44 (1.15) 
Tuition and grants 3.40 (1.81) 6.75 (1.98) −0.73 (1.33) 2.30 (1.92) 
Total 4.05 (1.51) 6.08 (2.38) 2.07 (2.16) 4.91 (2.96) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 3.07 (1.57) 5.77 (1.59) −0.08 (2.54) 0.33 (2.65) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −4.04 (4.58) −5.43 (4.31) 11.94 (5.59) 10.25 (5.10) 
Parental education 1.51 (1.34) 0.36 (1.09) 1.13 (1.97) −0.37 (1.59) 
Location, in-state status 1.72 (2.05) 1.55 (2.15) −1.77 (2.95) −2.76 (3.03) 
School sector, attendance, major −1.94 (11.85) −2.01 (10.65) −5.92 (6.25) −4.28 (5.73) 
Expected family contribution −6.33 (2.34) −1.65 (2.12) 9.90 (3.53) 15.49 (3.14) 
Tuition and grants 0.90 (5.41) −2.20 (6.25) −4.20 (8.18) −6.99 (9.60) 
Constant 10.08 (14.51) 11.16 (14.40) −2.07 (11.54) −0.99 (11.44) 
Total 4.98 (1.57) 7.55 (2.24) 8.93 (2.02) 10.69 (2.68) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are based on coefficients from the 
base period reference and are estimated via OLS (with sample weights). Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and intracollege 
correlation are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS 
Loans). Results change trivially if time to degree is included for the latter two panels. 
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Table 4.2B  Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions of Ever Borrowed, Using Cost of Attendance
1990–2000 
1990–2008 1996–2000 1996–2008 
Mean difference (%-points) 9.03 (1.41) 13.64 (1.43) 10.99 (2.02) 15.60 (2.05) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.28 (0.32) −0.76 (0.43) −0.15 (0.39) 1.12 (0.78) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.91 (0.49) 1.11 (0.55) 0.87 (0.50) 1.29 (0.65) 
Parental education −0.41 (0.30) −0.50 (0.46) 0.90 (0.67) 1.18 (0.91) 
Location, in-state status −1.02 (0.68) −1.81 (0.66) 0.48 (0.86) 0.50 (0.90) 
School sector, attendance, major −0.51 (0.72) 0.32 (0.82) 1.75 (0.67) 0.81 (1.05) 
Expected family contribution 1.18 (0.30) 0.77 (0.43) −1.08 (0.86) −2.51 (1.16) 
Attendance cost and grants 4.14 (0.94) 8.21 (1.34) 0.50 (1.53) 4.36 (1.86) 
Total 4.57 (1.44) 7.34 (1.93) 3.27 (2.26) 6.75 (2.94) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 3.12 (1.57) 5.56 (1.60) −0.43 (2.57) −0.30 (2.67) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −4.94 (4.61) −6.80 (4.30) 12.78 (5.59) 10.69 (5.14) 
Parental education 1.25 (1.33) 0.25 (1.08) 0.84 (1.98) −0.53 (1.61) 
Location, in-state status 1.22 (2.05) 1.85 (2.21) −1.51 (3.00) −1.69 (3.09) 
School sector, attendance, major −1.34 (3.91) −2.99 (3.69) −6.68 (6.15) −6.57 (5.76) 
Expected family contribution −7.37 (2.33) −2.98 (2.12) 9.15 (3.50) 14.55 (3.12) 
Attendance cost and grants −22.89 (9.03) −3.57 (10.88) −0.31 (13.41) 19.22 (15.59) 
Constant 35.42 (10.88) 14.99 (11.93) −6.11 (15.16) −26.54 (16.99) 
Total 4.47 (1.54) 6.30 (1.82) 7.73 (2.11) 8.88 (2.60) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are based on coefficients from the 
base period reference and are estimated via OLS (with sample weights). Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and intracollege 
correlation are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS 
Loans). Results change trivially if time to degree is included for the latter two panels. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS. 
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to changes in the coefficients relating the observables to the outcome, 
but the factor-specific estimates are too imprecise to isolate changes in 
marginal relationships. When examining the longer interval from 1990 
to 2008, again 45 percent of the increase is explained, with a slightly 
greater role for tuition.19 
The next two panels use 1996 as the base year. While there are 
slightly larger increases in the percentage borrowing relative to the 
1990 base year, the share of the increases attributable to the covariates 
was smaller, between 20 and 30 percent. Furthermore, the explanatory 
share in this horizon did not load so heavily on costs but was more 
diffuse. On the other hand, the estimates on the coefficients for EFC 
are quite large and statistically significant, suggesting that for a given 
ability to pay, students were becoming more likely to borrow. However, 
because the 1996 sample size is relatively small (see Appendix Table 
4C.5), these coefficient estimates are less reliable, and we treat them 
cautiously. 
Table 4.2B shows that if we use the broader cost of attendance mea-
sure instead of tuition (but leave other variables the same), the picture 
is similar. A slightly larger share is accounted for by the observables— 
between 50 and 55 percent for the 1990 base, and 30 and 40 percent 
for the 1996 base—suggesting that increases in nontuition expenses 
also increased borrowing. In summary, roughly half of the long-term 
increase in the borrowing rate was due to observable factors, with cost 
increases explaining the lion’s share. This leaves a substantial frac-
tion due to structural changes, and more so if 1996 is used as the base 
instead. Note that this pattern is consistent with the large increases in 
the debt profile between 1996 and 2000. The behavioral explanation for 
this trend is a topic to which we will return. 
Semiparametric Decompositions of the Distributions 
What would the cumulative distribution of borrowing in 2008 look 
like if the distribution of covariates were the same as it was in 1990? 
Figure 4.6 answers this question by plotting the cumulative distribution 
functions (CDFs) from 1990 and 2008 (as in Figure 4.1) against just 
such a counterfactual distribution. Reweighting the 2008 distribution 
shows that just over half of the increased propensity to borrow (the 
change in density at zero) can be explained by changes in the covari-
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Figure 4.6  Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among 
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NOTE: The DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (DFL, 1996) reweighting procedure is used 
to create a counterfactual distribution for 2008, assuming the distribution of covariates 
was the same as in 1990. (See text for the set of covariates used for reweighting.) All cal-
culations use sample weights, are in constant (year 2012) dollars, and include student-
level borrowing from all sources except informal loans from friends and family. 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
ates—very similar to the Oaxaca-Blinder findings despite a quite differ-
ent methodology. Moving up the distribution, changes in observables 
explain approximately half of borrowing levels up to the median, but 
they become less and less relevant in the higher quantiles. This result 
is not entirely unexpected: changes in borrowing limits, both federal 
and private (see Appendix 4B), are not included in the set of covari-
ates, since they vary only over time and not in the cross-section, but we 
would anticipate that their effect would be concentrated heavily in the 
upper tail of the distribution. 
The four panels of Figure 4.7 use the same reweighting approach 
across shorter time intervals. By looking at different time horizons, 
it is possible to locate when, and where in the distribution, structural 
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changes were more important in affecting borrowing than covariates. 
The top left panel reweights the covariate distribution in 1996 to resem-
ble the distribution in 1990. Interestingly, the counterfactual shows a 
much larger reduction in borrowing rates than actually took place, indi-
cating that structural or policy changes increased the fraction of gradu-
ates who borrowed.20 For levels, the counterfactual for 1996 generally 
gets more than halfway to the 1990 distribution between the 60th and 
90th percentiles, and it is basically identical to the 1990 distribution for 
the top decile. Observables clearly explain the bulk of the debt increase 
between 1990 and 1996, and we will subsequently analyze which 
observables were important to this change. 
In contrast, the top right panel of Figure 4.7 illustrates a negli-
gible role for observables between 1996 and 2000. Virtually all the 
debt increase throughout the entire distribution is due to unexplained 
or structural factors. Consistent with the Oaxaca-Blinder analysis, the 
importance for behavioral changes is much greater in the late 1990s 
than earlier that decade.21 In fact, the bottom left panel, looking at 
changes between 1990 and 2000, is almost a composite of the previous 
two panels, with the counterfactual distribution approaching the half-
way point between the actual 1990 and 2000 distributions through the 
50th percentile, and roughly a quarter of the way from the 2000 to 1990 
distribution at higher quantiles. In some ways, this is reassuring, as it 
suggests that the earlier results are not just due to small sample issues 
in the 1996 wave. The last panel focuses on the change between 2000 
and 2008, when debt profiles increased relatively little. Here, reweight-
ing the covariates accounts for all the change up to the 80th percentile, 
about half of the change between the 80th and 90th percentiles, and 
almost none in the top decile. 
From these decompositions, it appears that changes in observables 
were responsible for much of the observed shifts in borrowing between 
1990 and 1996 and again from 2000 to 2008. The exceptions are that 
observables overexplain the lower tail in the early 1990s and underex-
plain the upper tail in the 2000s. Moreover, observables seem to have 
no explanatory power during the late 1990s. What policy or behavioral 
explanations fit with these patterns is a topic we return to in the next 
section. Before that, however, we turn to recentered influence function 
decompositions in order to gauge which set of observables mattered 
most. 
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Figure 4.7  Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among 
College Graduates, DFL Counterfactuals 
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NOTE: The DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (DFL, 1996) reweighting procedure is used 
to create a counterfactual distribution for 2008, assuming the distribution of covariates 
was the same as in 1990. (See Figure 4.6 for the set of covariates used for reweight-
ing.) All calculations use sample weights, are in constant (year 2012) dollars, and 
include student-level borrowing from all sources except informal loans from friends 
and family. 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
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Recentered Influence Function Decompositions 
While the reweighting-based decompositions give a useful graphi-
cal overview, the RIF method allows for a greater level of detail of the 
importance of specific factors. Table 4.3A presents the decompositions 
over the 1990–2008 period for four statistics: the mean level of borrow-
ing (which uses the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition), and the 50th, 75th, 
and 90th percentiles of the distributions of debt. Of the mean difference 
in borrowing levels of $9,940, only $1,940—or about 20 percent—is 
explained, a result quite consistent with Figure 4.6. Although the larg-
est component is due to cost structure, the coefficient is imprecise.22 
Smaller, but more precise, effects are due to changes in EFC and atten-
dance patterns.23 
At the median and 75th percentile, about one-third of the borrowing 
increase is explained, which is somewhat less than in Figure 4.6 for the 
median and somewhat more for the higher quantile, but not statistically 
different in either case. At both quantiles, the factors that were impor-
tant at the mean are still relevant, as well as a slight role for age due 
to graduates being more likely to finish in their mid- to late 20s. At the 
90th percentile, observables explain essentially nothing, as before, and 
this appears to be due to the coefficient on cost structure turning nega-
tive and canceling out the mostly positive effects from other factors. 
Table 4.3B repeats the analysis using the broader cost of attendance 
measure. The results are similar except for a slightly greater share 
explained by observables, and this is entirely due to a higher loading on 
cost structure (which is now statistically significant). Nontuition costs 
such as room and board matter, particularly in the top decile, where the 
coefficient is now positive and nearly 30 percent of the increase in bor-
rowing is now explained. 
Looking at the bigger picture, between 30 and 40 percent of the 
debt increase between 1990 and 2008 at both the median and 75th per-
centiles is explained by observables, and half of this share (15–20 per-
cent of the total increase) is due to changes in the cost structure alone 
(mostly tuition). At the top decile of borrowing, changes in the tuition 
and grant structure led to students borrowing less, but this reverses once 
nontuition expenses are accounted for.24 A small share, between 5 and 7 
percent, of the overall rise in borrowing is due to the increased financial 
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Table 4.3A  Recentered Influence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2008, Using Tuition 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 9.94 (0.27) 11.17 (0.48) 15.19 (0.54) 21.66 (0.53) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.16 (0.08) 0.42 (0.14) 0.54 (0.17) 0.21 (0.18) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.11 (0.11) 0.18 (0.14) 0.14 (0.23) −0.11 (0.25) 
Parental education 0.02 (0.10) 0.08 (0.11) 0.27 (0.20) 0.14 (0.20) 
Location, in-state status −0.14 (0.13) −0.37 (0.30) −0.18 (0.61) 0.00 (0.63) 
School sector, attendance, major 0.63 (0.21) 0.96 (0.54) 0.96 (0.83) 1.65 (1.11) 
Expected family contribution 0.26 (0.08) 0.67 (0.22) 1.08 (0.21) 1.28 (0.26) 
Attendance cost and grants 1.23 (0.83) 1.32 (1.07) 2.67 (2.03) −4.06 (2.82) 
Total 1.94 (0.86) 3.26 (1.48) 5.48 (2.32) −0.89 (2.75) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.23 (0.45) 0.85 (0.79) −1.38 (0.83) −2.86 (1.00) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −1.39 (1.00) −2.75 (1.40) −2.95 (2.11) −3.97 (2.09) 
Parental education 0.06 (0.25) 0.18 (0.34) −0.68 (0.44) −0.29 (0.46) 
Location, in-state status −0.40 (0.85) −0.63 (0.71) −0.13 (1.15) −0.32 (1.45) 
School sector, attendance, major 0.75 (1.47) −2.55 (3.31) 0.98 (2.23) 1.45 (2.86) 
Expected family contribution −0.27 (0.54) −1.42 (0.67) 0.99 (0.81) 2.89 (1.10) 
Attendance cost and grants 4.57 (1.60) 8.51 (3.51) 2.74 (3.19) 9.40 (3.97) 
Constant 4.89 (2.48) 5.72 (5.34) 10.15 (4.20) 16.26 (5.69) 
Total 8.01 (0.91) 7.91 (1.76) 9.71 (2.35) 22.55 (2.78) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered influence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefficients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 
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Table 4.3B  Recentered Influence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2008, Using Cost of Attendance 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 9.94 (0.27) 11.17 (0.48) 15.19 (0.54) 21.66 (0.53) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.14 (0.07) 0.41 (0.14) 0.46 (0.16) 0.13 (0.17) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.15 (0.10) 0.18 (0.13) 0.14 (0.24) −0.16 (0.26) 
Parental education 0.02 (0.10) 0.08 (0.11) 0.29 (0.20) 0.17 (0.21) 
Location, in-state status −0.17 (0.13) −0.32 (0.29) −0.30 (0.60) −0.04 (0.62) 
School sector, attendance, major 0.66 (0.19) 0.96 (0.52) 0.61 (0.79) 1.25 (1.06) 
Expected family contribution 0.28 (0.08) 0.61 (0.21) 1.00 (0.21) 1.14 (0.26) 
Attendance cost and grants 1.76 (0.35) 2.11 (0.98) 3.71 (1.40) 3.83 (1.93) 
Total 2.55 (0.43) 4.03 (1.39) 5.91 (1.78) 6.32 (2.24) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.24 (0.45) 1.07 (0.71) −1.69 (0.80) −3.29 (0.97) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −2.28 (1.06) −3.26 (1.50) −4.39 (2.20) −5.71 (2.28) 
Parental education 0.02 (0.25) 0.16 (0.33) −0.79 (0.44) −0.39 (0.47) 
Location, in-state status −0.31 (0.88) −0.37 (0.68) 0.03 (1.13) −0.31 (1.44) 
School sector, attendance, major −1.29 (1.08) −2.79 (1.09) −2.03 (2.08) −2.08 (2.65) 
Expected family contribution −0.87 (0.54) −2.63 (0.67) −0.02 (0.83) 1.93 (1.19) 
Attendance cost and grants 11.52 (2.60) 20.82 (5.33) 12.22 (4.65) 5.46 (5.43) 
Constant 0.84 (3.15) −5.85 (4.51) 5.96 (5.33) 19.73 (7.22) 
Total 7.39 (0.46) 7.15 (1.68) 9.28 (1.79) 15.34 (2.33) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered influence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefficients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS. 
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of independent students. This apparent paradox results from fewer 
dependent students qualifying for need-based grant aid and more inde-
pendent students not having sufficient outside income to pay for col-
lege expenses. In all cases, a large share remains unexplained, with the 
largest change in coefficients loading on cost structure. That is, not only 
did costs rise, but for a given set of costs and grants, students borrowed 
more than they did in the past, conditional on the other observables.25 
We now break down the decompositions by time period, looking 
at the 1990s and 2000–2008 periods separately. For the former, a quick 
glance reveals that, as in the reweighting-based decomposition, observ-
ables explain quite little (less than 15 percent) of the debt increase over 
the 1990s, and this is true throughout the distribution and whether the 
tuition (Table 4.4A) or cost of attendance measure (Table 4.4B) is used. 
The reduction in explanatory power relative to that of the longer period 
stems from the smaller load on cost changes, which is now negligible. 
This pattern is consistent with relatively small increases in both list 
tuition and cost of attendance in this time frame (Table 4C.1). While 
structural (coefficient) effects on costs are generally still present, the 
coefficients representing the constant term, which likely capture omit-
ted variables such as policy reforms, are quite large and statistically 
significant, especially in upper quantiles. 
Before turning to the 2000s, it is helpful to look at the 1990s more 
granularly, as the reweighting decompositions showed substantial dif-
ferences in the role of observables between the two. Appendix Tables 
4C.3A–4C.4B examine the 1990–1996 and 1996–2000 periods sepa-
rately. Reassuringly, the RIF estimates are quite consistent with the 
reweighting decompositions, down to overexplaining the increase in 
borrowing at the median in the early 1990s.26 For the earlier period, 
the change in age composition, cost structure, and EFC all contribute 
significantly toward greater debt at the median and above, although 
the explanatory share falls from about one-half to about one-third 
when moving from the 75th to the 90th percentile, as the roles of cost 
structure and age diminish at the top of the distribution.27 In contrast, 
between 1996 and 2000, the role of age has diminished to negligible 
levels, and while attendance patterns contribute slightly toward greater 
borrowing, this covariate is outweighed by the reversal in the relation-
ships of EFC and costs. In short, observables explain more of the debt 
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Table 4.4A  Recentered Influence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2000, Using Tuition 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 7.13 (0.29) 9.03 (0.61) 13.12 (0.52) 13.96 (0.64) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.13 (0.07) 0.63 (0.22) 0.81 (0.19) 0.33 (0.21) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.11 (0.10) 0.09 (0.11) 0.05 (0.20) −0.15 (0.20) 
Parental education −0.01 (0.07) 0.05 (0.07) 0.02 (0.13) 0.14 (0.15) 
Location, in-state status −0.07 (0.14) −0.88 (0.39) −0.50 (0.56) 0.07 (0.70) 
School sector, attendance, major −0.02 (0.25) 1.05 (0.65) −0.01 (0.67) −0.25 (0.92) 
Expected family contribution 0.15 (0.06) 0.49 (0.17) 0.47 (0.11) 0.42 (0.12) 
Tuition and grants 0.85 (0.36) −0.12 (0.45) 0.15 (0.76) −1.36 (0.92) 
Total 1.15 (0.34) 1.32 (0.61) 0.99 (0.89) −0.80 (0.98) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.51 (0.40) −0.62 (0.84) 0.12 (0.75) −6.72 (1.26) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −1.72 (0.98) −2.62 (1.88) −1.21 (2.18) −4.34 (2.56) 
Parental education 0.17 (0.35) 1.37 (0.57) −0.52 (0.49) 0.11 (0.72) 
Location, in-state status 0.23 (0.74) 1.28 (0.85) 0.38 (1.01) −1.66 (1.53) 
School sector, attendance, major 1.37 (1.77) −5.63 (4.07) 1.80 (2.68) 1.54 (3.83) 
Expected family contribution −1.82 (0.49) −6.99 (1.15) −0.09 (0.91) −0.12 (1.51) 
Tuition and grants 2.78 (1.40) 7.15 (2.93) −0.70 (2.73) 8.73 (3.20) 
Constant 5.47 (2.58) 13.42 (5.52) 12.27 (4.77) 17.22 (6.30) 
Total 5.99 (0.46) 7.71 (0.99) 12.14 (1.02) 14.75 (1.25) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered influence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefficients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 
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Table 4.4B  Recentered Influence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2000, Using Cost of Attendance 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 7.13 (0.29) 9.03 (0.61) 13.12 (0.52) 13.96 (0.64) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.11 (0.06) 0.61 (0.21) 0.70 (0.19) 0.21 (0.21) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.14 (0.09) 0.08 (0.11) 0.04 (0.20) −0.18 (0.21) 
Parental education −0.02 (0.07) 0.06 (0.08) 0.04 (0.13) 0.15 (0.16) 
Location, in-state status −0.07 (0.14) −0.84 (0.37) −0.66 (0.54) −0.04 (0.68) 
School sector, attendance, major 0.21 (0.16) 0.61 (0.42) 0.09 (0.71) 0.12 (0.95) 
Expected family contribution 0.17 (0.06) 0.50 (0.17) 0.49 (0.11) 0.43 (0.12) 
Attendance cost and grants 0.64 (0.24) 0.31 (0.61) 0.25 (0.70) 0.29 (0.69) 
Total 1.17 (0.32) 1.32 (0.67) 0.94 (0.87) 0.96 (0.87) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.41 (0.41) −0.30 (0.79) −0.17 (0.77) −6.64 (1.24) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −2.26 (0.96) −2.51 (1.98) −2.33 (2.17) −5.63 (2.64) 
Parental education 0.13 (0.35) 1.24 (0.57) −0.66 (0.49) −0.04 (0.74) 
Location, in-state status 0.30 (0.78) 1.23 (0.85) 0.49 (1.01) −1.60 (1.51) 
School sector, attendance, major −0.52 (1.31) −4.98 (1.75) −1.25 (2.65) −3.27 (3.99) 
Expected family contribution −2.34 (0.51) −7.80 (1.17) −0.83 (0.92) −1.80 (1.58) 
Attendance cost and grants 3.27 (1.94) 12.27 (5.94) 0.74 (3.73) 10.76 (5.08) 
Constant 7.81 (2.54) 8.56 (5.52) 16.20 (5.36) 21.21 (6.88) 
Total 5.96 (0.41) 7.71 (0.97) 12.18 (1.05) 12.99 (1.08) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered influence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefficients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS. 
Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 80    1/28/2015 8:22:50 AM     
80 Hershbein and Hollenbeck 
matter the most, cost and EFC, changed more in this period than they 
did between 1996 and 2000. The apparent puzzle is that the fastest debt 
growth occurred in a period when list cost barely budged and net cost 
actually fell. 
The contribution of changes in observables over the 2000s, on the 
other hand, is considerable, and much of this is due to increases in cost. 
As shown in Tables 4.5A and 4.5B, the RIF approach substantially 
overexplains the shift in borrowing at the median and 75th percentiles, 
and more so when cost of attendance is used instead of tuition. Changes 
in cost often account for half or more of the observable share, although 
parental education, attendance patterns, and EFC also matter. At the 
90th percentile, where the reweighting decomposition found only a 
modest role for observables, the RIF technique places more weight on 
them, explaining at least two-thirds of the debt increase, with cost and 
EFC having the largest impact.28 
In summary, the RIF decompositions qualitatively resemble the 
reweighting-based decompositions: a large role for observables in 
the early to mid-1990s and again between 2000 and 2008, but almost 
no explanatory power for them in the late 1990s. In both techniques, 
observables explain less at the very top of the borrowing distribution. 
The RIF analysis, however, shows that the most important observed 
factor contributing toward greater borrowing is cost, and this is particu-
larly true over the 2000s, when costs increased relatively quickly. EFC 
also matters consistently across time periods and quantiles. Smaller but 
still meaningful effects are found for age composition over the 1990s 
and attendance patterns and parental education over the 2000s, with 
all these more prominent in the middle of the debt distribution. Core 
demographics and geography, despite changing a great deal over time, 
do not seem to be related to the shift in student debt. 
DISCUSSION 
Although much of the increase in debt over the 2000s can be 
explained by changes in student and institutional characteristics, the 
NPSAS data point to structural, behavioral, or policy shifts underlying 
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Table 4.5A  Recentered Influence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 2000–2008, Using Tuition 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 2.81 (0.25) 2.14 (0.50) 2.07 (0.38) 7.71 (0.61) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.47 (0.11) −0.34 (0.12) −0.25 (0.07) −0.57 (0.18) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.12 (0.05) 0.26 (0.09) 0.13 (0.05) 0.26 (0.12) 
Parental education 0.49 (0.08) 1.16 (0.19) 0.40 (0.08) 0.52 (0.14) 
Location, in-state status −0.05 (0.06) −0.04 (0.21) 0.02 (0.10) 0.42 (0.23) 
School sector, attendance, major 0.22 (0.10) 0.50 (0.28) 0.45 (0.14) 0.92 (0.33) 
Expected family contribution 0.22 (0.08) 1.33 (0.17) 0.66 (0.07) 1.30 (0.19) 
Tuition and grants 1.09 (0.15) 2.44 (0.41) 1.11 (0.20) 2.15 (0.45) 
Total 1.62 (0.24) 5.30 (0.65) 2.52 (0.27) 5.01 (0.61) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.47 (0.42) 1.61 (0.66) −1.51 (0.48) 4.31 (1.21) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.20 (0.94) −0.65 (1.48) −1.88 (1.05) 0.15 (2.39) 
Parental education −0.57 (0.22) −2.32 (0.43) −0.31 (0.30) −0.92 (0.44) 
Location, in-state status −0.65 (0.59) −1.36 (0.85) −0.21 (0.65) 0.85 (1.16) 
School sector, attendance, major −0.19 (0.81) 2.50 (1.14) −0.30 (0.70) 0.88 (1.48) 
Expected family contribution 1.45 (0.54) 4.42 (0.84) 1.02 (0.44) 2.57 (0.80) 
Tuition and grants 1.07 (1.39) 0.35 (2.66) 4.86 (1.52) −4.19 (3.03) 
Constant −0.58 (1.88) −7.70 (3.21) −2.12 (2.10) −0.96 (3.79) 
Total 1.20 (0.30) −3.16 (0.75) −0.46 (0.45) 2.70 (0.90) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered influence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefficients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 
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Table 4.5B  Recentered Influence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 2000–2008, Using Cost of Attendance 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 2.81 (0.25) 2.14 (0.50) 2.07 (0.38) 7.71 (0.61) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.43 (0.11) −0.30 (0.11) −0.23 (0.06) −0.55 (0.17) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.11 (0.04) 0.24 (0.09) 0.12 (0.05) 0.24 (0.12) 
Parental education 0.46 (0.08) 1.11 (0.19) 0.38 (0.08) 0.48 (0.14) 
Location, in-state status −0.06 (0.06) 0.02 (0.21) 0.08 (0.10) 0.59 (0.24) 
School sector, attendance, major 0.14 (0.10) 0.37 (0.27) 0.33 (0.13) 0.60 (0.30) 
Expected family contribution 0.23 (0.08) 1.40 (0.17) 0.70 (0.08) 1.42 (0.20) 
Attendance cost and grants 2.08 (0.18) 4.29 (0.40) 2.34 (0.21) 4.61 (0.63) 
Total 2.53 (0.24) 7.13 (0.62) 3.72 (0.28) 7.39 (0.85) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.35 (0.40) 1.47 (0.64) −1.52 (0.47) 3.82 (1.15) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −0.12 (0.92) −0.90 (1.48) −2.08 (1.03) −0.29 (2.37) 
Parental education −0.53 (0.22) −2.18 (0.43) −0.25 (0.30) −0.81 (0.45) 
Location, in-state status −0.64 (0.57) −1.09 (0.81) −0.17 (0.65) 0.71 (1.17) 
School sector, attendance, major −0.46 (0.82) 2.18 (1.13) −0.60 (0.73) 1.72 (1.52) 
Expected family contribution 1.35 (0.52) 3.88 (0.85) 0.62 (0.46) 3.02 (0.86) 
Attendance cost and grants 7.29 (2.52) 6.06 (5.04) 12.58 (3.17) −6.37 (5.70) 
Constant −6.97 (2.95) −14.41 (5.47) −10.23 (3.50) −1.48 (5.99) 
Total 0.28 (0.29) −4.99 (0.71) −1.66 (0.44) 0.32 (1.15) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered influence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefficients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS. 
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when debt profiles increased faster than in any other period. In this sec-
tion, we review several possible explanations and weigh the evidence 
for each. 
Formal Loans Crowding Out Informal Loans 
The analysis above considers formal loans in which a promissory 
note has been signed and repayment shows up in credit reports. Informal 
loans from friends and family also occur, although it is unclear whether 
these are actually intended to be repaid (with or without interest). A pos-
sible “structural” explanation for debt increase is that formal loans have 
displaced informal loans over time. The NPSAS asked about informal 
loans only through 2000, but that covers the period in which observables 
have little explanatory power. Figure 4.8 plots CDFs of borrowing for 
1990, 1996, and 2000, both with and without informal borrowing. The 
thinner or paler lines reflect the distributions of formal borrowing from 
Figure 4.1, while the thicker lines add in informal borrowing. If dis-
placement were occurring, we would see the difference between total 
and formal borrowing shrink over time. In fact, we see the opposite: 
while informal borrowing is rare in 1990, it expands by 1996 and is of a 
similar magnitude in 2000. We can thus rule out this story. 
Parents Transferring Loan Burden to Children 
Our analysis also has focused on debt in the student’s name and 
thus has excluded borrowing directly by parents in the form of PLUS 
Loans. While the terms of student-level loans are more generous than 
parent-level PLUS Loans (see Appendix 4B), parents are often in a bet-
ter financial position with which to make repayment. However, if par-
ents have become less willing or able to borrow for their children than 
in the past, the transference of the burden could explain increases in 
student-level borrowing. Figure 4.9 shows that this is not the case. The 
lighter-line CDFs in the figure again show the distributions of borrow-
ing taken from Figure 4.1, while the heavier lines add in cumulative 
PLUS borrowing of parents (data for 1990 are unfortunately unavail-
able). Rather than decreasing over time, PLUS borrowing has increased 
substantially and become more pronounced further down the distribu-
tion. Thus, the intergenerational transfer explanation, at least through 
PLUS Loans, does not work, either.29 
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Figure 4.8  Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among 










NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars. 
Thicker lines include student-level borrowing from all sources including loans from 
friends and family; thinner lines exclude these informal loans, as in Figure 4.1. 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
Change in Interest Rates 
The prevailing interest rates for student loans (federal and other) 
have varied over time, and basic economic theory implies that lower 
interest rates should increase borrowing, all other things being equal. 
Figure 4.10 presents time series for the interest rates on the predomi-
nant federal loan program, the Stafford Loan, as well as the U.S. prime 
rate, a benchmark for private loans and, at times, federal loans as well. 
Prior to the early 1990s, Congress periodically set a fixed rate for Staf-
ford Loans (sometimes creating a huge subsidy, as in the early 1980s). 
Between 1992 and 2006, Stafford rates were tied to market rates before 
being fi xed again.30 Although interest rates drop by nearly four percent-
age points in the early 1990s, they are relatively flat over the late 1990s, 
1990 
1990 + Informal loans 
1996 
1996 + Informal loans 
2000 
2000 + Informal loans 
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Figure 4.9  Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among 










NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars. 
Thicker lines include borrowing from parental PLUS Loans; thinner lines exclude 
PLUS Loans, as in Figure 4.1. 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
and they drop considerably again over the early 2000s recession. This 
pattern is not consistent with large increases in borrowing during the 
late 1990s and a flat, or even falling, borrowing profile between 2000 
and 2004. It would appear that the borrowing decisions of bachelor’s
degree graduates are insensitive to the cost of loans, and interest rates 
therefore cannot explain the observed borrowing patterns.31 
Borrowing Eligibility 
Another set of possible factors deals with increased eligibility 
to borrow (on both extensive and intensive margins). As Appendix 
4B shows, major changes in the student loan market took place over 
the 1990s, including the introduction of unsubsidized Stafford Loans 
1996 
1996 + PLUS Loans 
2000 
2000 + PLUS Loans 
2004 
2004 + PLUS Loans 
2008 
2008 + PLUS Loans 
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NOTE: All federal loans were subsidized until 1992, when unsubsidized loans became 
available. 
SOURCE: Senate Committee on the Budget (2006); http://www.fi naid.org/loans/ 
historicalrates.phtml (accessed April 17, 2014). 
(which are more available to higher-income families than are subsi-
dized Stafford Loans), increases in the federal statutory borrowing lim-
its, and the development of private loans. In contrast, there was little 
structural change in the loan market between 2000 and 2008 (although 
there was considerable change after the 2007–2008 school year). 
Except for a brief period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, fed-
eral loan eligibility was means tested and subject to a family-income 
threshold (with the government paying interest while the student was 
enrolled) until 1992. That year, unsubsidized loans first became avail-
able. While interest accumulates on these loans from the time of dis-
bursement, students have access to them regardless of family income. 
Their availability opened up a large segment of the student popula-
tion to federal loans, so it would not be surprising if increases in the 
debt distribution followed. However, Figure 4.5 shows that borrowing 
increased much faster in the late 1990s than between 1990 and 1996 for 
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wealthier students—the group that would be expected to benefi t most 
from unsubsidized loan eligibility. Why didn’t their borrowing increase 
immediately after 1992? Three reasons suggest that unsubsidized loans 
became more important in the late 1990s despite becoming available 
for the 1992–1993 school year. First, total unsubsidized loan volume 
was quite small initially. In 1992–1993, unsubsidized loan disburse-
ments for all postsecondary students totaled $440 million (in 2011 dol-
lars), just 1.9 percent of aggregate loan volume. In 1993–1994, dis-
bursements had increased to $2.7 billion, an 8.9 percent share, and in 
1994–1995, the numbers jumped to $9.5 billion, a 26.7 percent share. 
From this point, the share increased slowly, to 32.5 percent by 1999– 
2000 (College Board 2012a, Figure 6). Their impact thus would have 
been muted for the 1996 graduating cohort relative to the 2000 cohort. 
Second, the Survey of Consumer Finances (Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors 2012) shows a pronounced jump between 1995 and 1998 
(but not between 1992 and 1995) in both the median and mean values 
of educational loans among families, and these increases were con-
centrated among families whose heads were college educated, were in 
managerial or professional occupations, and had income in the second-
highest quintile. This pattern is consistent with increased loan volume 
for the types of households that would benefit most from unsubsidized 
loans occurring several years after the program’s introduction. Third, 
and perhaps most tellingly, the income distribution among graduates 
with a Stafford Loan their senior year increased sharply (relative to the 
income distribution of all graduates) between 1996 and 2000, but not 
between 1993 and 1996.32 This is shown in Figure 4.11, with the lighter 
lines representing the income distributions for Stafford borrowers and 
the heavier lines those for all graduates. 
Furthermore, it is possible to use a back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tion to quantify how important unsubsidized loans were to the increase 
in total borrowing between 1996 and 2000. Figure 4.12 shows the dif-
ference in senior-year borrowing between 1996 and 2000 by percentile 
(now on the x-axis). The solid line counts all borrowing, and the dashed 
line nets out unsubsidized Stafford Loans. Throughout much of the dis-
tribution, the gap between the two years is significantly reduced once 
unsubsidized loans are taken out of the picture.33 Indeed, the mean gap 
in the latter case is only 36 percent of the former; the mean squared 
deviation, 66 percent. (Excluding the area above the 98th percentile, the 
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Figure 4.11  Cumulative Distribution Function of Family Income, All 
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NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars. 
Thicker lines represent family income for the set of all graduates; thinner lines repre-
sent graduates who took out a Stafford Loan their senior year. 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
two figures are 24 and 23 percent, respectively.) In levels, the mean gap 
is reduced by $460, and if this pattern held for previous years of enroll-
ment, it could account for roughly $2,500, or about half, of the mean 
increase in total debt of $5,200 between 1996 and 2000.34 However, 
because of the factors mentioned above, this gap in senior-year borrow-
ing probably overstates the gap for earlier years, when unsubsidized 
loan volume was smaller. But the senior year alone can account for 9 
percent of the $5,200 difference, and even conservative estimates for 
previous class years would bring this share to a quarter. 
Thus, unsubsidized loans were important for debt increases in the 
late 1990s, but what about increases in federal borrowing limits? The 
annual borrowing limit under the Stafford program, by far the largest 
federal loan program, was fixed—in nominal terms—between July 
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Figure 4.12  Difference in Senior-Year Borrowing between 1996 and 
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NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars. 
Thicker lines represent all formal student-level borrowing in senior year; thinner lines 
exclude unsubsidized Stafford Loans. 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
1993 and June 2007. The supplementary limits, which raise the maxi-
mum borrowing for independent students and some dependent students, 
were fixed between July 1994 and June 2008. However, the increase in 
statutory limits in July 1993 applied only for students in their second 
or higher class year, and the shift in supplementary limits in July 1994 
applied only for students in their third or higher year. This means that 
graduates of the class of 1996 experienced the same nominal limits as 
the class of 2000; in real terms, borrowing limits declined slightly.35 
Consequently, borrowing limits are not behind the debt increase of the 
late 1990s. 
The other major innovation of that time period was the rise of the 
private loan sector (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2012). Too 
new to be asked about explicitly in the 1996 NPSAS, private loans in 
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that wave must be inferred by netting out institutional and state-level 
loans from all nonfederal loans. For graduates of that class, 1.0 percent 
took out a nonfederal loan their senior year, and most of these were 
institutional or state loans: just 0.3 percent took out an “other” or pri-
vate loan. By 2000, the numbers had increased to 6.2 and 4.6 percent, 
respectively, and they continued to grow through 2008 before retrench-
ing during the recession. The NPSAS data do not break out cumulative 
borrowing by nonfederal sector, but one can compare cumulative total 
borrowing to cumulative federal borrowing, and this is done in Figure 
4.13 for the 1996 and later waves. The lighter lines represent cumulative 
total borrowing, as in Figure 4.1, while the heavier lines show cumula-
tive federal borrowing only. The difference between the two captures 
nonfederal borrowing. For 1996, the gap occurs entirely below the 70th 
Figure 4.13  Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among 












NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars. 
Thicker lines represent cumulative formal student-level borrowing from federal loans 
only; thinner lines include all loans, as in Figure 4.1. 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
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percentile and is small, reflecting that most of these nonfederal loans are 
institutional or state-based and intended for lower-income borrowers.36 
By 2000, the gap has widened, especially above the 75th percentile. In 
fact, about half of the total increase in borrowing in the top quartile is 
due to nonfederal—essentially private—loans. (For the same quartile 
between 1996 and 2008, about three-quarters of the increase is due to 
private loans, and between 2000 and 2008, all of it is, though much of 
this latter increase is accounted for by observables.37) 
Broadly speaking, informal loans, PLUS Loans, interest rate 
changes, and statutory borrowing limits are unlikely to be factors behind 
the debt increase of the late 1990s. Unsubsidized Stafford Loans and 
private loans, on the other hand, are probable culprits, at least in part. 
Other Explanations 
One factor for which we have been unable to control is the use 
of tax credits, which came into existence in the late 1990s. Nicholas 
Turner (2012) has shown that the value of educational tax credits is 
largely capitalized into increases in net tuition (i.e., fewer institutional 
grants), with suggestive evidence that students compensate by borrow-
ing more. However, the timing of tax credit availability precludes them 
from being a major factor for the borrowing increases observed during 
the 1990s. Both the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits fi rst became 
available during the 1998–1999 school year (and tax deductions not 
until the 2002–2003 school year). As the Hope Credit was available 
only for the first two years of postsecondary education, it could not have 
benefitted students who graduated during the 1999–2000 school year 
and took four or more school years to finish. Until 2003, the Lifetime 
Learning program allowed a (nonrefundable) credit of 20 percent of the 
first $5,000 in tuition and fees, making its maximum value $1,000.38 
But, according to the NPSAS data, only 20 percent of graduates’ fami-
lies claimed the credit in the 1999 tax year, and only about 20 percent of 
the claimants qualified for the maximum credit. Even if the credit were 
completely capitalized into higher borrowing, it could explain only a 
tiny portion of the increase in debt in the late 1990s.39 
Another factor we did not examine explicitly is the use of home 
equity loans and lines of credit for education financing. There is some 
evidence that these tools became less important over the 1990s. In the 
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NPSAS, about 4 percent of the class of 1996 claimed to have used 
them, versus 2.3 percent in 2000. Similarly, the Survey of Consumer 
Finances shows that in 1989, 0.6 percent of all households were using 
a home equity loan or line of credit to pay for education expenses; by 
1995, the last year in which the purpose can be ascertained, the figure 
had fallen to 0.4 percent. These levels are probably too small to have 
had a meaningful impact on student borrowing. 
CONCLUSION 
Using NPSAS data, we have shown that the entire debt profi le of 
college graduates grew much faster in the 1990s than in the 2000s, and 
that this growth was concentrated especially in the late 1990s. Between 
2000 and 2008, debt was remarkably stable for the bottom three quar-
ters of the distribution—the increase that took place in the top quar-
tile was driven by graduates at private, not-for-profit institutions and 
stemmed largely from greater private borrowing. 
Statistical decomposition techniques consistently indicate that 
observable characteristics of students and institutions—such as demo-
graphics, geography, attendance patterns, income, and costs—explain 
about one-third of the overall debt increase across the two decades. 
However, their explanatory power is stronger at the extensive margin 
and in the middle of the distribution than in the right tail. Moreover, the 
observables account for more than half of the increase between 1990 
and 1996 and approximately all of it between 2000 and 2008, leav-
ing the late 1990s as the period that remains unexplained. Among the 
observables, cost tends to be the most important factor, often explaining 
about half of the observable share, but EFC is also important, as is the 
age structure in the 1990s and parental education in the 2000s. 
In trying to unpack the puzzle of the late 1990s, we have ruled out 
informal loans, PLUS Loans, interest rate changes, and statutory bor-
rowing limits as likely explanations. Instead, the evidence is consistent 
with the “unobservable” share being driven by the advent of unsubsi-
dized Stafford Loans and private loans. This would imply that much of 
the debt increase over the 1990s—a much greater increase than over the 
2000s—was primarily due to supply-side and not demand-side factors. 
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Indeed, while nominal costs of college have risen considerably, so has 
financial aid in the form of grants (Avery and Turner 2012; Greenstone 
and Looney 2013; see also Appendix Table 4C.1.) Our fi ndings show 
that changes in costs account for only 20 percent of the increase in 
distribution-wide borrowing between 1990 and 2008, and this is after 
capturing the complex interplay between nominal prices and grants. 
Of course, the partial-equilibrium analysis we have undertaken does 
not account for the possible endogeneity between college costs and 
financial aid. Recent research on the incidence of federal fi nancial aid 
indicates that in many cases, schools seem to capture much of the benefit: 
Nicholas Turner (2012) cannot rule out that schools offset one dollar of 
student tax benefi ts with one dollar of higher net tuition; Lesley Turner 
(2012) finds that schools on average reduce institutional grants by $0.16 
per dollar of Pell Grants ($0.80 for selective nonprofits); and Cellini and 
Goldin (2012) conclude that Title IV–eligible for-profits charge tuition 
78 percent higher than comparable programs in non-Title IV–eligible 
for-profits. Whether these results hold specifically for loans, however, is 
still an open question in which more research is needed.
Notes 
1. From January 1, 2012, through September 16, 2013, we found 504 hits of the 
search term “student debt” across the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the 
Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. 
News and World Report. For the same outlets, there were 673 hits between 1991 
and 2011, inclusive. 
2. See Martin and Lehren (2012) and Mitchell and Jackson-Randall (2012). 
3. For example, collegerealitycheck.com and collegecompletion.chronicle.com (both 
by the Chronicle for Higher Education); collegecost.ed.gov/scorecard/ and college 
cost.ed.gov/catc/ (both by the federal government); projectonstudentdebt.org (by 
The Institute for College Access and Success); and collegeportraits.org (by the 
American Association of State Colleges and Universities). 
4. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/22/remarks-president 
-college-affordability-buffalo-ny (accessed April 17, 2014). Congress has also 
investigated growing debt (Joint Economic Committee 2013). 
5. We hope to investigate other groups in subsequent work. 
6. The 2012 wave of NPSAS was released in late August of 2013. Although we have 
requested these data, our analyses are currently limited to 2008 as an endpoint. 
7. It also forms the sampling frame for two longitudinal surveys: the Beginning Post-
secondary Students study (BPS), which tracks first-time students, and the Bac-
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calaureate and Beyond study (B&B), which tracks bachelor recipients. We use the 
NPSAS rather than the B&B because the former is available earlier and more often. 
8. The NPSAS was also fielded in 1993. However, an error in the survey led to many 
bachelor’s degree graduates not being asked the relevant questions on cumulative 
borrowing, forcing us to exclude this wave. 
9. Unfortunately, private, for-profit institutions are too small a group to examine in 
all but the 2008 wave. Even then, fewer than 4 percent of bachelor’s recipients 
graduated from a private, for-profit institution. Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner 
(2010) document rising time to bachelor’s degree and attempt to explain the fac-
tors behind it. 
10. Improper specification of the model, such as omitted variables, would show up in 
this component. 
11. For example, in gender-wage discrimination, the reference coefficient is often set 
to that of men because the exercise is meant to examine how much of the gender 
gap can be attributable to differences in characteristics under the assumption that 
the return to those characteristics is the same as men’s (the “explained” part) and 
how much is attributable to “discrimination” (the “unexplained” part, but see Note 
10). 
12. It is also more robust to functional form violations, such as when Y is a nonlinear 
function of X. Because this functional form need not be known, the technique is 
semiparametric. On the other hand, it is more sensitive to the common support 
requirement that sets of covariate realizations are common to both groups. 
13. This setup will make the distribution of XB resemble the distribution of XA; switch-
ing the coding of the dependent variable will cause the reverse. 
14. This follows because fraction q of the population (and sample analogue) has Y ≤ Yq, 
by defi nition of q. 
15. We also experimented with using time to degree, which was available in every 
wave except 1990. Somewhat surprisingly, the inclusion of this variable, condi-
tional on the others, had a negligible effect on the decompositions. In order to 
include the 1990 wave, we thus chose to exclude time to degree in the presented 
results. 
16. Expected family contribution measures a student’s family’s ability to pay for col-
lege expenses and is based on family structure, income, and certain assets (exclud-
ing home equity). The relationship between borrowing and EFC is likely non-
monotonic, as low EFC levels increase the likelihood of receiving grant aid, and 
very high EFC levels are associated with a lower need to borrow. The cost of atten-
dance is broader than tuition and fees and also includes room and board, books, 
travel, and other expenses. 
17. A polynomial in net cost implies parameter restrictions in the more fl exible model. 
When we test these restrictions in the relationship between borrowing and cost 
and aid structure, they are sharply rejected at all conventional signifi cance levels. 
18. When the constituent variables diverge in their effects, we make note of it. 
19. There is also a slightly positive role from demographics (an increasing minority 
share) and an offsetting role from location (regional changes in graduates from the 
Northeast to the South). 
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20. Indeed, as Appendix 4B documents, unsubsidized Stafford Loans, which are not 
means tested, became available in 1992, and this would be expected to increase 
borrowing at the extensive margin. 
21. Note that while the Oaxaca-Blinder results showed a small role for observables 
at the extensive margin during this time period, the estimate was not statistically 
different from zero. 
22. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping the entire RIF procedure (with 100 
replications) to account for estimation error in the density function. 
23. The attendance coefficient is largely driven by a shift from nondoctoral to doctoral 
public institutions (see Appendix Table 4C.2). 
24. For evidence of the growing role of amenities in driving students’ attendance deci-
sions, see Jacob, McCall, and Stange (2013). 
25. Recall that the cost structure observables include quartics in list prices and grants 
and their pairwise interactions. These relationships are highly nonlinear and non-
monotonic, so it is not quite accurate to say that “costs” rose; we are trading off 
accuracy for expediency. 
26. That borrowing increased less than predicted at this quantile is due to a change 
in the coefficients on marital status; specifically, married graduates borrowed less 
than single graduates in 1990, but this relationship reversed in 1996. Since singles 
increased as a share of graduates between 1990 and 1996 (Table 4C.2), borrowing 
was predicted to have increased. 
27. The explanatory shares of the cost structure are slightly lower when using cost of 
attendance rather than tuition, reflecting a reduction in nontuition expenses that 
partially offset tuition hikes over this period (see Appendix Table 4C.1). 
28. The difference between the decomposition techniques over this time period may 
stem from the functional form limitation of the RIF (i.e., linearity). However, iso-
lating the role of specific observables through sequential reweighting yields simi-
lar relative magnitudes as RIF. 
29. We unfortunately cannot observe direct transfers from parents to students. How-
ever, since parents are borrowing more through PLUS Loans, it is very unlikely 
that the transfer motive has decreased. 
30. In late summer of 2013, new legislation passed that will again tie federal borrow-
ing rates to market rates. Although, prior to the legislation’s passage, much atten-
tion was given to the fact that subsidized rates would double to the unsubsidized 
rate for the 2013–2014 school year, it was generally unmentioned that the rates had 
differed at all only since 2009. Note also that, historically, Stafford rates were sim-
ilar to or below the U.S. prime rate except during and after the Great Recession. 
31. There is surprisingly little work on the elasticity of credit demand with respect 
to price in the higher education context, and it would be a fruitful area for future 
research. 
32. We use the 1993 wave here because the data are for senior-year and not cumula-
tive borrowing. While NPSAS separates survey school year Stafford borrowing by 
subsidized and unsubsidized status beginning in 1996, it unfortunately does not do 
so for cumulative borrowing. 
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33. The notable exception is above the 95th percentile and is probably due to private 
loans, which are discussed next. The negative section of the lines reflects the nomi-
nal annual borrowing cap for Stafford Loans. 
34. This assumes a time to degree of 5.5 years, the average for the class of 2000 in the 
NPSAS data. 
35. These statements also apply to lifetime borrowing limits. 
36. In 1996, the median recipient of institutional or state loans was below the 30th 
percentile of the family income distribution of all students; the median recipient of 
a private loan was at the 70th percentile. 
37. That observables can account for most of the change between 2000 and 2008 is 
likely in large part due to private loans being well established by 2000. An auxil-
iary analysis that examined the period between 1996 and 2008, with 1996 refer-
ence coefficients, found a much smaller role for observables. 
38. The threshold was raised from $5,000 to $10,000 in 2003. In all years, the credit 
was subject to income phase-outs. 
39. A back-of-the-envelope calculation that subtracts the real value of the credit from 
cumulative borrowing—among all students, not just those claiming the credit— 
shows that debt would have risen by about $500 less at most points of the distribu-
tion between 1996 and 2000. At the mean, this is less than 10 percent. At the 90th 
percentile, it is about 5 percent. 









NPSAS Data Details 
The National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) has been fielded 
eight times: in 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. In each 
case, the year references the spring semester or the end of the school year. 
This chapter employs the restricted-use 1990, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 
waves.1 The 1987 wave was not used because its sampling frame and question 
bank were significantly different from those of subsequent waves. The 1993 
wave was not used because of an interviewing error that caused the cumulative 
borrowing question—the key outcome of interest—to be not asked of some 
graduates. Finally, the 2012 wave has only been partially released. (We plan to 
update the study when the 2012 wave is fully released.) 
The longitudinal comparisons in the chapter required that the data be har-
monized across waves. Although each wave is similar to the preceding one, 
there have been many variable name changes and some definition (or universe) 
changes over time. In most cases, it was straightforward to rename variables 
or recode values for consistency, although this often necessitated losing some 
detail for categorical responses. The processing of the most important vari-
ables for the analysis is described in this section.2 
The primary outcome variable is the cumulative borrowing of the student 
from all sources for undergraduate education. The variable is called BORAMT1 
in each of the waves we use, although its construction varies somewhat over 
time. In 2004 and 2008, BORAMT1 is constructed as the greater of the stu-
dent’s self-reported borrowing total, the cumulative federal borrowing total 
taken from the National Student Loan Data System plus self-reported private 
borrowing in the survey school year, or self-reported total borrowing in the 
survey school year. In each case, the borrowing numbers exclude loans in the 
name of parents or guardians (e.g., PLUS Loans), as well as informal loans 
without a promissory note. This is the definition of cumulative borrowing we 
use in the paper. 
In 2000, there are two versions of the BORAMT1 variable: one that 
matches the 2004 and 2008 definition, and one that also includes informal 
loans. We use the first version. In 1996, only the version that includes informal 
borrowing is available. However, a separate variable (FAMLOAN) asks about 
cumulative loans from friends and family, although this variable is present 
only for the portion of the sample that conducted a CATI interview (about two-
thirds of the overall sample). We revise the BORAMT1 variable in 1996 by 
subtracting from it FAMLOAN among the CATI part of the sample and use a 
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revised sampling weight (see below) to correct for the smaller sample. In 1990, 
historical data from National Student Loan Data System was not included. 
All cumulative borrowing is thus self-reported. After applying the maximizer 
decision rule used in the 2004 and 2008 waves, PARLOAN is subtracted from 
BORAMT1, where PARLOAN represents informal borrowing for the 1989– 
1990 school year. (There is no cumulative informal loan variable in the 1990 
NPSAS, so cumulative loan totals, especially near the top of the distribution, 
may be biased upward.) 
The cleaned BORAMT1 variable is converted to year 2012 dollars using 
the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. We then applied the following five sample restrictions to 
focus on our population of interest (the 2008 nomenclature of the variable[s] 
used for the restriction is in parentheses): 
1. The respondent was enrolled in the fall term of the survey school 
year at an institution in the 50 U.S. states or the District of Columbia 
(COMPTO87 = 1). 
2. The respondent was enrolled at a primarily bachelor’s (or higher) 
degree-granting institution (SECTOR9 = 3,4,6,7,9). 
3. The respondent was an undergraduate during the survey school year 
(STUDTYP = 1). 
4. The respondent earned a bachelor’s degree during the survey school 
year (COLLGRAD = 1). 
5. The respondent was not a foreign or international student on an edu-
cation visa (SAMESTAT ≤ 2). 
Additionally, because construction of a consistent, cumulative borrowing 
amount in the 1996 wave required variables from the interview component of 
the survey, the estimation sample for that wave was restricted to respondents 
with a positive interview weight (CATIWT > 0). The WTA000 sample weights 
were used for the 2000 and later waves (using late 2013 vintage weights), the 
WTB000 sample weight was used for the 1996 wave, and the PSKEEPWT
sample weight was used for the 1990 wave. 
The NPSAS is also used as the sampling frame for two longitudinal 
studies, the Beginning Postsecondary Study (BPS), which follows first-time 
postsecondary students, and the Baccalaureate and Beyond (B&B), which fol-
lows bachelor’s degree recipients. These two studies alternate NPSAS waves, 
with BPS being drawn from the 1990, 1996, 2004, and 2012 NPSAS waves, 
and B&B being drawn from the 1993, 2000, and 2008 NPSAS waves. Since 
the population of interest for the longitudinal studies is oversampled in the 
NPSAS, the effective sample sizes for college graduates is quite large in 2000 
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and 2008 and somewhat smaller in 1990, 1996, and 2004. Final sample sizes, 
rounded to the nearest 10 to comply with rules on disclosure, are found in 
Appendix Table 4C.5. 
The NPSAS is not the only data set that can be used to track how stu-
dent debt profiles have changed over the last 20 years. Some longitudinal data 
sets, such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics, ask about educational borrowing, as does the repeated, 
cross-sectional Survey of Consumer Finances. These latter data sets have 
the advantages of containing information on other forms of debt as well as 
income and loan repayment information. However, they have a few disadvan-
tages relative to the NPSAS. First, the sample sizes are much smaller. While 
the NPSAS typically has several thousand college graduates in each wave (or 
cohort), the other data sets often have only a few hundred per cohort, and this 
makes examining entire distributions more difficult. Second, the data on col-
lege expenses and financing are not as detailed. The NPSAS benefits from the 
merge with administrative data on exact loan amounts and family financials, 
and it surveys students immediately after the school year. The other data sets 
often gather loan data from retrospective questions, introducing the possibility 
of recall bias. 
While we believe NPSAS is the best data set to look at cumulative bor-
rowing at graduation, the other data sets have a comparative advantage when 
investigating the topics of loan repayment, default, and debt-income ratios, 
and how and why these have changed over time. These are clearly important 
topics, but they are beyond the scope of the current chapter. 
Appendix Notes 
1. These are available by license from the Department of Education’s Institute of 
Education Sciences (IES) after an application process. 
2. A complete list of variables used is available by request from the authors. 
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A Primer on Student Loans 
FEDERAL LOANS 
The primary federal borrowing program for undergraduates is the Stafford 
program, established in 1965 as part of the Higher Education Act that year, 
and later named after Senator Robert Stafford in 1988.1 Originally intended 
for lower-income students, all Stafford Loans were subsidized until 1992, with 
the federal government paying the interest while the student was enrolled.2 
Beginning that year, unsubsidized Stafford Loans became available for stu-
dents regardless of their financial background. These loans accumulate interest 
while the student is enrolled, although repayment for either type of Stafford 
Loan does not begin until six months after school leaving. 
Stafford Loans account for the vast majority of federal lending to stu-
dents. Among graduating seniors in the 2007–2008 school year, for example, 
Stafford Loans accounted for 96 percent of federal borrowing, with about 60 
percent of this volume as subsidized loans.3 While these loans require the stu-
dent to fill out the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form, 
they are not subject to credit checks and do not require a cosigner. There are 
limits, however, to how much can be borrowed each year and over a student’s 
lifetime, and these limits have changed over time. 
The other major undergraduate federal student lending program is the 
PLUS Loan, which consists of loans to the students’ parents (or legal guard-
ians) rather than directly to the student herself. These also require the FAFSA
form to be filed. Unlike the Stafford Loan, PLUS Loans are subject to a credit 
check. 
Both the Stafford and PLUS Loans were administered under the Federal 
Family Educational Loan Program (FFELP) as well as the Direct program. 
Under FFELP, private lenders made loans to students under the terms set by 
the federal government and received subsidies to cover interest rate spread 
and nonpayment. Under the Direct program, the federal government acted as 
the lender. The FFELP ended in 2010, with all new loans operating under the 
Direct program. From the point of view of the borrower, there is practically no 
difference between the two programs, as terms and conditions are identical. 
Table 4B.1 shows the annual limits (in nominal dollars) for the Stafford 
program. Starting in July 2008, these limits were increased by $2,000 for each 
class year for dependent students (whose parents were not denied a PLUS 
Loan), but this higher limit was available only as an unsubsidized loan. 
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For independent students and dependent students whose parents were 
denied a PLUS Loan, the limits in Table 4B.1 were increased by the amounts 
shown in Table 4B.2, with these higher limits also available only as unsubsi-
dized loans. 
In addition to these annual loan limits, there are also cumulative lifetime 
limits on Stafford borrowing. Through 1986, this aggregate limit was $12,500. 
In 1987, the limit was raised to $17,500, and in October of 1992, it was raised 
again to $23,000. For subsidized loans, this (nominal) cap is still in place. For 
dependent students (whose parents were not denied a PLUS Loan), the lifetime 
Stafford limit was increased to $31,000 in July 2008, but amounts beyond 
$23,000 must be unsubsidized loans. For independent students (or dependent 
students whose parents were denied a PLUS Loan), the limit was increased 
to $46,000 in July 1994 and to $57,500 in July 2008, but again the balance 
beyond $23,000 must be unsubsidized loans. 
The PLUS Loan for parents was initially capped at $4,000 per year (and 
$20,000 per student lifetime), but this changed in 1993, with the annual limit 
set to the net cost of attendance (list price minus grants) and an unlimited life-
time amount. 
PRIVATE LOANS 
Private educational lending (not to be confused with FFELP loans, above) 
was practically nonexistent until the late 1990s, when attendance costs grew 
enough relative to the federal borrowing limits to create a market for addi-
tional lending. Private loans do not require a FAFSA but often do require credit 
checks and/or a cosigner. Their interest rates and fee structures are generally 
more variable than federal loans, with terms that are often worse except for 
the most creditworthy students. While there are no statutory borrowing lim-
its, borrowing is functionally limited by the net cost of attendance as well as 
creditworthiness. 
Among graduating seniors in 2008, 20 percent took out a private loan that 
year; these loans constituted 34 percent of total borrowing. (These numbers 
were up from 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in 2000.) Private loan 
volume decreased dramatically after 2008 in the wake of the Great Recession 
as private capital dried up, but it is expected to grow again as the economy 
improves, as long as education costs continue to grow faster than federal bor-
rowing limits. 
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Table 4B.1  Undergraduate Stafford Borrowing Limits, by Calendar
Year and Class Standing 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year + 
1977–1986 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 
1987–June 1993 2,625 2,625 4,000 4,000 
July 1993–June 2007 2,625 3,500 5,500 5,500 
July 2007–June 2012 3,500 4,500 5,500 5,500 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS. 
Table 4B.2  Supplemental Undergraduate Stafford Borrowing Limits, by 
Calendar Year and Class Standing 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year + 
1986–1994 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 
July 1994–June 2008 4,000 4,000 5,000 5,000 
July 2008– June 2012 6,000 6,000 7,000 7,000 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS. 
OTHER LOANS 
In addition to the federal and private lending programs, some states and 
educational institutions themselves have lending programs. These programs, 
however, are very small relative to federal and private loans. Less than 2 per-
cent of graduating seniors in 2008 received loans from states or educational 
institutions, and these loans made up less than 2 percent of the total loan vol-
ume for the same set of students. 
Finally, there are informal loans in which students borrow directly from 
their parents or other relatives and friends. Because these loans do not appear 
on credit reports, and because it is uncertain whether they are expected to be 
repaid, NPSAS stopped collecting data on them after 2000. 
Appendix Notes 
1. Much of the material in this appendix, including the timeline of changes and statu-
tory borrowing limits, is drawn from www.finaid.org and Dynarski and Scott-
Clayton (2013). 
2. Except for a brief period between 1978 and 1982, eligibility for subsidized loans 
has been means tested throughout the life of the program. 
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3. Almost all of the remaining 4 percent consists of Perkins Loans, which are intended 
for very low-income students and function similarly to subsidized Stafford Loans 
with slightly more generous terms. About 6 percent of graduating seniors in 2008 
received Perkins Loans, while 51 percent received Stafford Loans. 
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Supplemental Tables 
Table 4C.1  Summary Statistics of BA/BS Graduates from NPSAS 







Family income, independent 
1990 1996 2000 2004 2008 
96.7 96.3 97.2 105.5 
49.5 52.6 49.1 53.6 
81.9 85.5 84.8 93.7 
121.4 125.8 125.8 137.3 
31.1 39.6 39.5 34.3 
7.3 11.2 11.5 9.0 
20.2 26.9 28.5 23.5 
43.3 55.1 56.3 49.4 
15.4 16.2 17.2 19.4 
4.4 5.1 4.5 5.1 
11.0 12.0 11.7 14.8 
21.0 23.3 21.8 27.1 
7.2 8.0 7.9 6.0 
0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3.1 3.9 2.9 2.0 
10.2 11.3 10.1 8.0 
3.4 4.3 5.5 7.4 
8.4 8.4 9.4 11.2 
2.8 2.7 3.5 4.2 
4.7 4.8 5.5 7.0 
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Table 4C.1  (continued) 
1990 1996 2000 2004 2008 
List cost of attendance 
Missing (%) 8.8 3.4 5.6 5.5 7.4 
Mean 17.9 17.5 18.4 19.6 22.9 
25th 10.0 11.8 11.4 12.3 13.9 
Median 15.9 14.8 15.7 17.1 20.0 
75th 23.8 22.2 22.7 23.9 29.8 
Total grants 
Mean 2.2 2.8 3.4 3.9 4.9 
25th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Median 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.6 2.2 
75th 3.1 3.8 4.7 5.7 7.2 
Tuition net of grants 
Missing (%) 8.4 3.4 4.3 5.5 7.4 
Mean 4.3 5.6 4.9 5.5 6.2 
25th 0.8 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.0 
Median 2.4 3.4 3.1 3.6 4.3 
75th 5.3 7.4 6.8 7.6 9.3 
Cost of attendance net of 
grants 
Missing (%) 8.8 3.4 5.6 5.5 7.4 
Mean 15.7 14.8 14.9 15.7 17.9 
25th 8.2 9.3 8.9 9.1 10.2 
Median 13.7 13.2 13.4 13.8 16.0 
75th 21.0 18.1 18.4 19.6 23.3 
NOTE: Statistics use population weights and are for domestic students graduating with 
a bachelor’s degree in the year indicated. Monetary amounts (in $000) are infl ated to 
2012 using the PCE index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Family income is 
for the calendar year two years prior to graduation year; tuition (and required fees) 
is for the final year of enrollment for students who attended only one institution that 
year and is adjusted for attendance intensity. Cost of attendance is tuition plus room 
and board, books, travel, and other expenses (also adjusted for attendance intensity 
by NPSAS). 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
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Table 4C.2  Summary Statistics of BA/BS Graduates from NPSAS 
(Categorical Variables), by Wave 
1990 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Dependency status 
Dependent 59.0 58.7 58.2 59.1 62.0 
Independent 41.0 41.3 41.8 40.9 38.0 
Age 
Less than 21 3.9 1.5 2.0 6.1 6.9 
21 26.2 26.0 25.0 22.5 23.8 
22 26.1 22.9 24.0 23.5 23.6 
23 12.1 13.4 12.6 12.4 12.8 
24 6.1 6.8 6.3 6.3 6.3 
25–29 10.3 16.0 13.5 12.7 12.4 
30–34 5.5 4.3 5.7 5.7 4.9 
Older than 34 9.9 9.2 10.8 10.9 9.3 
Sex 
Male 45.3 43.5 42.5 42.1 42.7 
Female 54.7 56.5 57.5 57.9 57.3 
Marital status 
Single, divorced, 79.6 84.6 82.2 81.2 84.6 
widowed 
Married 19.7 15.1 16.9 17.5 14.4 
Separated 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.3 1.0 
Race/ethnicity 
White, non-Hispanic 86.2 82.7 75.6 73.6 70.5 
Black, non-Hispanic 5.7 6.0 8.2 9.2 10.0 
Hispanic 4.0 4.5 6.8 7.7 9.4 
Asian 3.6 5.9 6.2 6.2 7.2 
Native American/other 0.4 1.0 3.3 3.2 2.9 
Mother’s education 
Unknown 7.1 10.3 9.2 2.5 2.7 
Less than high school 7.4 5.0 6.8 6.8 6.1 
High school/GED 39.2 36.1 31.0 32.1 28.1 
Some college 19.6 18.2 19.1 23.5 26.2 
Bachelor’s 17.3 19.6 22.7 21.9 22.4 
Postgraduate 9.4 10.9 11.3 13.2 14.5 
(continued) 
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Table 4C.2  (continued) 
1990 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Father’s education 
Unknown 9.0 11.4 10.2 4.4 5.0 
Less than high school 8.3 6.0 8.0 8.3 7.0 
High school/GED 25.2 27.7 25.2 27.7 27.1 
Some college 14.7 10.3 14.7 18.8 20.3 
Bachelor’s 19.8 22.3 23.4 21.9 21.4 
Postgraduate 19.4 20.5 18.5 18.9 19.3 
Attendance pattern 
Full-time, full-year, 1 45.1 55.5 52.4 52.7 54.8 
school 
Full-time, full-year, 2+ 1.3 1.5 2.5 3.3 4.5 
school 
Full-time, part-year 16.0 11.9 18.0 13.5 13.1 
Part-time, full-year, 1 17.3 19.8 15.6 17.9 14.3 
school 
Part-time, full-year, 2+ 7.0 1.6 0.9 1.3 1.9 
schools 
Part-time, part-year 13.3 9.8 10.7 11.3 11.4 
Years to degree 
Unknown – 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Fewer than 4 – 1.6 12.6 10.8 8.9 
4 – 32.6 34.5 34.5 35.7 
5 – 24.4 21.3 22.6 21.0 
6 – 11.6 8.0 8.1 9.1 
7–9 – 12.6 9.2 9.3 10.9 
10 or more – 16.7 14.0 14.7 14.4 
Institution sector 
Public, nondoctoral 29.6 20.1 19.6 21.6 16.8 
Public, doctoral 36.4 44.8 46.3 45.8 49.0 
Private, NFP,a nondoc 19.5 21.9 19.7 17.9 15.0 
Private, NFP, doc 13.8 12.6 13.2 12.4 15.0 
Private, FPb 0.6 0.6 1.3 2.3 4.2 
Institution region 
New England 10.8 4.7 6.5 8.2 5.8 
Mid East 19.5 19.8 17.9 14.8 17.4 
Great Lakes 18.9 18.1 16.6 14.4 14.7 
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Table 4C.2  (continued) 
1990 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Plains 6.7 7.5 8.6 8.3 7.9 
Southeast 18.3 22.4 22.7 26.2 25.4 
Southwest 8.2 10.9 10.5 8.5 11.5 
Rocky Mts. 3.8 2.9 3.7 6.6 4.0 
Far West 13.8 13.8 13.5 13.2 13.5 
In-state student 
Yes, public 60.1 58.5 58.1 61.5 60.7 
Yes, private 22.0 22.5 21.8 22.2 22.2 
No 17.9 19.1 20.1 16.3 17.0 
Major 
Unknown 6.7 2.3 2.5 1.5 0.8 
Humanities 13.9 12.6 13.2 12.5 13.6 
Social sciences 14.6 17.3 16.8 15.5 14.7 
Life sciences 4.8 10.0 7.2 6.6 9.5 
Physical sciences/math 1.8 3.7 2.4 2.6 2.4 
Computer science 2.3 2.5 4.4 5.3 2.4 
Engineering 7.1 6.1 4.8 5.3 6.3 
Education 7.8 8.8 9.2 10.3 8.1 
Business 22.5 19.5 20.1 20.5 21.0 
Health 8.9 9.4 9.0 6.9 7.8 
Other 9.7 8.0 10.4 13.0 13.5 
a Not for profit. 
b For profit. 
NOTE: Statistics use population weights and are for domestic students graduating with 
a bachelor’s degree in the year indicated. Attendance pattern refers to the final year of 
enrollment. Years to degree refers to the difference between the calendar year of first 
postsecondary enrollment and the graduation year indicated. In-state students attend 
an institution in their state of legal residence. 
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Table 4C.3A  Recentered Influence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–1996, Using Tuition 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 2.01 (0.49) 0.58 (0.47) 6.35 (0.97) 4.55 (0.92) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.13 (0.13) 0.66 (0.20) 0.92 (0.27) 0.43 (0.24) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.12 (0.06) −0.02 (0.09) −0.06 (0.11) −0.11 (0.12) 
Parental education −0.07 (0.07) 0.16 (0.13) 0.16 (0.16) 0.13 (0.17) 
Location, in-state status −0.24 (0.20) −0.55 (0.32) −0.40 (0.40) −0.24 (0.49) 
School sector, attendance, major −0.11 (0.23) 0.54 (0.64) −0.23 (0.47) −0.14 (0.55) 
Expected family contribution 0.25 (0.09) 0.72 (0.17) 0.88 (0.21) 0.98 (0.22) 
Tuition and grants 1.14 (0.33) 0.72 (0.52) 1.65 (0.51) 0.44 (0.84) 
Total 1.22 (0.40) 2.23 (0.57) 2.92 (0.75) 1.49 (1.06) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.52 (0.67) 1.99 (0.55) 1.63 (1.36) −3.12 (1.30) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −1.90 (2.75) −3.44 (1.72) −2.44 (5.09) −3.83 (4.11) 
Parental education 0.29 (0.55) −0.23 (0.49) 0.18 (1.01) 1.60 (1.07) 
Location, in-state status 0.68 (0.81) 0.32 (0.59) −0.21 (1.39) −0.05 (1.55) 
School sector, attendance, major 1.88 (1.86) −0.57 (4.95) 5.60 (3.44) 3.36 (3.44) 
Expected family contribution −3.72 (0.85) −1.23 (0.72) −5.22 (1.62) −1.13 (1.41) 
Tuition and grants 2.92 (2.07) −1.76 (2.20) 7.31 (4.27) 9.98 (4.07) 
Constant 0.14 (3.78) 3.25 (6.14) −3.42 (7.98) −3.76 (6.69) 
Total 0.79 (0.50) −1.65 (0.55) 3.43 (0.95) 3.06 (1.33) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered influence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefficients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 






















   
   
 
Table 4C.3B  Recentered Influence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–1996, Using Cost of Attendance 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 2.01 (0.49) 0.58 (0.47) 6.35 (0.97) 4.55 (0.92) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.13 (0.11) 0.63 (0.19) 0.76 (0.24) 0.25 (0.23) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.18 (0.07) −0.02 (0.09) −0.07 (0.12) −0.13 (0.14) 
Parental education −0.06 (0.07) 0.17 (0.14) 0.15 (0.17) 0.14 (0.18) 
Location, in-state status −0.26 (0.20) −0.54 (0.31) −0.50 (0.41) −0.32 (0.50) 
School sector, attendance, major 0.09 (0.19) 0.12 (0.28) −0.15 (0.45) 0.12 (0.57) 
Expected family contribution 0.27 (0.10) 0.71 (0.18) 0.89 (0.21) 0.95 (0.22) 
Attendance cost and grants 0.40 (0.19) 0.94 (0.28) 0.80 (0.41) 0.19 (0.42) 
Total 0.73 (0.38) 2.00 (0.52) 1.88 (0.74) 1.19 (0.80) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.65 (0.67) 1.89 (0.55) 1.73 (1.34) −3.21 (1.32) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −3.02 (2.97) −4.04 (1.72) −4.43 (5.37) −5.87 (4.50) 
Parental education 0.39 (0.56) −0.17 (0.48) 0.42 (1.02) 1.69 (1.09) 
Location, in-state status 0.68 (0.84) 0.19 (0.60) −0.40 (1.39) −0.25 (1.57) 
School sector, attendance, major 0.02 (1.69) 1.54 (1.56) 1.36 (3.46) −1.73 (3.46) 
Expected family contribution −3.75 (0.85) −1.58 (0.71) −6.15 (1.59) −2.22 (1.43) 
Attendance cost and grants 0.72 (2.77) −9.79 (3.30) 2.93 (6.41) 5.66 (5.47) 
Constant 5.60 (4.27) 10.54 (4.09) 9.00 (9.07) 9.30 (7.89) 
Total 1.28 (0.49) −1.43 (0.50) 4.47 (0.96) 3.36 (1.11) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered influence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefficients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS. 
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Table 4C.4A  Recentered Influence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1996–2000, Using Tuition 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 5.12 (0.46) 8.45 (0.60) 6.78 (0.83) 9.41 (0.86) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.04 (0.12) 0.01 (0.04) −0.05 (0.15) −0.12 (0.31) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.13 (0.14) 0.07 (0.06) 0.05 (0.21) 0.01 (0.15) 
Parental education −0.04 (0.15) −0.06 (0.09) 0.08 (0.33) −0.10 (0.29) 
Location, in-state status 0.11 (0.17) −0.08 (0.15) 0.31 (0.46) 0.03 (0.39) 
School sector, attendance, major 0.37 (0.16) 0.35 (0.17) 0.07 (0.53) 0.70 (0.52) 
Expected family contribution −0.32 (0.18) −0.43 (0.11) −1.12 (0.31) −0.68 (0.20) 
Tuition and grants −0.12 (0.32) −0.52 (0.25) −0.83 (0.86) −0.54 (0.85) 
Total 0.18 (0.51) −0.67 (0.33) −1.50 (1.12) −0.70 (1.02) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −1.06 (0.63) −2.65 (0.67) −1.58 (1.23) −3.59 (1.21) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.05 (2.69) 1.21 (1.61) 1.38 (4.68) −0.57 (4.29) 
Parental education −0.02 (0.47) 1.55 (0.49) −0.92 (0.75) −1.37 (0.83) 
Location, in-state status −0.39 (0.68) 0.71 (0.82) 0.18 (1.33) −1.33 (1.43) 
School sector, attendance, major −0.78 (1.46) −4.91 (1.44) −3.65 (2.75) −2.64 (2.69) 
Expected family contribution 2.12 (0.88) −5.55 (0.88) 5.85 (1.62) 1.13 (1.42) 
Tuition and grants −0.31 (1.96) 8.59 (2.09) −8.68 (3.98) −2.51 (3.61) 
Constant 5.33 (3.58) 10.17 (3.05) 15.69 (7.18) 20.99 (6.40) 
Total 4.94 (0.48) 9.13 (0.62) 8.28 (1.13) 10.10 (1.11) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered influence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefficients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 
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Table 4C.4B  Recentered Influence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1996–2000, Using Cost of Attendance 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 5.12 (0.46) 8.45 (0.60) 6.78 (0.83) 9.41 (0.86) 
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.05) 0.01 (0.13) −0.07 (0.28) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.15 (0.14) 0.08 (0.06) 0.10 (0.20) 0.03 (0.15) 
Parental education −0.07 (0.15) −0.08 (0.09) −0.03 (0.34) −0.16 (0.29) 
Location, in-state status 0.13 (0.18) −0.13 (0.16) 0.11 (0.46) −0.15 (0.40) 
School sector, attendance, major 0.39 (0.15) 0.42 (0.16) 0.39 (0.50) 0.78 (0.51) 
Expected family contribution −0.31 (0.18) −0.45 (0.12) −1.19 (0.33) −0.73 (0.21) 
Attendance cost and grants 0.21 (0.35) −0.37 (0.25) −0.61 (0.87) −0.30 (0.82) 
Total 0.51 (0.53) −0.52 (0.35) −1.22 (1.13) −0.59 (1.04) 
Structural effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −1.09 (0.63) −2.23 (0.65) −1.97 (1.18) −3.40 (1.20) 
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.57 (2.88) 1.55 (1.59) 2.11 (4.97) 0.16 (4.56) 
Parental education −0.15 (0.48) 1.39 (0.49) −1.18 (0.76) −1.56 (0.83) 
Location, in-state status −0.32 (0.70) 0.87 (0.83) 0.61 (1.32) −0.92 (1.46) 
School sector, attendance, major −0.80 (1.48) −6.45 (1.37) −2.76 (2.94) −2.31 (2.60) 
Expected family contribution 1.61 (0.86) −5.99 (0.86) 6.10 (1.59) 0.63 (1.45) 
Attendance cost and grants 2.58 (2.91) 21.80 (4.11) −2.13 (5.85) 5.49 (5.57) 
Constant 2.21 (4.28) −1.98 (4.47) 7.20 (8.24) 11.91 (7.62) 
Total 4.61 (0.49) 8.97 (0.63) 8.00 (1.12) 10.00 (1.12) 
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered influence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefficients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans). 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS. 
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Table 4C.5  Sample Sizes 
1990 1996 2000 2004 2008 
College graduates 3,270 1,340 12,230 5,170 23,340 
Weighted: college 724,000 897,000 1,217,000 1,448,000 1,822,000 
graduates 
NOTE: College graduates are oversampled in 2000 and 2008, as these years represent 
sampling frames for the Baccalaureate and Beyond longitudinal studies. Sample sizes 
are rounded to the nearest 10 (thousand for weighted numbers) to comply with dis-
closure restrictions. 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years. 
Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 115    1/28/2015 8:23:10 AM   
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When outstanding debt passed the $1 trillion mark two years ago, 
i t prompted many to question whether the student lending market is 
headed for a crisis, with many students unable to repay their loans 
and taxpayers being forced to foot the bill. Commentators have also 
expressed concerns that increasing education debt loads are making it 
more difficult for borrowers to start families, buy houses, and save for 
retirement (Brown and Caldwell 2013). There is clear evidence that the 
number of students taking on debt has been increasing and that debt 
burdens have been growing. However, the large and growing economic 
return to college education implies that many of these loans are financ-
ing sound investments. Consequently, it is not obvious that the growth 
in debt is problematic. Existing evidence is insufficient to determine 
what these changes mean for the financial well-being of borrowers and 
the health of the overall student lending market. 
The returns to a college degree are higher than they have ever been. 
In 2011, college graduates aged 23–25 earned $12,000 more per year 
on average than high school graduates in the same group, and they 
had employment rates 20 percentage points higher. Over the last 30 
years, the increase in lifetime earnings associated with earning a college 
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degree has grown by 75 percent, whereas costs have grown by 50 per-
cent (Greenstone and Looney 2012). These economic benefits accrue 
to individuals, but also to society in the form of increased tax revenue, 
improved health, and higher levels of civic participation (Baum, Ma, 
and Payea 2013). 
Today’s students are more likely than their predecessors to borrow 
and to take out larger loans to pay for tuition, fees, and living expenses 
while in college. Over the last 20 years, infl ation-adjusted published 
tuition and fees have more than doubled at four-year public institu-
tions and have increased by more than 70 percent at private four-year 
and public two-year colleges (Figure 5.1). The fact that the total out-
standing balance on student loans recently passed $1 trillion, combined 
with media reports of students with large debts—often in excess of 
$100,000—have garnered a great deal of public attention. However, the 
debt picture for the typical college graduate is not so dire. For example, 
bachelor’s degree recipients in 2011–2012 who took on student loan 
debt accumulated approximately $26,000 in student loan debt ($25,000 
at public institutions, and $29,900 at private, nonprofit institutions) 
(College Board 2013). Debt per borrower is growing rapidly (at an 
annual rate of 1.2 percent above inflation at nonprofit institutions and 
2.1 percent at public institutions), but it is still a manageable burden if 
the graduate is able to find gainful employment. Extremely high debt 
levels remain quite rare: in 2012, only 5 percent of borrowers with edu-
cation debt owed more than $100,000 (College Board 2013). 
In the United States, student lending takes place through two chan-
nels, the federal lending programs and the private market for student 
loans. The federal lending program exists because, in the absence of 
government intervention, the private market would provide too few 
students access to loans, which would result in underinvestment in 
education at the national level. The basis for this theory is that, unlike 
physical capital, human capital—or the skills that one obtains through 
education—cannot effectively serve as collateral for a loan. This makes 
student lending inherently risky, because a lender cannot foreclose on 
a student’s education the same way it can foreclose on a home if the 
borrower goes into default. More generally, the federal loan program 
ensures that all students have access to higher education, regardless of 
their ability to pay. 
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SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics (2012, Table 381). 
Most student lending takes place through the federal government 
because the interest rates offered in federal lending programs are below 
those typically offered by private lenders. Interest rates on federal loans 
are set by legislation and do not depend on the likelihood that a borrower 
will default. The amount that students can borrow from the government 
depends on whether they are financially dependent on their parents (as 
defined by a federal formula) and on their year in college (including 
whether they are a graduate student). Students from households judged 
to have more financial need are eligible to borrow a larger portion of 
their federal loans through the subsidized loan program, in which the 
government pays interest while the student is in school. Federal student 
loans carry additional benefits beyond the below-market interest rates 
and in-school interest subsidies for eligible families. Borrowers who 
face financial hardship after leaving college are eligible for deferral or 
reduction of monthly payments, and even forgiveness through a number 
of repayment programs. 
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Some students also borrow from private financial institutions, 
usually after they have exhausted their ability to borrow from the gov-
ernment. Unlike the loans offered in the federal lending programs, 
private lenders offer loans with interest rates that reflect a borrower’s
likelihood of default. This means that borrowers from low-income 
households or borrowers attending colleges with lower completion rates 
are likely to face the highest rates. In addition, private student loans 
carry less generous repayment terms than federal loans, an important 
distinction given that both federal and private student loans are more 
difficult to discharge in bankruptcy than other types of consumer debt. 
Despite the significant role that loans play in our nation’s higher 
education system and the increased attention to rising debt levels, there 
is little existing empirical evidence that attempts to explain these trends. 
In this chapter, we examine how education loan balances have evolved 
over time and measure the extent to which changes in degree attain-
ment, tuition, demographics, and borrowing behavior have contributed 
to the observed increase in student debt. 
BACKGROUND AND DATA 
The lack of empirical evidence available to support discussions 
about perceived problems in the student loan market is at least partly 
due to the limitations of existing data sources. The primary source of 
data on student aid is the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Sys-
tem (IPEDS). These data, which are derived from the Department of 
Education’s survey of all institutions participating in federal student aid 
programs, report institution-level lending variables, including total out-
lays within the federal loan program and number of borrowers. While 
this information is incredibly important, it does not tell the whole story. 
For instance, we cannot tell how the use of private loans has changed or 
how much debt students accumulate over time. 
In addition to the data available through IPEDS, the Department of 
Education publishes the findings from a few different longitudinal stud-
ies, including Baccalaureate and Beyond and Beginning Postsecondary 
Students, both of which draw their participants from the National Post-
secondary Student Aid Study. These studies track a specific cohort of 
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students for a set number of years. The Baccalaureate and Beyond study 
collects data for 10 years following graduation from a bachelor’s degree 
program, and the Beginning Postsecondary Students study collects data 
for 6 years following initial enrollment in postsecondary education. 
These longitudinal data sources enable us to observe cumulative debt 
burdens for student borrowers, but only for a select cohort of students. 
The most valuable feature of these studies for this area of research is 
that they collect information on both earnings and education liabilities. 
However, the small number of cohorts available and the relatively short 
period of observation limit the usefulness of these data. 
Two additional data sources not collected by the U.S. Department 
of Education have been used to answer questions about the evolution of 
the student loan market. First, the College Board has compiled annual 
reports that summarize both public and proprietary data on student bor-
rowing from both federal and private sources. The proprietary data are 
collected through a survey of institutions administered by the College 
Board. The annual, Web-based survey collects data from nearly 4,000 
accredited undergraduate colleges and universities. Although this data 
set succeeds in filling a void left by federal data, its usefulness is limited 
by the fact that the data are self-reported by institutions and thus are 
subject to inconsistencies in reporting and potential manipulation by 
institutions. 
Another data source that has been used to produce evidence on 
the student loan market is the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s 
(FRBNY) Consumer Credit Panel. These data, which are based on 
the proprietary data used in credit bureau reports, capture longitudi-
nal information on the debt portfolio of all individuals who have ever 
applied for credit. Researchers at the FRBNY have used this resource 
to compile data on the market for outstanding student loan debt. The 
primary shortcoming of these data for the purpose of understanding 
the state of the student loan market is that they do not capture much 
background information on borrowers, in particular, their level of edu-
cational attainment. 
The Federal Reserve Board administers a nationally representative 
survey that generates data with many of the features not available in the 
previously discussed data sources. The Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF) is administered every three years and collects information on 
household finances. Unlike the Consumer Credit Panel, the SCF gen-
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erates cross-sectional data. A key advantage of the SCF is that it links 
information on liabilities, including outstanding student loan debt, to 
data on earnings and demographics. Unlike the other data sources, the 
SCF is a household-level survey. This is advantageous for our analysis. 
Since financial decision making often takes place at the household level, 
individual analysis could easily misrepresent an individual’s financial 
well-being. Although the SCF lacks some background variables that 
would be useful to allow us to more fully understand the decision to 
take out education loans, it does report educational attainment, which 
is critical for this work. Since the SCF has been administered in a rela-
tively consistent manner since 1989, it allows for thorough analysis of 
changes over time for the full U.S. population. However, one limitation 
of the SCF is that, owing to its sampling procedures, it does not capture 
the liabilities of young adults living in a household headed by someone 
else, such as a parent. 
We use the SCF from 1989 to 2010 to track changes in student loan 
debt over time. We measure student loan debt as the total outstanding 
balance, measured in 2010 dollars, of all education debt held by house-
holds, calculated on a per-person basis (that is, we divided household 
debt by two for households with two adults). We apply survey weights 
throughout the analysis so that the results are representative of the U.S. 
population of households.1 
RESULTS 
Trends in Debt over Time 
The SCF data show a dramatic increase in education debt among 
households with an average age between 20 and 40. Table 5.1, with key 
indicators depicted in Figure 5.2, shows that the share of young U.S. 
households with education debt more than doubled in 2010, from 14 
percent in 1989 to 36 percent. Not only were more individuals taking out 
education loans, but they were taking out larger loans—not necessarily 
what you would expect as people cross the margin from being nonbor-
rowers to borrowers. Among households with positive debt, the mean 
per-person debt more than tripled, from $5,810 to $17,916. Median debt 
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Table 5.1  Incidence and Amount of Debt over Time, Age 20–40 
Those with debt 
Incidence Mean Mean Median 
Year (%) debt ($) ($) ($) Cell size 
1989 14 806 5,810 3,517 971 
1992 20 1,498 7,623 3,730 1,323 
1995 20 1,475 7,521 3,577 1,429 
1998 20 2,539 12,826 8,027 1,362 
2001 22 2,881 12,939 6,156 1,307 
2004 24 3,402 14,204 7,503 1,246 
2007 28 4,583 16,322 9,728 1,144 
2010 36 6,502 17,916 8,500 1,865 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF. 
Figure 5.2  Trends in Debt over Time, Households with Average Age 
20–40, 1989–2010 
20,000 40 
18,000 Mean debt (left axis) 
Median debt (left axis) 





































SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF. 
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Figure 5.3  Cumulative Distribution of Education Debt, Households with 
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Total education debt ($) 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF. 
grew somewhat less rapidly, from $3,517 to $8,500. Among all house-
holds, including those with no debt, mean debt increased eightfold, 
from about $800 to about $6,500. 
The change in the distribution of debt between 1989/1992 (com-
bined to increase precision) and 2010 is depicted in Figure 5.3, which 
shows the cumulative share of households with debt at or below a given 
level (density plots are shown in Figure 5.4). In the earlier period, not 
only was the incidence of debt low, but most borrowers had very small 
loan balances. Only a trivial number of households had more than 
$20,000 in debt (per person) in 1989/1992, whereas in 2010, about 10 
percent of households—or more than a quarter of those with debt—had 
balances exceeding $20,000. The incidence of very large debt balances 
is greater now than it was two decades ago, but it is still quite rare. In 
2010, 3 percent of all households, or about 8 percent of households with 
debt, had balances in excess of $50,000. 
Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 125    1/28/2015 8:23:16 AM     
Understanding Changes in the Distribution of Student Loan Debt 125 















20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 
Total education debt ($) 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF. 
The focus on the age range 20–40 allows us to examine households 
that are likely to be within the repayment period of student loans while 
also capturing individuals who potentially take on graduate as well as 
undergraduate debt.2 Because we focus on the remaining total balance 
of education debt, the trends over time we observe will refl ect changes 
in both borrowing and repayment behavior.3 In order to examine repay-
ment over time, we would ideally use a panel data set that tracks a 
cohort of individuals over a long period of time. As a rough approxi-
mation using the SCF data, we track a group of age cohorts over time. 
Specifi cally, we examine the education loan balances of the group that 
was aged 20–25 in 1989 or 1992 at three-year intervals through 2007 
and 2010, when those cohorts were aged 38–43 (we average over pairs 
of survey years in order to increase the precision of the results). 
The results of this descriptive analysis are shown in Figure 5.5. 
The share of this group with any education debt declines over time 
from 28 percent at ages 20–25 to 18 percent at ages 38–43. (The slight 
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Figure 5.5  Tracking Cohort Debt over Time, Age 20–25 in 1989/1992 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF. 
uptick between ages 35–40 and 38–43 could reflect a small number 
of loans taken for children in the household.) Among the remaining 
borrowers, mean debt increases dramatically, from less than $7,000 to 
more than $14,000. The combination of these two trends results in a 
mean debt level (including those without any debt) that increases from 
about $2,000 to about $2,500 over the roughly 20-year period that we 
observe, an increase of about 25 percent. We interpret these data as 
suggesting that many individuals are paying off their education loan 
balances during this time period, but some individuals are still taking on 
more debt (for graduate school or attending undergraduate programs at 
non-traditional ages) as they age, pushing up the balance of those with 
any debt. 
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Explaining Changes in Education Debt 
The large increases in education debt levels over the last two 
decades documented in the SCF data and other data sources are often 
attributed to the increases in tuition charged by colleges and universi-
ties. The tuition trends shown in Figure 5.1 certainly support that theory. 
But there is also evidence that college students are relying more on debt 
to finance college costs and paying less out-of-pocket (Greenstone and 
Looney 2013), suggesting that student behavior is changing in ways 
that favor loans over other ways of paying for college. Furthermore, 
there have been shifts in the educational attainment level and demo-
graphic characteristics of the U.S. college-age population that could 
impact observed student borrowing. 
We begin by examining the extent to which changes in education 
debt levels can be explained by changing population characteristics. We
primarily focus on educational attainment, given the fact that increased 
debt due to rising educational attainment may reflect rational human 
capital investments given the large and growing economic returns to 
education. Table 5.2 shows that educational attainment of households 
aged 20–40 rose between 1989 and 2010. The share of households with 
no college experience fell from 41 to 31 percent, the share with at least 
one person with a bachelor’s degree increased from 20 to 24 percent, 
Table 5.2  Summary Statistics, Household Level, Average Age 20–40 (%) 
Race/ethnicity of Maximum education 
household head of household 
High 
His- school Some Gradu-
Year White Black panic Other Couple or less college BA ate 
1989 72 11 11 6 62 41 29 20 9 
1992 71 14 10 5 61 37 29 25 9 
1995 73 14 9 4 59 36 31 23 10 
1998 71 14 11 4 62 36 32 21 11 
2001 68 16 12 4 60 38 28 23 11 
2004 67 15 14 4 58 34 31 23 12 
2007 63 16 15 6 62 33 33 22 12 
2010 62 15 17 6 58 31 32 24 13 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF. 
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and the share with at least one person with a graduate degree increased 
from 9 to 13 percent.4 
It is not surprising that education debt levels vary markedly by 
educational attainment, but debt trends also vary noticeably along this 
dimension, as shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. Among households with 
some college but no bachelor’s degree, the incidence of debt increased 
from 11 to 41 percent. Households where at least one member holds a 
bachelor’s degree saw an increase from 22 to 50 percent, and house-
holds with at least one graduate degree went from 33 to 58 percent. 
Among those with debt, the average per-person debt load increased 
135 and 162 percent among households with some college and a bach-
elor’s degree, respectively. Households with a graduate degree saw an 
increase of 311 percent, from just under $10,000 to more than $40,000. 
Given the rising levels of educational attainment over the 21-year 
period from 1989 to 1992 and the concentration of debt increases 
among the more educated, to what extent do the changes in attainment 
explain the changes in debt? We address this question by calculating 
what the average debt in 2010 would have been had educational attain-
ment remained at its 1989 level. We do this by calculating a weighted 
average of mean debt (including those without debt, in order to reflect 
changes in incidence) in 2010 by educational attainment, using the per-
centage of borrowers in the educational attainment category in 1989 as 
the weights. From 1989 to 2010, average debt increased from $806 to 
$6,502, a change of $5,696. Had attainment (measured as the maximum 
value in two-person households) remained the same, average debt in 
2010 would have been $5,343, a change of $4,538. In other words, the 
change in attainment explains about 20 percent of the observed change. 
We implement this approach for all years of data and report the 
results in Figure 5.8. As attainment increases over time, the gap between 
actual debt and the simulated debt with constant attainment grows. 
These calculations only take into account educational attainment and 
do so in a simple way by taking the maximum for households. We next 
implement a multivariate decomposition that allows us to more accu-
rately capture changes in educational attainment of the household and 
also adjust for race/ethnicity. Table 5.2 shows that, between 1989 and 
2010, the white share of the population fell and the Hispanic share rose. 
To the extent that race and debt are correlated, these changes could also 
have contributed to (or mitigated) rising debt levels. 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF and the Digest of Education 
Statistics. 
To more carefully account for changes in educational attainment 
and race, we implement a multivariate decomposition approach along 
the lines of the one used by Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner (2012). As 
above, we reweight the 1989 SCF to create a counterfactual distribu-
tion of debt in 2010 that captures what student debt would look like 
if population characteristics had remained constant between 1989 and 
2010. To do this, we stack the 1989 and 2010 data and run the following 
logit regression: 
I(Year = 1989) = β + δEdhh × Edsp + γRacehh + ϵ, 
where I(Year = 1989) is a dummy variable identifying whether the 
observation is from the year 1989 (as opposed to 2010), β is a constant, 
Edhh × Edsp is a vector of dummy variables identifying the full set of 
interactions between the educational attainment of the household head 
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households where there is no spouse), Racehh is a vector of dummies 
identifying the race of the household head, and ϵ is the error term. We
then obtain predicted values Î from the logit regression and calculate a 
set of weights   (which we combine with the SCF survey weights).5   
We first confirm that the reweighting procedure is working correctly 
by reporting summary statistics for 1989, 2010, and 2010 with the 
reweighting. Table 5.3 shows that the reweighting produces summary 
statistics for 2010 that are nearly identical to the actual statistics for 
1989, in all cases to within one percentage point. 
We then apply these weights to the 2010 data to calculate an esti-
mate of what debt would have been in 2010 had educational attainment
and race remained at their 1989 values. We find that mean per-per-
son debt (among all households) would have been $4,932 (instead of 
$6,502) in 2010 had educational attainment and race remained at their 
1989 values. In other words, the variables included in the decomposi-
tion exercise explain 28 percent of the observed change.6 
We next explore how much changes in education debt can be 
explained by rising college tuition. Ideally, we would implement this as 
follows: 1) measure how much each individual paid for his or her edu-
cation; 2) measure how much they would have paid 21 years prior (i.e., 
the number of years between 1989 and 2010); 3) calculate the causal 
effect of price on debt; and 4) calculate how much debt they would have 
taken out had they faced the prices from 21 years prior by multiplying 
Table 5.3  Summary Statistics, Household Level, Average Age 20–40 (%) 
2010 
1989 2010 reweighted 
Maximum education 
High school or less 41 31 42 
Some college 29 32 29 
BA 20 24 20 
Graduate 9 13 9 
Race/ethnicity of household head 
White 72 62 72 
Black 11 15 11 
Hispanic 11 17 11 
Other 6 6 6 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF. 
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the effect of price on debt by the difference between actual tuition paid 
and the counterfactual tuition (from 21 years prior). 
This is not possible for two main reasons. First, the SCF does not 
contain information on how much respondents paid for their educa-
tion or even the institutions they attended—only the highest degree 
obtained. Second, it is far from straightforward to estimate the causal 
effect of price on debt, and we are unaware of any research on the topic. 
As a rough substitute, we instead deflate the 2010 distribution of debt 
to a simulated 1989 level using data on published tuition and fees by 
year, assuming that the percentage increase in debt is the same as the 
percentage increase in published tuition. 
Specifically, for each individual we calculate counterfactual debt in 
2010 as the actual debt multiplied by the ratio of counterfactual tuition 
(average tuition 21 years prior to when the respondent was age 20) to 
actual tuition (average tuition when the respondent was age 20).7 For 
example, a household with an average age of 34 in 2010 is assigned 
an actual tuition from 1996 (i.e., at age 20) and a counterfactual tuition 
from 1975 (i.e., 21 years prior to age 20). Tuition is calculated as a 
weighted average of published tuition and fees at two-year, public 
four-year, and private four-year institutions across the country, using 
enrollment shares as weights (National Center for Education Statistics, 
various years). We use published tuition and fees, even though net price 
(tuition and fees less grant and scholarships) would be a better mea-
sure because the latter is not available for a sufficiently long period of 
time.8 As a result, we likely overstate the contribution of rising prices 
to growth in debt. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5.4. The tuition 
adjustment explains 58 percent of the 1989–2010 increase in mean 
debt. Combining the tuition adjustment with the reweighting proce-
dure, which adjusts for changes in educational attainment and race, 
increases to 72 percent the share of the change explained. Our use of 
published rather than net price implies that this is an overestimate, but it 
still leaves 28 percent of the change unexplained. This remaining share 
of the change could be the result of some combination of changes in 
characteristics not measured in the SCF data and changes in borrowing 
behavior. 
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Table 5.4  Decomposition of Changes in Mean Debt, 1989–2010 
Change from Share of change 
Mean debt ($) 1989 ($) explained (%) 
1989 debt 806 
2010 debt 
No adjustment 6,502 5,696 0 
Applying 1989 characteristics 4,932 4,126 28 
Applying 1989 tuition 3,194 2,388 58 
Applying 1989 characteristics 2,402 1,596 72 
and tuition 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF and the Digest of Education 
Statistics. 
CONCLUSION 
The media has provided many anecdotes about recent graduates 
with large amounts of student loan debt who are in fi nancial distress, 
often living in their parents’ basements. Data on the distribution of loan 
debt, both from the SCF and other sources, indicate that extremely large 
debt burdens remain exceptional cases. Our analysis of the SCF data 
also provides some initial estimates of the role that different factors 
have played in driving up student debt over the last two decades. Rising 
educational attainment explains some of the trend, and debt data disag-
gregated by highest degree earned suggest that graduate education has 
played a particularly important role, especially for the cases of large 
debt balances. 
Tuition is also a likely culprit, although the limitations of historical 
data on tuition make it difficult to tell exactly how much. Our analysis 
suggests that inflation in published prices may account for upward of 
60 percent of the increase in debt, leaving a significant share of the 
rise in debt that is unexplained. This fact, coupled with evidence that 
students are substituting away from paying for college out-of-pocket 
toward financing (Greenstone and Looney 2013), suggests that behav-
ioral shifts may account for some of the increase in education debt. 
These analyses do not shed light on whether the increasing loan 
burdens taken on to finance education are leading to fi nancial hardship 
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for borrowers. To the extent that increases in attainment are the culprit, 
at least some of the increase in debt has financed sound investments. 
But there are surely cases of investments in education that did not pay 
off or did not even result in a degree. Expanding this analysis to exam-
ine debt-to-income ratios and other measures of financial distress is a 
ripe area for future research. 
Notes 
1. The use of survey weights in the SCF is particularly important because the sample 
design oversamples high-income households to properly measure the full distribu-
tion of wealth and assets in the United States. This high-income sample makes up 
approximately 25 percent of households in the SCF. 
2. In addition, the SCF does not record the individual associated with loan origina-
tion. Therefore, with individuals no older than 40, we are more confident that the 
loans on their balance sheets are associated with an adult rather than a child in the 
household. 
3. The SCF collects data on the size of loan at origination, but this refers to the date 
of most recent loan terms, which includes consolidation. Thus, we are not able to 
measure the size of loans taken out while enrolled for all households. 
4. We find similar attainment trends after converting the household-level SCF data 
into individual-level data (assigning one-half the survey weight to each individ-
ual in a two-person household). These summary statistics are available from the 
authors upon request. 
5. Specifically, we use weights that are the product of the weights generated by the 
logit regression and the original survey weights. 
6. These types of reweighting exercises assume that the relative borrowing behavior 
of demographic groups remains constant over time. This is obviously a strong 
assumption, and understanding changes in borrowing behavior is left for future 
research. 
7. We calculate the years to use for tuition using the average age of the household 
rounded to the nearest year. 
8. Our tuition data series begins in 1971. We proxy for 1969 and 1970 tuition levels 
using the 1971 value. 
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Perhaps no culprit has been more incriminated for the rising levels 
of student loan debt in the United States than for-profit postsecond-
ary institutions. Two trends have drawn a great deal of attention to this 
sector. First, students at for-profit institutions disproportionately accrue 
federal student loan disbursements, leading to concern about the use of 
public funds and debt burden on students in the sector. Second, student 
loan default rates are higher at this group of institutions than other sec-
tors on average, calling into question relative employment prospects. 
There is still much to learn, however, about the student context of these 
high-level trends, and research on student lending and the for-profit 
sector remains underdeveloped. Using student-level nationally rep-
resentative data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 
(NPSAS), we analyze student borrowing trends over the past decade, 
with a particular focus on the behavior of students in for-profit institu-
tions compared to students in other sectors.1 
An impediment to understanding relative student outcomes in the 
for-profit sector is the unique nature of students served. Descriptive 
research informs us that the sector disproportionately enrolls financially 
independent and low-income students (Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012) 
such that credit is necessary for many of these students to invest in their 
137 



















138 Cellini and Darolia 
human capital. Therefore, we push further than previous research to also 
ask whether borrowing patterns differ by various measures of financial 
need and available resources. We further examine preferences for bor-
rowing relative to other available financing options such as working, 
grants, and family transfers to provide a better understanding of debt 
behavior in the context of the financial constraints these students face. 
As expected, we find that students at for-profit institutions are much 
more likely to borrow than students in public and nonprofi t institutions. 
We also find that, over the past decade, the incidence of borrowing has 
risen more steeply than borrowing in other sectors. These high bor-
rowing rates lead to higher average borrowing by students in for-profit 
institutions than students in public and nonprofit institutions. Published 
tuition in the for-profit sector has risen substantially over the last decade, 
following patterns similar to those making headlines in the public and 
nonprofit sectors. But unlike other sectors, grant aid has not risen with 
tuition in the for-profit sector, leading to increases in the net price that 
students pay. In particular, we observe increases in institutional aid in 
the private nonprofit sector that accompany tuition increases but find 
little evidence of this type of support in the for-profit sector. Student 
borrowing in the for-profit sector has risen dramatically to meet the ris-
ing net price. 
Our examination of financial resources reveals that students attend-
ing for-profit institutions have the lowest available personal and family 
resources to contribute to higher education costs, relative to students 
in other sectors. Not only do they have the lowest calculated expected 
family contribution (EFC) according to financial aid formulas, but it is 
also less likely that they or their parents own a home or have substantial 
investment or business assets. Given their relative lack of resources, it 
is not surprising that these students turn to the credit market to finance 
their education. Students in the for-profit sector also work longer hours 
and are more likely to work full time than students in the public four-
year or private nonprofit sectors (and at levels that are generally similar 
to public two-year college students). Therefore, the high borrowing 
rates of for-profit students do not appear to simply refl ect preferences 
for debt over working. Rather, they both seem to be working and bor-
rowing at relatively high rates. 
Paradoxically, students in for-profit institutions are most similar 
to public community college students in the degrees they seek, their 
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demographics, and their financial resources, yet their costs and their 
debt burdens are on par with students in private nonprofi t institutions 
who typically seek bachelor’s degrees from institutions with long-
standing reputations and higher expected postcollege incomes. Why 
are the most disadvantaged students attending relatively expensive for-
profi t institutions? 
We cannot provide an answer here, but our findings highlight the 
policy importance of the question. An economically rational student will 
decide whether to attend higher education by comparing the expected 
benefits of school, such as higher earnings, against expected costs, 
including tuition and forgone earnings. The answer to the question, 
therefore, may be that advantages offered by for-profit colleges, such 
as lower opportunity costs associated with convenient class schedules 
and streamlined programs, make for-profit education an appropriate 
choice for judicious and shrewd students. This may be of little concern 
for policymakers. On the other hand, policymakers may be rightfully 
concerned if students are making choices while lacking information or 
being misled. 
BACKGROUND ON FOR-PROFITS AND DEBT 
Across all sectors of higher education, student borrowing plays 
an important role in ensuring access to higher education for low- and 
middle-income students. Yet, evidence that credit constraints affect 
educational attainment is mixed. Ellwood and Kane (2000) and Belley 
and Lochner (2007) find some support that credit constraints impact 
college going, while Cameron and Taber (2004) and Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner (2008) find little evidence in that regard. 
Whether students borrow “too much” or “too little” is subject to 
debate, though analyses of typical debt burdens and returns to college 
do not indicate that average student borrowing behavior, even at cur-
rent higher levels, is a serious concern (see Avery and Turner [2012] 
and Baum and Schwartz [2006] for a more detailed discussion). Loans 
can promote access to higher education by lowering costs, and research 
indicates that social benefits to higher education can exceed private ben-
efits (Wolfe and Haveman 2002). Therefore, a robust educational credit 
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market can have both equity and effi ciency benefits. On the other hand, 
debt burdens can lower expected future consumption, since relatively 
large portions of some borrowers’ incomes will be dedicated to making 
loan payments. Evidence also indicates that high debt can potentially 
alter choices about early career decisions (Field 2009; Rothstein and 
Rouse 2011) and other choices (Gicheva 2011). 
If not properly managed, student debt can impair access to other 
credit markets, making it more difficult for students to borrow money 
to purchase assets such as houses or to guard against income or asset 
shocks. Debt burdens, therefore, should be considered in relation to 
the expected benefits associated with borrowing. For student loans, the 
prominent private benefit is higher expected earnings associated with 
completed college. For the average student, college earnings premiums 
have grown, even when taking into account increasing college costs 
(Avery and Turner 2012). Therefore, modest increases in student bor-
rowing for the average student may not be a source of public concern. 
Returns to college investments, however, are heterogeneous across 
student characteristics and abilities, as well as institutions. Therefore, 
not every student will earn the average wage premium to college, and 
students are not evenly stratified across school sectors and types. In fact, 
several recent studies on the returns to for-profit college attendance sug-
gest that for-profit students generate earnings gains that are lower than 
those of students in other sectors (Cellini and Chaudhary 2012; Dem-
ing, Goldin, and Katz 2012; Turner 2012). Among associate’s degree 
students, estimates of returns to for-profit attendance are generally in 
the range of 2–7 percent per year of education, compared to upward of 
9 percent in the public sector (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2005; 
Jepsen, Troske, and Coomes 2014).2 Assessing returns from a different 
angle, Cellini (2012) calculates that the earnings gains needed to offset 
the cost of one year of an associate’s degree program in a for-profit 
college must be equal to or greater than 8.5 percent for students to see 
net benefits. Current estimates fall just short of this threshold. Still, the 
literature on the returns to for-profit education is quite thin. We know 
little about how returns have changed over time, and this has important 
implications for our understanding of the temporal patterns of student 
borrowing discussed below. 
Complicating the policy discussion is that publicly subsidized 
federal student loans are the most common source of borrowing for col-
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lege students. Federal loans include Stafford Loans, Perkins Loans, and 
PLUS Loans for parents. While these loan programs have been widely 
touted as improving access to higher education for low-income students 
in “traditional” nonprofit and public institutions, they have come under 
increasing scrutiny for their role in supporting the growth of the for-
profi t sector. 
For-profit students receive a disproportionate share of federal aid. 
In recent years, for-profit students composed just over 10 percent of 
postsecondary enrollment but received about double that proportion of 
federal Pell Grant and subsidized student loan disbursements (College 
Board 2013). As we show below, tuition averages about $10,000 per 
year, and for-profits may be raising tuition to maximize their federal aid 
(Cellini and Goldin forthcoming). Of course, another explanation for 
the high aid receipt is that for-profits tend to enroll more disadvantaged 
students than nonprofits. Deming, Goldin, and Katz (2012) report that 
among first-time college students, for-profit institutions serve a higher 
proportion of women, minority students, GED recipients, and single 
parents than other sectors. Many of these characteristics are associated 
with lower financial resources. We explore these patterns further using 
NPSAS data in the analysis that follows. 
Disproportionate borrowing alone may not be a problem if dis-
advantaged students can easily pay back their debt after graduation. 
More troubling is that student loan default rates are much higher in the 
for-profit sector than in other sectors. Three-year cohort default rates 
from 2009 are over 22 percent in the for-profit sector compared to 8.4 
percent for public community colleges. Two other estimates produced 
by the U.S. Department of Education, but not used for Title IV eligibil-
ity, yield even higher default rates for for-profit students. Estimates of 
“cumulative lifetime default rates” based on the number of loans, rather 
than borrowers, yield a rate of about 31 percent for cohorts graduat-
ing between 2005 and 2009. The highest estimate uses dollars, rather 
than loans or borrowers, to estimate defaults and is used in the presi-
dent’s budget. By this measure, lifetime defaults are around 48 percent 
for two-year for-profit students (U.S. Department of Education 2011). 
These patterns have raised the suspicions of policymakers and led the 
Obama administration to propose new regulations on restricting fed-
eral student aid to for-profit institutions (see Darolia [2013b] for further 
discussion). 
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There is a small but growing literature on for-profit colleges in 
economics. Many studies describe student demographics and program 
offerings at for-profit institutions (Apling 1993; Bailey, Badway, and 
Gumport 2001; Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012; Rosenbaum, Deil-
Amen, and Person 2006; Turner 2006).3 Administrative licensing data 
has added to our knowledge of these institutions in recent years and 
allowed for causal studies of competition in the two-year college mar-
ket (Cellini 2009) and a more accurate count of for-profit institutions 
(Cellini and Goldin forthcoming). And, as noted above, several authors 
have exploited new sources of student-level data to estimate the labor 
market returns to a for-profit education (Cellini and Chaudhary 2012; 
Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012; Lang and Weinstein 2013; Turner 
2013). 
Several studies on the relationship between financial aid policy 
and institutional behavior are particularly relevant to this study. Cel-
lini (2010) finds that for-profit college openings and closings correlate 
with the generosity of federal aid in the Pell Grant program. Cellini 
and Goldin (forthcoming) find that for-profit institutions participating 
in federal grant and loan programs charge tuition that is 78 percent 
higher than similar programs in institutions that are not eligible for aid. 
In absolute terms, they find that the dollar value of tuition difference 
is similar to the value of the aid the institution receives, suggesting 
that institutions may capture federal student aid. Turner (2013) looks 
more closely at the incidence of the Pell Grant program and fi nds that 
for-profit institutions behave no differently than nonselective nonprofit 
institutions, capturing around 20 percent of students’ Pell Grant awards 
through reductions in institutional aid. Finally, Darolia (2013a) finds 
that the loss of federal aid because of high cohort default rates leads 
to declines in annual enrollment at for-profit colleges that exceed 16 
percent. This indicates that the federal government has powerful policy 
levers at its disposal to determine where and if students attend college 
by regulating which institutions can disburse aid. 
We build on this literature and focus on changes over time in stu-
dent borrowing in the for-profit sector. We begin to untangle the myriad 
of possible explanations for the time trends we observe, bringing new 
data to bear on questions of student resources and work behavior. Our 
results have important implications for the design of federal student aid 
policies and the regulation of for-profi t colleges. 
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DATA 
To examine trends in postsecondary borrowing and financing 
behavior of undergraduate students in the United States, we use the four 
most current available complete waves of the NPSAS. Coordinated by 
the U.S. Department of Education, NPSAS combines institutional and 
governmental records with student surveys to produce nationally rep-
resentative repeated cross-sectional student-level data with information 
on how students pay for their postsecondary expenses. The advantages 
of these data are their relatively large sample sizes and particularly 
detailed information about students’ financial backgrounds and college 
fi nancing strategies. 
We use study waves from the 1995–1996, 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 
and 2007–2008 school years.4 Each wave contains information on 
between 41,000 (in 1995–1996) and 105,000 (in 2007–2008) under-
graduate students surveyed at random from institutions participating 
in federal student aid programs under Title IV of the Higher Educa-
tion Act of 1965.5 For our analysis, we use measures of borrowing, aid, 
and other amounts for that year, with all dollars reported in constant 
2008 terms. We restrict the sample to undergraduate students but con-
sider yearly figures similarly across the year students are in school and 
enrollment intensity. 
We group schools into four distinct types: 1) for-profit institu-
tions, 2) public institutions that offer programs of two years or less,6 3) 
public institutions that offer four-year programs, and 4) private, non-
profit institutions. Note that both the for-profit and nonprofit groups 
include all levels of institutions—less-than-two-year, two-year, and 
four-year—but the composition of the institutions in each sector differs 
substantially. In 2007–2008 almost 95 percent of private not-for-profit 
postsecondary institutions were four-year colleges, compared to just 47 
percent of for-profit institutions (National Center for Education Statis-
tics 2013, Table 306).7 We include unweighted counts of observations 
by year and school sector in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1  Sample Summary 
For- Public Public Private 
profit two-year four-year nonprofit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Student characteristics (2007–2008) 
Enrolled in a certifi cate program 
(%) 
Enrolled in an associate’s degree 
program (%) 
Enrolled in a bachelor’s degree 
program (%) 





Age at time of survey 
Age at the start of postsecondary 
education 
Years delayed entry into 
postsecondary education 
First-generation immigrant (%) 
Second-generation immigrant (%) 
Current or past military service (%) 
Parent(s) completed high school or 
higher (%) 
Parent(s) completed bachelor’s
degree or higher (%) 
Independent (%) 
Single parent (%) 
Number of dependents 
Risk index 










































































NOTE: Survey weights used. Sample sizes rounded to the nearest 10. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
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STUDENT FINANCING TRENDS: SIMILARITIES 
AND CONTRASTS 
We begin by describing borrowing behavior over time. In the sec-
tions that follow, we examine various explanations for these substantial 
differences in student borrowing both across sectors and over time 
within the for-profit sector. The relatively high sticker costs of for-profit 
colleges and relatively low grant aid and personal financial resources 
available to students who attend these schools leave a relatively large 
amount of unmet need for students. While for-profit students appear to 
be working at comparatively high rates, this behavior does not appear 
to prevent students from borrowing at high rates or levels. 
Borrowing 
Table 6.2 presents the average borrowing behavior of students 
for the 2007–2008 school year. A remarkable 87 percent of for-profit 
students borrow money of some kind, compared to just 14 percent of 
public two-year students, 48 percent of public four-year students, and 
60 percent of private nonprofi t students.8 Not surprisingly, most student 
borrowers obtain loans through federal programs. In the for-profit sec-
tor, 81 percent of students receive federal loans. Relative to students in 
other sectors, for-profit students are much more likely to supplement 
federal borrowing with borrowing from nonfederal sources, but just 6 
percent borrowed only from nonfederal sources, as shown in the bottom 
part of the table. 
Figure 6.1 displays the trend of percentage of students who borrow 
(from any source) from 1996 to 2008. While the relative position of 
schools in this trend stays constant, and all schools experience a posi-
tive upward trend of the percentage of students borrowing, the for-profit 
sector experienced a 30 percentage point increase in the proportion of 
students borrowing since 1996, whereas the increase for the other three 
sectors were all below 15 percentage points. The upward trend in bor-
rowing is notable in the most recent period, climbing from 75 percent 
in 2004 to 87 percent in 2008. 
In addition to the high (and climbing) proportion of students bor-
rowing, the first row of Table 6.2 reveals that for-profit students also 
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Table 6.2  Average Per Student Borrowing (2007–2008) 
Public Public Private 
For-profit two-year four-year nonprofit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rates of student borrowing (%) 
Borrowed any loans 87 14 48 60 
Borrowed federal loans 81 11 43 56 
Borrowed nonfederal loans 41 5 15 25 
Borrowed both federal and 36  2  10  21  
nonfederal loans 
Borrowed federal, but not 45  9  33  34  
nonfederal loans 
Borrowed nonfederal, but not 6 3 5 4 
federal loans 
Average per student borrowing, 
including all students ($) 
Total loans 7,319 632 3,713 6,530 
Federal loans 4,842 457 2,793 4,227 
Subsidized federal loans 2,256 253 1,350 2,007 
Parent PLUS Loans 485 23 570 1,190 
Nonfederal loans 2,477 175 920 2,303 
Private loans 2,423 172 856 2,210 
Average loan amount for those 
who borrow each loan type ($) 
Total loans 8,457 4,424 7,769 10,955 
Federal loans 5,975 4,053 6,454 7,602 
Subsidized federal loans 2,888 2,768 3,870 4,214 
Parent PLUS Loans 9,099 7,073 9,558 13,657 
Nonfederal loans 6,026 3,586 6,156 9,087 
Private loans 5,990 3,652 6,142 9,225 
NOTE: Survey weights used. Total loans include parent PLUS Loans. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
have the highest average yearly total loan amounts when considering all 
students (whether they borrow or not). The for-profit sample has an aver-
age debt load of over $7,000 per year, a figure even higher than private 
nonprofit students, who borrow about $6,500 per year. We display the 
trend of average student borrowing in Figure 6.2. Per-student borrow-
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Figure 6.1  Percentage of Students Borrowing 











1996 2000 2004 2008 
NOTE: Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
ing is increasing in all sectors, but the rate of increase and the relative 
position of for-profit institutions is the highest among all sectors. 
These are annual borrowing figures, such that total debt would 
depend on the accrual over the whole time the student is in college, 
and could therefore be lower for for-profit than private nonprofit stu-
dents overall, as for-profit programs are generally shorter (more on this 
below). If we assume that the average for-profit student attends for two 
years and the average nonprofit student attends for four, the total amount 
borrowed comes to $14,000 for for-profits and $26,000 for nonprofits.9 
Note that the average per student borrowing in Table 6.2 and Figure 
6.2 display averages that are taken across all students rather than just 
borrowers. Averages conditional on borrowing are listed in the bottom 
part of Table 6.2. Averages for for-profit student borrowers increase 
modestly to about $8,400, since almost all students borrow, but the 
figures become much higher for other sectors because of lower propor-
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Figure 6.2  Average Loan Amount 











1996 2000 2004 2008 
NOTE: All dollars in constant 2008 dollars. Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
tions of borrowers. Notably, when considering loan volume of only the 
60 percent of students who borrow in the private nonprofit sector, aver-
age loan amounts exceed those of for-profit students, at almost $11,000, 
while the average loan volume among borrowers in public two-year and 
four-year institutions remains below that of for-profi t students. 
Table 6.2 also displays the composition of loans across sectors. 
In dollar terms, federal loans make up the largest portion of for-profit 
student borrowing, and just under half of these loans are federally subsi-
dized. About a third of for-profit student loans are from private lenders. 
Overall, the patterns of for-profit student borrowing look similar to 
private nonprofit borrowing. Figure 6.3 presents the categorization of 
student loan types by school sector over time. Although borrowing has 
increased across all sectors, the for-profit sector saw borrowing increase 
by the largest loan dollar amount between 1996 and 2008. 
It is also worth noting that private loan dollars increased most sub-
stantially in the for-profit sector. This trend could be interpreted in a 
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NOTE: All dollars in constant 2008 dollars. Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
couple of different ways. Since private lender loans often have less 
favorable terms than federal loans, this could be troubling given the 
expected debt burden on this group of students coming from relatively 
disadvantaged backgrounds. On the other hand, given some of the con-
cern about public funding at some for-profit institutions, a shift toward 
more private loans may be welcome to those who believe subsidized 
public funds should not be used at for-profit institutions. These trends 
would need to be evaluated after the changes to the federal loan pro-
gram delivery system in 2010, though more current data similar to that 
analyzed here is currently not available. 
Credential and Demographic Differences 
Differences among student bodies present a challenge when com-
paring financing strategies across school types, as dissimilarities in 
student demographics and the credentials that students seek may both 
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be important drivers of borrowing behavior. Table 6.1 shows student 
characteristics across the sector from the 2007–2008 school year. 
A number of differences are apparent across school sectors, includ-
ing the credentials sought by students. About one-third of for-profit 
students are enrolled in certificate programs, over a third are enrolled in 
associate’s degree programs, and less than a third are enrolled in bach-
elor’s level programs (column 1). This is compared to about 80 percent 
of students at public two-years that are seeking associate’s degrees, and 
over 90 percent of students at public four-years and private nonprofits 
enrolled in bachelor’s degree programs. Over 10 percent of students at 
public two-year institutions are not enrolled in a degree or certificate 
program, compared to just 1–2 percent of students in the other sectors. 
These differences in credentials across sectors should be considered 
in relation to student borrowing behavior. If, as the research described 
earlier suggests, short-term credentials in for-profit colleges yield lower 
returns than other credentials and sectors, then policymakers and stu-
dents should carefully consider whether the debt burden of for-profit 
attendance is worthwhile. A complicating consideration is that forgone 
wage costs for a short-term credential could also be expected to be 
lower. Still, much more research on college wage premia across sectors 
and for various subbaccalaureate degrees, diplomas, and certifi cates is 
needed before assessing whether the debt of the average for-profit stu-
dent has a reasonable chance of being repaid. 
Students vary across sectors demographically, as displayed in 
Table 6.1. Although for-profit students’ borrowing patterns are similar 
to private nonprofit students’, their demographics are a stark contrast. 
For-profit students are demographically most similar to public two-year 
students, but even between these two sectors, many important differ-
ences remain. For-profits have the highest proportion of female and 
minority students, and these come from families with the lowest levels 
of parental education. For example, 83 percent of for-profit students in 
the sample have at least one parent who completed high school, com-
pared to 94 percent of private nonprofit school students. As well, only 
19 percent of for-profit students in the sample have a parent who com-
pleted at least a bachelor’s degree, as compared to 30 percent of public 
two-year students, 48 percent of public four-year students, and 52 per-
cent of private nonprofit school students. 
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Furthermore, for-profit students are, on average, the oldest students 
in the sample, with the highest age at the start of postsecondary educa-
tion (22.7), and the longest number of years between secondary and 
postsecondary studies (3.6). Reflective of their older average age, most 
for-profit students are independent (76 percent), as compared to public 
two-year (57 percent), public four-year (33 percent), and private non-
profit (34 percent) students. Students who attend for-profit colleges are 
also the most likely to be a single parent, and they have the highest 
average number of dependents among the sectors. Taken together, these 
characteristics suggest that for-profit students may most likely need to 
support dependents and be less likely to have access to the financial 
resources of parents, spouses, or other custodians. Access to credit for 
education may be particularly important for these students. We examine 
more detailed measures of need, assets, and parental support in subse-
quent sections. 
Finally, NPSAS publishes a “risk index” for each student, which is 
an index of characteristics potentially related to postsecondary success: 
delayed enrollment into postsecondary education, enrolling part-time, 
being an independent student, having dependents, being a single parent, 
working full time while enrolled, and not having a high school diploma. 
This index reflects the higher average number of postsecondary risk fac-
tors belonging to for-profit students (3.0) and public two-year students 
(2.7) as compared to public four-year students (1.2) and the private non-
profit students (1.3). As we will show in the following sections, these 
demographic differences are related to differences in resources and con-
straints of students across school sectors. Therefore, it is important to 
consider these differences when assessing borrowing behavior across 
different types of students. 
Costs of Education 
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for disproportionate borrow-
ing of for-profit students is simply the high cost of for-profi t institutions. 
Table 6.3 displays measures of costs of education for the 2007–2008 
school year. Although private nonprofits have average yearly gross 
costs over $7,000 higher than for-profits (as displayed in column [4]), 
for-profits have much higher average tuition and fees than either of 
the public sectors. For example, compared to students at public two-
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Table 6.3  Average Per Student Costs, Grant Aid, and Institutional Aid, 
2007–2008 ($) 
For- Public Public Private 
profit two-year four-year nonprofit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gross tuition and fees 9,807 1,133 5,391 17,519 
Tuition and fees minus grants 7,814 700 3,447 10,252 
Total grants 2,091 878 2,733 7,629 
Total federal grants 1,456 504 838 964 
State grants 141 139 681 792 
Institution grants 119 77 811 5,069 
Outside grants (private and employer) 374 159 403 804 
Merit aid 61 57 619 2,414 
Veteran and Department of Defense 208 93 138 146 
aid 
Total institutional aid 181 89 899 5,232 
NOTE: Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
year colleges, the gross tuition and fees of for-profit students is nearly 
nine times higher: for-profits average $9,807 of gross tuition and fees, 
compared to just $1,133 for community colleges. The trend of gross 
tuition and fees for the sample is included in Figure 6.4. Here we see 
the highest and most rapid growth at private nonprofits, but for-profits 
and publics also experienced a fairly steep increase over this period, 
with for-profit tuition and fees growing about 35 percent for students 
in the sample. 
Grants are perhaps the most important source of nondebt financ-
ing, since they lower the net cost of education to the student and do not 
need to be repaid. Grants can come from a number of different sources. 
For example, the federal government offers the Pell Grant for low-
income students, and other grants are available to targeted groups such 
as teachers and children of veterans. State governments and individual 
institutions also make grants available to students based on income, 
merit, or other characteristics (e.g., sports). Finally, private employ-
ers and foundations may provide funds to students of their choosing in 
order to help subsidize education costs. 
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Figure 6.4  Average Gross Tuition and Fees 

















NOTE: All dollars in constant 2008 dollars. Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
As shown in the third row of Table 6.3, for-profit students have 
the second-lowest level of total grant aid, at $2,091 per year, more than 
public two-year students and close to the grant aid received by public 
four-year students. Private nonprofit students receive by far the larg-
est amount of grant aid, at $7,629 annually. The trend of total grants 
is displayed in Figure 6.5. Given prior observed trends of increasing 
sticker prices in the private nonprofit sector, the increasing grant aid 
in this sector is consistent with a “high cost, high subsidy” strategy of 
college pricing. 
Breaking down the sources of grant aid reveals that for-profi t stu-
dents have higher average levels of federal grants than all other sectors 
but lower levels of every other type of grant aid. For-profit students not 
only have higher levels of total federal grant aid ($1,456), but they also 
receive slightly more grant aid through federal veterans and Depart-
ment of Defense programs, such as the G.I. Bill. For-profit students 






154 Cellini and Darolia 












1996 2000 2004 2008 
NOTE: All dollars in constant 2008 dollars. Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
receive an average of $208 in veterans and Department of Defense 
grants compared to $146 in the nonprofit sector, but in relative terms 
the value of military aid is quite low—just 10 percent of the value of 
other federal grant aid. 
The biggest difference in aid across sectors in Table 6.3 appears to 
be funding that comes from the institution. For-profit students receive 
remarkably little institutional aid. Institutional grants average just $119 
in the for-profit sector. The same figure is almost 7 times higher for 
public four-year students and over 40 times higher for private nonprofit 
students, at $5,069. 
The last row of Table 6.3 shows the average of all sources of institu-
tional aid (which can include grants, loans, work-study, and other types 
of aid) across sectors. Of course, grants make up the largest portion of 
total institutional aid across all sectors, so again we see a great disparity 
in the amount of institutional aid provided across sectors. We plot the 
trend of institutional aid in Figure 6.6. Here we see a large increase in 
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Figure 6.6  Average Institutional Aid 
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NOTE: All dollars in constant 2008 dollars. Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
institutional aid in the private nonprofit sector and almost no movement 
in institutional aid in the for-profit sector between 1996 and 2008. 
Finally, when accounting for grants, education prices net of grant 
aid in the for-profit sector remain relatively high, as shown in the sec-
ond row of Table 6.3 for the 2007–2008 school year. Moreover, the gap 
between the price of for-profit and public colleges has been increasing 
over time, as shown in Figure 6.7. Most striking, however, is that the 
gap between gross prices of for-profit and private nonprofi t education 
closes substantially when taking into account grant aid. 
Institutional aid, particularly institutional grants, appear to be 
filling the gap between cost and need in the nonprofit sector, thereby 
mitigating the rise in student borrowing for this group of institutions. 
Presenting difficulty for for-profit students, however, is that the upward 
trend in this sector’s prices is not met by a similarly rapidly increas-
ing trend. While institutions in the nonprofit sector appear to be trying 
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NOTE: All dollars in constant 2008 dollars. Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
to make tuition increases less painful for their students (or at least for 
some of their neediest students), for-profits have not made the same 
effort: over the years we observe that they appear more reliant on stu-
dent debt to cover the high cost of tuition. 
Need and Available Financial Resources 
Tuition and fees can be considered endogenous if we assume that 
students have various education options from which to choose. This 
returns us to the question of why students—particularly disadvantaged 
students—attend for-profit colleges given their relatively high costs. 
Here, we examine more closely issues of student need and available 
financial resources that might explain the patterns of attendance and 
borrowing that we observe. 
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Consistent with the demographic patterns described earlier, we 
observe relatively fewer personal financial resources for students in 
the for-profit sector, as displayed in Table 6.4. In isolation, the lack of 
financial resources available to for-profit students may be suffi cient to 
explain why borrowing is so high in the sector, but it does not appear 
to explain the steep increase in borrowing in the last decade. As shown 
in Table 6.4, based on need and resources, for-profit students are most 
similar, but in many ways still less affluent, than public two-year stu-
dents who pay much lower costs. As noted above, for-profit students 
pay similar costs to private nonprofit students, but differences in the 
observed financial positions between for-profit and private nonprofit 
students are sizable. 
Table 6.4  Average Per Student Need and Resources, 2007–2008 
For- Public Public Private 
profit two-year four-year nonprofit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Expected family contribution ($) 4,759 8,387 12,243 14,367 
Student budget minus expected 15,822 3,423 7,480 16,678 
family contribution ($) 
Student budget minus expected 13,782 2,681 5,188 9,865 
family contribution and grants ($) 
Adjusted gross income ($) 31,739 46,225 63,401 72,180 
Percent of the poverty line (%) 198 283 350 387 
Parent(s) and/or student own a 46 63 73 76 
home (%) 
Parent(s) and/or student own > 9  18  24  27  
$10,000 in investments (%) 
Receive help from parents 
Tuition and fees (%) 47 51 63 74 
Other educational expenses (%) 42 49 59 66 
Housing (%) 75 79 71 74 
Other living expenses (%) 61 61 66 73 
NOTE: Survey weights used. Student budget is a measure of “total” direct educational 
expenses, including tuition, fees, room and board, books and supplies, transportation, 
and other living expenses. Investments include business and farming assets. Survey 
responses about help from parents was only solicited from students under 30. 
SOURCE: NPSAS.
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Students and/or their families’ expected family contribution (EFC) 
to college costs is typically calculated when applying for financial aid. 
Reflective of their relative lack of resources, for-profit students’ average 
EFC is about half that of public two-year students and less than a third 
of that of public four-year and private nonprofi t students. 
We present the trend of EFC in Figure 6.8. Between 1996 and 2008, 
EFC increased for public four-year and private nonprofi t students—per-
haps mitigating the need for additional student borrowing in that sector 
even during times of increasing tuition. In contrast, we observe that 
EFC stayed effectively stagnant, and even declined, for for-profi t stu-
dents between 1996 and 2008. This trend indicates that the gap between 
resources available to for-profit students and other sectors may be grow-
ing, but it suggests that the increases in student borrowing we observe 
were likely not driven by the increasing enrollment of needy students 
in the for-profi t sector. 
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NOTE: All dollars in constant 2008 dollars. Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
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Consider students’ remaining budgets after taking into account 
EFC, which gives a measure of how much the typical student will need 
to cover after subtracting available family resources.10 Here, we observe 
that the highest average gaps in costs versus resources (not taking into 
account grants or other financing strategies) are in the for-profit and pri-
vate nonprofit sectors, almost five times that of public two-year students 
and over twice as much as public four-year students. When consider-
ing student budget minus both EFC and grants, the picture gets even 
bleaker, as the high grant aid in the private nonprofit sector allows the 
for-profit sector to stand alone with the highest average gaps between 
college costs and resources by some margin. 
The measure of EFC described above masks some dispersion of 
income at the lower end of the income distribution, as students below 
certain income thresholds are all counted as having a zero EFC; we 
therefore examine other measures of available financial resources in 
Table 6.4. For-profit students undoubtedly have fewer assets with which 
to contribute, or with which to securitize other credit, for educational 
expenses. For-profit students have by far the lowest average annual 
household income, at just $31,739, and are closest, on average, to the 
poverty line. Even public two-year students seem to be much better off 
than their for-profit counterparts, with incomes averaging $46,225. As 
well, for-profit students have the lowest homeownership (46 percent vs. 
63 percent for community college students) and extremely low personal 
or business investment rates (just 8 percent own more than $10,000 in 
investments vs. 18 percent of community college students). 
Table 6.4 also reports survey responses of students about the finan-
cial assistance they received from their parents. Among respondents, 
for-profit students are least likely to get help from parents for tuition, 
fees, other educational expenses, and other living expenses across the 
sectors. Since for-profit students are most likely to be independent, 
older, and come from more disadvantaged backgrounds, it is not sur-
prising that aid from parents is relatively low. However, it reinforces the 
financial challenges faced by many of these students. 
Aid Application 
Differences in ability to obtain grants, loans, or other types of finan-
cial aid can be affected by students’ choices to apply for aid, as well as 
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their knowledge of different financing options. In Table 6.5, we provide 
a summary of survey responses that yield some insight into these differ-
ences. Almost all for-profit students apply for financial aid (96 percent) 
and federal aid specifically (91 percent). Students in the for-profi t sector 
were also least likely to not have information about how to apply for aid 
or believe they were ineligible for aid. 
Therefore, it appears as though for-profit students are obtaining 
information about aid application. The source of such information may 
be important, however. Interestingly, for-profit students were most 
likely to talk with staff about financial aid. This is perhaps not sur-
prising, given the lack of financial resources by many students in the 
sector. Some have concern, however, that for-profit financial aid offices 
may not be protecting students’ best interests in financing and enroll-
ment decisions (Government Accountability Office 2010). Although 
the extent of mistreatment is unknown, it may be worth considering the 
types of incentives involved at for-profi t institutions. 
An important source of knowledge about financial aid on which 
many students rely is family and friends, but for-profit students appear 
Table 6.5  Financial Aid Application, 2007–2008 (%) 
For- Public Public Private 
profit two-year four-year nonprofit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Applied for any aid 96 59 79 87 
Applied for federal aid 91 43 62 70 
Talked with staff about fi nancial aid 71 42 45 51 
Discussed financing decisions with 52 54 71 70 
family/friends 
Researched financial aid on the 35 34 45 45 
Internet 
Compared lender options 30 14 25 30 
Reason did not apply for aid 
Did not want to take on debt 39 40 42 36 
Forms too much work 15 19 19 18 
No information on how to apply 16 24 21 17 
No need 55 48 54 62 
Thought ineligible 53 60 63 64 
NOTE: Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
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to be soliciting and/or receiving less advice from this group, with about 
an 18 percentage point lower rate than for the public four-year and pri-
vate nonprofit students. The rate of discussion of financing with family 
and friends, as well as researching aid on the Internet, is similar to that 
of public two-year students, suggesting that information on aid options 
may be lacking for these students (especially if one assumes college 
staff to not be operating in the best interests of students). Because of 
the high unmet need of for-profit students relative to public two-year 
students, however, this lack of information may be particularly harmful 
to the former group. 
Work Behavior 
Working while in school may be an alternative to borrowing for 
some students. Consider a simple budget equation for students. The 
most common ways to pay for college costs are grants, savings, paren-
tal/family transfers, working, and borrowing. The economically rational 
student will not turn down grants, since they are relatively cost-free, 
and we have already shown that students’ and families’ assets are lower 
in the for-profit sector, such that these students would be expected to be 
able to rely less on savings and parental/family transfers than students 
in other sectors. Therefore, students with resource constraints may be 
faced with the choice of borrowing and/or working to cover college 
costs. Could high levels of borrowing simply refl ect for-profi t students’
preferences for debt over working? 
Working can have benefits to future labor market outcomes through 
the accrual of soft skills (Light 2001), although competing evidence 
shows there could be a penalty to grades (Stinebrickner and Stinebrick-
ner 2003). Moreover, there is evidence that increased working may lead 
to less credit accrual (Darolia 2014) and therefore potentially longer 
time to earn a degree. Considering observed relatively high work rates 
for for-profit students in conjunction with high borrower rates, for-
profit students may be uniquely facing challenges associated with both 
working and borrowing. 
Table 6.6 provides average working behavior of students in the 
sample across the sectors. Interestingly, a similar proportion (76–83 
percent) of students work at least some amount (including work-study 
and all types of employment) while enrolled across all sectors. Differ-
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Table 6.6  Average Per Student Employment and Work, 2007–2008 
For- Public Public Private 
profit two-year four-year nonprofit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Works while enrolled (%) 
Works full-time while enrolled (%) 
Earnings from work while enrolled 
($) 
Hours worked per week while 
enrolled 
Works off campus while enrolled (%) 
Distance from school to work (miles) 
Worked in summer prior (%) 
Job is related to coursework or major 
(%) 
Can afford school without working 
(%) 
Reason for working 
Minimize debt (%) 
Pay educational expenses (%) 
Pay living expenses (%) 
To send money home (%) 
Job limits access to campus facilities 
(%) 
Job limits class schedule (%) 
Job limits number of classes (%) 




















































NOTE: Survey weights used. Average earnings, hours worked, and distance from 
school to work include only respondents with values. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
ences become more apparent when examining full-time work behavior. 
Only about a quarter of four-year students in public and nonprofi ts work 
full time, compared to 43 percent and 41 percent in public two-years 
and for-profits, respectively. As well, among students who work, for-
profit and public two-year students work the most average hours per 
week, almost 25 percent more than their public four-year and private 
nonprofit counterparts. Reflective of this behavior, these two sectors 
have the highest earnings from work while enrolled. As shown in Fig-
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ure 6.9, hours worked by students, as well as work participation rates 
(not shown), stay relatively flat over the time period examined among 
all sectors. This suggests that either these students cannot add more 
work in order to meet debt or that they do not use earnings to substitute 
for debt. For-profit and public two-year students are also most likely to 
have jobs off campus, which may increase commuting times and reduce 
campus integration. 
In survey responses, less than a third of for-profit and public two-
year students indicate that they can afford school without working 
(Table 6.6). For-profit students are also most likely to report that they 
work in an effort to minimize debt. Therefore, even though student loan 
rates and amounts are high in this sector, students are still working in an 
effort to lower the amount they have to borrow. 
Notably, students in the for-profit sector are among the least likely 
to report that their job limits access to campus facilities, class sched-
ules, the number of classes the student can take, and the choice of 
Figure 6.9  Average Hours Worked 
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NOTE: Survey weights used. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
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classes. These responses may refl ect an advantage associated with for-
profit colleges, namely, that course delivery is structured in a manner 
that allows working and schedule-constrained students to attend. These 
conveniences may be attracting students to this sector, even considering 
large tuition and fee costs. 
Estimations 
We have shown that students in the for-profit sector have relatively 
higher borrowing amounts on average, and that borrowing has risen 
more sharply for these students in the past decade. Our descriptive 
analysis suggests that these patterns are driven by high (and climb-
ing) tuition, no commensurate increase in grant aid (as in the nonprofit 
sector), and the fact that students in the for-profit sector have fewer 
fi nancial resources than others. To give a picture of relative borrowing 
after controlling for available resources, we estimate regressions of the 
following form: 
Debt = α + βSector + ηX + ε. 
Here, Sector is a vector of indicator variables for borrowing at for-
profit, public four-year, or private nonprofit institutions (with public 
two-year colleges as the omitted base group), with parameter vector β; 
X is a vector of covariates with parameter vector η; α is the intercept, 
and ε is the error. We make no claims to causal inference in these esti-
mations, and indeed, we would expect many of these decisions to be 
endogenously determined (for example, the decision to work or bor-
row). Nonetheless, the results provide some measure of relative debt 
levels, conditional on observable college costs, financial resources, and 
student characteristics. 
We present estimates of total debt and by federal and nonfederal 
loan programs in Table 6.7. Column (1) in the table displays estimates 
including only student characteristics as covariates. In the subsequent 
columns we add measures of college costs, financial resources, and 
financing strategies to the vector of covariates. 
After accounting for just student characteristics, we observe that 
for-profit students have the highest levels of debt, over $6,500 more 
annually than public two-year students (column [1]). When accounting 
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Table 6.7  Estimations of Debt, 2007–2008 
Nonfederal 
Total loans Federal loans loans
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
For-profit 6,568*** 4,118*** 2,883*** 1,235***
 (64) (68) (52) (43) 
Public four-year 1,255*** 985*** 1,032*** −47
 (77) (74) (57) (47) 
Private nonprofit 4,171*** 890*** 737*** 153***
 (84) (91) (70) (58) 
Enrolled in a certificate −1,533*** −699*** −735*** 36 
program (216) (207) (160) (131) 
Enrolled in an associate’s −1,191*** −358* −602*** 243* 
degree program (211) (202) (156) (128) 
Enrolled in a bachelor’s 192 645*** 55 590*** 
degree program (201) (192) (148) (121) 
Coursework only (no −1,545*** −577*** −817*** 240* 
program enrollment) (220) (210) (162) (133) 
Independent −454*** −179*** 49 −228***
 (52) (57) (44) (36) 
Single parent −177*** −398*** −225*** −174***
 (59) (57) (44) (36) 
Tuition and fees ($000s) 275*** 140*** 135***
 (3) (3) (2) 
Grants ($000s) −63*** 19*** −82***
 (4) (3) (3) 
EFC ($000s) −23*** −17*** −6***
 (1) (1) (1) 
Parent(s) and/or student own 40 −8 48* 
a home (41) (32) (26) 
Parent(s) and/or student own −1,219*** −738*** −481*** 
> $10,000 in investments (42) (33) (27) 
Works while enrolled 355*** 177*** 178***
 (43) (33) (27) 
Earnings from work while −8*** −7*** −1 
enrolled ($000s) (1) (1) (1) 
Observations (unweighted) 84,890 84,890 84,890 84,890 
Adjusted R2 0.232 0.299 0.228 0.136 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Survey weights used. Standard errors 
included in parentheses. Sample size rounded to the nearest 10. All estimates include 
controls for credential, age, class level, race/ethnicity, gender, number of dependents, 
and an indicator for being a first-generation immigrant. Investments include business 
and farming assets. 
SOURCE: NPSAS. 
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for college costs and financial factors in column (2), we see a decline in 
this marginal amount to about $4,100. The gap between for-profi ts and 
public four-years also declines but remains over $3,000. Accounting for 
these factors, however, increases the gap between for-profit and private 
nonprofit students. Columns (3) and (4) split estimates for federal loans 
and nonfederal loans, with similar apparent trends. Independent stu-
dents appear to borrow fewer nonfederal loans, but a relatively similar 
amount of federal loans, with a possible explanation being that they 
have restricted access to the private educational credit market because 
of a lack of cosigners. 
Unsurprisingly, rising tuition and fees are associated with higher 
borrowing amounts, while higher EFC is associated with lower bor-
rowing amounts. Higher grants appear to be positively correlated 
with federal loan amounts but negatively correlated with nonfederal 
loan amounts, holding all else equal (column [4]). Owning substantial 
investment or business assets is related to lower borrowing amounts, 
indicating that students with more assets are unsurprisingly able to 
borrow less. Interestingly, working while enrolled is associated with 
higher borrowing, suggesting that students that lack fi nancial resources 
choose to both borrow and work instead of wholly substituting one for 
the other. We also observe a small decrease in federal loan amounts 
associated with increasing earnings. 
Many determinants of borrowing and college going are unobserved 
in the data, and therefore these results should be interpreted with cau-
tion. Nonetheless, they provide some evidence that borrowing in the 
for-profit sector is high relative to the other sectors, even after con-
trolling for a set of plausible, though incomplete, set of explanatory 
factors, including costs and financial resources that could explain these 
differences. Potential unobserved explanatory factors could lead to dif-
ferent levels of policy concern. It should be troubling for policymakers 
and regulators if this higher borrowing is explained by misleading 
guidance or fraud from the colleges. Less worrying would occur if the 
unexplained borrowing is driven by preferences for borrowing or other 
student choices. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Drawing on data from the NPSAS, we find that for-profi t students 
are much more likely to incur debt to finance their education than stu-
dents in the public and nonprofit sectors. Nearly 90 percent of students 
in for-profit institutions borrow and 81 percent participate in federal 
loan programs. More notable is that the proportion of for-profi t students 
borrowing increased by 30 percentage points between 1996 and 2008, 
compared to a growth of less than 15 percentage points among students 
in other sectors. 
We document that the borrowing behavior, loan volume, and costs 
of attendance for for-profit students is most similar to that of private 
nonprofit students, except that borrowing for nonprofit students did not 
increase as steeply in the period we observe. Our descriptive analysis 
suggests that while both sectors experienced steep increases in tuition 
and fees, the private nonprofit sector mitigated their tuition hikes with 
increases in institutional grant aid for needy students. We observe no 
such increase in institutional aid among for-profits. In 2007–2008 the 
dollar value of institutional grant aid in nonprofit institutions was more 
than 40 times higher than that in for-profits. The discrepancy may be 
explained by the structure of the organization: since the profits of for-
profit institutions are distributed to shareholders, there is little incentive 
to provide institutional aid to students or otherwise reinvest those prof-
its back into the institution, as is required of nonprofi t institutions. 
In contrast to several similarities found between nonprofits and for-
profits in college costs and borrowing, the students at for-profi t colleges 
come from much more disadvantaged backgrounds and have fewer 
financial resources than students in nonprofi ts. We show that for-profit 
students appear most similar to public two-year college students in the 
credentials they seek, their demographics, their financial resources, and 
their work behavior. 
Our analysis leads us to question why disadvantaged and finan-
cially constrained students are choosing expensive for-profit colleges 
over lower-cost community colleges. The answer is not clear. 
If we assume that students have full information about their col-
lege options and the likely labor market returns to their education, then 
one possibility is that students choosing for-profits do so because these 
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institutions offer programs, courses, and schedules that better meet 
their needs than other sectors. Our data on working students, described 
above, suggest that these students may fi nd for-profit colleges the most 
convenient option and may be willing to pay a higher price for that 
convenience. Relatedly, work by Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen, and Person 
(2006) finds that some top-performing for-profit colleges provide better 
advising and student services than public sector institutions. This kind 
of advising may set these colleges apart and justify the high price, at 
least for some students. 
Another possibility is that lower-cost public institutions may be 
capacity constrained, especially in high-demand fields and in states 
or localities where public higher education budgets are tight. In this 
scenario, public institutions may simply not be available for students 
wishing to pursue certain types of training, leaving for-profi t institutions 
as the only timely option. Indeed, Cellini (2009) finds that infrastruc-
ture investments in California community colleges drive out for-profit 
institutions, providing evidence that public institutions and for-profits 
compete for students. From a policy perspective, this evidence suggests 
that investments in public institutions may be worthwhile, especially 
if they increase capacity to allow more students to access lower-cost, 
high-quality public education. Without additional public funding, how-
ever, for-profit colleges may be the only option for some students in 
high-demand fields or in geographic areas with few public alternatives. 
Still, the high default rates on student loans in the for-profit sector 
raise concerns that students are borrowing more than they can reason-
ably expect to repay given the returns to their certificate or degree 
program. As noted previously, Cellini’s (2012) analysis of the costs of a 
for-profit education suggests that the returns to attendance would need 
to be over 8.5 percent per year of education to fully offset the cost 
to students. Adding taxpayer costs to the equation would require 9.8 
percent returns. Literature on the returns to for-profit degrees and cer-
tificates is still underdeveloped, but recent studies suggest that returns 
to for-profit associate’s degrees are between 2 and 8 percent per year, as 
of the early 2000s (Cellini and Chaudhary 2012; Turner 2012). Much 
more research on the returns to education and whether returns have 
changed over time is needed to fully understand the temporal patterns 
of student borrowing. 
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If students were aware of the costs and returns described here, then 
it would be surprising that so many would choose for-profit institu-
tions. It could be that students are overly optimistic or simply believe, 
even with knowledge about the distribution of earnings outcomes, that 
they are above average. More troubling for policymakers, however, is 
the potential for students to be misinformed or misled about the earn-
ings they can expect after completing their education, or about the true 
cost of their debt. For example, the Government Accountability Office
(2010) documented conversations of for-profit staff misrepresenting 
starting salaries of graduates and claiming that debt did not have to be 
repaid. It is unclear how widespread these practices are. Still, our data 
on financial aid applications reveal that a much higher proportion of 
for-profit students talked to staff about financial aid (71 percent) than 
students in other sectors (42–51 percent). Even if college staff members 
are equally misrepresenting costs and outcomes across all sectors, for-
profit students are much more likely to come into contact with them 
than students in other sectors. 
Finally, we must consider the role of federal student aid policy in 
affecting both the behavior of institutions and the choices of students. 
Since for-profit institutions are beholden to the (profit-maximizing) 
interests of shareholders, there is, of course, an incentive to generate 
as much taxpayer support as possible. For-profit institutions receive 
about 74 percent of their revenue from federal student aid (Deming, 
Goldin, and Katz 2012) and are allowed to receive up to 90 percent, 
under the so-called 90-10 rule. Veterans’ benefits do not count toward 
the 90 percent, so there is an added incentive to recruit military stu-
dents to capture additional taxpayer dollars. As noted earlier, Cellini 
and Goldin (forthcoming) find that tuition is much higher in for-profit 
certificate programs that receive aid relative to those that do not, and 
Turner (2013) finds additional evidence of aid capture in the Pell Grant 
program. The patterns we document appear to be consistent with these 
articles in suggesting that high levels of student borrowing may support 
high tuition levels and the crowding-out of institutional aid in the for-
profi t sector.11 
We suggest that policymakers look closely at student borrowing in 
the for-profit sector and the incentives created under the current federal 
student aid system. Given the large public investment in students in the 
for-profit sector, policymakers should make efforts to ensure that col-
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leges are contributing to positive student outcomes and that students 
and taxpayers are protected. Recent efforts at regulation based on the 
“gainful employment” of graduates may be warranted.12 However, 
policymakers should think carefully about the metrics used to measure 
student outcomes. Single measures, such as the amount of borrowing 
alone, may be too narrow of a metric on which to judge the multi-fac-
eted goals and outcomes of education. And, as we show here, other 
factors that affect student borrowing behavior, such as backgrounds, 
resources, and constraints, are not evenly distributed across sectors. 
As noted previously, whether or not the level of borrowing needed to 
finance a for-profit college education is a worthwhile investment for the 
average student depends crucially on the labor market returns to for-
profit degrees and certificates. Much more research remains to be done 
to investigate this issue and answer questions about student choice, 
cost, debt, and information in the for-profi t sector. 
Notes 
1. The NPSAS is nationally representative of students who attend postsecondary 
institutions eligible to disburse federal fi nancial aid. 
2. Lang and Weinstein (2013) find that for-profit certificate students have lower 
returns, but associate’s degree students have higher returns than students in public 
community colleges. They attribute the latter finding to a selection problem: stu-
dents in community colleges are more likely to go on to a bachelor’s degree and 
are not included in their sample. 
3. The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System severely undercounts the 
number of two-year for-profit colleges in the United States. For many years the 
survey relied on snowball sampling and did not require their participation. In 
recent years, greater efforts have been made to track down institutions receiving 
federal financial aid, but many colleges remain unaccounted for in the data (Cellini 
and Goldin forthcoming). 
4. The full 2011–2012 wave of the NPSAS was not yet available at the time of 
this writing. Future research will incorporate these data. It is worth noting that 
the higher education landscape continued to evolve post-2008, such that trends 
observed after the period analyzed here may lead to an update of the inferences 
we draw. 
5. Note that many for-profit institutions (particularly those that do not offer degrees) 
do not participate in Title IV programs and are therefore not represented in the 
NPSAS. See Cellini and Goldin (forthcoming) for a discussion of these institutions. 
6. We refer to these institutions in the text as public two-year colleges and commu-
nity colleges for ease of exposition. 
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7. Adding students in two-year nonprofit institutions to the public two-year and less-
than-two-year group made very little difference in the analysis. We believe that our 
categorization allows for the cleanest comparisons across institution types. 
8. In this and all subsequent tables we use survey weights unless otherwise noted. 
9. Calculations of cumulative debt are not straightforward in the NPSAS. 
10. “Student budget” is a measure of “total” direct educational expenses in NPSAS, 
including tuition, fees, room and board, books and supplies, transportation, and 
other living expenses. 
11. We have also considered the role of federal student loan limits in encouraging 
borrowing, but despite small increases in the limits for freshmen and sophomores 
around 2007, the aggregate limit on Stafford Loans has remained stable at $23,000 
since 1992 (http://www.finaid.org/loans/historicallimits.phtml (accessed April 17, 
2013). 
12. See the Department of Education’s Web site for a discussion of the negotiated 
rulemaking process for details on the latest proposed regulations: http://www2.ed 
.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2012/gainfulemployment.html (accessed 
April 17, 2013). 
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What effect will a law that virtually eliminates the possibility that 
a loan will be discharged in bankruptcy have on the pricing and avail-
ability of that loan? This chapter seeks to answer that question by inves-
tigating the effect of bankruptcy discharge on private student loans 
(PSLs). We use a unique data set and find some unexpected results. 
On April 20, 2005, President Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) into law.1 The bill 
was the result of intense political wrangling dating as far back as 1999.2 
Proponents of the bill argued that the significant increases in bank-
ruptcy filing rates were the result of strategic debtors taking advantage 
of lax bankruptcy rules; a problem that they thought would be solved 
by increasing the hurdles to a bankruptcy discharge. 3 Opponents argued 
that the vast majority of debtors filed bankruptcy for reasons largely 
beyond their control: loss of a job, divorce, medical issues, or a death in 
the family. Many argued that instead of further limiting bankruptcy pro-
tection, Congress should focus on regulating the availability of credit. 
Proponents of bankruptcy reform predicted that its effect would be 
to reduce the cost of consumer credit by reducing the “bankruptcy tax” 
implicitly spread to all consumers in their cost of credit. Opponents of 
the bill hypothesized that consumer lenders were providing a rebate of 
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the bankruptcy tax to high credit-scoring borrowers, and thus expected 
no change in the cost of student loans as a result of BAPCPA.4 In this 
chapter, we report on our tests of some of the predictions made by both 
groups as they relate to the market and pricing of private student loans. 
The 2005 amendments added private student loans (PSLs), that is, 
loans originated by the private market and not insured by any federal 
or state institution, to the list of debts presumptively nondischargeable 
in bankruptcy. Through a series of legislative changes that began in 
1976 and culminated in 1998, loans made, guaranteed, or insured by the 
federal or state governments, as well as loans made by nonprofi t institu-
tions, were already presumptively nondischargeable before 2005.5 
This special treatment granted to PSLs ran counter to two of the 
fundamental policies behind the bankruptcy laws: the equality of treat-
ment of creditors in bankruptcy and the fresh start for the debtor. 6 
Neither of these policies has ever been absolute—tax debts and debts 
obtained by fraud, for example, have both received priority over other 
unsecured creditors and been nondischargeable as far back as the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898.7 Nonetheless, most of the 19 so-called “rifle-shot” 
exceptions to discharge exist for strong policy reasons. For example, 
when domestic support obligations were added to the list of exceptions, 
the rationale was that this would “provide new protections for parents” 
and “strengthen their ability to collect child support.”8 The rationale for 
adding federal and state loans to the list of presumptively nondischarge-
able debts was to protect the public fisc. 
PSLs are very different from the other kinds of student loans that 
were nondischargeable before the 2005 bankruptcy reform. A brief syn-
opsis of their features is instructive because it highlights how extraor-
dinary the law change was. Unlike federal student loans, PSLs are risk-
priced at origination. Only creditworthy individuals (or individuals with 
creditworthy borrowers) are eligible to obtain PSLs.9 Since the majority 
of undergraduate students do not have a significant credit history, most 
PSLs require students to secure a cosigner who will be responsible for 
the loan if the student does not repay. In fact, 90 percent of all PSLs 
required a cosigner in 2011, even if the student had a good credit history 
or was attending graduate school.10 The cosigner is liable for the loan as 
much as the student is, even if the student does not finish school or dies. 
PSL borrowers take on the risk of interest rate changes over the 
typical 15–20 year repayment period. The typical PSL is a variable-rate 
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loan, indexed to LIBOR or similar.11 Students are offered loans at an 
“index-plus” variable interest rate. That “plus” (the interest rate charged 
above the index) is the risk premium, presumed to be closely related to 
the risk-of-loss that the lender places on that borrower. In this chapter, 
we refer to that plus as the “margin.” All things being equal, a borrower 
with a higher credit score should receive a loan with a smaller mar-
gin than a borrower with a lower credit score. In 2011, initial variable 
PSL interest rates varied between 2.98 percent and 19 percent for the 
riskiest borrowers.12 Finally, funding for PSLs during the period of our 
study came primarily from the secondary market through asset backed 
securities.13 
When BAPCPA became effective on October 17, 2005, every out-
standing PSL—no matter when originated—became presumptively 
nondischargeable for both borrowers and coborrowers. Loans that were 
originated before BAPCPA presumably priced in the cost of bankruptcy 
dischargeability in their margins (risk premiums), but those loans 
became presumptively nondischargeable all the same.14 
The nondischargeability of PSLs is problematic from at least two 
perspectives: the concern that billions in outstanding student loans may 
be stifling the economy and the general lack of protections offered to 
delinquent borrowers. 
Standing at over $1 trillion, student loan debt is the second larg-
est type of debt Americans carry, surpassed only by mortgage debt. In 
recent years, regulators, policymakers, and academics have worried 
publicly over the effect this amount of debt has on our economy. PSLs 
are a small but significant feature of the American postsecondary edu-
cation finance system and may become more prominent to the extent 
that other forms of aid do not keep pace with increasing costs of atten-
dance. As of 2011, 15 percent of student loan debt had been originated 
by for-profit companies (typically, but not exclusively, banks) in the 
form of PSLs.15 The current $150 billion in PSL outstandings is espe-
cially concerning because of the lack of protections for borrowers who 
cannot repay. 
Outside of bankruptcy, federal student loans have protections for 
borrowers in fi nancial distress. These include the ability for borrowers 
to enter into income-based or income-contingent repayment plans, tem-
porarily suspend payments for up to 2 years, and extend the term of the 
loan for up to 30 years.16 Federal loans are also eligible for cancellation 
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in the case of total or permanent disability, the death of a student or par-
ent taking out a PLUS Loan, where the school that the student attends 
closes while the student is enrolled, or in some cases, if the student 
becomes a teacher or works in public service.17 None of these features 
are found in the typical PSL. Student borrowers with federal and private 
loans will have a difficult time discharging either federal loans or PSLs, 
but they will have a much tougher time living with delinquent private 
loans because of the lack of protections for those in default. In addition, 
some students may have a disproportionate amount of PSL debt relative 
to federal loans because students need not exhaust their federal loan 
opportunities before obtaining a PSL. The CFPB found that “more than 
54 percent of PSL borrowers do not exhaust their Stafford Loan eligibil-
ity, or do not even apply for federal aid.”18 
We would ideally like to be able to compare federal and PSL default 
rates and bankruptcy filing rates. Unfortunately, it is impossible to com-
pare the default rate of federal loans versus PSLs, owing to differences 
in the methodology of calculating those rates and the lack of availabil-
ity of data. The Department of Education (DOE) does not report how 
many individuals with federal student loans have filed for bankruptcy. 
The DOE publishes “cumulative lifetime default rates” for loans that 
enter repayment during a fiscal year and have defaulted through the end 
of the fiscal year. As an example, for the cohort that graduated or left 
school in 2006 that had federal student loans, the DOE estimates that 
9.2 percent will default over their lifetime.19 In contrast, what we know 
about PSL default rates is limited to the origination-year level (also 
called “vintages”) or alternatively to loans outstanding at the end of a 
year. The CFPB found that lenders’ underwriting practices had a sig-
nificant effect on PSL default rates. While some securitized trusts have 
“default rates expected to reach 50 percent,” some depository institu-
tions that never securitized their loans have default rates of less than 4 
percent.20 The nine lenders in our study had approximately $8.1 billion 
in cumulative defaults as of 2011, a figure made up of approximately 
850,000 distinct loans.21 Between 2005 and 2011, as few as 0.2 percent 
of outstanding PSLs and as high as 1.1 percent of all outstanding loans 
made by the lenders in our study were included in a bankruptcy filing.22 
This chapter relies on a unique large data set that sheds some light 
on the typically opaque private student loan market. Per a congressio-
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nal mandate, the CFPB collected data that have never been available 
before.23 Our data set covers loan-level information for all PSL origina-
tions made by the nine largest PSL lenders between 2005 and 2011. The 
data are de-identified but include borrowers’ and coborrowers’ credit 
scores, amount borrowed, the student’s year in school, and the name 
of the school the student is attending. We merge these data to DOE 
administrative data sources that provide school-level information about 
federal student loans as well as institutional characteristics. 
Lenders use most of these variables in their underwriting. Credit 
scores in particular are highly correlated with loan grants and pricing. 
However, we do not observe all variables that lenders have available 
for underwriting purposes. For example, lenders may have asked about 
coborrowers’ employment or income or have included information 
from a credit report (e.g., the fact that someone has a large number of 
credit cards) that we do not observe. The granular information from the 
credit report is “baked in” the credit score number, but income is not. 
Wefind that excluding PSLs from discharge in bankruptcy decreased 
the average credit score of borrowers and increased the volume of loans 
but also increased the overall cost of loans. This latter finding runs 
counter to general economic theory as well as the arguments of both 
proponents and opponents of BAPCPA. Specifi cally, we find that the 
credit score composition of borrowers after the law changed skewed 
toward the lower end of the credit score spectrum, but the average bor-
rower credit score only decreased slightly in practical terms. We also 
find that the overall cost of PSLs at four-year undergraduate institutions 
increased by an average of 35 basis points (0.35 percent) as a result of 
the law change. Finally, we observe that the volume of loans originated 
tripled after BAPCPA and find that 60 percent of that increase is attrib-
utable to the law change. 
The first section of this chapter provides some background on PSLs 
and a brief literature review. The second section describes the compet-
ing theories predicting the effect of BAPCPA on credit and bankrupt-
cies. The third section describes our unique data set, its limitations, and 
our empirical strategy. We report our results in the fourth section. Fol-
lowing that, we attempt to explain our surprising findings and consider 
welfare implications. We conclude by discussing next steps. 
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BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
Since 1976, federal student loans have received some form of 
bankruptcy protection. The stated purpose when the first restriction 
on the dischargeability of federal loans passed in Congress was a con-
cern that students were using bankruptcy opportunistically to wipe out 
their student debt on the eve of a “lucrative career.”24 There has never 
been empirical evidence of widespread strategic default with regard to 
student loans. Even as far back as 1977, the evidence pointed to the 
contrary—strategic defaults are a rarity.25 Nonetheless, by 1998, fed-
eral loans became nondischargeable “unless excepting [them] from 
discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the 
debtor’s dependents.”26 In 2005, PSLs were added to the list.27 In this 
section, we explain the legal implications of this treatment and put it in 
context of the empirical studies that have examined its effect to date. 
Congress never elaborated on the meaning of “undue hardship.” 
The sole mention of the phrase in the congressional record comes from 
opponents of the amendments who called it “vague” and argued that 
the provision itself “may create an undue hardship for good faith bank-
rupts” because “the standard is a very hard one. It will be very diffi-
cult to meet. Worse, it will be variously interpreted by different judges 
around the country and even in the same judicial district.”28 As we dis-
cuss below, there is some evidence that this is what happened. 
The nondischargeability provision has been amended five times 
with the same “undue hardship” language, with no clarifi cation from 
Congress.29 In the meantime, courts have settled on two interpretations 
of the phrase. Almost all courts use the fairly rigid Brunner test to eval-
uate whether a debtor can overcome the presumptive nondischargeabil-
ity of student loans.30 Rebutting the presumption can be a diffi cult task. 
To do so, the debtor must file an “adversary proceeding” (effectively a 
lawsuit) with the bankruptcy court against her student loan creditors. 
She must convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that 
repaying her loans would present an undue hardship.31 The bankruptcy 
court must determine whether the debtor has met the threshold for dis-
chargeability, even if the creditor does not respond to the suit.32 If the 
debtor loses the lawsuit, or does not file one in the first place, her stu-
dent loans are unaffected by the bankruptcy.33 
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A handful of empirical studies have examined debtors seeking to 
discharge student loans in bankruptcy and how they fared in the courts. 
Three key findings pertain to this study: 1) an almost infi nitesimal num-
ber of student loan borrowers seek to discharge their student loans in 
bankruptcy; 2) discharge seekers are outliers—they have high educa-
tional debt relative to the population and find themselves in especially 
miserable situations; and 3) about half of discharge seekers are suc-
cessful, but the reasons for their success are not entirely explainable by 
objective factors. 
Only a handful of individuals attempt to discharge their student 
loans in bankruptcy. In the only nationwide study on the subject, Jason 
Iuliano estimates that of the individuals who filed bankruptcy in 2007, 
only 0.1 percent had student loans and sought to discharge those loans.34 
That percent amounted to 213 individuals out of the 169,774 who filed 
a bankruptcy case in 2007 and had a student loan.35 
Based on Iuliano’s study as well as two studies from Rafael Pardo 
and Michelle Lacey, we can establish a picture of the “typical” dis-
charge seeker. 36 All three studies find that the average discharge seeker 
is over 41 years old, well past typical college age.37 Between 62 and 80 
percent of discharge seekers were unmarried, but most had one or more 
dependents, which is suggestive of a number of single-parent house-
holds.38 Fewer discharge seekers tended to be employed at the time 
they file bankruptcy relative to the rest of the bankrupt population.39 
Unsurprisingly, discharge seekers are in more financial distress. “They 
make less money, own fewer assets, and have more liabilities, including 
educational debt” than nondischarge seekers.40 The average educational 
debt load varies between $47,137 in the oldest study to $80,476 in the 
study with the most recent data.41 Discharge seekers are also in dire 
straits: more than half of them suffered from a medical condition them-
selves or had one or more dependents with a condition.42 The majority 
of the discharge seekers seem to have tried various avenues to mitigate 
or resolve their student debt issues before fi ling bankruptcy.43 
Discharge seekers are more often than not successful in obtaining 
at least a partial discharge: 57 percent of the adversary proceedings in 
Pardo and Lacey’s study of bankruptcy cases filed between 2002 and 
2006 in the Western District of Washington resulted in at least a partial 
discharge.44 In Iuliano’s study, 39 percent (or 81 individuals out of the 
almost 1 million nationwide bankruptcies in 2007) received either a 
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full or a partial discharge of their student loans.45 This may seem like 
favorable odds, but it is likely a result of a selection bias. The more 
downtrodden and unfortunate, the more likely one might be to seek a 
discharge. These odds are nonetheless hard to predict: Pardo and Lacey 
argue that the undue hardship standard is not applied consistently.46 
Their 2005 study finds few statistically significant differences between 
debtors who were granted a discharge of their student loans versus 
those who were denied.47 Troubling from an equal justice perspective, 
Pardo and Lacey also find that “factors unrelated to the command of the 
law (e.g., the identity of the judge assigned to the debtor’s adversary 
proceeding), rather than factors deemed relevant by the legal doctrine 
(e.g., the debtor’s income and expenses), account for the substantive 
outcomes” in the case.48 
Iuliano and Pardo and Lacey’s studies do not distinguish between 
federal and private loans, but they nonetheless give us a sense of who 
might seek and who might get their student loans discharged. Only one 
study has examined the effect of the bankruptcy reform on the avail-
ability of PSLs.49 Mark Krantowitz from the Web site FinAid.org issued 
a report shortly after the law came into effect finding a small expansion 
in loan availability to borrowers with lower FICO scores. 50 Using data 
from student loan securitizations,51 he found a 1.2 percent increase in 
loans to borrowers with FICO scores less than 650 (typically considered 
subprime borrowers) after BAPCPA.52 However, when looking only at 
loans originated without a coborrower, Krantowitz found that credit 
contracted after BAPCPA by 1.7 percent for subprime borrowers. He 
also found a modest increase (5.2 percent) in PSL availability to bor-
rowers with a FICO score between 651 and 710 (generally considered 
prime).53 Krantowitz also found that in some of his sample the average 
FICO score post-BAPCPA dropped from 719 to 715, further indicating 
a slight credit expansion to borrowers with lower creditworthiness.54 
Until now, Krantowitz’s report has been the only analysis attempt-
ing to answer the question of the effect of BAPCPA on the pricing and 
availability of private student loans. His findings that credit moderately 
expanded are consistent with the hypotheses we discuss in the next part 
of this chapter. 
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Under the dominant legal and economic theory behind the latest 
round of bankruptcy reform, the “easy” availability of bankruptcy was 
thought to have one of two effects: increasing the cost of credit for 
everyone to account for strategic borrowers or rationing credit, leading 
to a suboptimal amount of available credit. Opponents of bankruptcy 
reform, on the other hand, argued that there was no empirical evidence 
for this view: household credit increased dramatically, even as bank-
ruptcy filings were increasing in the late 1990s. In their view, lenders 
in particular stopped rationing credit as early as the 1980s, just after the 
Supreme Court effectively lifted usury cap restrictions and after credit 
scoring had improved enough that lenders were better able to identify 
high-risk borrowers.55 Each of these predicted effects yields some intu-
itions about what might happen to the cost of credit (specifi cally PSLs) 
post-BAPCPA. In this part, we develop three models to more formally 
theorize the expected result from the increased protection of PSLs in 
bankruptcy. In a later section, we compare the models’ predictions to 
our results and discuss the similarities and (surprising) differences. 
The majority of the 2005 bankruptcy reforms were directly respon-
sive to a view of the world that assumed consumers were not only per-
fectly rational but also engaging in strategic behavior. We refer to this 
as the “bankruptcy tax” view. According to this view, strategic consum-
ers impose a cost on the system by forcing lenders to either pass on 
the cost of opportunism to borrowers as a whole or ration credit. Por-
tions of BAPCPA, including the PSL nondischargeable provision, were 
designed to ameliorate these problems. Some BAPCPA proponents 
posited that current strategic behavior was causing a “bankruptcy tax” 
of “$400-a-year on every household in the country.”56 Alternatively 
or in conjunction with a bankruptcy tax, lenders may ration credit in 
a world where bankruptcy is easy “in order to maintain underwriting 
standards.”57 One of the aims of bankruptcy reform was to reduce the 
number of opportunistic borrowers. In support of BAPCPA, Judge Pos-
ner theorized that “by increasing the rights of creditors in bankruptcy . . . 
[bankruptcy reform] should reduce interest rates and thus make borrow-
ers better off.”58 
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We can model this straightforwardly. Let x be a measure of the 
credit quality of a borrower and f(x) denote the probability with which 
type x borrowers repay their loans, regardless of the loan amount. Let r
be one plus the rate of return of the loan for the creditor conditional on 
the borrower repaying their loan,59 and let c(x) be the average recovery 
rate of loans that are not repaid in full.60 For these purposes, assume 
that repayment rates and the average proportion repaid are increasing in 
x, so f’(x) > 0 and c’(x) > 0. Let z(r) represent the original balance of a 
loan a borrower is willing to accept, which depends on the interest rate. 
Assume also that consumers are risk averse, so that z'(r) and z"(r) < 0. 
Further assume that the creditor is risk neutral and rational. Then for 
each borrower of type x, the creditor maximizes expected repayment or 
recovery net of the loan amount, as shown in Equation (7.1). 
(7.1)        
 
A rational, risk-neutral creditor will only originate a loan for which 
expected repayment net of loan amount is nonnegative such that 
 
(7.2)   
  
As the average recovery rate of the loans not repaid in full, c(x) 
increases, the right-hand side of Equation (7.2) decreases, so if repay-
ment rates are increased by BAPCPA, creditors would be willing to 
make loans to borrowers with lower values of x, so access to credit 
should expand. 
Taking the first order conditions of Equation (7.1) and then differ-
entiating implicitly yields Equation (7.3), 
   
(7.3)  
      
This implies that for any type x borrower, rates of returns condi-
tional on borrowers repaying the loan in full should decrease if bank-
ruptcy protection increases the recovery rate of loans that default, which 
would correspond to a decrease in interest rates for borrowers of all lev-
els of credit quality, as shown in Figure 7.1, which illustrates the equi-
librium price schedule for a PSL of a given size by credit quality. Prior 
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to BAPCPA, P0 traces out the relationship between the cost of credit, 
captured by r, and credit quality, x. After BAPCPA, the increase in c(x), 
the return given less than full payment at a given interest rate, result-
ing from higher rates of recovery conditional on bankruptcy, should be 
offset by a decrease in interest rates for borrowers, so the price sched-
ule shifts from P0 to P1. Note that the size of the decrease may vary by 
credit quality. 
Consider the case where the borrower is von Neumann-Morgenstern 
(VNM) rational, as assumed by proponents of bankruptcy reform.61 In 
that case, his utility function can be expressed as 
U(z,r;x) = g(x)u(z,r) + (1 − g[x])v(z,r), 
where g(x) is the borrower’s ex ante belief about the probability that he 
will repay the loan, u(z,r) is the expected utility from successfully being 
able to pay back his loan when he borrows z at interest rate r − 1, and 
v(z,r) is his expected utility of not being able to pay back a loan that he 
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borrows at these terms. The larger the loan, the better off he is when he 
is able to pay it back, so u1 > 0, and the worse off he is when he is unable 
to pay it back, so v1 < 0. From the first order conditions 
   
  ,
   
which implicitly defines z(r). Note that consumer overoptimism or pos-
itive cognitive bias can be captured by g(x) > f(x). In other words, the 
borrower’s belief about his ability to repay the loan is greater than his 
actual probability of repaying the loan. 
The new treatment of PSLs in bankruptcy—making them pre-
sumptively nondischargeable and effectively very unlikely to be dis-
charged—makes the consequences of default more severe; a severity 
that increases with the size of the loan. We model this as the expected 
utility of not being able to repay a loan, v(z,r), becoming v̂(z,r), and v̂1. 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the effect of BAPCPA on the supply of and demand 
for PSL for a borrower of a fixed credit quality, x. Assuming that ability-
to-repay conditional on credit quality is not affected by BAPCPA—that 
is, there is no additional strategic default after BAPCPA—then g(x) is 
unchanged and 
   
 ,
    
so ẑ < z.62 This implies that the VNM borrower’s demand curve shifts 
down, as illustrated in Figure 7.2. Supply responds as described in 
Equation (7.3) and shifts from S0 to S1.63 Equilibrium moves from E 
to Ê1. 
0 
Note that the magnitude of this shift is determined by the relation-
ship between the change in the expected utility of not being able to 
repay a loan and the average recovery rate of loans that are not repaid in 
full, c(x), so, a priori, it is not possible to determine whether loan sizes 
will increase, decrease, or remain the same as a result of BAPCPA. 
Similar to Judge Posner’s prediction for the law change, this simple 
model would thus predict that the price of the loans—in our parlance, 
the loan margin—will decrease after the law change and the effects on 
credit quality and volume are an empirical question. 
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Figure 7.2  Effects of BAPCPA on Supply and Demand of PSL for
Consumers of a Fixed Credit Quality 
r 










z(r) (loan amount) 
As an alternative model, we also consider credit provision in the 
private student loan market in a Stiglitz-Weiss model in Appendix 7C.64 
For this model to hold, we assume that there is credit rationing in the 
private student loan market, as some BAPCPA proponents argued.65 
The Stiglitz-Weiss model predicts that the cost of credit will remain 
the same (because of rationing); the supply of credit will increase 
(increased volume of loans originated, as opposed to the ambiguous 
effect on quantity in the simple model); and that lenders will on average 
lend to riskier borrowers (in our data, lower credit scores).66 
Opponents of BAPCPA have argued that the assumptions of strate-
gic rationality on the part of consumers are too simplistic. Incorporating 
behavioral research findings and empirical research of actual debtors in 
bankruptcy, Susan Block-Lieb and Edward Janger propose a behavioral 
model of consumer bankruptcy that relaxes the assumption of consumer 
rationality but retains the assumption of lender rationality.67 This is cap-
tured by the model presented above, since f (x) and g(x) can differ. Posi-
tive consumer biases, including optimism, present bias, and probability 
neglect, correspond to cases where g(x) > f (x). 
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If we assume, for example, that borrowers are present biased, then 
they focus on the interest rate, and do not fully consider their probabil-
ity of bankruptcy or the consequences of BAPCPA upon bankruptcy.68 
These behaviors could be captured by setting g(x) = 1 (assuming that a 
borrower believes he will definitely repay the loan) or by setting v̂ (z,r) 
= v(z,r) (borrower ignores the consequences of bankruptcy), respec-
tively. This would mean that borrowers’ demand curves do not shift 
in response to BAPCPA. Instead, these loans will appear “cheaper” to 
borrowers because they are not fully accounting for the costs or are 
overly optimistic about their likelihood of repayment, and therefore 
loan originations and loan amounts should increase at any given credit 
quality, as shown in Figure 7.2. BAPCPA causes the supply curve to 
shift downward for individuals of credit quality x, which means that 
the price of credit, r, decreases. In response to this shift, the new equi-
librium moves along the demand curve from E0 to E1, so the loan size 
demanded increases, in contrast to the loan size decrease we see in Ê1, 
the case where borrowers internalize the cost of nondischargeability. 
Block-Lieb and Janger go further than this model. They theorize 
that “consumer lenders already provide a rebate of the bankruptcy tax” 
to subprime and less credit-worthy consumers.69 This model is really 
a special case of the competitive model with present-biased consumer 
above. If, as Block-Lieb and Janger predict, the charge-off rate does 
not change post BAPCPA, then c(x) does not change, and so the supply 
curve does not shift. Also, if consumers understand that c(x) does not 
change, or if they do not factor in nondischargeability in bankruptcy 
into v(z,r), the demand curve does not shift. Therefore, prices and bor-
rowing decisions will remain the same. 
To summarize, depending on what assumptions we make and what 
model we use, we would expect a variety of different outcomes for 
the effect of the change to the bankruptcy laws making private student 
loans presumptively nondischargeable, as shown in Table 7.1. 
Incorporating all of these leads to the following hypotheses, which 
we test with our analysis: 
• H0— Price, average credit quality or loan amount, and total loan 
volumes will remain the same. 
• H1 — Loan pricing (that is, lender margins) should remain the 
same or decrease for originations after the law change. 
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• H2 — Lenders should be willing to lend to borrowers with lower 
credit quality than they were willing to lend before the law 
change. 
• H3 — Overall loan volumes should increase. 
• H4 — Average loan amount should also increase independent of 
tuition and fees. 
Table 7.1  Expectation of Outcomes by Theory 
Simple Block-Lieb 
Competitive (CP) Stiglitz-Weiss CP + Present- & Janger 
Outcome Model (credit rationing) Biased Consumer (CP + ∆c(x)=0)70 
Price Decrease No change Decrease No change 
Credit quality Decrease Decrease Decrease No change 
Loan amount Ambiguous Increase Increase No change 
Loan volume Ambiguous Increase Increase No change 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
Our data set was created by CFPB economists in preparation for 
the congressionally mandated report on PSLs issued in 2012.71 The data 
set includes PSL originations from the nine largest PSL lenders in the 
period between the first quarter of 2005 and the last quarter of 2011.72 
The data do not allow us to identify the lender for a given loan, but it 
does contain origination information at the individual loan level. The 
variables available in the data set include the loan amount, credit score 
of the borrower, credit score of any coborrowers, interest rate for fixed-
rate loans, margin and the index used for variable rate loans, and the 
state of residence of the borrower.73 This data set was merged to two 
public administrative data sets maintained by the Department of Educa-
tion: the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS) and the 
Postsecondary Education Participants System (PEPS).74 IPEDS “gath-
ers information from every college, university, and technical and voca-
tional institution that participates in the federal student financial aid 
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programs.”75 It includes data on “enrollments, program completions, 
graduation rates, faculty and staff, finances, institutional prices, and stu-
dent financial aid programs.”76 The PEPS data include school-level data 
on topics such as school characteristics, cohort default rates, and eli-
gibility status.77 We used these additional variables in the school-level 
analysis. 
In order to compare PSLs to federal loans for the difference-in-
differences (DD) analysis, we also made use of data from the DOE’s 
Title IV Program Volume Reports for Direct Loans and Federal Fam-
ily Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans at the school level in the 
2004–2005 and 2005–2006 academic years.78 
While the PSL data set includes originations on a variety of school 
types, for purposes of this study, we restricted the data set to origina-
tions for undergraduates at four-year institutions from the fi rst quarter 
of 2005 and 2006. We limited ourselves to this smaller (though still con-
siderable) sample because we thought the heterogeneity of school and 
program type (certificate, medical school, law school) might obscure 
the effect. We also limit ourselves to this time period to avoid conflating 
the effects of other major policy changes, such as the 2006 implementa-
tion of the Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005, which modi-
fied eligibility and application requirements for Title IV funds, with the 
effects of BAPCPA.79 
Our outcome variables include the credit worthiness of student loan 
applicants (measured by the highest FICO score between the borrower 
and coborrower), the margins (interest above the index), the lender 
charged on the loan, the size of the loan, and the total number of loans 
originated. Table 7.2 presents summary statistics for private student 
loans originated in the first quarter of 2005 (before the law changed) 
and the first quarter of 2006 (after the law changed). Of note is the 
overall small reduction in mean and median FICO scores in 2006; this 
is true both for borrower FICO scores and for maximum FICO score 
(if the borrower applied with a coborrower, the maximum of the two 
scores). The average original balance and the number of loans origi-
nated increased; the latter more than tripled in the postperiod. 
In Figure 7.3, we plot the distribution of maximum FICO scores 
before and after BAPCPA. We observe that the distribution shifts 
slightly to the left, so that FICO scores decrease after BAPCPA. 
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Table 7.2  Summary Statistics for Loans Originated in the First Quarter
of 2005 and First Quarter of 2006 
Before BAPCPA After BAPCPA 
(Q1 2005) (Q1 2006) 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Has a coborrower 
Maximum FICO score 
Borrower’s FICO score 
Year in school 
Margin (%) 
Original balance ($) 
Deferral term (months) 



















































NOTE: Maximum FICO score is the maximum of the borrower and all coborrower 
scores. Standard deviations in parentheses. Restricted to loans originated in the first 
quarter of 2005 and 2006 to undergraduates at four-year institutions for which a bor-
rower or coborrower’s FICO score was reported. 
Figure 7.4 displays the changes in margins between the fi rst quarter 
before the law change and the same quarter one year later. Before the 
law changed, some lenders were originating PSLs that had a zero or 
below zero margin; in other words, they were not charging a premium 
above the index for some loans. After the law changed, surprisingly, 
premium-free or less-than-index loans were no longer being originated, 
and the distribution shifts toward higher margins. 
Figure 7.5 presents the distribution of the original balances of the 
loans originated in the first quarter before the law changed (Q1 2005) 
and the same quarter after the law changed (Q1 2006). Original bal-
ances are positively skewed in both time periods, but slightly higher 
after BAPCPA. 
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Figure 7.3  Distribution of Maximum FICO Scores Shifts toward Less 
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SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of CFPB private student loan data. 
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SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of CFPB private student loan data. 
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Limitations 
The available data impose some limitations on our analysis. The 
first limitation is related to the timing of bankruptcy reform, the second 
with the available data. 
First, bankruptcy reforms, including changes to the dischargeability 
of PSLs, were debated in Congress as early as the mid-1990s, and by 
1999 and 2000, the House and Senate had passed bills that included lan-
guage adding PSLs to the list of presumptively nondischargeable loans 
in bankruptcy. These bills were vetoed by President Clinton in 2000.80 
The upsurge of Republican congressional members in the 2004 election 
and the public support of bankruptcy reform by sitting President Bush 
meant that the bill, as one newspaper phrased it in an opinion piece a 
month before the bill’s passage, “gained the momentum of a runaway 
freight train.”81 The bill was introduced in the Senate on February 1, 
2005, passed by both houses on April 14, 2005, was signed into law by 
President Bush on April 20, 2005, and became effective on October 17, 
2005.82 
Despite the lack of a “surprise” factor for the law change, lenders 
are unlikely to have made preemptive changes to their underwriting 
algorithms, primarily because by doing so they could lose the benefit 
afforded by the law’s protection for at least some of the loans they would 
originate in anticipation. This is because BAPCPA did not apply retro-
actively: PSLs were not affected unless and until a bankruptcy case was 
filed after the law became effective. This means that PSLs only became 
presumptively nondischargeable for bankruptcies that were filed on 
or after October 17, 2005, and they became so regardless of when the 
loans were originated.83 Prior to that date, the loans were dischargeable 
like most other forms of unsecured debt, such as credit card debts. 
Our earliest data are from Q1 2005, before the law was passed or 
took effect. The law took effect at the very end of Q3 2005, so we use 
Q1 2006 as the effective postperiod. Figure 7.6 shows the timeline of 
the law changes and the available data. 
We note one additional limitation to using fi rst-quarter origina-
tions. Because the academic year traditionally runs from August to 
May, many student loans are originated over the summer or the fall. 
Beyond the fact that there are fewer originations in Q1 than Q3, loans 
originated in Q1 differ from loans originated in other quarters. Table 7.3 
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Figure 7.6  Major Events in Bankruptcy Reform and Our Data Set 
Observations 
April 20, 2005 October 17, 2005 
BAPCPA signed into law Effective date of BAPCPA 
Pre-period Post-period
(Q1 2005) (Q1 2006) 
Academic year 2004-05 Academic year 2005-06 
10/04 1/05 4/05 7/05 10/05 1/06 4/06 7/06 
presents a comparison of first quarter 2006 originations to third-quarter 
originations in 2005 and 2006. Columns (2)–(5) present the results for 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the outcome variables with 
controls for quarter of origination and school fixed effects. Compared to 
first-quarter loans, third-quarter loans tend to have signifi cantly larger 
original balances, are more likely to be originated through the school 
channel, are more likely to be made with coborrowers, and have slightly 
higher maximum FICO scores. To mitigate these seasonal differences, 
we restrict our analysis to comparing Q1 2005 data (the first quarter 
available) to Q1 2006 data. 
Empirical Strategy 
We analyze changes in loan characteristics—that is, changes in 
loan amount, debtor credit quality, and margin (risk premium cost)—at 
the loan level. We implement three methods in this analysis: 1) OLS 
regression, 2) Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, and 3) propensity-score 
matching. We then collapse the data and analyze the volume of loans 
originated at the school level using the same three methods and also 
perform a DD analysis using volumes of federal loans as a comparison 
for PSL volumes. 
Loan-level analysis 
We can think of the price and terms of credit in terms of the expected 
returns for the creditor conditional on repayment, the amount of the loan 
extended, and the credit quality of the borrower. In our data set, these 
characteristics most closely correspond to margin (the risk premium),84 
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Table 7.3  OLS Regressions Comparing First-Quarter 2006 Originations 
with Third-Quarter 2006 Originations 











2006 Q1 16,017 
2005 Q3 37,795 1,927*** 0.0420*** 0.0250*** 6.563*** 
(78.89) (0.00388) (0.00356) (0.473) 
2006 Q3 26,127 2,689*** 0.00796** 0.0499*** 1.798*** 
(74.17) (0.00365) (0.00334) (0.445) 
Constant 9,936*** 0.248*** 0.821*** 716.5*** 
(61.80) (0.00304) (0.00279) (0.371) 
Observations 79,913 79,939 79,939 79,939 
R2 0.148 0.293 0.079 0.098 
NOTE:*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Restricted 
to four-year undergraduates in the first quarter of 2006 and the third quarters of 2005 
and 2006. Columns (2) through (5) represent separate OLS regressions and include 
school-level fi xed effects. 
original balance, and the maximum FICO scores among borrowers and 
coborrowers on a loan.85 To evaluate how these characteristics changed 
as a result of BAPCPA, we implement three techniques. 
As a first approach, we run OLS regressions of these characteristics, 
y, on post, a dummy variable for receiving a loan after the implementa-
tion of BAPCPA, and a vector of control variables, X, that would be 
included in an underwriting model, such as type of school attended, 
tuition and fees, credit score, year in school, and a constant, as shown 
in Equation (7.5).86 The sample is restricted to individuals with valid 
FICO scores, as this is the dominant measure of creditworthiness used 
in the data set. 
(7.5) yi = βpost posti + βx Xi + εi 
Note that H2 discussed in the analytical framework implies that the 
coefficient on βpost < 0 when the outcome under consideration is the 
maximum credit score among all borrowers and H1 implies that at each 
maximum credit score, the interest rate should decrease, so βpost < 0. 







198 Ang and Jiménez 
 
(7.6)   
  
We also perform this analysis with interactions between school and 
borrower characteristics, which are observable to the creditor, and an 
indicator for the postperiod. Let Xi be a vector of school or borrower 
characteristics,     . Then the interaction terms 
can be written as in Equation (7.6). For a borrower with characteristics 
Xi , the estimated effect of BAPCPA on the outcome variables is given 
by  
     
  
Effectively, βj × post can be interpreted as the contribution of having 
one more unit of xj to the magnitude of the effect of the policy. For 
example, if two borrowers have identical characteristics except that one 
has a coborrower and the other does not, we would expect the effect of 
BAPCPA on their outcomes to differ by βcoborrower × post on average. 
Since the lender data set only contains data for originated loans, one 
concern is that the composition of borrowers in the data set may change 
in response to changes in the loan offers by creditors. In order to sepa-
rately identify effects due to changes in terms for borrowers who would 
have received loans in the absence of BAPCPA and the effects of the 
change in the composition of borrowers, we employ two techniques: the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and propensity score matching. 
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition was initially developed in 
the context of wage discrimination, where wages are only observed 
for individuals who are employed.87 In the context of this study, we 
consider the group that was exposed to BAPCPA, that is, borrowers 
who received loans in the first quarter of 2006.88 First, we run regres-
sions of the outcome variables on their characteristics for both samples 
restricted to the pre group, which received loans before BAPCPA (in 
Q1 2005), and the post group, which received loans after BAPCPA (in 
Q1 2006), as in Equations (7.7) and (7.8). 
   (7.7)   
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   (7.8)   
An estimate of the difference in average loan terms for the groups 
due to the changes in the characteristics of the individuals in the group 
(“endowments”) is captured in the first term on the right-hand side of 
Equation (7.9). An estimate of the effects of the program on the loan 
terms for individuals who would receive loans in the absence of BAP-
CPA is captured by the effect due to coefficients in the second term 
of the right-hand side of Equation (7.9). The effect due to coefficients 
can be thought of as the change in how the underlying underwriting 
model classifies borrowers with a certain set of observable characteris-
tics (e.g., a certain credit score). 
      (7.9)     
It follows that for margins, the effect due to the program corre-
sponds to an average of the effects characterized by H2. These results 
are invariant to omitted reference groups when dummy variables are 
added; that is, the program effect estimates do not vary with the omitted 
category when we use indicator variables for the values of a categorical 
variable as controls.89 Since Kline has shown that the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition is a reweighting estimator, we can also interpret the 
Blinder-Oaxaca results causally.90 
To further isolate the effect of BAPCPA, we use propensity score 
matching methods to understand its effect on individuals who received 
loans after BAPCPA but who, based on their observable characteris-
tics, would have been approved for loans in the absence of BAPCPA. 
We estimate the effects on this population using nearest-neighbor pro-
pensity score matching, matching observations from the first quarter 
of 2006 with a single observation from the first quarter of 2005. This 
allows us to reduce the bias due to potential confounding variables. 
During this time period, underwriting of student loans was largely 
based on automated underwriting and primarily based on the charac-
teristics we observe—namely, credit score, amount of loan, and school 
characteristics. In other words, conditional on borrower and coborrower 
characteristics, approval for a loan is deterministic because lenders are 
making decisions based on observable characteristics run through an 
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algorithm. We thus have reason to believe that propensity score meth-
ods are appropriate because our sample satisfies the strong ignorability 
and conditional independence assumptions in Equation (7.10), where S 
is post-BAPCPA status, as discussed in Rosenbaum and Rubin.91 
(7.10)    
(7.11)         
The effect of the program on individuals in the common support of 
the characteristics of those observed in the pre- and postperiods can be 
estimated by Equation (7.11), where τ is the treatment effect and p is 
the propensity score estimated by a probit regression, and S = 1 if the 
individual is observed post BAPCPA and 0 otherwise.92 
H2 implies that the composition of borrowers may change, owing 
to the availability of credit to individuals who would not have been 
offered credit prior to the policy change. Lenders’ ex ante assessment 
of borrower credit quality, x, may be determined by multiple factors, 
including credit score, school attended, and year in school. Therefore, 
there may be differences in the observable characteristics of borrowers 
between the pre- and postperiods. The propensity score analysis thus 
cannot tell us anything about the type of borrower that is able to get a 
loan after BAPCPA. It can only tell us the effect of BAPCPA on bor-
rowers in the first quarter of 2006 that would have been approved for a 
loan before the law changed. 
School-level analysis 
To test the hypothesis that loan volumes increase because of BAP-
CPA, H3, we collapse our loan origination data set to the school level. 
Since our unit of observation is now a school, we are able to use the 
three methods described above—1) OLS, 2) Blinder-Oaxaca, and 3) 
propensity-score matching—to examine loan volumes. We also imple-
ment a DD strategy using federal loan volumes for comparison. 
First we compare the log number of private student loans in the 
lender data sample at each school in the preperiod to the postperiod. 
Note that in order to understand the magnitude of the effect, we must 
exponentiate the coefficients on post in the OLS specification and 
the analogues in the Oaxaca decomposition and the propensity score 
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matching models. We also run a school fixed effects model in order to 
consider the within school effects. All models are weighted by full-time 
equivalent enrollments. 
We also perform a DD analysis using available information on the 
volume of both Direct and FFELP Loans at a given school for the 2004– 
2005 and 2005–2006 academic years. We assume that in the absence 
of BAPCPA, the change in PSLs would parallel the change in federal 
loans and that the change in federal loans is proportional across quar-
ters. We can then estimate the effect of the program on loan volumes 
using a DD strategy. We believe that our assumption of PSL volume 
moving in a parallel fashion to federal loan volume in the absence of 
BAPCPA is likely, since they are subject to the same demand shocks, 
such as enrollments and changes in tuition costs. Although we do not 
have quarterly data for federal loans, annual average loans per student 
grew steadily from 2000 through 2005.93 
We combine Direct Loan and FFELP Loan totals at the institution-
year level, append the resultant data set to the school-level origination 
data, and merge the appropriate IPEDS and PEPS data at the institution-
year level. We then consider PSLs the treated group, so the coefficient 
of interest is βpsl×post in Equation (7.12), and the comparison groups are 
subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford Loans, Parental PLUS Loans, 
combined Stafford Loans, and all federal loans. We use a similar strat-
egy to estimate the effects of the program on average loan size at a given 
school by stacking the loan-level origination data with the Title IV Pro-
gram Volume Reports and weighting by the number of originations.94 
(7.12)        
One challenge with using federal loans as controls for PSLs arises 
from the fact that federal loans have defined maximum loan amounts.95 
This means that loan demand for federal loans is effectively top-coded, 
which leads to downward bias in estimates of .96 As a result, as 
shown in Appendix 7B, we are likely to underestimate the true effect 
with the DD analysis. 
We make two assumptions in our DD analysis. This is necessary, 
since data on federal loans are only available at the academic-year level. 
These assumptions are illustrated in Figure 7.6. First, we assume that all 
of the federal student loans originated in academic year 2004–2005 are 
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originated by April 20, 2005. It is likely that the majority of federal loans 
are originated by this point in time, since the academic year ends at the 
close of the second quarter, and the law took effect midway through the 
second quarter. This allows us to associate academic year 2004–2005 
with the pre-BAPCPA period and academic year 2005–2006 with the 
post-BAPCPA period. Second, we assume that at any given institution, 
the proportion of the academic year’s federal loans originated is con-
stant: if x percent of academic year 2004–2005 federal loans at school y
are made in Q1 2005, then x percent of academic year 2005–2006 fed-
eral loans at school y are made in Q1 2006. Similarly, we assume either 
that the absolute difference or the proportional difference in average 
federal loan size between quarters is constant within schools across aca-
demic years, in the specifications that consider average original balance 
and log original balance, respectively. Academic year volumes are a 
noisy measure of quarterly volumes, which means our results are biased 
toward zero, and the true effect is likely larger than what we observe.97 
RESULTS 
We analyzed the loans originated in the first quarters of 2005 and 
2006 using OLS regression, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, and pro-
pensity score matching. These methods produced similar results dis-
played in Appendix 7A, Tables 7A.1–7A.5. All of the results we dis-
cuss in this section are statistically significant to the 95 percent level or 
higher unless noted. 
Loan-Level Analysis 
Table 7A.1 uses OLS to estimate Equation (7.5) for tuition and fees, 
with various combinations of controls for a borrower’s year in school, 
school type, maximum FICO scores, linear splines for FICO scores, 
and school fixed effects.98 Once school fixed effects are introduced, 
the results are stable across specifications. As predicted by H2, lenders 
are lending to borrowers who have worse credit after the law changed, 
as evidenced by the 5.3 point average decrease in FICO scores shown 
in column (3). Contrary to the prediction from H1 that for a given 
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credit quality the consumer price of borrowing will decrease owing to 
increased collections, the margins increase by 30 basis points in column 
(5). Mean original balance also increased by $1,189. 
Because of their credit quality, some applicants would have been 
able to receive a PSL both before and after BAPCPA. To understand 
how BAPCPA may have affected the borrower population through 
changes in underwriting, we turn to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposi-
tion. The results displayed in Table 7A.2 show a 26 basis-point increase 
in margin but no significant change in loan amount. In column (2) of 
Panel A, the 0.398 decrease in credit scores due to endowments sug-
gests that some of the characteristics of borrowers may have changed 
that resulted in average lower FICO scores. This result is statistically 
significant at the 0.1 level but disappears when school fixed effects are 
added in column (3). This suggests that the composition of schools to 
which the sample creditors are lending may have changed and merits 
further investigation. 
Consistent with the OLS results in Table 7A.1, column (5) of Panel 
B shows a within-school effect of a 35-basis-point increase in margins, 
11 basis points of which are attributable to changes in the composi-
tion of students (endowments in Blinder-Oaxaca terminology), and 26 
basis points of which are attributable to changes in underwriting (coef-
ficients). Recall that we defined r as one plus the rate of return of the 
loan for the creditor conditional on the borrower repaying their loan. 
This suggests that for a given set of borrower characteristics, lenders 
are increasing r, so, inconsistent with the prediction from H1, lenders 
increased the price of loans in response to BAPCPA. 
Similarly, in Panel C, the overall change in original balance due to 
BAPCPA is insignificant, but changes in borrower characteristics pre-
dict a $116 increase in borrowing due to endowments (changes in the 
composition of students after the law changed). 
Table 7A.3 presents the results from the propensity score match-
ing, where the propensity score is calculated by a probit regression of 
borrower characteristics on whether or not an individual appears in the 
post-BAPCPA observations. For each specification, the raw difference 
in means is reported above the difference in means for the matched 
pairs, labeled as the average treatment on the treated effect. For maxi-
mum FICO scores, these results can be interpreted as the type of stu-
dents, based on schools attended and school year, that the lenders would 
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have successfully extended credit to pre-BAPCPA. The result in col-
umn (3) of a 4.2 point average decrease in FICO scores is consistent 
with the previous results and suggests that within a given school, lend-
ers are extending credit to individuals with slightly lower credit scores 
in the postperiod. 
For margins and original balances, the results in Table 7A.3 can be 
interpreted as the effects of the program on the loan terms of individuals 
who would have been granted loans prior to BAPCPA, based on their 
characteristics. Consistent with the OLS and Blinder-Oaxaca result, the 
result in column (5) suggests a 30-basis-point increase in the average 
margin experienced by a borrower. As also shown in that column, aver-
age original balances increased by $1,157 post-BAPCPA. 
Overall, these results suggest that credit did expand to some indi-
viduals who previously did not have access to private student loans 
prior to BAPCPA either because of their observable credit quality 
through their FICO scores or the characteristics of the schools that they 
attended. This is consistent with H2, and as can be seen from Figure 7.3, 
it was significant to a number of borrowers with low credit scores. Con-
sistent with the previous methods presented, margins actually increase 
by a significant amount post-BAPCPA. This is inconsistent with the 
theoretical prediction of H1 that the price of loans, as captured by the 
margin, should not increase, since collection given bankruptcy should 
increase the value of defaulted loans for creditors. 
School-Level Analysis 
As predicted by H3, when we collapse our data set to the school 
level, we observe a significant increase in the volume of PSLs after the 
implementation of BAPCPA. As shown in Table 7A.4, once we control 
for school characteristics, including tuition and fees, graduation rates, 
Carnegie classification, log full-time equivalent students, and the per-
cent of the student body that is black and Hispanic, we observe a 174.3 
percent increase in PSL originations in the OLS specification in column 
(6) of Panel A.99 The corresponding Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in 
column (6) of Panel B suggests that a 192.1 percent increase is due to 
a change in underwriting due to BAPCPA.100 Similarly, the propensity 
score matching result yields a 215.2 percent increase in loans due to 
BAPCPA in column (6) of Panel C. 
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An OLS regression of log borrowers on BAPCPA with school fixed 
effects, restricted to students at schools where the creditors issued loans 
before the policy change, yields an estimate of a 243.0 percent increase 
in loan volumes. Note that these volumes may be attenuated owing 
to measurement error and may underestimate the effect of the policy 
change, since we do not observe other firms that enter due to the con-
struction of the sample.101 
The DD results for loan volumes in Table 7A.5 are qualitatively 
similar to estimates in Table 7A.4. With all of our comparison groups, 
we observe an approximate 60 percent increase in the number of pri-
vate student loan originations, and a similar increase in the number of 
distinct borrowers in each loan type. When we compare average origi-
nal balance to Stafford Loan balances, we observe an effect of the law 
change of an approximately $600 increase in the average original bal-
ance of PSL. This is smaller than our point estimate using other tech-
niques, and we believe that that DD estimate may be biased downward, 
owing to the loan limits for federal loans.102 
We add Parent PLUS Loans as comparison in column (4) because 
they are a close substitute for PSLs, and because PLUS loan eligibility 
is based on the parents’ creditworthiness. Doing so leads us to esti-
mate a $121 decrease in the average size of the PSL. In our sample of 
PSLs the original rate is negatively correlated with original balance (ρ
= −0.0975), so it is possible that marginal individuals who would have 
applied for smaller PLUS Loans in the absence of the policy change 
make have substituted PSLs for PLUS Loans because of potentially 
lower interest rates.103 
DISCUSSION 
Recall our hypotheses from Table 7.1. While not every model pre-
dicted every outcome of interest, those that did were heading in the 
same direction. Our prediction was that credit would expand; in other 
words, borrower credit quality would stay the same or decrease, and 
average loan amounts as well as the volume of loans would stay the 
same or increase. Our models predicted the prices would either stay the 
same or decrease. Our results are mostly consistent with these hypoth-
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eses: credit expanded among all dimensions after BAPCPA. The first 
quarter after the law changed saw a dramatic 309 percent increase in the 
number of loans originated; we estimate that 60 percent of that increase 
was caused by BAPCPA.104 Additionally, borrowers with lower credit 
scores were moderately more able to obtain PSLs as a result of BAP-
CPA. The decrease in the average maximum credit score was small 
in magnitude, a drop similar to the effect of applying for two credit 
cards within a few days. Credit also expanded at the loan level; the 
average original balance of the loans increased by between $1,100 and 
$1,400, even after controlling for tuition and fees, year in school, hav-
ing a coborrower, maximum FICO score, and school fi xed effects. All 
of this is not unexpected. The most surprising finding of our study is 
that contrary to our hypotheses, both from the point of view of reform 
proponents and opponents, average loan prices (in our parlance, lender 
margins) increased during this period.105 Our estimates show that mar-
gins increased by between 30 and 40 basis points, even for students 
who would have received a loan before BAPCPA. 
An expansion of credit coupled with an increase in price sounds 
eerily similar to what happened in other consumer credit markets dur-
ing the pre-Great Recession bubble. The secondary market for all con-
sumer credit—mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, etc.—increased 
dramatically before the Great Recession. Consumer credit ABS issu-
ances peaked before 2005, but it is widely theorized that, securitization 
demand drove both an expansion of credit as well as an increase in 
prices in markets such as housing.106 One potential story here is that 
we are not observing BAPCPA so much as securitization demand. This 
account would be consistent with Block-Lieb and Janger’s prediction 
that lenders would not relax underwriting standards or originate more 
loans after BAPCPA because they had no reason to expect increased 
charge-offs after the law changed.107 If BAPCPA did not cause shifts 
in supply, then lenders would have only relaxed their underwriting cri-
teria in order to meet the demand from the securitization market. We
cannot discount that securitization had an effect on our fi ndings; how-
ever, as we discuss below, we find evidence that is inconsistent with this 
hypothesis. 
As shown in Figure 7.7, PSL Asset Backed Securities (PSLABS) 
outstandings increased in a steep linear fashion between 2003 and 2007. 
We note that the growth in outstandings in the period we studied (repre-
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Figure 7.7  Outstanding Private and Mixed Private/Public Student Loan 
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SOURCE: U.S. ABS Issuance and Outstanding, Securities Industry and Financial Mar-
kets Association (see Note 108). 
sented by the vertical lines in Figure 7.7) is similar to that in the period 
that came before it (2004–2005) and after 2006–2007. In other words, 
PSLABS were increasing steadily between 2003 and 2007. 
Given this stable increase, we compare our results among our four 
outcomes of interest (maximum FICO score between borrower or 
coborrower, margin charged on the loan, original balance of the loan, 
and the volume of loans originated) between the first quarters strad-
dling bankruptcy reform (Q1 2005 to Q1 2006) and the same quarters 
one year after reform (Q1 2006 to Q1 2007).109 Table 7.4 reports the 
raw means for the three periods.110 Credit expands the year after the law 
changes (2006–2007), but the growth is much more muted than in the 
period spanning bankruptcy reform. For example, between Q1 2006 
and Q1 2007, the mean maximum FICO score decreased one point; 
noticeably less than the five-point decrease after BAPCPA. Similarly, 
Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 208    1/28/2015 8:24:00 AM   
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Table 7.4  Raw Means of Outcomes of Interest in the First Quarters of 
2005, 2006, and 2007 
Q1 2005 Q1 2006 Q1 2007 
Mean Mean Mean 
Maximum FICO score 720 715 714 
Margin (%) 4.2 4.6 5.1 
Original balance ($) 8,614 10,015 10,147 
Loans originated 4,960 15,318 19,658 
loan volumes increased 128 percent between Q1 2007 and Q1 2006, but 
this is not the astounding 309 percent increase we observe between Q1 
2005 and Q1 2006. Continuing the puzzling trend, margins increased 
50 basis points between the first quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of 
2007. 
If securitization were a principal driver of the expansion of credit 
we observe between before and after bankruptcy reform, we would 
expect similar effects in the cost and availability of credit between 
the bankruptcy reform period (2005–2006) as well as the period after 
(2006–2007). That is not what the data show: the changes in borrower 
composition and the spike in loan volumes are quite pronounced in the 
period around bankruptcy reform, while not nearly as much in the same 
period one year later. 
Figure 7.7 depicts securitizations outstanding, which are necessarily 
cumulative. Figure 7.8 presents annual PSLABS issuances, which is a 
closer analogue to loan originations—closer but with one caveat. When 
comparing securitization issuances and loan originations, it is important 
to consider that PSLABS issuances necessarily lag originations. This 
is because it takes some time to package and securitize loans that are 
made during a particular time period. In addition, the typical securitiza-
tion trust contains loans originated during multiple years as part of the 
risk spreading investors require. The “youngest” loans included in a 
portfolio of PSLABS were typically originated 3–6 months prior to the 
issuance of the securities.111 Because of this lag, if the secondary mar-
ket was the reason for the large expansion of credit we observe in the 
time period around bankruptcy reform (and not BAPCPA), we should 
observe an increase in securitizations in 2005 (or before) relative to 
later years. The expected increase should attenuate in 2006 and later 
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Figure 7.8  Issuances of Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities 
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SOURCE: CFPB PSL report (see Note 112). 
to account for the “cooling off” in credit expansion that we discussed 
above. We observe the opposite. As shown in Figure 7.8, securitization 
issuances spike in 2006, the year immediately after BAPCPA became 
effective. 
Because of the lag in issuing securities, PSLABS packaged and 
offered to investors in 2006 were primarily made up of loans origi-
nated before bankruptcy reform. Regardless of when these loans were 
originated, however, when BAPCPA became effective on October 17, 
2005, all private student loans became presumptively nondischargeable 
and thus more valuable to investors. It is thus not surprising to observe 
a spike in securitization issuances in 2006 as shown in Figure 7.8 and 
a corresponding faster increase in PSLABS outstanding between 2005 
and 2006, as shown in Figure 7.7. The expected recovery of PSLs was 
higher now that they (effectively) could not be discharged in bank-
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ruptcy. This likely increased the demand for PSL securities from the 
secondary market but only after BAPCPA was enacted.113 This latter 
increased demand, however, could not be the cause of what we observe 
during the 2005–2006 period. 
Demand for PSLABS was progressively increasing well before 
BAPCPA was enacted. It is likely responsible for expansion of the PSL
market.114 However, a steady expansion of PSLABS from 2003–2007 
and a spike in PSLABS issuances in 2006 (which necessarily included 
few loans originated post-BAPCPA) are inconsistent with a hypothesis 
that the sudden expansion of credit we observe between Q1 2005 and 
Q1 2006 (around bankruptcy reform) was caused by securitization. 
Instead, what we know about securitization volumes in the period dur-
ing this time is more consistent with a story that bankruptcy reform 
further stoked the fires of the secondary market, leading to the peak in 
PSLABS issuances in 2006. 
If securitization does not explain the expansion of credit we observe, 
then what accounts for the puzzling increase in margins? One plausible 
explanation is that the increased prices are driven by lender advertising. 
We’ve reported evidence that the composition of borrowers changed 
after BAPCPA: in other words, credit expanded to borrowers who 
would not have received loans before the law changed. The data also 
show that borrowers who would have received loans before BAPCPA
obtained loans in increasing numbers after the law change. 
There is reason to think that advertising might have been well tar-
geted to the relevant population. Advertisements for PSLs could have 
come through regular channels (such as television, direct mail, and 
the Internet). Lenders could have also targeted students directly. Dur-
ing this period, the lenders in our study were part of FFELP and were 
federal as well as private student loans. If a student had applied for a 
FFELP loan from a lender, they would have some information about 
both the appetite and credit profile of the student, not to mention their 
contact information. Armed with this knowledge, the lender could reach 
out directly to students and promote their PSL product. This focused 
advertisement would lead to increased student demand for PSLs, which 
would have driven up the cost of the loans. There is anecdotal evidence 
of a growth in direct-to-consumer marketing during this time period 
and continuing for a few years. 
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We need much more information than we have available to test this 
theory. Ideally, we would have some data on advertising trends over 
time. We would also really want to have data on how margins were 
changing before 2005. It seems plausible that lenders began trying to 
fan demand as a result of securitization before BAPCPA. In that case, 
BAPCPA may have further increased marketing efforts. The increase in 
margins that we observe may be part of a broader trend that continues in 
the period one year after bankruptcy reform; potentially a lagging result 
of the increase in advertisement the previous year. Regrettably, the data 
available do not allow us to corroborate these suppositions. 
As a final note, we briefly discuss the potential welfare effects of 
bankruptcy reform vis-à-vis PSLs. Our data do not allow us to draw con-
clusions about whether the expansion of credit was welfare-enhancing. 
Robert Lawless and others have noted that a rapid expansion of credit 
is usually correlated with increased bankruptcy filings.115 Comparing 
PSLs to loans issued by nonprofit institutions, the CFPB found that 
“more careful underwriting ([by nonprofits] relative to [PSL] lenders) 
reduced default rates.”116 It is worth remembering, however, that in 
terms of less-than-prime borrowers, the credit expansion we observe 
was modest: the effect on the average credit score was the same as 
applying for multiple credit cards within a short period. 
Arguably, however, an expansion of credit is precisely what sup-
porters of the special treatment for PSLs intended. As then Representa-
tive Lindsey Graham (R-SC) stated during the 1999 debates arguing for 
the passage of the law: 
There is a growing industry in the private sector. There is a $1.25 
billion loan volume for where private lenders who will loan money 
to students for their college expenses as the federally guaranteed 
program does not in every occasion meet the needs of the student, 
and we are trying to give the private lender the same protection 
under bankruptcy that the federally guaranteed loan program has 
and nonprofit organizations have. We are trying to make sure 
they are [sic] available loans, loans are available to students to 
meet their financial needs, and this would have a benefi cial effect, 
make sure that the loan volume necessary to take care of college 
expenses are available for students . . . 117 
The congressional record is bare of any other explanations for the 
purpose of the special treatment of PSLs. John Pottow has theorized 
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that nondischargeability can be justified “as an attempt to make private 
loans ‘cheaper’ for students” and to create a “a robust private lending 
market . . . a bountiful capital supply available for loans.”118 
A bountiful capital supply was indeed available for loans immedi-
ately after BAPCPA, although the capital supply disappeared almost as 
quickly as it had appeared. After growing 20 percent per year between 
2005 and 2007, PSL originations in our sample peaked at $10.1 bil-
lion and dropped to pre-2005 levels in 2010–2011.119 Of course, other 
intervening factors likely played a role here, the Great Recession and 
credit crunch in particular. Nonetheless, it is important to note that a 
law’s purported positive effects (increasing availability of credit) may 
be short lived, while its potential negative ones (nondischargeability in 
bankruptcy) continue on. 
The increase in the risk premium lenders charge for a loan, on the 
other hand, does not seem welfare enhancing to borrowers. A 35-basis-
point increase in the price of a $10,000 15-year loan can translate to an 
added cost to the borrower of almost $25 per year or $365 over the life 
of the loan.120 This increase becomes more significant when one consid-
ers that the lenders in the sample made an additional 10,358 loans in the 
postperiod. If we take our $25 per year increase as an average for all 
loans, this would mean that BAPCPA may have cost student borrowers 
an additional $382,950 per year in the first quarter of 2006.121 
CONCLUSION 
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were a watershed 
moment almost a decade in the making. Proponents of bankruptcy 
reform blamed rapidly rising bankruptcy filings on strategic consum-
ers using the Bankruptcy Code to escape their debts. They argued 
that reform was necessary to prevent strategic borrower behavior and 
reduce the cost of consumer credit. Opponents of the proposed bank-
ruptcy reforms pointed to the dearth of data supporting the strategic 
consumer story and instead cited behavioral experiments establishing 
consumers’ less-than-perfect rationality and empirical evidence that 
the majority of bankruptcy filers had very low income and few assets. 
Opponents predicted that there would be no discernible change in the 
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cost of consumer credit or loan volumes. In this chapter, we developed 
and tested theoretical models predicting the effects of the part of the law 
change on PSLs granted to students at four-year undergraduate institu-
tions.122 Using a unique data set of PSL originations before and after the 
law change, we tested those predictions using OLS regression, Blinder-
Oaxaca, matching, and DD methods. 
Some of our findings are unsurprising: the law change caused a 
moderate expansion of credit for less creditworthy borrowers, although 
the average borrower credit score decreased only slightly in practi-
cal terms. Loan volumes also tripled; we attribute 60 percent of that 
increase to the law change. Contrary to our hypotheses, however, we 
find that the overall cost of private student loans at four-year under-
graduate institutions increased by an average of 35 basis points as a 
result of the law change. We posit that the larger cost may have been 
driven by increased demand for PSLs from students as a result of lender 
advertising. We speculate that the increased marketing may have started 
before BAPCPA. 
Our analysis so far suggests that this is a story about distributions— 
that is, that certain students may have seen an increase in the cost of 
their loans and others might have seen a decrease. In future work, we 
intend to investigate the variation in credit quality and margins to see 
whether the effect of BAPCPA was different across types of schools 
(e.g., higher versus lower prestige); types of borrowers (e.g., prime ver-
sus subprime); or types of loans (e.g., those marketed through the school 
versus those marketed directly to the consumer).123 We expect that this 
will give us a more complete picture of the effects of BAPCPA.124 
Notes 
This chapter conforms generally to the Bluebook legal style of citation. For the latest 
edition, see The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, 19th ed. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Law Review Association, 2010). 
1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 
Pub.L. 109–8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
2. In 1999 and 2000, the House and Senate passed bills that were vetoed by President 
Clinton. Clinton vetoes bankruptcy bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 20, 2000, avail-
able at http://lubbockonline.com/stories/121900/upd_075-5725.shtml; 145 Cong. 
Rec. H2655-02 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
















214 Ang and Jiménez 
3. For more information on the history and motivation of BAPCPA, see Susan 
Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, 
Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1481, 1483 (2006).
 4. Id. at 1562.
 5. See, e.g., Section 439A of the Higher Education Act, codified at 20 U.S.C. 1087-3 
(1976); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (1979) (Pub.L. 96-56, § 3 (1979)); 11 U.S.C. 523(a) 
(8) (1990) (see Pub.L. 101-647, § 3621(1) (1990)); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (1998) 
(see Pub.L. 105-244, § 971(a) (1998)). 
6. The first policy prescribes that similarly situated creditors not receive an advantage 
over others—sometimes termed “equity is equality”—for our purposes, unsecured 
creditors are all asked to share the loss equally. The second policy prescribes that 
the debtor should exit bankruptcy unshackled from the debts that were weighing 
down her economic productivity, or in bankruptcy parlance, that the debtor receive 
a “fresh start,” or a discharge of her debts. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle 
R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of 
the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 UNIV. OF CIN. L. REV. 405, 413-419 (2005) 
[hereinafter Pardo & Lacey (2005)]; National Bankruptcy Review Commission, 
BANKRUPTCY: THE  NEXT  TWENTY  YEARS 179 (1997), available at http://govinfo 
.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/07consum.pdf. 
7. An Act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy in the United States, 30 Stat. 
544 Section 17 (July 1, 1898). Exceptions to discharge have also been added for 
various kinds of fraud or false representations or violations of the law. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), (a)(9), (a)(11), (a)(12), (a)(13) & (a)(19). Many 
are also concerned with excepting taxes or duties owed to a state or federal entity. 
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1), (a)(7), (a)(11), (a)(12), (a)(14), (a)(14A), (a) 
(17), (a)(18) & (a)(19). The stated reason for the change here was the possibility 
for fraud and strategic filing by debtors seeking to start their postgraduation career 
without any student loans. 
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), (a)(15). 108 Cong. Rec. H156 (2004) (statement of Rep. 
Cantor). Senator Sessions also stated that the bill would “also provide[ ] tremen-
dous benefits for women and children.” 109 Cong. Rec. S1915 (2005) (statement 
of Sen. Sessions). 
9. What are the main differences between federal student loans and private student 
loans?  CONSUMER  FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 26, 2013), http://www.consumer-
finance.gov/askcfpb/545/what-are-main-differences-between-federal-student-
loans-and-private-student-loans.html. 
10. In our sample, 80 percent of student borrowers in Q1 2005 applied with a cobor-
rower. That proportion had risen slightly to 82 percent in Q1 2006. Federal loans 
have no cosigners, but Federal PLUS Loans are available to parents of under-
graduates who qualify for federal loans. 
11. See Appendix Figure 1 at page 96 of the CFPB PSL REPORT for a graphical rep-
resentation of the various indices used to calculate PSL interest rates from 2004– 
2012. Most federal loans are fixed rate. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STU-
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DENT LOANS 96 (2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_ 
Private-Student-Loans.pdf [hereinafter CFPB PSL REPORT].
 12. Id. at 12. By comparison, rates for federal student loans that did not require 
cosigners in 2011 were either 4.5 percent or 6.8 percent fixed, depending on the 
type of loan. A 4.5 percent fixed rate was available for undergraduate students tak-
ing out a subsidized Stafford Loan; 6.8 percent was available for undergraduate 
unsubsidized Stafford Loans and for graduate student subsidized and unsubsidized 
Stafford Loans. FinAid, Historical Interest Rates, http://www.fi naid.org/loans/ 
historicalrates.phtml. The federal loan program has had multiple instances where 
loans were offered as variable rates but has always had a cap of 8.25 percent APR 
for Stafford Loans and 9 percent for PLUS Loans. Id. 
13. Federally insured Stafford Loans issued by banks were also securitized during this 
time period. CFPB report at 17-18. For an explanation of asset-backed securitiza-
tion, see CFPB report at 104. 
14. There was no “consumer rebate.”
 15. Rohit Chopra, Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 17, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/ 
student-debt-swells-federal-loans-now-top-a-trillion.
 16. Income-Based Plan | Federal Student Aid, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid 
.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-based (accessed Apr. 11, 2014). 
17. For a full list, see Forgiveness, Cancellation, and Discharge | Federal Stu-
dent Aid, FED. STUDENT  AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness 
-cancellation#death-discharge (accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
 18. Id. at 10. 
19. Department of Education, Default Rates: Cohort Default Rates 2005-09, http:// 
ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/010512DefaultRates20052009.html. 
20. CFPB PSL REPORT, supra note 11, at 64-65.
 21. Id. at 64.
 22. Id.
 23. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1035, Pub. L. 
111-203 (2010). 
24. Pardo & Lacey, supra n. 6, at 427; see id. at note 112 and 113 for citations to illus-
trative cases. 
25. The GAO found that despite a general default rate on educational loans of 18 per-
cent, less than 0.75 percent of all education loans were discharged in bankruptcy. 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 132 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6094. 
The GAO also found that the majority of students were not filing for bankruptcy 
immediately upon graduation. The average time between when a student obtained 
a loan and when they filed for bankruptcy in the GAO sample was 41 months. 
Id. at 6103-04. In addition, lucrative careers were not signifi cantly represented 
among those who sought to discharge their student loans. While 72 percent of the 
individuals who discharged student loans in the GAO sample were employed, the 
top occupations were teacher (10 percent), clerk (8 percent), salesman (6 percent), 
housewife (5 percent), and student (4.5 percent). Id. Also, the individuals seeking 
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the protection of the bankruptcy laws were not particularly well off.  The average 
earnings for the individuals studied for the year prior to filing for bankruptcy were 
$5,361 in 1977 dollars ($20,787.42 today). Id. at 6105. 
26. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2005). 
27. The design of bankruptcy protections for student loans has clear welfare impli-
cations: in 2011, Felicia Ionescu modeled the effect of alternative bankruptcy 
regimes for federal student loans under uncertainty about college completion and 
future earnings, and concluded that nondischargeability benefi ts high ability, low 
income students, and that welfare effects differ by bankruptcy regime. Felicia 
Ionescu. Risky Human Capital and Alternative Bankruptcy Regimes for Student 
Loans, 5 J. HUMAN CAPITAL 153 (2011). 
28. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 154-55 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6115-16 (section 439A, effective September 30, 1977). Representative Edwards 
advised that “[i]f the exception to discharge is to be enacted, we must provide for 
a more definite standard that will not encourage forum shopping.” Id. That, unfor-
tunately, did not happen.
 29. See Higher Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-482 § 439, 90 Stat. 2081 
(Oct. 12, 1976)(section 439A, effective September 30, 1977); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) 
(8) (1979) (Pub.L. 96-56, § 3 (1979)); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (1990) (see Pub.L. 101-
647, § 3621(1) (1990)); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (1998) (see Pub.L. 105-244, § 971(a) 
(1998)); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (2005) (see Pub.L. 109-8, § 220 (2005)). For an 
empirical account of undue hardship determinations made by bankruptcy courts 
arguing that the legal outcomes in the determination of undue hardship can be best 
explained by “differing judicial perceptions of how the same standard applies to 
similarly situated debtors,” see Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6, at 486. 
30. Brunner v. N. Y. State Higher Educ. Servcs. Corp., 831 F. 2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). 
This is a three-part test; the debtor is required to meet all parts: 
(1) That the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, 
a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to 
repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this 
state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment 
period of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor had made good faith 
efforts to repay the loan. 
Id. at 396. At least one court has referred to the standard as the “certainty of hope-
lessness.” Daniel A. Austin, Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy: An Empirical 
Assessment at 5 (May 27, 2014)(forthcoming Suffolk U. L. R.), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2442312 (quoting In re Roberson, 
999 F. 2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993)). Note, however, that recently some courts seem to 
be relaxing the standard. Id.
 31. See FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 7001; Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Stu-
dent Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L. J. 
495, 496 (2012). 
32. United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010). 
33. In other words, the loans continue to accrue interest and fees while the individual 
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is in bankruptcy and she is still liable for all that the contract obligates her to pay 
even after she receives her bankruptcy discharge.
 34. Iuliano, supra note 31, at 504-05.
 35. Id. Using a different sampling protocol drawing from cases between 2005 and 
2013 in 10 judicial districts, Daniel Austin estimates that less than 0.33 percent of 
individuals with student loans seek to discharge them in bankruptcy. See Austin, 
supra n. 30, at 5. 
36. Pardo and Lacey’s 2005 study offered the very first empirical evidence of out-
comes in undue hardship cases. The study suffered from serious limitations, since 
it was based on published judicial opinions, rare and nonrandom events in them-
selves, and was composed of only cases that went to trial and produced a pub-
lished opinion. Not all trials produce a published opinion and not all attempts to 
discharge student debt go to trial. Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6. Their 2009 
study examined a data set of 115 student-loan discharge proceedings—for both 
private and federal loans—that were filed between 2002 and 2006 in the Western 
District of Washington. Rafael I. Pardo and Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student 
Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 179,
200 (2009) [hereinafter Pardo & Lacey (2009)].
 37. See Iuliano, supra note 31, 509 (mean age 49 and median 48.5); Pardo & Lacey 
(2005), supra note 6, at 442-43 (mean 41.5, median 41); Pardo & Lacey (2009), 
supra note 36, at 204 (mean: 45; median not reported).
 38. Iuliano, supra note 31, at 508 (68 percent unmarried, 46 percent had dependents); 
Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6, at 445-47 (62 percent unmarried, 56 percent 
had dependents); Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra note 36, at 204 (80 percent unmar-
ried, 38 percent had dependents).
 39. See Iuliano, supra note 31, at 508 (60 percent of discharge seekers were employed 
versus 81 percent of the overall bankruptcy population); Pardo & Lacey (2009), 
supra note 36, at 204 (58 percent were employed).
 40. Iuliano, supra note 31, at 511. 
41. Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6, at 474 (mean: $47,137); Iuliano, supra note 
31, at 510 (mean: $80,746). See also Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra note 36, at 207 
(mean: $76,139).
 42. Iuliano, supra note 6, at 518 (52 percent); Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra note 36, 
at 204 (55 percent). 
43. Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6, at 477. 
44. Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra note 36, at 184.
 45. Iuliano, supra note 31, at 505. Most of those discharges came about as a result of 
a settlement with a student loan creditor (56 cases or 69 percent of all debtors who 
obtained relief). Only in 22 percent of cases in which a debtor obtained a partial 
discharge or more did the bankruptcy judge make a determination that the debtors 
satisfied the undue hardship standard. Id. at 512. 
46. Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6.
 47. Id. at 433. 
48. Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra n. 36, at 185. 
49. Mark Krantowitz, FINAID.ORG, IMPACT OF THE BANKRUPTCY EXCEPTION FOR PRIVATE
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STUDENT LOANS ON PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN AVAILABILITY (Aug. 14, 2007), http:// 
www.fi naid.org/educators/20070814pslFICOdistribution.pdf.
 50. Id. at 2. 
51. Krantowitz’s data came from PSLs included in the prospectuses of asset backed 
securitizations (student loan asset backed securities, or SLABs for short) done 
between 2002 and 2007. Krantowitz, supra note 49 at 1. One issue with Kran-
towitz’s analysis is that one of the SLABs examined included loans that may have 
been nondischargeable before BAPCPA because of the involvement of a nonprofit 
entity. In the case of one of the SLABs examined in the report, First Marble-
head, the loans were guaranteed by The Education Resources Institute, or TERI, 
a national nonprofit. Id. at 5. It is not entirely unclear that these loans would have 
been nondischargeable prior to BAPCPA, id., but the uncertainty can also cloud 
the results
 52. Id. at 4.
 53. Id. 
54. Id. at 5. The report noted that the prospectuses for the SLABs examined did not 
disclose any change in underwriting criteria for loans originated after BAPCPA. 
Id. 
55. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 3, at 1511-14. See also Marquette Nat’l Bank of 
Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
 56. Id. at 1484 (citing 151 CONG. REC. S1813, S 1842 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) 
(statement of Sen. Hatch insisting that there is a “bankruptcy tax” of “$400-a-year 
on every household in the country,” which could amount to a “mortgage or a rent 
payment” for many families).
 57. Id.
 58. Id. citing Posting of Richard Posner to Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-
posner-blog.com (Mar. 27, 2005, 02:20 PM) (“If bankruptcy is more costly, there 
will be less of it.”). 
59. In other words, r can be thought of as the present discounted value of the fl ow of 
payments made by a borrower who follows the repayment schedule. Therefore, 
for a given loan term and conditions, a higher value of r implies a higher interest 
rate for borrowers. 
60. This includes partially paid loans for which the remaining outstanding balance is 
sent to collections. 
61. “To model decision-making under uncertainty, almost all game theory uses the 
theories of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and of Savage (1972). That is, 
if the consequence function is stochastic and known to the decision-maker . . . then 
the decisionmaker is assumed to behave as if he maximizes the expected value of 
a [utility] function . . .” Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game 
Theory 5 (1994). 
62. We would expect BAPCPA to diminish the opportunity for strategic default, even 
if there was rampant strategic behavior pre-BAPCPA. 
63. Note that neither the shift in demand nor supply need be parallel. Consider the 
case where v̂(z,r) = v(kz,r) where k is a constant. Then dk
dz– is a function of r, so shifts 
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do not have to be parallel. It follows from Equation 7.3 that shifts in supply also 
do not have to be parallel. 
64. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981). 
65. This assumption is based on our informal understandings of the market. More 
research is needed. 
66. A number of scholars have argued that the Stiglitz-Weiss model is no longer appli-
cable in a world of sophisticated credit scoring models, and “big data” number 
crunching lenders can differentiate between good and bad risks and thus can price 
products according to risk. Risk-based pricing is very much alive in the context 
of PSLs and can be seen in our data. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 3 and 
Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1255 (2002).The rise of the 
securitization market has also been cited as a reason why credit rationing may no 
longer occur as in the Stiglitz-Weiss model, given that there is more capital avail-
able to lenders. See generally Engel and McCoy. In any event, the Stiglitz-Weiss 
model predictions are very similar to the competition model above. The primary 
difference is that the Stiglitz-Weiss model predicts that loan pricing (lender mar-
gins) should remain the same for originations after the law change. 
67. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 3. 
68. Students may be unaware of the law change or what it means for their private 
student loans or they may suffer from a number of other behavioral biases other 
than present bias, such as optimism bias or probability neglect. Cass Sunstein, 
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L. J. 61 (2002). 
69. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 3 at 1562. 
70. We consider the Block-Lieb hypothesis to be a distinct model even though it can 
be described as a subset of the CP model. 
71. CFPB PSL REPORT, supra note 11.
 72. Id. at 7. “The participating lenders included: RBS Citizens N.A., Discover Finan-
cial Services, The First Marblehead Corporation, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
PNC Bank, N.A., Sallie Mae, Inc., SunTrust Banks, Inc., U.S. Bank National 
Association, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A..” Id. at 109. 
73. Most of the PSLs in the data set had variable interest rates that varied according 
to an index, such as LIBOR or the Prime Rate. The “margin” on those loans is the 
premium “added to the current index value to determine the total interest rate for 
the loan. The margin is set at the time of origination and varies based on the credit 
worthiness of a borrower. This variation in margin value is one way that a creditor 
might establish ‘risk-based’ pricing.” Id. at 108. 
74. Details of this merge are described id. at 93-95. 
75. The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System – About IPEDS, INSTITUTE
OF EDUCATION SCIENCES, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/about/ (accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
 76. Id.
 77. Postsecondary Education Participants System (PEPS) homepage, FED. STUDENT
AID, http://www2.ed.gov/offi ces/OSFAP/PEPS/index.html (accessed Apr. 11, 
2014). 
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78. “Title IV” refers to the part of the Higher Education Act of 1965 that covers 
the administration of federal financial aid programs. Title IV Program Volume 
Reports | Federal Student Aid, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/about/ 
data-center/student/title-iv (accessed Apr. 11, 2014). The Federal Family Educa-
tion Loan Program (FFELP) was in effect from 1965–2010 and was a public-
private partnership whereby private lenders would originate federal loans. It was 
eliminated in 2010 when it was projected it would save $68 billion over 11 years. 
Tracey D. Samuelson, Student Loan Reform: What Will It Mean For Students?
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
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Table 7A.1  Loan-Level OLS Analysis, Q1 2005 and Q1 2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Maximum FICO score 
Post −5.825*** −5.890*** −5.262*** 
(0.0811) (0.0752) (0.679) 
N 19,759 19,759 20,170 
R2 0.013 0.083 0.192 
Margin 
Post 0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0042*** 0.0036*** 0.0033*** 
(4.5e-05) (4.5e-05) (0.00022) (0.00022) (0.00022) 
N 19,759 19,759 20,170 20,170 20,170 
R2 0.042 0.042 0.200 0.327 0.389 
Original balance 
Post 1,326*** 1,325*** 1,268*** 1,198*** 1,189*** 
(16.68) (16.88) (104.7) (104.1) (103.6) 
N 19,759 19,759 20,170 20,170 20,170 
R2 0.0159 0.0161 0.181 0.186 0.187 
Controls 
Tuition and fees X X 
Year in school X X X X X 
School type X X 
Has a coborrower X X X 
Maximum FICO score X 
Spline of maximum X 
FICO score 
School fi xed effects X X X 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Each cell 
corresponds to a separate regression. Restricted to four-year undergraduates in the first 
quarters of 2005 and 2006. Spline of FICO scores in 20-point intervals. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, and 
PEPS. 
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Table 7A.2  Loan-Level Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions, Q1 2005 and 
Q1 2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
                                 Panel A: Max FICO 
Before BAPCPA 720.4*** 720.4*** 720.3*** 
(0.654) (0.654) (0.706) 
After BAPCPA 715.0*** 715.0*** 715.0*** 
(0.388) (0.388) (0.402) 
Difference 5.439*** 5.439*** 5.377*** 
(0.761) (0.761) (0.812) 
Endowments −0.329*** −0.398* −0.939 
(0.0941) (0.219) (1.200) 
Coefficients 5.967*** 6.018*** 1.058 
(0.761) (0.726) (4.741) 
Interactions −0.199* −0.181 5.257 
(0.113) (0.117) (4.840)
 Panel B: Original balance 
Before BAPCPA 11,171*** 11,171*** 11,221 11,221 11,221*** 
(42.67) (42.67) (0) (0) (42.15) 
After BAPCPA 11,183*** 11,183*** 11,288 11,288 11,288*** 
(37.65) (37.65) (0) (0) (37.05) 
Difference −12.11 −12.11 −66.82 −66.82 −66.82 
(56.90) (56.91) (0) (0) (56.12) 
Endowments −18.66* −13.41 −399.4 −255.1 −116.2*** 
(10.53) (10.85) (0) (0) (10.06) 
Coefficients −7.194 −11.60 112.4 174.2 32.94 
(56.12) (56.07) (0) (0) (56.32) 
Interactions 13.75*** 12.91*** 220.2 14.03 16.39 
(4.836) (4.902) (0) (0) (11.01)
                                Panel C: Margins 
Before BAPCPA 0.0436*** 0.0436*** 0.0436 0.0436 0.0436*** 
(6.40e−05) (6.40e−05) (0) (0) (6.32e−05) 
After BAPCPA 0.0469*** 0.0469*** 0.0470 0.0470 0.0470*** 
(5.31e−05) (5.31e−05) (0) (0) (5.26e−05) 
Difference −0.00335***−0.00335*** −0.00347 −0.00347 −0.00347*** 
(8.31e−05) (8.31e−05) (0) (0) (8.22e−05) 
Endowments −8.05e−06 −1.41e−05 −0.000660 −0.00127 −0.00110*** 
(1.12e−05) (1.16e−05) (0) (0) (4.47e−05) 
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Table 7A.2  (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
                                Panel C: Margins (continued) 
Coefficients −0.00336***−0.00336*** −0.00289 −0.00247 −0.00256*** 
(8.24e−05) (8.24e−05) (0) (0) (7.32e−05) 
Interactions 2.49e−05***2.48e−05*** 8.36e−05 0.000276 0.000194*** 
(7.18e−06) (7.28e−06) (0) (0) (1.96e−05) 
Controls 
Tuition and fees x x 
Year in school x x x x x 
School type x x 
Has a coborrower x x x 
Maximum FICO x 
score 
Spline of maximum x 
FICO score 
School fi xed effects x x x 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Restricted to four-year 
undergraduates in the first quarters of 2005 and 2006. Spline of FICO scores in 20-year intervals. 
Tuition and fees calculated based on IPEDS data and student’s reported state of residence. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, and 
PEPS. 
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Table 7A.3  Loan-Level Propensity Score Matching, Q1 2005 and Q1 2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
                               Panel A: Maximum FICO score 
Unmatched −5.439 −5.439 −5.189 
(0.777)*** (0.777)*** (0.784)*** 
Average treatment −4.971 −3.458 −4.225 
on the treated (1.585)*** (1.402)*** (1.376)***
                               Panel B: Margin 
Unmatched 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Average treatment 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 
on the treated (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
 Panel C: Original balance 
Unmatched 1371.186 1371.1853 1352.15 1352.147 1352.147 
(125.50)*** (125.50)*** (127.05)*** (127.05)*** (127.05)*** 
Average treatment 1272.251 1120.066 1425.717 1303.748 1157.226 
on the treated (240.41)*** (213.86)*** (214.30)*** (168.91)*** (170.74)*** 
Number of observations 
Untreated 4,828 4,828 4,838 4,838 4,838 
Treated 14,931 14,931 13,634 13,634 13,634 
Controls 
Tuition and fees x x 
Year in school x x x x x 
School type x x 
Has a coborrower x x x 
Maximum FICO x 
score 
Spline of maximum x 
FICO score 
School fixed x x x 
effects 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Restricted to four-
year undergraduates in the first quarters of 2005 and 2006. Spline of FICO scores in 20-point 
intervals. Propensity scores calculated using probit regression. Nearest neighbor matching with 
replacement. Tuition and fees calculated based on IPEDS data and student’s reported state of 
residence. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, and 
PEPS. 
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Table 7A.4  Private Student Loan Volumes at the School Level, Q1 2005  
and Q1 2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















 Panel B: Oaxaca decomposition 
Difference 0.541*** 0.436** 0.590*** 0.744*** 0.590*** 0.590*** 
(0.178) (0.182) (0.165) (0.222) (0.183) (0.180) 
1.718 1.547 1.804 2.104 1.804 1.804 
Difference due to –0.00419 0.00179 –0.135 −0.0761 −0.292** −0.289** 
endowments (0.0484) (0.0489) (0.113) (0.180) (0.138) (0.136) 
0.996 1.002 0.835 0.927 0.747 0.749 
Difference due to 0.546*** 0.492*** 0.873*** 0.974*** 1.069*** 1.072*** 
coefficients (0.170) (0.184) (0.103) (0.154) (0.0777) (0.0748) 
1.726 1.636 2.394 2.649 2.912 2.921 
Difference due to 0.000748 –0.0581 –0.148* −0.153 −0.187** −0.193** 
interactions (0.00896) (0.0857) (0.0825) (0.144) (0.0757) (0.0769) 
0.999 0.944 0.862 0.858 0.829 0.824
 Panel C: Propensity score matching 
Average treatment 0.993*** 1.016*** 1.146*** 1.141*** 1.148*** 1.148*** 
on the treated (0.0408) (0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0410) (0.0412) (0.0413) 
2.699 2.762 3.146 3.130 3.152 3.152 
Controls 
Tuition and fees x x x x x x 
Graduation rate x x x x x 
Carnegie x x x x 
classification 
ln(full-time equivalent x x x 
students) 
HBCU, HSI x 
% black, % Hispanic x 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects in 
italics. Restricted to four-year undergraduates in the first quarters of 2005 and 2006. Marginal 
effects calculated by exponentiating estimated coeffi cients. Outcome is natural log of PSL bor-
rowers in the lender data. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, PEPS, and Title 
IV Program Volume Reports. 
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Table 7A.5  Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effects of 
BAPCPA on Loan Volumes and Original Balances, Q1 
2005 and Q1 2006 
 Control group 
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Stafford Stafford All Stafford PLUS Loans All federal 
subsidized unsubsidized Loans loans 
loans loans 
Loan volumes 
ln(originations) 0.512*** 0.459*** 0.491*** 0.450*** 0.487*** 
(0.0210) (0.0215) (0.0210) (0.0231) (0.0207) 
1.669 1.582 1.634 1.568 1.627 
ln(borrowers) 0.491*** 0.438*** 0.471*** 0.434*** 0.467*** 
(0.0208) (0.0214) (0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0206) 
1.634 1.550 1.602 1.543 1.595 
Average loan size 
Original balance 641.6*** 647.5*** 624.5*** −120.7* 542.9*** 
(163.5) (159.9) (161.2) (68.55) (143.1) 
ln(original balance) 0.0544*** 0.0451*** 0.0450*** -0.0143* 0.0330*** 
(0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0148) (0.00843) (0.0117) 
1.056 1.570 1.046 0.986 1.034 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal 
effects in italics. Restricted to four-year undergraduates in the first quarters of 2005 
and 2006. Marginal effects calculated by exponentiated estimated coeffi cients. Note 
that program effects on loan size may be biased downward. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, PEPS, and Title 
IV Program Volume Reports. 
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Appendix 7B 
Bias in Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
Suppose that the outcome equation for federal loans is determined by the 
following equation and that yi
* is bounded above by ymax 
yi
* = f(xi ) + εi 
 
   
 Then the observed mean fi rst difference,  , can be written as 
a function of the uncensored loan amount, bi
* function, and the maximum loan 
amount allowable. 




     
So when we take difference-in-differences when the outcome for private 
loans is not censored (i.e., bi = bi
*), the estimate δ̂ of program effect δ is biased 
downwards. 
   
 
    
 
        
 
     
 
     
We do not observe  , so we cannot estimate the magnitude of the 
bias. 
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This appendix contains the relevant theorems, notation, and equations 
from Stiglitz and Weiss’s 1981 paper. For ease of discussion, we retain Stiglitz 
and Weiss’s numbering. 
Each project, indexed by θ, is assumed to have a probability distribution 
of gross return R. The distribution of returns is denoted F(R,θ) and the density 
of returns is denoted f (R,θ). Higher values of θ correspond to higher levels of 
risk in the sense of mean-preserving spreads, i.e., for θ1 > θ2 
 
     
 
then for y ≥ 0, 
 
     
 
An individual who borrows amount B at interest rate r̂ repays his loan if 
R > B(1 + r̂ ). Note that this is a simplification from the Stiglitz-Weiss model as 
there is no term for collateral, since student loans are unsecured. The return to 
the creditor or bank is denoted ρ(R, r̂ ) = min (R,B(1 + r̂ )). Upper bars denote 
means. 
Theorem 1: For a given interest rate r̂ , there is a critical value θ̂ such that a firm 
borrows from the bank if and only if θ > θ̂. 
Theorem 3: The expected return on a loan to a bank is a decreasing function 
of the riskiness of the loan to the bank. 
Theorem 5: Whenever ρ(r̂ ) has an interior mode, there exists supply functions 
of funds such that competitive equilibrium entails credit rationing. 
Corollary 1: As the supply of funds increases, the excess demand for funds 
decreases, but the interest rate charged remains unchanged, so long as there is 
any credit rationing. 
Equation (7.5): (Zero-profit condition) 
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Private student loan borrowers are analogous to the firms in the model: 
projects, or school-major choices, with different mean returns can be distin-
guished from each other—to the lender returns to education for individuals 
in the same major at the same school are drawn from the same distribution.1 
Private student loan borrowers with the same expected mean return differ from 
each other in their risk parameter, which Stiglitz-Weiss denote θ, where risk is 
increasing in θ. In the analysis below, we consider credit score a proxy for −θ, 
since risk is decreasing in credit score. The BAPCPA reforms that effectively 
made most loans nondischargeable in bankruptcy decrease the risk associated 
with any given loan, which effectively increases the expected return to the 
creditor, as described in Stiglitz and Weiss’s Theorem 3.2 
Given the Stiglitz-Weiss model and the theories described in the paper, our 
hypotheses for the effect of the change to the bankruptcy laws making private 
student loans presumptively nondischargeable can be stated as follows: 
• H1—Loan pricing (that is, lender margins) should remain the same 
for originations after the law change. Since the profitability of a given 
loan increases for creditors, following Theorem 3 the supply of credit 
should increase.3 Assuming an interior mode for the return to the cred-
itor of lending at a given interest rate, Theorem 5 implies that credit 
rationing will still exist. Given these conditions, Corollary 1 states 
that “as the supply of funds increases, the excess demand for funds 
decreases, but the interest rate charged remains unchanged, so long as 
there is credit rationing.”4 
• H2—Lenders should be willing to lend to borrowers with lower credit 
quality than they were willing to lend before the law change. This is 
essentially a decrease in the critical value θ̂, which Theorem 1 states 
that an individual will borrow from the creditor if and only if the bor-
rower’s value of θ exceeds θ.5̂
• H3—Overall loan volumes should increase. This follows from the 
argument presented for H1. 
Appendix Notes 
1. One can think of a choice of major at a particular school as an investment with 
uncertain returns. For example, a freshman liberal arts student might know the 
distribution of returns of liberal arts majors from his school but does not know 
what his particular return will be ex ante.
 2. See Stiglitz and Weiss supra note 64. 
3. Theorems refer to theorems in Stiglitz and Weiss’s paper.
 4. Id. at 398. 
5. Consider Stiglitz and Weiss’s Equation (5). Id. 
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A growing number of college students in the United States borrow 
thousands of dollars from public and private lenders to finance their 
higher education, and an increasing portion of them have been default-
ing on their obligations. Over the past decade, the total number of Staf-
ford Loan borrowers has nearly doubled to 10.4 million recipients in 
2011–2012. In recent years, undergraduates have borrowed more than 
$70 billion annually in federal student loans. More ominously, student 
loan default rates have risen continuously since 2005 after falling for 
more than a decade. Three-year cohort default rates stand at 13.4 per-
cent for students entering repayment in 2009. Among students from pri-
vate for-profit institutions, three-year default rates exceed 20 percent.1
Against this backdrop, there is growing concern that many students are 
borrowing too much, especially in the wake of the Great Recession. 
These developments have led to renewed interest in the design of fed-
eral student loan programs, including a reevaluation of student borrow-
ing limits, interest rates, and income-contingent repayment schemes. 
Unfortunately, much of this discussion is occurring amid scant sys-
tematic evidence on the determinants of student loan repayment and 
default, especially for recent cohorts. 
Dynarski (1994), Flint (1997), and Volkwein et al. (1998) study 
the determinants of student loan default using nationally representa-
tive data from the 1987 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study that 
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surveyed borrowers leaving school in the late 1970s and 1980s. Other 
empirical studies have generally examined default behavior at specific 
institutions or in individual states in the United States.2 Gross et al. 
(2009) provide a review of this literature and conclude that factors such 
as race, socioeconomic background, educational attainment, type of 
postsecondary institution, student debt levels, and postschool earnings 
are important determinants of default. Minorities, students from low-
income families, and college dropouts all tend to have higher default 
rates, as do students attending two-year and for-profit private institu-
tions. Default is also more likely for those with high debt levels and low 
postschool earnings. 
We go beyond previous analyses of default to consider other impor-
tant measures of student loan repayment and nonpayment that are likely 
to be of greater interest to potential lenders (public or private). Most 
lenders are concerned about the expected return on their investments, 
although government lenders may have other objectives. While default 
is a key factor affecting the expected returns on student loans, other fac-
tors can also be important. For example, government student loans offer 
opportunities for loan deferment or forbearance, which temporarily 
suspend payments.3 The timing of default and deferment/forbearance 
can also influence returns to lenders. From the lender’s point of view, 
it matters if a borrower defaults (without reentering repayment) imme-
diately after leaving school or after five years of standard payments. 
The discounted value of payments from the former is much lower than 
from the latter. Similarly, the discounted present value of payments is 
much lower for borrowers who defer payments for extended periods of 
time than for those who do not. These simple examples suggest that the 
credit-worthiness of different types of borrowers (based on their back-
ground or their schooling choices) depends on the expected payment 
streams and not simply whether they had ever entered default or are 
currently in default at some arbitrary survey date. 
Unfortunately, an analysis of expected returns across different 
types of borrowers is impossible given current data sources, since it 
requires data on potential determinants of repayment and access to 
full repayment histories. As far as we know, these data are not avail-
able. In this chapter, we use data from the Baccalaureate and Beyond 
Longitudinal Studies (B&B) to analyze a number of different repay-
ment and nonpayment measures that provide useful information about 
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expected returns on student loans. As discussed further in the follow-
ing section, the B&B follows a random sample of 1992–1993 U.S. 
college graduates for 10 years and contains rich information about 
the individual and family background of respondents, choice of col-
lege major and institution, student borrowing levels, postschool earn-
ings, and loan repayment status (including outstanding balances) 5 and 
10 years after graduation. We use the student loan records to compute 
five different measures related to repayment and nonpayment of stu-
dent loans 10 years after graduation: 1) the fraction of initial student 
debt still outstanding; 2) an indicator for default status; 3) an indicator 
for nonpayment status (includes default, deferment, and forbearance); 
4) the fraction of initial debt that is in default; and 5) the fraction of 
initial debt that is in nonpayment. We then study the determinants of 
all of these repayment/nonpayment measures, focusing on the roles of 
individual and family background factors, college major, postsecondary 
institution characteristics, student debt levels, and postschool earnings. 
We find that many of the factors identified in earlier studies are impor-
tant for our more recent sample of borrowers; however, the importance 
of some factors depends on the measure of repayment or nonpayment 
under consideration. We highlight a number of general lessons and open 
questions arising from our results in the concluding section. 
DATA: THE BACCALAUREATE AND BEYOND 
LONGITUDINAL STUDY 
We use the B&B to analyze patterns in student loan repayment and 
default for college graduates up to 10 years after graduating. The B&B 
was initially drawn as a subsample from the 1993 National Postsecond-
ary Student Aid Study, a nationally representative random sample of 
all postsecondary students in the United States.4 More specifi cally, the 
B&B has followed the roughly 16,000 respondents who received bac-
calaureate degrees in the 1992–1993 academic year through 2003. The 
B&B uses data from three basic sources: 1) survey data in 1993, 1994, 
1997, and 2003; 2) institutional records on college costs and financial 
aid; and 3) snapshots from student loan administrative records in 1998 
and 2003. With extensive information about family background and 
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demographic characteristics, student achievement as measured by SAT/ 
ACT scores, college-related outcomes (e.g., undergraduate major, insti-
tution attended, graduate school attendance, and postgraduate degrees), 
labor market outcomes every few years, and student loan balances and 
repayment status 5 and 10 years after graduation, the B&B offers a 
unique opportunity for studying student loan repayment and default 
behavior in the United States. 
The B&B sample is relatively homogeneous in its educational 
attainment: all students have at least a BA/BS degree. The lack of col-
lege dropouts and students with less than four-year degrees is unfortu-
nate, since previous research shows that repayment problems are most 
common among these individuals.5 Still, we find that many students 
who graduated from college in 1992–1993 have experienced repayment 
problems. 
To focus on a typical American college student, we exclude non-
citizens, the disabled, and individuals receiving their BA/BS at age 
30 or older (less than 14 percent received their BA/BS at later ages). 
Because new graduates who then attend graduate school are eligible 
for automatic loan deferments when they are enrolled, they will have 
spent less time in repayment. This directly reduces their opportunities 
for both repayment and default within any given time frame, making it 
difficult to compare their repayment/default outcomes with those of stu-
dents who have not participated in postgraduate studies. Our main anal-
ysis, therefore, excludes respondents who attended 12 or more months 
of graduate school as of 1997, received any postgraduate degrees by 
2003, or were enrolled in school in 2003.6 Altogether, this leaves 4,300 
U.S. citizens who received baccalaureate degrees in 1992–1993 but 
participated in little schooling thereafter. Roughly half of these gradu-
ates report that they borrowed money for their undergraduate school-
ing as of 2003. Our analysis of repayment and default focuses on these 
2,180 borrowers. 
The B&B contains standard demographic characteristics such as 
gender and race/ethnicity (Asian, black, Hispanic, white). We also use 
measures of maternal education, categorizing students based on whether 
their mothers never attended college, attended but did not receive a BA/ 
BS, or completed their BA/BS. Dependency status (for fi nancial aid 
purposes) is also available for students, along with parental income in 
1991 for those who are dependents. The B&B also contains data on 
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student SAT and ACT scores. We categorize individuals into quartiles 
based on their SAT scores if they are available. If an individual did 
not report an SAT score, we use the corresponding ACT quartile.7 The 
data also include information about the major course of undergradu-
ate study and the type of institution from which individuals graduated 
(public, private nonprofit, private for-profit, historically black college/ 
university). We use the undergraduate institution from which individu-
als graduate to include a measure of the selectivity of the institution as 
determined by Barron’s 1992 Admissions Competitiveness Index. We
consider the following three competitiveness categories: 1) most com-
petitive and highly competitive, 2) very competitive and competitive, 
and 3) all others. Sample averages for all of these variables are reported 
for our sample of borrowers and nonborrowers, as well as borrowers 
only, in Table 8A.1. 
Our main focus is on student borrowing, repayment, and default 
measured 10 years after graduation. As noted earlier, roughly half of 
our sample borrowed funds for their undergraduate studies. Among 
those who borrowed, the average amount of undergraduate loans was 
$9,300. On average, another $600 was borrowed for graduate studies. 
The latter amount is small, since our sample restrictions ensure that 
students in our sample spent very little (or no) time in graduate school. 
Ten years after graduation, borrowers still owed, on average, $2,600 on 
their undergraduate loans. Two-thirds had repaid their undergraduate 
loans in full. 
Table 8.1 reports repayment status for borrowers as of 1998 and 
2003. In both years, 92 percent were repaying their loans or had already 
fully repaid their loans. The fraction of borrowers receiving a defer-
ment or forbearance declined from 3.8 percent in 1998 to 2.5 percent in 
2003, while the share of borrowers in default rose from 4.2 percent to 
5.8 percent over this period.8 These figures suggest that deferment and 
forbearance are important forms of nonpayment with a diminishing role 
over time: They make up nearly half of all nonpayments five years after 
school, falling to slightly less than one-third five years later. 
Table 8.2 shows transition rates for these repayment states from 
1998 to 2003. The rows in the table list the probabilities of being in 
repayment (including those who fully repaid), receiving a deferment 
or forbearance, or being in default 10 years after school (in 2003) con-
ditional on each of those repayment states five years earlier in 1998. 
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Table 8.1  Repayment Status for Undergraduate Borrowers 5 and 10 
Years after Graduation 
Status 1998 2003 
Fully repaid 0.269 0.639 
(0.013) (0.013) 
Repaying or fully paid 0.920 0.917 
(0.008) (0.007) 
Deferment or forbearance 0.038 0.025 
(0.006) (0.004) 
Default 0.042 0.058 
(0.006) (0.005) 
NOTE: Estimates are based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
Ninety-four percent of borrowers in repayment (including those who 
had fully repaid) in 1998 were also making their payments or had 
fully repaid their loans by 2003. Four percent of borrowers who were 
in repayment (or fully repaid) in 1998 were in default five years later. 
Only 75 percent of borrowers in deferment/forbearance in 1998 were in 
repayment (or fully repaid) five years later, while 16.5 percent were still 
in deferment/forbearance and 8.5 percent were in default. Among those 
in default in 1998, 54 percent had returned to repayment (or had fully 
Table 8.2  Repayment Status Transition Probabilities 
Repayment status in 2003 
Repaying/ Deferment/ 
Repayment status in 1998 fully paid forbearance Default 
Repaying or fully paid 0.939 0.020 0.040 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Deferment or forbearance 0.749 0.165 0.085 
(0.063) (0.057) (0.032) 
Default 0.544 0.038 0.418 
(0.070) (0.020) (0.068) 
NOTE: The table shows the probability of each status in 2003 conditional on the status 
in 1998. Estimates based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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repaid) five years later, while 42 percent remained in default. Although 
there is considerable persistence in these repayment states, many bor-
rowers who were not making payments five years after school (i.e., in 
deferment/forbearance or default) were making payments (or had fully 
repaid their loans) five years later. Not surprisingly, deferment/for-
bearance is the least persistent state, since it is designed to temporarily 
help borrowers in need. Indeed, borrowers cannot typically receive a 
deferment or forbearance indefinitely. In the end, most borrowers who 
receive this form of assistance return to repayment; however, one in six 
end up defaulting. 
Finally, the B&B asked respondents about their earnings in the 
1997 and 2003 surveys; we also use these data. The 1997 survey asked 
respondents about their annual salaries for the jobs they were working 
during April of that year, while the 2003 survey asked respondents about 
their total income from work earned in 2002. Based on these questions, 
respondents in our sample (borrowers and nonborrowers alike) reported 
average earnings of roughly $30,000 in 1997 and $50,000 in 2002. 
DETERMINANTS OF STUDENT BORROWING 
AND REPAYMENT 
In this section, we study the determinants of undergraduate bor-
rowing and repayment behavior measured in 2003, roughly 10 years 
after graduation. Since the standard repayment plan for Stafford Loans 
is based on a 10-year repayment period, students who were always 
in good standing and making the standard payment should have paid 
down most, if not all, of their loans. As we show, many did not. In 
addition to studying the fraction of debt students repaid within the first 
10 years after school, we also examine the traditional metric used to 
study student loan repayment behavior: default.9 We then extend this 
metric to include borrowers in deferment or forbearance and report on 
the fraction of undergraduate debts remaining for borrowers who have 
defaulted or are in nonpayment more generally. 
We begin with an analysis of average postschool earnings, under-
graduate borrowing, and repayment/nonpayment rates by student char-
acteristics. We then explore differences in these outcomes based on the 
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types of institutions from which students graduated. Finally, we use 
standard multivariate regression methods to examine the importance 
of individual/family and institutional factors, along with college major, 
student borrowing, and postschool earnings levels in determining stu-
dent loan repayment, default, and other measures of nonpayment. This 
enables us to identify which factors are most important while simulta-
neously controlling for other potentially important factors. 
Differences by Borrower Characteristics 
Table 8.3 characterizes the postschool labor market outcomes, 
undergraduate borrowing, and repayment outcomes across different 
types of students defined by gender, race/ethnicity, SAT/ACT quar-
tiles, and maternal education. Because we are primarily interested in 
repayment/nonpayment, this table focuses on our sample of borrowers 
only. Before discussing repayment, we briefly comment on differences 
in earnings and undergraduate borrowing across groups as reported in 
columns (2) and (3). 
Column (2) reveals a large difference in earnings (including 
incomes of zero for the nonemployed) between men and women, while 
differences by race/ethnicity, student aptitude, and family background 
are more modest. Male college graduates earn about 70 percent more 
than female graduates 10 years after finishing school. Blacks earn about 
15 percent less than whites, while Asians earn about 15 percent more. 
Hispanics had earnings similar to whites in our sample of borrowers. 
Earnings increase over SAT/ACT quartiles 1–3; however, earnings for 
the top quartile are very similar to those in the second quartile (nearly 
20 percent less than the third quartile). This seemingly perverse pattern 
at the top is largely due to our sample selection criteria, which exclude 
those who attended 12 or more months of graduate school (by 1997) or 
received a graduate degree. This restriction disproportionately affects 
the top aptitude quartile, and removing it yields very similar average 
income levels for the top two quartiles (see Table 8A.2). Differences in 
earnings based on maternal education are relatively modest, although 
those with mothers who received a BA/BS degree earned almost $9,000 
more than those whose mothers did not attend college. 
Column (3) in Table 8.3 reveals very small differences in aver-
age undergraduate loan amounts compared across gender and SAT/ 
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ACT quartiles. Differences by race/ethnicity and maternal background 
are more pronounced, though still modest. In considering race/ethnic-
ity, Hispanics borrowed the least, at $8,100, while whites borrowed 
the most, at about $1,300 more. Students whose mothers fi nished col-
lege borrowed nearly $1,200 more than students whose mothers never 
attended college. These two patterns suggest that whites and borrow-
ers from higher socioeconomic families are attending more expensive 
institutions, on average. 
The remaining columns in Table 8.3 focus on repayment and non-
payment of student loans. Column (4) shows the average fraction of 
undergraduate loan amounts still outstanding in 2003. This provides a 
useful measure of returns to lenders within the fi rst 10 years. As noted 
earlier, borrowers who make standard payments every month should 
owe very little (or nothing) on their undergraduate loans by this time. A
high value here indicates low payment levels or periods of nonpayment. 
As the first row in Table 8.3 shows, of the $9,300 initially borrowed, 
students still owed 19 percent, on average, 10 years later. Column (5) 
reports the fraction of borrowers in default, while column (6) reports a 
broader measure of nonpayment that includes borrowers in deferment, 
forbearance, or default. In our sample, 5.8 percent of all borrowers were 
in default 10 years after finishing college, while 8.3 percent were not 
making payments for various reasons (i.e., deferment, forbearance, or 
default). Finally, columns (7) and (8) report the average share of under-
graduate loan amounts currently in default or currently not being repaid 
because of deferment, forbearance, or default.10 If borrowers in default 
or nonpayment 10 years after leaving school are very unlikely to return 
to good standing, these figures suggest that the expected loan loss rate 
(for a typical borrower) faced by lenders is around 2.8 percent (based on 
defaults), or as high as 5.2 percent (based on any nonpayment). These 
amounts are notably lower than default/nonpayment rates themselves 
(columns [5] and [6]) because many defaulters (nonpayers) repay some 
of their student debts before entering default (nonpayment). 
Now, consider differences in repayment and nonpayment patterns 
by gender as reported in Table 8.3. Consistent with significantly lower 
postschool earnings, women owe more on their loans than men 10 years 
after finishing college (22 percent vs. 15 percent) and have higher rates 
of nonpayment (9.5 percent versus 6.7 percent). The fraction of debt in 
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Table 8.3  Average Earnings, Undergraduate Borrowing, and Repayment/Nonpayment Measures in 2003 by 
Individual Characteristics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total undergrad Share of Default × share Not paying × 
Earnings loan amount undergrad debt Fraction in Fraction not of debt share of debt 
Characteristic N ($000s) ($000s) still owed default paying still owed still owed 
Full sample 2,120 49.629 9.336 0.188 0.058 0.083 0.028 0.052 
(1.300) (0.179) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Males 900 64.199 9.646 0.146 0.057 0.067 0.019 0.028 
(2.426) (0.304) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Females 1,210 37.705 9.091 0.221 0.059 0.095 0.034 0.071 
(1.097) (0.212) (0.018) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) 
Asians 50 58.085 8.706 0.236 0.112 0.130 0.020 0.026 
(3.975) (1.039) (0.075) (0.043) (0.047) (0.013) (0.015) 
Blacks 150 42.123 9.165 0.506 0.132 0.180 0.156 0.208 
(2.513) (0.522) (0.064) (0.029) (0.032) (0.057) (0.060) 
Hispanics 130 47.235 8.127 0.216 0.113 0.134 0.031 0.048 
(3.115) (0.786) (0.054) (0.038) (0.041) (0.011) (0.020) 
Whites 1,780 49.965 9.441 0.158 0.047 0.070 0.017 0.040 
(1.483) (0.197) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
SAT/ACT Q1 510 41.641 9.466 0.236 0.061 0.097 0.032 0.059 
(1.641) (0.460) (0.025) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) 
SAT/ACT Q2 500 50.197 9.153 0.141 0.048 0.054 0.022 0.025 
(2.164) (0.319) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
SAT/ACT Q3 480 60.087 9.673 0.175 0.047 0.076 0.010 0.026 
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SAT/ACT Q4 370 50.540 9.131 0.151 0.061 0.084 0.027 0.052 
(2.508) (0.378) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) 
Mother no 920 48.168 8.911 0.223 0.060 0.088 0.027 0.058 
college (1.726) (0.240) (0.021) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) 
Mother some 610 44.452 9.184 0.140 0.055 0.069 0.028 0.039 
college (1.960) (0.297) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) 
Mother BA+ 580 56.838 10.161 0.180 0.058 0.089 0.028 0.055 
(3.177) (0.416) (0.021) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) 
NOTE: The table shows sample means based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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these differences are not apparent when comparing default rates, which 
are nearly identical for men and women. Even with similar default 
rates, women have defaulted on 80 percent more debt than men. These 
figures highlight the value of considering alternative measures of repay-
ment and nonpayment beyond traditionally used default rates. Despite 
very similar default rates between male and female student borrow-
ers, lenders can expect faster payments and a higher recovery rate from 
male students. 
Differences in repayment behavior are much more pronounced 
by race/ethnicity than by gender, with particularly stark differences 
between blacks and whites. On average, black borrowers still owe 51 
percent of their student loans 10 years after college, while white bor-
rowers owe only 16 percent. Hispanics and Asians owe 22 percent and 
24 percent, respectively. Black borrowers have defaulted on 16 percent 
of their undergraduate debt and are in nonpayment on 21 percent. By 
contrast, the next highest rates of nonpayment are for Hispanics, who 
have defaulted on only 3.1 percent of their debt and are in nonpayment 
on 4.8 percent. Given these dramatic differences, it is interesting to note 
that default rates are quite similar for all three minority groups (13 per-
cent for blacks, 11 percent for Hispanics and Asians), while they are 
much lower for whites (less than 5 percent). There are larger differences 
between blacks and the other minority groups for nonpayment rates 
that include deferment and forbearance (18 percent for blacks versus 13 
percent for Hispanics and Asians). Once again, important differences in 
repayment and expected loan losses by lenders are obscured by focus-
ing exclusively on default rates. It is also worth noting that the racial/ 
ethnic differences in repayment/nonpayment outcomes are unlikely to 
be driven by differences in borrowing or postschool earnings, which are 
quite modest. We explore this issue further below. 
The share of undergraduate debt remaining 10 years after gradu-
ation is highest for students with the lowest SAT/ACT scores (24 per-
cent for the lowest quartile, and 14–18 percent for all other quartiles). 
All default and nonpayment outcomes show an interesting U-shaped 
pattern in achievement that is roughly consistent with the inverted 
U-shaped pattern for earnings. Default and nonpayment rates are as 
high as 6 percent and 10 percent, respectively, for the lowest SAT/ACT
group; they then fall to around 5 percent for the second and third quar-
tiles before returning to higher levels for the top ability group. A simi-
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lar, though weaker, pattern is evident for the share of debt in default or 
nonpayment. Unlike the relationship for earnings, the surprising non-
monotonic relationship between achievement and default/nonpayment 
is not a consequence of our sample restriction that excludes those with 
graduate degrees or 12 or more months of graduate school. A similar 
pattern arises even when we do not impose this restriction. Indeed, the 
fraction of debts in default or nonpayment is actually highest for the top 
SAT/ACT quartile in the unrestricted sample (see Table 8A.2). 
The last three rows in Table 8.3 show that socioeconomic status, as 
measured by maternal education, is only weakly and statistically insig-
nificantly related to default and nonpayment.11 
By contrast, the fraction of debt repaid after 10 years is significantly 
higher for borrowers whose mothers attended college. Students with 
stronger socioeconomic backgrounds appear to reduce their loan bal-
ances more quickly; however, they do not appear to be any less likely to 
enter default, deferment, or forbearance. 
Differences by Institutional Characteristics 
We next explore differences in borrowing and repayment/nonpay-
ment patterns, categorizing individuals based on the type of institution 
from which they graduated. Table 8.4 shows differences by institutional 
control (public, private not-for-profit, and private for-profit), and by col-
lege selectivity as determined by Barron’s. Given the high nonpayment 
rates for black college graduates reported in Table 8.3, we also exam-
ine outcomes for blacks graduating from historically black colleges and 
universities (HBCU) versus those from traditional non-HBCU institu-
tions. Table 8.4, like Table 8.3, is based on our sample of borrowers. 
There is considerable interest today in the high default rates at pri-
vate for-profit institutions. There is also concern about the high debt 
levels associated with attendance at private institutions more generally. 
The first few rows of Table 8.4 offer more detailed evidence on these 
issues from 1992–1993 graduates 10 years after school. Postschool 
earnings are quite similar across graduates from public and private for-
profit and nonprofit institutions; however, student debt levels are highest 
for graduates of nonprofit institutions ($11,200), followed by for-profit 
institutions ($9,700) and public institutions ($8,400). Unfortunately, the 
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Table 8.4  Average Earnings, Undergraduate Borrowing, and Repayment/Nonpayment Measures in 2003 by Type 
of Institution Attended 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total under- Share of 
grad. loan undergrad. Default × Not paying × 
Earnings amount debt still Fraction in Fraction share of debt share of debt 
Institution type N ($000s) ($000s) owed default  not paying still owed still owed 
Public 1,350 49.458 8.407 0.174 0.056 0.076 0.025 0.047 
(1.630) (0.224) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) 
Private nonprofit 720 49.827 11.207 0.213 0.054 0.086 0.032 0.061 
(2.268) (0.297) (0.021) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Private for-profit 30 51.434 9.738 0.199 0.182 0.264 0.059 0.087 
(7.896) (1.263) (0.073) (0.091) (0.108) (0.042) (0.047) 
Most competitive 150 61.583 11.453 0.202 0.043 0.087 0.009 0.043 
(4.663) (0.650) (0.034) (0.016) (0.022) (0.005) (0.014) 
Competitive 1,300 49.990 9.471 0.168 0.054 0.075 0.026 0.041 
(1.558) (0.235) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Noncompetitive 620 46.041 8.668 0.230 0.065 0.096 0.034 0.076 
(2.696) (0.308) (0.026) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.021) 
Black, not HBCU 100 44.421 10.085 0.448 0.170 0.223 0.157 0.203 
(3.088) (0.667) (0.054) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) 
Black, HBCU 50 38.850 7.855 0.589 0.078 0.119 0.155 0.215 
(4.075) (0.837) (0.132) (0.033) (0.041) (0.124) (0.129) 
NOTE: The table shows sample means based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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ficult to draw strong conclusions about borrowing and repayment/non-
payment rates for this group; note the large standard errors across the 
table for this institution type. On average, the fraction of debt still owed 
is slightly lower for public school graduates, but the differences across 
institution types are statistically insignificant. Default and nonpayment 
rates are very similar for public school graduates and nonprofi t gradu-
ates, but they are three to four times higher (18 percent and 26 percent, 
respectively) for for-profit graduates. Unfortunately, because of small 
sample sizes, we cannot statistically distinguish across the groups. The 
extremely high default/nonpayment rates for for-profit graduates do not 
appear to translate into much higher shares of debt in default/nonpay-
ment as observed in the last two columns. 
Our next set of results compares students based on Barron’s rank-
ings of institutional selectivity. Earnings and debt levels are both nota-
bly higher among students from the most competitive institutions. Dif-
ferences in repayment, default, and nonpayment measures across school 
selectivity are quite modest and generally not statistically signifi cant. As 
might be expected, default and nonpayment rates are generally lowest 
for graduates of the most competitive institutions; however, they do not 
have the lowest share of debt still owed. In general, these differences 
are not statistically significant. There is little evidence to suggest that 
institutional selectivity is a particularly important determinant of repay-
ment and nonpayment; however, we examine below whether important 
differences are confounded by other systematic differences in the char-
acteristics and choices of individuals attending these institutions. 
Finally, the bottom of Table 8.4 compares the outcomes for blacks 
attending HBCU and non-HBCU institutions. Small sample sizes are 
a problem here, as with for-profit institutions, yet a few patterns are 
worth noting. While earnings of HBCU graduates are similar to those of 
black graduates from non-HBCUs, HBCU graduates leave school with 
signifi cantly lower debt. The most notable differences between HBCU 
and non-HBCU graduates, however, are for default and nonpayment. 
Blacks from HBCUs have default (nonpayment) rates of 8 percent (12 
percent) compared with roughly twice those rates for non-HBCU grad-
uates. Despite these sizable differences, the fraction of debt in default 
or nonpayment is remarkably similar (16 percent and 20–21 percent, 
respectively). 
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A Multivariate Analysis of Student Loan Repayment 
As Tables 8.3 and 8.4 show, many important dimensions of het-
erogeneity across college graduates may affect repayment behavior. 
Therefore, it is important to simultaneously account for all of these fac-
tors before drawing strong conclusions about which are most important 
and why. We use standard multivariate regression methods to do this. 
These methods can be helpful in sorting out questions such as the fol-
lowing: Are default rates so high among blacks because they attend dif-
ferent types of schools than whites? Or because their SAT/ACT scores 
are lower? Or because their mothers are less educated? Do differences 
in repayment or nonpayment across institution types simply reflect the 
students they attract? 
Before exploring repayment and nonpayment outcomes, we begin 
by examining which factors determine how much a student borrows 
(based on our full sample of borrowers and nonborrowers). Table 8.5 
shows the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates for total 
undergraduate loan amounts (in thousands of dollars) as a function of 
individual characteristics, college major, institutional characteristics, 
and state fixed effects based on the institutions from which students 
graduated.12 Column (1) includes only demographic characteristics: 
gender, race/ethnicity, SAT/ACT quartile, maternal education, depen-
dency status (for financial aid purposes), and parental income (in thou-
sands of dollars) interacted with dependency status.13 This specifica-
tion is useful for measuring the full impact of these individual/family 
characteristics on borrowing (and repayment/nonpayment outcomes 
examined in subsequent tables) and incorporates any effects coming 
through choice of major or institution of attendance. Column (2) con-
trols for the same background characteristics, as well as college major 
(all other majors not specifically listed reflect the omitted category), 
while column (3) includes controls for background characteristics and 
institution characteristics (e.g., type of control and Barron’s selectivity). 
Column (4) includes all three types of variables: background, college 
major, and institutional characteristics. Comparing estimated effects of 
background characteristics across columns (1) versus (2) through (4) is 
informative about the extent to which individual characteristics affect 
borrowing through the choice of college major or institution. Column 
(5) adds state fixed effects to the specification in column (4), accounting 
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for any unobserved differences in policies, educational institutions, and 
labor markets that vary across states. Similar specifications are used to 
study repayment, default, and more general measures of nonpayment 
below. 
Several individual and family characteristics are important determi-
nants of borrowing. Black students borrow significantly more than all 
other racial/ethnic groups. Columns (1) and (2) suggest that black grad-
uates borrow nearly $2,000 more than whites. Accounting for choice 
of major, this difference grows even larger, suggesting that blacks tend 
to choose majors that are not typically associated with extensive bor-
rowing. We also estimate higher levels of borrowing for students with 
better SAT/ACT scores. Comparing columns (1) and (4) suggests that 
much of this difference is explained by choice of major and institu-
tion: Higher-scoring students are inclined to attend schools and to 
choose majors associated with greater borrowing. Table 8.3 shows that 
students whose mothers have college education tend to borrow more. 
Regression results in Table 8.5 show that the opposite is true once we 
account for other personal differences, especially race, achievement, 
and parental income. Accounting for these other factors, students whose 
mothers received their BA/BS borrow roughly $1,500 less than those 
whose mothers did not attend college. The estimates also suggest that a 
$10,000 increase in parental earnings is associated with about $250 less 
in borrowing. We find no evidence to suggest that differences in bor-
rowing by maternal education or parental income are due to differential 
choices regarding major and institution. 
Some majors appear to be associated with greater borrowing—engi-
neering, health-related majors, history, and especially biology—though 
not necessarily with high-paying professions. Institutional characteris-
tics also appear to be important determinants of borrowing. Students 
graduating from private (for-profit or nonprofit) institutions tend to bor-
row about $3,000 more than those attending public institutions, all else 
equal. Black students attending HBCUs tend to borrow $1,500–$2,000 
less than blacks attending other institutions. Less-competitive institu-
tions are associated with about $600–$700 less in borrowing, although 
these differences are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
Altogether, many factors affect undergraduate borrowing; however, 
differences across individuals, college majors, and institutions are gen-
erally modest. Tables 8.6–8.10 show the extent to which these same 
Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 252    1/28/2015 8:24:14 AM     
252 Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 
Table 8.5  Explaining Total Undergraduate Student Loan Amounts 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Male 0.086 0.046 0.192 0.139 0.096 
(0.211) (0.222) (0.208) (0.218) (0.215) 
Black 1.875** 1.843** 2.559** 2.460** 2.803** 
(0.486) (0.486) (0.559) (0.557) (0.549) 
Hispanic 0.670 0.744 0.695 0.733 1.561** 
(0.523) (0.521) (0.520) (0.518) (0.551) 
Asian −0.626 −0.767 −0.499 −0.673 −0.079 
(0.609) (0.609) (0.600) (0.600) (0.616) 
SAT/ACT Q2 0.254 0.110 0.215 0.089 0.139 
(0.282) (0.282) (0.278) (0.278) (0.273) 
SAT/ACT Q3 0.723** 0.545 0.588** 0.413 0.348 
(0.293) (0.296) (0.291) (0.294) (0.290) 
SAT/ACT Q4 1.076** 0.749** 0.639** 0.312 0.195 
(0.318) (0.325) (0.322) (0.328) (0.324) 
Mother some college −0.641** −0.608** −0.625** −0.580** −0.310 
(0.263) (0.262) (0.259) (0.257) (0.254) 
Mother BA+ −1.447** −1.402** −1.607** −1.525** −1.445** 
(0.247) (0.246) (0.244) (0.243) (0.240) 
Dependent −0.131 −0.041 −0.376 −0.291 −0.643** 
(0.270) (0.269) (0.266) (0.265) (0.265) 
Parental income −0.025** −0.025** −0.026** −0.026** −0.023** 
× dependent (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Business 0.004 −0.075 −0.184 
(0.374) (0.368) (0.360) 
Education 0.436 0.306 0.215 
(0.375) (0.368) (0.363) 
Engineering 1.263** 1.445** 1.228** 
(0.467) (0.460) (0.453) 
Health 1.904** 1.953** 1.755** 
(0.459) (0.451) (0.447) 
Public affairs −0.402 −0.588 −0.893 
(0.603) (0.592) (0.584) 
Biology 3.189** 2.897** 2.951** 
(0.532) (0.527) (0.523) 
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Table 8.5  (continued) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Math/science 0.318 0.321 0.447 
(0.488) (0.482) (0.476) 
Social science 0.453 0.340 0.112 
(0.407) (0.400) (0.395) 
History 1.618** 1.008 1.195 
(0.797) (0.779) (0.767) 
Humanities 0.440 0.013 −0.031 
(0.408) (0.403) (0.396) 
Psychology −0.072 0.122 0.330 
(0.609) (0.596) (0.588) 
Private for-profit 2.798** 3.049** 3.036** 
(1.045) (1.039) (1.023) 
Private nonprofit 3.075** 3.089** 2.656** 
(0.226) (0.225) (0.235) 
HBCU −2.128** −1.945** −1.552 
(0.909) (0.907) (0.906) 
Competitive −0.657 −0.565 −0.675 
(0.385) (0.384) (0.397) 
Noncompetitive −0.651 −0.567 −0.720 
(0.427) (0.426) (0.440) 
State fi xed effects No No No No Yes 
N 3,750 3,750 3,700 3,690 3,690 
R2 0.062 0.077 0.113 0.128 0.183 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Estimates based on the sample of B&B 
borrowers and nonborrowers. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
factors affect repayment and nonpayment behavior for our sample of 
borrowers only. All of these tables have the same structure, which is 
very similar to that of Table 8.5. Indeed, the specifications in columns 
(1)–(4) are the same as in Table 8.5. These specifications are informa-
tive about the importance of characteristics and choices known ex ante 
(i.e., when lenders decide how much to lend to students). It is also use-
ful to consider the extent to which ex post borrowing and earnings lev-
els affect repayment/nonpayment outcomes conditional on these other 
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factors, as well as the extent to which background, college major, and 
institutional characteristics affect repayment/nonpayment through bor-
rowing and earnings levels. To explore these issues, column (5) adds 
measures of earnings in 1997, earnings in 2002, and the total amount 
borrowed for undergraduate schooling (all in $000s) to the background, 
college major, and institutional characteristics of column (4). Column 
(6) also includes state fi xed effects. 
In Table 8.6, we consider the share of undergraduate debt still owed 
10 years after graduation. These OLS regressions produce a number of 
interesting results. First, column (1) shows that, conditional on other 
background characteristics, the share of debt owed by men was almost 
5 percentage points less than the share owed by women. About one-
quarter of this difference is explained by choice of college major (see 
column [2]) and another half by differences in postschool earnings (see 
column [5] and recall that initial borrowing amounts were the same for 
men and women as shown in Table 8.5). Most strikingly, the share of 
debt still owed was 22–27 percentage points higher for blacks than for 
whites. While this gap is smaller than the unconditional gap in Table 
8.3, it is still statistically and economically quite signifi cant. Compar-
ing columns (1)–(5) suggests that very little of this gap is explained by 
choice of major, institution, loan amounts, or postschool earnings. His-
panics owe a slightly larger share of their debt than do whites; however, 
half of the effect disappears when accounting for state fi xed effects. 
Accounting for other individual characteristics eliminates the raw dif-
ferences by SAT/ACT scores in the fraction of debt still owed. We also 
observe no differences by dependency status or parental income. Stu-
dents whose mothers graduated or obtained postgraduate degrees owe 
4–7 percentage points less as a fraction of their initial loan when com-
pared with students whose mothers never attended college. 
Engineering majors reduce their loans more within the first 10 years 
after graduating, owing 10 percentage points less as a share of their 
initial loan (compared with “other” majors). Column (5) in Table 8.6 
suggests that this is not explained by differences in borrowing or post-
school earnings. 
Accounting for earnings and borrowing levels (and state fixed 
effects), social science and humanities majors appear to owe about 8 
percentage points more (than “other” majors) as a share of their original 
loan amounts. Institutional characteristics do not play an important role 
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in determining repayment rates after accounting for loan amounts and 
postschool earnings. 
As might be expected, both earnings and loan levels are important 
determinants of the share of debt repaid. Students with higher earnings 
in 1997 had repaid a greater fraction of their debt (roughly 1.2 per-
centage points for every $10,000 in earnings), while those with higher 
student debt levels had repaid a lower fraction (roughly 1.3 percent-
age points for every additional $1,000 in debt). It is also worth noting 
that the R-squared values (reported at the bottom of the table) suggest 
that debt levels and postschool earnings account for about 7 percent 
of the variation in the share of debt owed, as much as individual back-
ground characteristics, college major, and institutional characteristics 
combined (compare columns [4] and [5]). 
We now turn to measures of nonpayment. Tables 8.7 and 8.8 show 
average marginal effects from probit specifications for default and our 
broader measure of nonpayment that also includes deferment/forbear-
ance. There is considerable agreement for both of these outcomes, so 
we discuss them together. Both blacks and Asians have significantly 
higher default and nonpayment rates than whites (differences are about 
6–9 percentage points), with slightly greater differences observed for 
the broader measure of nonpayment.14 Default/nonpayment rates are 
quite similar for whites and Hispanics. The estimated effects of race/ 
ethnicity are similar across all specifications, suggesting that racial 
and ethnic differences in default and nonpayment rates are not driven 
by differences in choice of major or institution, student debt levels, or 
even postschool earnings realizations. Parental income for dependent 
students reduces default and nonpayment, but the effects are small in 
magnitude (e.g., an additional $10,000 in income lowers the probabil-
ity of default by less than 0.01) and drop by half when accounting for 
borrowing and postschool income levels. Before accounting for loan 
amounts and postschool income (column [4]), we see that business 
majors are significantly less likely to experience default/nonpayment, 
while history and math/science majors are more likely to experience 
these problems. Perhaps surprisingly, the estimated effects of college 
major are not much different after accounting for student borrowing 
and postschool earnings (compare columns [4] and [5]). None of the 
institutional characteristics appear to influence default/nonpayment 
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Table 8.6  Explaining Fraction of Undergraduate Student Debt Still Owed 10 Years after Graduation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male −0.0467** −0.0341 −0.0471** −0.0344 −0.0170 −0.0194 
(0.0168) (0.0177) (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0189) (0.0190) 
Black 0.2710** 0.2720** 0.2560** 0.2510** 0.2440** 0.2160** 
(0.0329) (0.0332) (0.0391) (0.0393) (0.0390) (0.0396) 
Hispanic 0.0610 0.0602 0.0681 0.0669 0.0675 0.0347 
(0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0369) (0.0411) 
Asian 0.0697 0.0621 0.0659 0.0598 0.0616 0.1070 
(0.0547) (0.0546) (0.0555) (0.0554) (0.0594) (0.0615) 
SAT/ACT Q2 −0.0000 0.0013 0.0017 0.0032 0.0088 0.0056 
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0236) (0.0236) 
SAT/ACT Q3 0.0046 0.0112 0.0056 0.0129 0.0179 0.0235 
(0.0233) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0242) (0.0249) (0.0252) 
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0143 0.0187 0.0093 0.0146 0.0228 0.0289 
(0.0252) (0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0266) (0.0272) (0.0276) 
Mother some college −0.0556** −0.0573** −0.0557** −0.0573** −0.0449** −0.0467** 
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0205) 
Mother BA+ −0.0596** −0.0659** −0.0655** −0.0724** −0.0550** −0.0616** 
(0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0210) (0.0213) 
Dependent −0.0073 −0.0079 −0.0129 −0.0132 −0.0190 −0.0094 
(0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0230) (0.0237) 
Parental income 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 
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Table 8.6  (continued) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private nonprofit 0.0520** 0.0474** −0.0000 0.0044 
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0197) 
HBCU 0.0416 0.0611 0.0488 0.0409 
(0.0649) (0.0653) (0.0665) (0.0686) 
Competitive −0.0115 −0.0090 0.0111 −0.0126 
(0.0320) (0.0322) (0.0327) (0.0344) 
Noncompetitive −0.0046 −0.0003 0.0203 −0.0118 
(0.0350) (0.0353) (0.0359) (0.0378) 
1997 earnings −0.0012** −0.0011** 
($000s) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
2002 earnings −0.0004 −0.0004 
($000s) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
UG loan amount 0.0130** 0.0133** 
($000s) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
State fi xed effects No No No No No Yes 
N 1,850 1,850 1,820 1,820 1,610 1,610 
R2 0.0507 0.0653 0.0562 0.0717 0.1410 0.1910 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows coefficient estimates based on OLS regressions for the fraction of student 
loan debt still owed in 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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we observe sizable and statistically significant effects of student bor-
rowing levels and postschool earnings. An extra $10,000 in earnings 
in 2002 is associated with a roughly 0.8 (1.2) percentage-point drop in 
the probability of default (nonpayment), while an additional $1,000 in 
student loans increases the likelihood of default (nonpayment) by 0.3 
(0.4) percentage points. 
Finally, we consider the extent to which these factors affect the 
share of undergraduate debt on which borrowers have defaulted or are 
not currently paying (10 years after graduating). Tables 8.9 and 8.10 
show results from OLS regressions for these two dependent variables. 
Here, we find that compared with whites, blacks default on 11–13 per-
cent more of their debt and are in nonpayment on about 13–16 percent 
more of their debt. Despite similarly high default and nonpayment rates 
for Asians and blacks (Tables 8.7 and 8.8), Asians neither default on nor 
are in nonpayment on a larger fraction of their debts relative to whites 
and Hispanics. These findings suggest that blacks enter nonpayment 
relatively early in the repayment process, while Asians enter relatively 
late after much of their debt has been repaid. The effects of race/ethnic-
ity on the share of debts in default/nonpayment are not driven by major, 
institution choices, differences in debt levels, or postschool earnings. 
The final two rows of Table 8.10 suggest that after accounting for earn-
ings and borrowing differences, students from the top SAT/ACT quar-
tile are in nonpayment on a greater fraction of their undergraduate debt 
(about 4 percentage points more) than all other achievement groups. 
Other individual/family characteristics have little impact on the fraction 
of debt in default/nonpayment. Choice of college major also appears 
to have only minor (and generally statistically insignificant at the 0.05 
level) effects on the share of debt in default/nonpayment; however, the 
estimates in the final two columns suggest that health majors default on 
a significantly smaller fraction, while humanities majors are in nonpay-
ment on a significantly higher fraction. Institutional control and college 
selectivity are unrelated to the share of debts in default/nonpayment; 
however, black borrowers attending HBCUs appear to stop paying and 
default on a significantly lower fraction of their debt than otherwise 
similar black borrowers who attend non-HBCUs. As with the probabil-
ity of default and nonpayment, higher earnings reduce the share of debt 
on which individuals default or stop paying, while higher debt levels 
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Table 8.7  Explaining Default 10 Years after Graduation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male −0.0023 −0.0058 −0.0058 −0.0089 −0.0001 0.0005 
(0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0125) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
Black 0.0733** 0.0687** 0.0804** 0.0732** 0.0665** 0.0554** 
(0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0223) (0.0222) 
Hispanic 0.0194 0.0184 0.0216 0.0191 0.0317 0.0267 
(0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0233) 
Asian 0.0709** 0.0704** 0.0750** 0.0745** 0.0734** 0.0718** 
(0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0295) (0.0292) (0.0323) (0.0326) 
SAT/ACT Q2 −0.0040 −0.0125 −0.0071 −0.0163 −0.0071 −0.0087 
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
SAT/ACT Q3 −0.0079 −0.0146 −0.0074 −0.0133 −0.0175 −0.0150 
(0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0180) (0.0179) 
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0185 0.0052 0.0206 0.0073 0.0056 0.0061 
(0.0171) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
Mother some college 0.0104 0.0119 0.0126 0.0143 0.0177 0.0225 
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0142) 
Mother BA+ 0.0182 0.0149 0.0180 0.0139 0.0064 0.0029 
(0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
Dependent −0.0040 −0.0132 −0.0012 −0.0122 −0.0152 −0.0170 
(0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0191) 
Parental income −0.0010** −0.0008** −0.0010** −0.0008** −0.0005 −0.0004 



















   
   
 


























































































































   
   
 
262   
Table 8.7  (continued) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private nonprofit 0.0085 0.0069 −0.0088 −0.0056 
(0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0133) 
HBCU −0.0331 −0.0281 −0.0099 −0.0049 
(0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0371) (0.0376) 
Competitive 0.0158 0.0145 0.0138 0.0117 
(0.0240) (0.0234) (0.0251) (0.0249) 
Noncompetitive 0.0167 0.0164 0.0274 0.0181 
(0.0259) (0.0254) (0.0268) (0.0269) 
1997 earnings −0.0003 −0.0001 
($000s) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
2002 earnings −0.0008** −0.0008** 
($000s) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
UG loan amount 0.0027** 0.0028** 
($000s) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Division fi xed effects No No No No No Yes 
N 1,870 1,870 1,840 1,840 1,610 1,610 
Log likelihood −436.7 −421.4 −426.4 −410.0 −337.9 −328.0 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows average marginal effects based on probit specifications for default in 2003. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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earnings in 1997 (a few years after graduation) rather than in 2003 are 
most important here. This finding is not surprising because most indi-
viduals enter default/nonpayment in the first few years after gradua-
tion. An extra $10,000 in 1997 earnings reduces the fraction of debt in 
nonpayment by about 0.4 percentage points, while an additional $1,000 
in undergraduate debt reduces this fraction by just over 0.3 percentage 
points. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Given the large number of specifications we consider for each out-
come, it is useful to briefly summarize our findings. Table 8.11 shows 
the estimates for all five repayment/nonpayment outcomes based on our 
most general specification (column [6] of Tables 8.6–8.10). To further 
focus on the factors that matter, only variables that are statistically sig-
nificant for at least one outcome are included. 
Among the individual and family background characteristics, only 
race is consistently important for all measures of repayment/nonpay-
ment. Ten years after graduation, black borrowers owe 22 percent more 
on their loans, are 6 (9) percentage points more likely to be in default 
(nonpayment), have defaulted on 11 percent more loans, and are in 
nonpayment on roughly 16 percent more of their undergraduate debt 
compared with white borrowers. These striking differences are largely 
unaffected by controls for choice of college major, institution, or even 
student debt levels and postschool earnings. By contrast, the repay-
ment and nonpayment patterns of Hispanics are very similar to those of 
whites. Asians show high default/nonpayment rates (similar to blacks), 
but their shares of debt still owed or debt in default/nonpayment are not 
significantly different from those of whites. This suggests that many 
Asians who enter default/nonpayment do so after repaying much of 
their student loan debt. Maternal college attendance is associated with a 
greater share of debt repaid after 10 years, while dependency status and 
parental income are largely unimportant for repayment/nonpayment 
after controlling for other factors. 
The B&B data suggest some variation in repayment/nonpayment 
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Table 8.8  Explaining Nonpayment (Default, Deferment, or Forbearance) 10 Years after Graduation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male −0.0170 −0.0197 −0.0212 −0.0235 −0.0049 −0.0027 
(0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Black 0.0900** 0.0855** 0.0999** 0.0906** 0.0905** 0.0853** 
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0246) (0.0247) 
Hispanic 0.0070 0.0045 0.0108 0.0070 0.0269 0.0286 
(0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0266) (0.0269) 
Asian 0.0790** 0.0768** 0.0826** 0.0810** 0.0885** 0.0888** 
(0.0364) (0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0364) (0.0372) (0.0377) 
SAT/ACT Q2 −0.0178 −0.0249 −0.0210 −0.0287 −0.0257 −0.0265 
(0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0187) 
SAT/ACT Q3 −0.0150 −0.0189 −0.0157 −0.0188 −0.0191 −0.0182 
(0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) 
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0268 0.0114 0.0257 0.0106 0.0081 0.0062 
(0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0205) (0.0203) (0.0202) 
Mother some college −0.0025 −0.0009 −0.0004 0.0017 0.0008 0.0076 
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0159) 
Mother BA+ 0.0014 −0.0036 −0.0006 −0.0069 −0.0055 −0.0068 
(0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0168) 
Dependent 0.0324 0.0256 0.0340 0.0251 0.0126 0.0112 
(0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0210) (0.0210) 
Parental income −0.0014** −0.0013** −0.0015** −0.0013** −0.0008 −0.0007 
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Table 8.8  (continued) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private nonprofit 0.0201 0.0167 −0.0036 −0.0000 
(0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0146) 
HBCU −0.0465 −0.0322 −0.0438 −0.0399 
(0.0445) (0.0442) (0.0434) (0.0443) 
Competitive −0.0100 −0.0129 0.0033 −0.0020 
(0.0255) (0.0251) (0.0265) (0.0265) 
Noncompetitive −0.0071 −0.0094 0.0171 0.0043 
(0.0279) (0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0289) 
1997 earnings ($000s) −0.0005 −0.0003 
(0.0005) (0.0005) 
2002 earnings ($000s) −0.0012** −0.0012** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Undergrad. loan amount 0.0040** 0.0040** 
($000s) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Division fi xed effects No No No No No Yes 
N 1,870 1,870 1,840 1,840 1,610 1,610 
Log likelihood −555.1 −538.4 −543.4 −525.9 −404.7 −396.1 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows average marginal effects based on probit specifications for nonpayment in 
2003. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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ful” in terms of repayment of debt depends on the measure. Engineer-
ing majors owe a significantly smaller share of their debts (than “other” 
majors) after 10 years, while social science and humanities majors owe 
a larger share. Humanities majors are also in nonpayment on the great-
est share of debt. Default rates are lowest for business majors, whereas 
health majors default on the lowest fraction of their debts (these are the 
only significantly different coefficients). In most cases, differences in 
these repayment measures across majors are modest compared with dif-
ferences between blacks and whites. 
Differences in repayment/nonpayment across the type of institu-
tional control or selectivity are always small and generally statistically 
insignificant for our sample of 1992–1993 graduates. Among black 
borrowers, those attending HBCUs tend to be in nonpayment on sig-
nificantly less debt (roughly 12 percent less); however, other repay-
ment/nonpayment measures show no statistically significant effects of 
an HBCU. Unfortunately, low sample sizes and correspondingly high 
standard errors limit the conclusions we can draw from our analysis of 
HBCUs. 
Student debt and postschool income levels are both statistically sig-
nificant determinants of all measures of repayment and nonpayment, 
although the estimated effects are modest (e.g., an extra $10,000 in 
2002 earnings reduces the probability of nonpayment by 1.2 percent-
age points and $1,000 in additional student debt raises the probability 
of nonpayment by 0.4 percentage points). For measures related to the 
fraction of student debt outstanding, earnings a few years after school 
are more important than earnings 10 years later when we measure 
repayment/nonpayment. The opposite is true when considering simple 
default/nonpayment rates. 
SOME GENERAL LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
To the extent that government and private lenders care about 
expected returns on student loans they distribute, we show that analy-
ses of default rates at some arbitrary date offer an incomplete picture 
for several reasons. First, many borrowers who enter default eventu-
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Table 8.9  Explaining Fraction of Student Loan Debt in Default 10 Years after Graduation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male −0.0107 −0.0105 −0.0117 −0.0124 −0.0060 −0.0058 
(0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0090) (0.0010) (0.0102) 
Black 0.1060** 0.1050** 0.1300** 0.1290** 0.1160** 0.1080** 
(0.0163) (0.0165) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0205) (0.0212) 
Hispanic 0.0248 0.0249 0.0262 0.0257 0.0297 0.0164 
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0193) (0.0219) 
Asian 0.0069 0.0028 0.0077 0.0039 0.0042 0.0031 
(0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0315) (0.0330) 
SAT/ACT Q2 0.0069 0.0052 0.0038 0.0018 0.0060 0.0086 
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0126) 
SAT/ACT Q3 0.0026 0.0008 0.0025 0.0004 0.0033 0.0062 
(0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0132) (0.0135) 
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0213 0.0163 0.0215 0.0157 0.0192 0.0216 
(0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0142) (0.0147) 
Mother some college −0.0016 −0.0026 −0.0014 −0.0024 0.0011 0.0009 
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0107) (0.0110) 
Mother BA+ −0.0156 −0.0186 −0.0143 −0.0176 −0.0152 −0.0185 
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0114) 
Dependent −0.0081 −0.0130 −0.0064 −0.0116 −0.0111 −0.0118 
(0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0122) (0.0127) 
Parental income −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001 
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Table 8.9  (continued) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private nonprofit −0.0038 −0.0057 −0.0200** −0.0117 
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0098) (0.0105) 
HBCU −0.0805** −0.0803** −0.0644 −0.0604 
(0.0322) (0.0324) (0.0349) (0.0366) 
Competitive 0.0187 0.0197 0.0214 0.0120 
(0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0173) (0.0185) 
Noncompetitive 0.0079 0.0098 0.0130 −0.0050 
(0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0190) (0.0203) 
1997 earnings ($000s) −0.0006** −0.0005 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
2002 earnings ($000s) −0.0001 −0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Undergrad. loan 0.0026** 0.0029** 
amount ($000s) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
State fi xed effects No No No No No Yes 
N 1,870 1,870 1,840 1,840 1,630 1,630 
R2 0.0302 0.0434 0.0341 0.0483 0.0634 0.0911 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows coefficient estimates based on OLS regressions for the fraction of student 
loan debt in default in 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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ent times. Total discounted payments are much lower from borrowers 
who default (without reentering repayment) early relative to late in their 
repayment period. Third, other forms of nonpayment are also impor-
tant, especially during early years. For example, deferment and forbear-
ance are more common than default 5 years after entering repayment. 
Even if borrowers eventually repay their loans, pushing payments years 
into the future can be costly to lenders, especially if interest is forgiven. 
Differences between default rates and other measures of nonpay-
ment can be sizable. For example, our results suggest that modest 
black-white differences in default understate much larger differences in 
expected losses when measured by the fraction of initial debt still owed 
or in default after 10 years. The opposite is true comparing Asians and 
whites. Default and nonpayment rates are high for Asians 10 years into 
repayment, but the fraction of debt repaid within 10 years and the frac-
tion in default are not statistically higher than corresponding rates for 
whites. Although blacks and Asians default at similar rates, blacks stop 
paying their loans early while Asians enter default relatively late. 
Not surprisingly, borrowers are less likely to experience repay-
ment problems when they have low debt levels or high postschool earn-
ings. These effects are robust and important. As a ballpark fi gure for 
all repayment/nonpayment measures, an additional $1,000 in debt can 
be roughly offset by an additional $10,000 in income. For example, an 
additional $1,000 in student debt increases the share of debt in nonpay-
ment by 0.3 percentage points, while an extra $10,000 in earnings 9 
years after graduation reduces this share by 0.4 percentage points. 
Given the importance of postschool earnings for repayment, it 
is natural to expect that differences in average earnings levels across 
demographic groups or college majors would translate into correspond-
ing differences in repayment/nonpayment rates—but this is not always 
the case. Despite substantial differences in postschool earnings by race, 
gender, and academic aptitude, differences in student loan repayment/ 
nonpayment across these demographic characteristics are, at best, mod-
est for all except race. And, while blacks have significantly higher non-
payment rates than whites, the gaps are not explained by differences in 
postschool earnings, nor are they explained by choice of major, type 
of institution, or student debt levels. Differences in postschool earn-
ings (and debt) also explain less than half of the variation in repay-
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Table 8.10  Explaining Fraction of Student Loan Debt in Nonpayment 10 Years after Graduation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male −0.0191 −0.0163 −0.0196 −0.0180 −0.0148 −0.0140 
(0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0142) (0.0137) (0.0139) 
Black 0.1340** 0.1350** 0.1590** 0.1560** 0.1590** 0.1580** 
(0.0259) (0.0262) (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0282) (0.0290) 
Hispanic 0.0091 0.0111 0.0109 0.0121 0.0244 0.0214 
(0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0265) (0.0300) 
Asian −0.0033 −0.0100 −0.0006 −0.0067 0.0033 0.0083 
(0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0432) (0.0453) 
SAT/ACT Q2 −0.0184 −0.0190 −0.0197 −0.0207 −0.0052 0.0017 
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0171) (0.0173) 
SAT/ACT Q3 −0.0177 −0.0178 −0.0161 −0.0169 0.0028 0.0023 
(0.0184) (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0181) (0.0185) 
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0266 0.0206 0.0275 0.0204 0.0394** 0.0411** 
(0.0198) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0196) (0.0202) 
Mother some college −0.0061 −0.0089 −0.0061 −0.0090 −0.0152 −0.0140 
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0151) 
Mother BA+ −0.0222 −0.0267 −0.0211 −0.0263 −0.0157 −0.0132 
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0152) (0.0156) 
Dependent −0.0014 −0.0054 0.0001 −0.0041 0.0019 −0.0015 
(0.0174) (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0180) (0.0167) (0.0174) 
Parental income −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001 0.0000 
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Table 8.10  (continued) 
Private nonprofit 0.0091 0.0064 −0.0140 −0.0006 
(0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0135) (0.0145) 
HBCU −0.0864 −0.0758 −0.1270** −0.1170** 
(0.0513) (0.0517) (0.0479) (0.0501) 
Competitive 0.0163 0.0167 0.0235 0.0106 
(0.0255) (0.0257) (0.0238) (0.0253) 
Noncompetitive 0.0197 0.0200 0.0193 −0.00482 
(0.0278) (0.0281) (0.0261) (0.0278) 
1997 earnings ($000s) −0.0005 −0.0004 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
2002 earnings ($000s) −0.0004** −0.0004** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
Undergrad. loan 0.0033** 0.0034** 
amount ($000s) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
State controls No No No No No Yes 
N 1,870 1,870 1,840 1,840 1,630 1,630 
R2 0.0228 0.0355 0.0241 0.0368 0.0655 0.0960 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows coefficient estimates based on OLS regressions for the fraction of student 
loan debt in default in 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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in repayment/nonpayment across different types of institutions attended 
by students. 
Our findings raise a number of important questions. First, what 
explains the poor repayment performance for black borrowers condi-
tional on their postschool income, debt, and other demographic charac-
teristics? Recent research by Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu 
(2013) suggests that parental transfers are an important determinant 
of student loan repayment for Canadian borrowers with low post-
school earnings. Given relatively low wealth levels among U.S. blacks 
(Barsky et al. 2002; Oliver and Shapiro 1997), it is likely that differ-
ences in parental support at least partially explain their high nonpay-
ment rates. This issue certainly merits greater attention. 
Second, what explains the large differences in national cohort 
rates by institution type (e.g., two- vs. four-year or public vs. private 
schools)? Official two-year cohort default rates for the 2010 cohort 
are more than twice as high at four-year for-profit schools as they are 
at four-year public or private not-for-profit schools (13.6 percent ver-
sus 6.0 percent and 5.1 percent, respectively). Yet, our results based 
on individual-level data suggest little difference in repayment patterns 
across institution types for college graduates. The discrepancy between 
our findings and official default rates can almost certainly be traced to 
much higher dropout rates at for-profit schools than at public or pri-
vate not-for-profit schools (Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012) and much 
higher default rates for dropouts (Gross et al. 2009). In this case, the 
default problem at private for-profit schools may simply be a symp-
tom of an underlying dropout problem. More generally, it is important 
to remember that our repayment/nonpayment patterns are based on a 
sample of baccalaureate degree recipients, and that some of these rela-
tionships might differ for borrowers without a four-year degree. 
Third, with so many important changes in the labor market and 
higher education sector over the past few decades, how different would 
things look for today’s graduates? Recent evidence by Lochner, Stine-
brickner, and Suleymanoglu (2013) suggests that the role of postschool 
income may have become more important for recent students, consis-
tent with increased government attention to repayment enforcement. 
The increasing importance of college major as a determinant of earnings 
(Gemici and Wiswall 2011) suggests that greater differences in repay-
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share of debt 
still owed 
Not paying × 
share of debt 
still owed 
Black 0.2160** 0.0554** 0.0853** 0.1080** 0.1580** 
(0.0396) (0.0222) (0.0247) (0.0212) (0.0290) 
Asian 0.1070 0.0718** 0.0888** 0.0031 0.0083 
(0.0615) (0.0326) (0.0377) (0.0330) (0.0453) 
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0289 0.0061 0.0062 0.0216 0.0411** 
(0.0276) (0.0184) (0.0202) (0.0147) (0.0202) 












(0.0213) (0.0151) (0.0168) (0.0114) (0.0156) 












(0.0378) (0.0289) (0.0348) (0.0202) (0.0277) 
Health −0.0073 −0.0475 −0.0195 −0.0424** −0.0266 
(0.0380) (0.0268) (0.0287) (0.0203) (0.0279) 
Social science 0.0783** −0.0221 −0.0136 −0.0081 0.0078 
(0.0351) (0.0241) (0.0273) (0.0187) (0.0256) 
Humanities 0.0826** 0.0008 0.0231 0.0305 0.0809** 
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HBCU 0.0409 −0.0049 −0.0399 −0.0604 −0.1170** 
1997 earnings ($000s) 
2003 earnings ($000s) 





































NOTE: **p < 0.05. The table shows estimated coefficients/average marginal effects from specification (6) of Tables 8.6–8.10 if the esti-
mate is statistically significant for any repayment or nonpayment outcome. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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this is far from certain given the modest role of earnings differences 
in explaining variation in repayment/nonpayment by college major in 
our sample. It is even more difficult to predict how other results might 
change. Data on more recent cohorts are obviously needed to better 
inform current policy debates. 
We conclude by arguing that future research and policy discussions 
of student loan repayment need to move beyond an exclusive focus on 
default rates. Other forms of nonpayment are common, and the actual 
timing of default matters as much as whether default occurs. 
Notes 
We thank Brian Greaney for his excellent research assistance and Brian Jacob and other 
participants at the Conference on Student Loans for their comments. We would also like 
to thank the Institute of Education and Sciences at the U.S Department of Education for 
providing us access to the data. The research results and conclusions are ours and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Education. This paper has been 
screened to ensure that no confidential data are revealed. The views expressed are those 
of the individual authors and do not necessarily refl ect official positions of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
1. See College Board (2012) for these and related statistics. 
2. See Schwartz and Finnie (2002) and Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu 
(2013) for empirical analyses of student loan repayment, delinquency, and default 
in Canada. 
3. Expected returns on income-contingent lending programs, such as the new Pay 
As You Earn student loan repayment program in the United States, can lead to 
full or partial loan forgiveness for borrowers experiencing low income levels for 
extended periods. This clearly lowers the expected returns on the loans. Further-
more, the timing of payments can affect expected returns if lenders have discount 
rates that are different from the nominal interest rates charged on the loans. 
4. All averages in the tables in the chapter use the B&B panel weights to account for 
the sampling scheme of the original National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 
survey and attrition in subsequent surveys. 
5. See Gross et al. (2009) for a survey of the literature on student loan default. 
6. To understand the implications of these restrictions, we performed an analogous 
analysis without imposing the restrictions on months of postgraduate study and 
degrees. In regressions using this broader sample (analogous to those used in 
Tables 8.5–8.10), we also included indicator variables for the following graduate 
degrees: master’s level, professional degree, and doctoral degree. These results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in the text, with a few exceptions spe-
cifically noted below. 
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7. These quartiles are based on the test score distributions for the full population 
rather than our restricted sample. 
8. Our repayment measures are based on individual loan records from the National 
Student Loan Data System, accessed in both 1998 and 2003. Loan status (for both 
dates) is determined from the most recent available status date at the time records 
were accessed. Our measures of default include borrowers who had defaulted or 
had expunged their student debt through bankruptcy. Since borrowers may have 
more than one loan in the system, we cycle through all government student loans 
in a borrower’s records and set the default indicator to one if any of the loans are 
determined to be in default (or expunged through bankruptcy). Similarly, if any 
loans are in deferment or forbearance, we set the indicator for deferment/forbear-
ance equal to one. 
9. Default is defined as 270 days (9 months) of missed payments (excluding bor-
rowers in formal programs designed to reduce payment, such as deferment or 
forbearance). 
10. Columns (7) and (8) report the sample averages for the shares of unpaid under-
graduate loans multiplied by the default and nonpayment indicators, respectively. 
11. Throughout the chapter, we refer to results as statistically significant based on a 
0.05 signifi cance level. 
12. Tobit estimates generally yield similar conclusions about which variables are 
important and their relative magnitudes/signs. 
13. Unfortunately, parental income is unknown for students classified as independent. 
14. When we do not exclude borrowers with longer periods of postgraduate studies or 
graduate degrees from our sample, Asians have default/nonpayment rates similar 
to those of whites and Hispanics. 
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Appendix 8A 
Supplemental Tables 
Table 8A.1  Sample Means for Full Sample and Borrowers Only 
Characteristic Full sample Borrowers only 
Male 0.442 0.444 
(0.013) (0.010) 
Asian 0.025 0.031 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Black 0.067 0.049 
(0.006) (0.004) 
Hispanic 0.060 0.043 
(0.007) (0.004) 
White 0.844 0.873 
(0.010) (0.007) 
Mother no college 0.442 0.369 
(0.013) (0.009) 
Mother some college 0.280 0.263 
(0.012) (0.009) 
Mother BA+ 0.278 0.368 
(0.012) (0.009) 
Dependent 0.576 0.671 
(0.013) (0.009) 
Parental income 25.453 41.417 
× dependent (0.856) (1.151) 
SAT/ACT Q1 0.286 0.272 
(0.013) (0.009) 
SAT/ACT Q2 0.282 0.290 
(0.013) (0.009) 
SAT/ACT Q3 0.247 0.259 
(0.012) (0.009) 
SAT/ACT Q4 0.185 0.179 
(0.011) (0.007) 
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Table 8A.1  (continued) 
Education 0.132 0.117 
(0.009) (0.006) 
Engineering 0.073 0.062 
(0.006) (0.004) 
Health 0.067 0.060 
(0.006) (0.004) 
Public affairs 0.038 0.038 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Biology 0.047 0.037 
(0.005) (0.003) 
Math/science 0.054 0.052 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Social science 0.082 0.090 
(0.006) (0.005) 
History 0.018 0.015 
(0.004) (0.003) 
Humanities 0.079 0.087 
(0.006) (0.005) 
Psychology 0.033 0.032 
(0.004) (0.003) 
Private for-profit 0.022 0.016 
(0.005) (0.003) 
Private nonprofit 0.322 0.283 
(0.013) (0.009) 
HBCU 0.029 0.020 
(0.005) (0.003) 
Most competitive 0.063 0.074 
(0.006) (0.005) 
Competitive 0.633 0.649 
(0.013) (0.009) 
Noncompetitive 0.304 0.278 
(0.013) (0.009) 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. 



















   
   
 
Table 8A.2  Average Earnings, Undergraduate Borrowing, and Repayment/Nonpayment Measures in 2003 by 
Individual Characteristics (Sample without Graduate School Attendance/Degree Restrictions) 
Total Share of 
undergrad undergrad Default × Not paying × 
Earnings loan amt. debt still Fraction Fraction share of debt share of debt 
Characteristic  N ($000s) ($000s) owed in default not paying still owed still owed 
Full sample 3,790 51.063 9.287 0.233 0.050 0.092 0.029 0.066 
(0.864) (0.133) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Males 1,620 64.951 9.426 0.206 0.050 0.091 0.029 0.060 
(1.595) (0.216) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Females 2,170 39.755 9.176 0.254 0.049 0.092 0.029 0.071 
(0.757) (0.165) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) 
Asians 120 62.395 8.856 0.286 0.050 0.071 0.009 0.033 
(3.150) (0.604) (0.063) (0.020) (0.023) (0.006) (0.017) 
Blacks 260 44.910 9.464 0.523 0.098 0.207 0.110 0.243 
(1.861) (0.394) (0.045) (0.019) (0.026) (0.036) (0.044) 
Hispanics 230 48.860 7.823 0.198 0.070 0.122 0.017 0.055 
(2.400) (0.552) (0.035) (0.022) (0.027) (0.006) (0.016) 
Whites 3,150 51.032 9.356 0.210 0.045 0.082 0.025 0.055 
(0.988) (0.147) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
SAT/ACT Q1 820 42.424 9.565 0.261 0.057 0.107 0.025 0.073 
(1.211) (0.354) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) 
SAT/ACT Q2 900 49.344 9.129 0.229 0.041 0.067 0.015 0.041 





















   
   
 
Table 8A.2  (continued) 
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Total Share of 
undergrad undergrad Default × Not paying × 
Earnings loan amt. debt still Fraction Fraction share of debt share of debt 
Characteristic N ($000s) ($000s) owed in default not paying still owed still owed 
SAT/ACT Q3 880 56.850 9.132 0.189 0.038 0.082 0.020 0.044 
(2.274) (0.251) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) 
SAT/ACT Q4 830 57.154 9.486 0.230 0.057 0.106 0.051 0.094 
(1.739) (0.291) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.021) 
Mother no 1,490 50.677 8.732 0.243 0.055 0.089 0.023 0.058 
college (1.254) (0.181) (0.016) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) 
Mother some 1,090 48.534 9.226 0.202 0.049 0.095 0.046 0.085 
college (1.339) (0.226) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) 
Mother BA+ 1,200 53.796 10.051 0.249 0.043 0.092 0.021 0.060 
(1.891) (0.283) (0.017) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
NOTE: The table shows sample means based on sample of borrowers without restrictions on graduate school participation/degrees. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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The Effects of Student Loans 
on Long-Term Household 
Financial Stability 
Dora Gicheva 
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Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
Student debt has been growing at a pace considerably faster than 
inflation, but so have the costs of and returns to postsecondary edu-
cation. For full-time undergraduate students in four-year colleges and 
universities, the average cost, in 2012 dollars, of published tuition, fees, 
room and board net of grant aid and tax benefits has increased from 
$7,620 to $11,630 for public institutions and from $17,470 to $22,830 
for private nonprofit institutions between the 1992–1993 and 2011–2012 
academic years (College Board 2012a). Since many students use loans 
to supplement grant aid, it is not surprising that the average inflation-
adjusted amount of federal loans per full-time-equivalent (FTE) under-
graduate student has increased by over $3,000 (in 2012 dollars) during 
the same period (College Board 2012b). Combined with an increase 
from 9 million to 14 million FTE undergraduate students and growth in 
graduate enrollment and costs, these trends have amounted to remark-
able growth in aggregate student borrowing, even without accounting 
for the private loan industry and the private for-profit education sec-
tor. At the same time, there is evidence that the return to college and 
graduate degrees has been increasing as well during the same period, 
although it is more difficult to quantify the increase because college and 
high school graduates may have different inherent abilities regardless 
of educational attainment (Willis and Rosen 1979).  Using March Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) data, Avery and Turner (2012) estimate 
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that the discounted value of the difference in mean earnings of college 
graduates and high school graduates, accounting for tuition payments 
and a four-year delay in labor market entry, has increased by more than 
$100,000 in 2009 dollars over the period above. It is difficult to disen-
tangle all of these concurrent trends and to determine based on aggre-
gate statistics alone whether the current debt levels are excessively high 
or still below the effi cient level. 
By examining how student borrowers fare financially after gradua-
tion, we attempt to further the existing knowledge of the costs associated 
with education debt and the manageability of the typical debt burden. 
We compare the financial stability of individuals who have borrowed 
for education to similar individuals who have not. We show unintended 
consequences of student debt of which borrowers and policymakers 
should be mindful: impaired access to financial markets after gradu-
ation and implied financial hardship for many borrowers. Our results, 
however, should be interpreted with caution because the optimal level 
of student debt and its repercussions vary considerably with individual 
ability, family background, and other characteristics. Furthermore, it 
is difficult to define a counterfactual outcome for a student borrower 
because this type of debt may have a pronounced positive impact on 
one’s lifetime earnings stream or occupational attainment. 
We explore further the manageability of student debt for individu-
als who do not complete a bachelor’s degree, for whom the net benefit 
of education loans is expected to be considerably lower without the 
boost in earnings associated with a college degree. Wei and Horn (2013) 
compare two cohorts of respondents from the Beginning Postsecondary 
Survey 1995–1996 and 2003–2004 six years postcollege entry. They 
show a steady noncompletion rate but a pronounced increase in the stu-
dent debt-to-income ratio of individuals in the sample without a degree, 
from 24 to 35 percent, as well as a substantial fraction of noncompleters 
with debt exceeding annual income. Our study provides more informa-
tion about the financial hardship faced by this segment of borrowers. 
We show that, keeping education constant, more student debt is 
associated with a higher probability of being credit constrained and 
a greater likelihood of declaring bankruptcy. We find evidence that 
homeownership rates may also be affected by education loans. Con-
trolling for earnings tends to strengthen these relationships, which is 
consistent with omitted variable bias combined with positive return to 
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student loans. The relationship between education debt and financial 
status appears to be related to current economic conditions: it weak-
ens when we control for aggregate economic conditions and consumer 
bankruptcy rates. Households that hold student debt and include a non-
completer tend to be more credit constrained. 
Student loans have undisputed value. Many high school graduates 
are otherwise unable to borrow against future income and would not 
enroll in college or persist until graduation, owing to credit constraints. 
Although there is no consensus in the literature about the fraction of 
high school graduates who face credit constraints when making educa-
tion decisions, researchers are generally in agreement that the impor-
tance of these constraints has been increasing since the 1980s.1 There 
is further evidence that some students borrow less than the optimal 
amount and substitute work hours for loans, which can affect academic 
performance and the probability of dropping out (e.g., Berkner, He, and 
Cataldi 2002; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003). 
The other side of the coin is overborrowing, which can be defined 
as borrowing above the efficient amount or beyond what constitutes a 
manageable level of debt given the obtained education. Inefficiently 
high borrowing can occur when students overestimate the expected 
returns to education or underestimate the probability of dropping out .2 
Lack of full information combined with the high risk inherent in edu-
cation investments can lead to financial hardship for many borrowers. 
Hansen and Rhodes (1988) attempt to quantify the manageable edu-
cation debt level and find that in the early 1980s in California, only 
about 4 or 5 percent of college seniors held potentially unmanageable 
student debt, assuming earnings roughly equal to the average starting 
salary for a college graduate at the time ($20,000). The debt levels in 
their sample are subject to considerably less variation than what we 
currently observe; only 2 percent of the students they analyze accumu-
lated more than $16,000 in debt. Baum and Schwartz (2006) expand the 
analysis and point out that the manageable loan repayment to income 
ratio increases with household income and varies by family structure, 
location, and other demographic characteristics. The median debt level 
at the time of their study, $20,000, is manageable for a single individ-
ual whose income is at least $30,000. However, student loans may be 
one area where focusing on outliers is no less important than analyzing 
trends around the median. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
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New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax data, while 55.5 percent of 
borrowers owed $10,000 or less at the end of 2005, 17.7 percent had 
a balance of $25,000 or more, with 3 percent owing above $75,000 
(Lee 2013). It is of course likely that many borrowers from the right 
tail of the debt distribution are also found in the right tail of the income 
distribution, for example, individuals who borrowed large amounts to 
complete professional degree programs with large expected returns. 
Our chapter adds to the existing literature that examines implica-
tions of student debt beyond increased educational attainment. Previous 
studies have analyzed the relationship between school loans and the 
decision to attend graduate school (Fox 1992; Schapiro, O’Malley, and 
Litten 1991; Weiler 1994), the choice of specialty by medical school 
graduates (e.g., Bazzoli 1985; Colquitt et al. 1996; Hauer et al. 2008; 
and Woodworth, Chang, and Helmer 2000, among others), law school 
graduates’ choice to enter public sector law (Field 2009; Kornhauser 
and Revesz 1995) and other postgraduation career decisions (Minn-
icozzi 2005; Rothstein and Rouse 2011). These studies are conducted in 
fairly specialized settings or focus on the graduates of one specifi c insti-
tution. Analyses of more inclusive groups of graduates tend to be more 
descriptive than causal and ignore the endogeneity of student loans and 
a wide range of omitted variables (e.g., Chiteji 2007; Choy and Carroll 
2000). Our goal is to study a more nationally representative sample of 
households who accrued education debt at different points in time. To
at least partially account for the complex relationship between student 
loans, education, career outcomes, and income, we instrument for the 
amount borrowed and show results conditional on a rich set of covari-
ates associated with higher labor market earnings. The study extends 
Gicheva (2013), where a similar instrumental variable approach is used 
and student debt is linked to lower probability of marriage, and Bricker 
and Thompson (2013), who find correlation between previously accu-
mulated student debt and the likelihood of experiencing fi nancial dis-
tress during the recession of 2009. 
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Suppose that household i’s earnings (in their natural logarithm 
form) are given by 
Yi = f (Si) + εi , 
where S is a measure of the respondent and spouse or partner’s edu-
cational attainment that incorporates all productive components of 
schooling, such as education quality and highest degree attained. The 
additional component εi accounts for all other random and nonrandom 
factors that affect earnings. The function f (s) is strictly increasing, 
which assumes positive returns to education. Educational attainment is 
a function of the amount of accumulated student debt L: 
Si = g(Li). 
The sign of g’(Li) depends on the counterfactual to a dollar of student 
loans. Under a fixed payment schedule, borrowers make a payment that 
constitutes a constant fraction of their total debt each period, mL, with 
m between zero and one. Household i’s earnings net of the loan pay-
ment are thus (Yi – mLi). 
Financial distress is experienced when net income falls below a certain 
threshold, c. The probability PD of experiencing financial distress is 
PD = Pr [εi < c – f(Si) + mLi]. 
This probability increases with the amount borrowed L as long as 
  
   
 
Scenario 1: The counterfactual of a dollar of student loans is a dollar in 
grant aid or a dollar decrease in the tuition price charged by institutions 
of higher education. Then g’(L) = 0, and 






   
  




the probability of experiencing financial distress increases with student 
loans. 
Scenario 2: Student debt is associated with increased educational 
attainment, so that g’(L) ≥ 0. Then 
   
 ,
 
which may be positive or negative. Holding constant Si , however, 
  
    
  
The relationship between financial distress and student loans is stronger 
and positive when we condition on educational attainment.3 
For individuals who obtain some postsecondary education but do 
not complete a degree, let 
Si = g(̃ Li), 
with 0 ≤ g ′̃ (Li) ≤ g'(Li): educational attainment does not increase as 
much with the amount borrowed as it does for individuals who attain a 
degree. Then under Scenario 1, the relationship between fi nancial dis-
tress and student borrowing would be similar for completers and non-
completers, but under Scenario 2, the probability of fi nancial distress 
increases faster with student loans for noncompleters. The difference 
between the two groups should narrow once we condition on the avail-
able human capital measures. We explore these relationships empiri-
cally in the rest of the chapter. 
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EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Specification 
We estimate linear probability models in which the dependent vari-
able is a binary measure of household fi nancial stability. The observed 
relationship between student debt and the outcomes of interest is likely 
to be confounded by unobserved heterogeneity, even when all available 
human capital and occupation controls are included. By their nature, 
student loans are correlated with the type of education obtained and 
with academic success (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003)—vari-
ables we do not observe—which may in turn affect factors such as 
job stability, starting wages, and career wage growth, as well as other 
correlates of financial status. To help us avoid some of these issues, 
we use an instrument for the amount of accumulated student debt that 
exploits time variations in the size of the federal and private student 
loan programs. 
Our instrument is based on the observed upward trend in student 
borrowing since the 1970s, when the federal student loan program was 
in its early stages. The growth in the aggregate level of education debt 
can be attributed in part to policy changes that should be exogenous to 
households’ financial stability. There have been multiple reauthoriza-
tions of the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 that have impacted the 
amount and types of financial aid available to postsecondary students. 
The 1992 reauthorization has had the strongest impact on federal loans. 
The amendment introduced unsubsidized Stafford Loans, increased the 
annual and aggregate limits for subsidized Stafford Loans, substantially 
increased the annual and eliminated aggregate PLUS Loan limits, and 
extended federal loan eligibility to more students from middle- and high-
income families. As a result, the total amount of federal student loans, 
in 2011 dollars, increased from $23 billion to $35.5 billion between the 
1992–1993 and 1994–1995 academic years. The share of all federal 
student aid composed of federal loans increased from 61 to 73 percent 
over the same period (College Board 2012b). The introduction of non-
federal loans in the mid-1990s also played a major role in the growth of 
aggregate student borrowing. Private debt peaked in 2006–2007, when 
the total amount of newly borrowed funds accounted for 26 percent of 
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all student borrowing and experienced a sharp decline after 2008. It is 
more difficult to measure changes in the take-up rate for student loans, 
but it has likely increased along with the mean and median debt level 
among borrowers. The College Board (2012b) reports that the num-
ber of borrowers under the Stafford Loan program increased from 4.4 
million in 1995–1996 to 10.3 million in 2010–2011. Increasing costs 
of higher education are potentially part of the explanation, as well as 
policy changes that increase the appeal of loans for certain groups of 
the population, such as allowing parents to defer repayment on PLUS 
Loans until six months after the student has left school, changing inter-
est rates, or transitioning toward an online-based FAFSA application. 
The instrument we use is constructed as the average amount bor-
rowed per FTE student (including nonborrowers) in constant 2011 
dollars, as reported by the College Board (2012b) in the year when a 
respondent was 17 years old (this is referred to as the cohort year in the 
rest of the chapter).4 High school graduates who made their borrowing 
decisions in years that loans were more widely available and commonly 
used among one’s peers are more likely to borrow or take on larger debt. 
Our instrument accounts for changes in the take-up of student loans as 
well as changes in eligibility, so we are able to exploit variations in 
both. This instrument is used in Gicheva (2013) to examine the impact 
of student debt on the rate of transitioning into first marriage. Figure 
9.1 shows the values used in the estimation, which combine federal and 
private loans. Policy-induced changes, such as the increase in federal 
borrowing after the 1992 reauthorization of the HEA or the upsurge 
in private loans in the early and mid-2000s, are reflected by the trends 
depicted in Figure 9.1, where in addition to a steady upward trend we 
observe more pronounced jumps in the expected years. 
Since the variation in the instrument is only across cohorts, and 
the variable exhibits a persistent trend, it is possible that our estima-
tion strategy may pick up similar trends in the outcome variables that 
are attributable to other factors unrelated to student borrowing. Figure 
9.2 plots homeowner rates for two age groups (25–29 and 45–49), the 
annual unemployment rate for one age group (25–29) and the nonbusi-
ness bankruptcy rate per household in years when respondents were 
surveyed. The bankruptcy rate fluctuates between less than 1 percent in 
1995 and 2007 and 1.3 or 1.4 percent in 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2010. 
While 40 percent or fewer of younger households own their home, this 
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Total (federal+private) loans per FTE student 
Federal loans per FTE student 
SOURCE: College Board (2012b). 
fraction is over 70 percent for the older age group. Homeownership 
rates increase for 25–29-year-olds between 1995 and 2007, with the 
most pronounced increase in the late 1990s, and drop between 2007 and 
2010. The decline starts earlier for older individuals, and the preceding 
increase is not as pronounced. Other age groups (not plotted in Fig-
ure 9.2) are subject to comparable fluctuations. The unemployment rate 
fluctuates between 4.7 and 6.1 percent in the first five sampling years 
and increases sharply in 2010 to 10.9 percent. Overall, the trends in these 
data do not mirror the sustained upward movement exhibited by student 
loans, but we nonetheless include the aggregate bankruptcy rate, along 
with the homeownership rate by five-year age group as controls in the 
estimation. There may also be spurious correlation in the data between 
student debt and economic conditions, such as unemployment due to 
recessions happening for unrelated reasons at the time when education 
borrowing was on the rise. To account for this we also control for the 
survey-year unemployment rate specific to the age group (in five-year 
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Bankruptcy Unemployment rate 25–29 yrs
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Unemployment rate 25–29 yrs 
NOTE: The bankruptcy rate is the annual number of nonbusiness bankruptcy fi lings from 
the American Bankruptcy Institute divided by total number of U.S. households from the 
U.S. census. 
SOURCE: Data on household homeownership rates are from the U.S. census. The unem-
ployment rate is reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics using CPS data. 
intervals) of the respondent and spouse or partner. All standard errors in 
the regressions are clustered by year of birth, and all regressions use the 
standard Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) weights. 
Survey of Consumer Finances Data 
We use data from the six waves of the SCF conducted between 
1995 and 2010. Several features of the survey make it appropriate for 
addressing the questions of interest and implementing our empirical 
approach. The survey collects very detailed information about house-
holds’ financial assets and liabilities, including full student borrowing 
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histories. This allows us to observe the long-term impact of education-
related debt, as many borrowers are interviewed 10 years or more after 
incurring their debt. The fact that the SCF is a triennial cross-sectional 
survey lets us observe the financial status of households with student 
loans during years characterized by differing economic conditions. 
As a survey of household finances and wealth, the SCF includes 
some assets that are broadly shared across the population (bank savings 
accounts), as well as some that are held more narrowly and are con-
centrated in the tails of the distribution (direct ownership of bonds). To
support estimates of a variety of financial characteristics as well as the 
overall distribution of wealth, the survey employs a dual-frame sample 
design. 
A national area-probability (AP) sample provides good coverage of 
widely spread characteristics. The AP sample selects household units 
with equal probability from primary sampling units that are selected 
through a multistage selection procedure, which includes stratification 
by a variety of characteristics, and selection proportional to their popu-
lation. Because of the concentration of assets and nonrandom survey 
response by wealth, the SCF also employs a list sample that is devel-
oped from statistical records derived from tax returns under an agree-
ment with Statistics of Income.5 (See Kennickell [2000] for additional 
details on the SCF list sample.) This list sample consists of households 
with a high probability of having high net worth.6 
The SCF joins the observations from the AP and list sample through 
weighting.7 The weighting design adjusts each sample separately, using 
all the useful information that can be brought to bear in creating post-
strata. The final weights are adjusted so that the combined sample is 
nationally representative of the population and assets. These weights 
are used in all regressions. 
The SCF measure of student loans combines all debt accumulated 
by household members, so we are implicitly making the assumption 
that a dollar of student loans has the same impact on household finan-
cial hardship regardless of whether the debt was incurred by the house-
hold head, the head’s spouse, or someone else.8 In our estimation we 
account for the likely situation in which parents accumulate education 
loans to finance their children’s education by using information on chil-
dren’s ages and the time when the debt was incurred. An additional 
limitation of the SCF information about student loans is that the year of 
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loan origination is replaced by the year of consolidation for loans that 
were consolidated. 
We focus on three distinct measures of financial hardship: 1) being 
denied credit, 2) not paying bills on time, and 3) filing bankruptcy in 
the 10-year period prior to the interview date. We also construct an 
indicator for homeownership as an additional measure of a household’s 
fi nancial stability. 
We restrict the sample to respondents who were born in 1954 or 
later (or, in cases when a spouse or partner is present, the average year of 
birth is 1954 or higher), because earlier cohorts completed high school 
before the federal student loan program took off in the 1970s. We also 
drop observations with age lower than 29. Most schooling should be 
completed by this age, and in addition, the age restriction eliminates 
individuals who were too young to incur consumer debt at the begin-
ning of the 10-year interval covered by the bankruptcy indicator. Fur-
thermore, the excluded age groups tend to have relatively low home-
ownership rates.9 Other covariates that we include in the regressions 
include demographic characteristics of the survey respondent (gender, 
race, and a quadratic in age) and indicators for the highest completed 
education level, presence of college-age children in the primary eco-
nomic unit (PEU), and disability status. 
Summary statistics of these variables, for respondents in the cohorts 
for 1971 and after in the 1995–2010 surveys, are included in Table 9.1. 
The different dependent variables we consider in the next section of the 
chapter are listed at the top. More than one-third—36.5 percent—of 
households indicate that they were either denied credit, granted less 
credit than they had applied for initially, or did not apply at all because 
they feared rejection in the previous five years. Jappelli (1990) and Duca 
and Rosenthal (1993) find that the SCF questions about credit applica-
tions and outcomes provide a useful indicator of households that are 
credit constrained. Jappelli (1990) finds that the families who believed 
they would be turned down looked and behaved like the families that 
had applied for and been denied credit. 
Nearly 9 percent of households experienced a spell of late payment 
(60 days or more) while paying bills at some point in the last fi ve years. 
Just over 8 percent of households have had a bankruptcy in the last 10 
years, and slightly more than 6 in 10 households report owning their 
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Table 9.1  Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Min Max 
Denied credit (or did not apply because 
feared rejection) 
Late payment (60 days or more) in last 
fi ve years 










Any college-aged kids in primary 
economic unit (18–24) 
Disabled (either respondent or spouse/ 
partner) 
County per-capita income (“relative” 
divided by national average) 











































































NOTE: Weighted summary statistics for the 1995–2010 SCF samples. N = 12,413. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using SCF data. County per-capita income and the 
county unemployment rate are derived from Bureau of Economic Analysis data. 
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primary residence, but as Figure 9.2 suggests, the rate varies consider-
ably with age. 
Slightly more than half of the respondents are female (54 percent). 
Twenty percent report a bachelor’s degree as the highest degree earned, 
with 6 percent reporting a master’s, and only 1 percent claiming a PhD. 
Nearly 70 percent of the sample is white, 14 percent African American, 
and 11 percent Hispanic, with the remainder identifying as either Asian 
or “other.” The average age of survey respondents is 40.6. Eleven per-
cent of households live with a college-aged (18–24) person (other than 
the spouse). In 1 of every 15 households either the respondent or the 
spouse identifies themselves as having a work-related disability.10 
Annual average county-level unemployment rate and per-capita 
personal income figures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis are 
merged into the SCF for each survey year. Unemployment averages 
6 percent and ranges from 1.1 to 16.4 percent. In addition to control-
ling for unemployment at the county level, we include the survey year 
age-specific unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics using CPS data. Since economic conditions at the time of gradu-
ating college have been found to have lasting impact on the return to 
schooling (Kahn 2010) and on the decision to continue one’s education 
(Johnson 2013), we also control for the cohort year unemployment rate 
for 24–29-year-olds in the United States. This variable ranges from 4.1 
to 10.7 percent for observations in our sample. County per-capita per-
sonal income, relative to the national average, ranges from 0.5 (half the 
national average) to 3.0. We also use “predicted wage income,” which 
is calculated using the internal SCF data using occupation, human capi-
tal, and demographic controls and CPS data.11 Predicted earnings aver-
age nearly $52,000 and range from $0 to $1.1 million.12 
Figure 9.2 suggests that the outcome variables we consider vary on 
an aggregate level with each installment of the SCF and with respon-
dents’ ages. To account for this we also include in the estimation the 
survey-year household bankruptcy rate in the United States. We con-
struct this rate as the number of nonbusiness bankruptcy fi lings reported 
by the American Bankruptcy Institute (n.d.) divided by the U.S. Census 
estimate of the total number of households in the United States. Since 
the bankruptcy outcome we consider is retrospective, we calculate the 
average bankruptcy rate in the survey year and preceding four years to 
use in the estimation. The homeownership rates we use are based on 
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CPS/Housing Vacancy Survey housing inventory estimates (U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau n.d.). In the models that estimate the effect of student loans 
on the probability of owning a home, we control for the age-specific 
homeowner rate in the survey year. 
Nearly one in five households has some student loan debt, with the 
average loan (among debt holders) equal to $32,000. The questions in 
the SCF on student loans reflect loans with an outstanding balance for 
any member of the PEU. Over the period we are studying in this chap-
ter, the share of households with educational loans and the size of the 
average loan rose. Table 9.2 shows trends in the share of households in 
the age group we study with any student loan debt and the average out-
standing balance among those with loans. The share of households with 
student loans rose from 16 percent in 1995 to 24 percent in 2010. The 
average loan balance rose from nearly $19,000 to more than $37,000 
(adjusted for inflation using U.S. CPI-U and expressed in 2010 dollars). 
Table 9.2  Student Loans in the SCF 
Share of PEU with any Average borrowing ($000s) 
student loan debt (%) among those with debt 
1995 16.1 18.9 
1998 15.1 22.1 
2001 14.8 37.8 
2004 16.7 29.5 
2007 19.1 34.3 
2010 24.1 37.6 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using SCF data. 
RESULTS 
Student Debt and Financial Stability among All Households 
We begin our analysis by focusing on one outcome: bankruptcy. 
Our estimates for the relationship between student debt and the likeli-
hood of filing for bankruptcy over a 10-year period are presented in 
Table 9.3, along with the coefficients on other covariates. 
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Column (1) of Table 9.3 shows the first-stage estimation results 
from a model that includes the full set of controls. The excluded instru-
ment is highly significant and has the expected positive sign and an 
F statistic of 25.3. A dollar increase in the aggregate annual amount 
borrowed per FTE student in the cohort year defined in the previous 
section corresponds on average to a $2.53 increase in the total amount 
borrowed by the individual and other members of the PEU. More edu-
cation is naturally associated with higher debt, and so is the presence 
of college-age children in the household. Higher predicted earnings 
are also correlated with more education debt, consistent with a posi-
tive expected return to student loans. The coefficient on the age-specific 
unemployment rate is positive and highly significant. 
In order to explore the mechanism through which student loans are 
related to long-term financial distress, we report three sets of second-
stage results. The model in column (2) is most parsimonious, using only 
student debt, indicators for female, African American, and Hispanic, 
and a quadratic in age as explanatory variables, but we still instrument 
for the amount borrowed. Debt has a strong positive impact on the prob-
ability of filing for bankruptcy, with $1,000 in loans increasing the like-
lihood by 0.8 percentage points. Based on the argument made earlier in 
the “Conceptual Framework” section, adding controls for educational 
attainment and other measures of human capital should strengthen the 
relationship when the counterfactual of student loans is lower educa-
tional attainment, which is indeed what we observe in column (3). This 
specification includes indicators for undergraduate and graduate degree 
attainment, the natural logarithm of predicted earnings and normal 
household income, disability status and presence of college-aged chil-
dren in the PEU, as well as the county unemployment rate and county 
per-capita income as controls for economic conditions. The coefficient 
on student loans increases to 0.01. This result highlights the importance 
of including a rich set of human capital covariates in any model that 
examines the implications of student debt. 
In the full model in column (4) we add more controls for the eco-
nomic conditions affecting households in the sample. In particular, we 
include the age-specific unemployment rate at the time of the survey, 
the unemployment rate among 24–29-year-olds in the cohort year, and 
the five-year bankruptcy rate. The latter has a very strong, positive, and 
highly significant effect, with a 0.1 percentage point increase in the 
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Table 9.3  Full-Sample Estimation Results for the Probability of 
Bankruptcy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
First stage 
(full model )
Amount borrowed 0.00793*** 0.00956*** 0.00644** 
(4.037) (3.674) (2.089) 
Average loans per FTE 0.00253*** 
(4.655) 
College degree 3.273*** −0.113*** −0.103*** 
(3.749) (−10.06) (−8.109) 
Master’s degree 8.418*** −0.162*** −0.137*** 
(5.005) (−6.266) (−4.369) 
Doctorate 15.51** −0.288*** −0.239*** 
(2.676) (−5.489) (−4.375) 
College-aged kids in 2.329*** −0.0139 −0.00756 
household (3.722) (−0.744) (−0.433) 
Disabled 0.372 0.0487*** 0.0488*** 
(0.625) (3.442) (3.471) 
County relative per- 0.307 −0.0607*** −0.0527*** 
capita income (0.430) (−3.679) (−3.519) 
County unemployment 0.0208 -0.00325 0.000557 
rate (0.148) (−1.669) (0.274) 
Ln(normal income) 0.989 −0.0208** −0.0189*** 
(1.482) (−2.702) (−2.978) 
Ln(predicted earnings) 0.719*** 0.00437* 0.00612** 
(4.906) (1.815) (2.661) 
Age-specific 0.831*** 0.00705 
unemployment rate (4.203) (1.218) 
Cohort unemployment −1.055 0.0104 
rate aged 24–29 (−0.669) (0.486) 
Five-year bankruptcy 155.9 17.86*** 
rate (0.944) (4.689) 
Constant −5.308 −0.740*** −0.494*** −0.624***
 (−0.517) (−6.158) (−3.866) (−5.144) 
NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. The dependent variable is an indicator for bankruptcy during the previ-
ous 10 years. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All specifications include controls for 
female, black, Hispanic, age, and age squared. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF, the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (county income and unemployment rate), the Bureau of Labor Statistics us-
ing CPS data (cohort-specific unemployment rates), and the American Bankruptcy 
Institute (bankruptcy rate). 
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aggregate bankruptcy rate increasing the 10-year probability of observ-
ing bankruptcy in our sample by 1.8 percentage points. The coefficient 
on the amount of student loans decreases but remains positive and sig-
nifi cant (0.006). 
The results from the full model in Table 9.3 are summarized in col-
umn (1) of Table 9.4, which also shows the estimation results for the 
other three outcomes of interest. All specifications in Table 9.4 include 
the full set of controls, and in the homeownership model we also hold 
constant the survey year homeowner rate by five-year age group. The 
coefficient on the amount borrowed for education has the “anticipated” 
sign when we consider the probability of being denied credit (column 
[2]) or owning a home (column [4]). While the coefficient in column (1) 
is positive and the same in magnitude as the one in the bankruptcy spec-
ification, it is not statistically different from zero (t-statistic of 1.3). On 
the other hand, $10,000 more in student loans decreases the probability 
of owning a home by 9 percentage points; this estimate is signifi cant at 
the 10 percent level. The coefficient in the late payment specification 
(column [3]) is negative, close to zero in absolute value, and not statisti-
cally significant. 
Overall, the results from the specifications in Table 9.4 are sug-
gestive of a potentially causal relationship between outstanding student 
Table 9.4  Full-Sample Estimation Results, All Outcomes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Late 
Dependent variable Bankrupt Denied credit payments Homeowner 
Amount borrowed 0.00644** 0.00643 −0.00274 −0.00899* 
(2.089) (1.322) (−1.105) (−1.726) 
Five-year 17.86*** −0.283 4.696 3.733 
bankruptcy rate (4.689) (−0.0699) (1.653) (0.744) 
Age-specific −0.0232 
homeowner rate (−0.595) 
NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All specifications include the con-
trols from the full model in Table 9.3. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF, the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (county income and unemployment rate), the Bureau of Labor Statistics us-
ing CPS data (cohort-specific unemployment rates), the American Bankruptcy Insti-
tute (bankruptcy rate), and the U.S. Census (homeownership). 
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loan balances and household financial distress, but the findings are not 
particularly strong and tend to be noisy. The coefficients on the educa-
tion variables in Table 9.3 also indicate that since higher attainment 
levels are negatively related to various financial distress measures, we 
might be able to get a clearer picture of the long-term impacts of student 
loans by contrasting completers and noncompleters. As discussed in the 
“Conceptual Framework” section, we expect the relationship between 
student loans and financial distress to be more pronounced for indi-
viduals who attend college without attaining a degree. The next section 
of results includes a series of specifications in which we contrast the 
impact of outstanding student loan debt on financial distress measures 
for college completers and noncompleters. 
Results by College Completion Status 
We focus on college attendance because it is by far the most com-
mon level of postsecondary education in the data and among the U.S. 
population, and because the consequences of holding student debt and 
not completing an undergraduate degree are an important policy con-
cern. As shown earlier in Table 9.1, college as the highest degree attained 
is much more common than graduate degrees. The more detailed col-
lege attendance and completion statistics in Table 9.5 show that only 
one quarter as many respondents (and spouses) report graduate school 
as the highest level of school attended as college. The rate of comple-
tion is also much higher among those who attend graduate school; only 
1 in 10 graduate school attending respondents or spouses fail to com-
plete.13 Because there are relatively few graduate school attendees and 
Table 9.5  Sample Distribution of College and Beyond College 
Attendance and Degree Completion 
Respondent Spouse 
Noncompleter Completer Noncompleter Completer 
Highest level of 
attendance 
College 2,060 3,365 1,306 2,856 
Graduate school 205 1,862 140 1,171 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using SCF data. 
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even fewer noncompleters, the next step of our analysis focuses only on 
cases with college as the highest level of attendance. 
Table 9.6 contains the key coefficient of interest, the one on stu-
dent loans, for a similar instrumental variable specification for each of 
the dependent variables, as shown in Table 9.4, using several different 
sample selections to contrast completers and noncompleters among col-
lege attenders. The specifications include indicators for female, black, 
and Hispanic, a quadratic in age, county relative per-capita income, 
the county unemployment rate, the cohort unemployment rate for age 
24–29, the five-year bankruptcy rate, and the age-specific homeowner 
rate in the case of the homeowner specifications. We estimate each 
model both with and without the predicted wage variable. Earlier we 
posit that holding constant the portion of earnings that varies with the 
amount and quality of schooling would magnify the coefficient on stu-
dent loans more for completers than for noncompleters when education 
loans are not directly replaceable by grant aid. The odd-numbered col-
umns in Table 9.6 contain results for the specifications without predicted 
earnings, while the results in the even-numbered columns account for 
this measure of schooling and occupation. 
Because the SCF student loan questions pertain to any outstanding 
loans for any member of the PEU, it is possible that the debt will actu-
ally be for currently (or recently) attending children and not have mean-
ingful relationship with the college completion status of the respon-
dent or spouse/partner. To isolate households where the loans are for 
the respondent and/or spouse/partner, we further restrict the sample of 
“noncompleters” to exclude households with both college-aged kids 
(18–24) in the home and with any of the student loans taken out within 
the past three years. 
We consider three subsamples of college attenders. Results for the 
broadest subsample, including all PEUs where either the respondent 
or the spouse has college as the highest level attended, are contained 
in Panel A. Panel B includes results for a second subsample, which 
includes cases where either the respondent or the spouse has college 
as the highest level of school attended, while the other member of the 
couple reports some lower level of attendance. The final subsample is 
restricted to households where both the respondent and the spouse/part-
ner (if there is one present) have college as the highest level of school 
attended (Panel C). 
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The consistent result across each of the three subsamples of college 
attenders is that the magnitude of the impact of outstanding student 
loan balances is much greater among noncompleters than among those 
who obtain a college degree. The coefficient on student loans is almost 
always greater in absolute value in the noncompleter specifications. In 
addition, adding the predicted wage to the models tends to decrease the 
difference between the two groups. 
Among households where either the respondent or the spouse/part-
ner (possibly both) failed to complete college, $1,000 in outstanding 
education loans raises the probability of bankruptcy by 1.2 percentage 
points (Panel A, columns [5] and [6]) and lowers the probability of 
owning a home by 1.4 percentage points (column [4]). The student debt 
coefficients for the other outcomes have the anticipated sign but are 
not significant at standard levels. Among college completers, only the 
coefficient for late payments is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level, though the magnitude of the student loan debt measure is slightly 
lower than it is for noncompleters. 
In the households where the sole college attender did not receive 
a degree, $1,000 in outstanding college debt raises the probability of 
experiencing bankruptcy in the last 10 years by almost four percent-
age points. That level of outstanding loans decreases the probability of 
owning a home by 5.6 percentage points. The effects of debt are much 
smaller, and largely not significant, among households where the sole 
college attender completed his or her degree. The coefficient for late 
payments, while borderline insignificant, is positive and larger than that 
for noncompleters, where the point estimate is negative. 
Among households in which both the respondent and spouse/part-
ner attended college and at least one person failed to complete, $1,000 
in outstanding student loan debt raises the probability of having late 
payments by two percentage points and decreases the probability of 
owning a home by three percentage points. There is only one outcome 
where the coefficient on outstanding student loans is statistically signif-
icant among completers when we condition on the CPS earnings vari-
able (late payments). In each case, however, the magnitudes on these 
coefficients are much smaller among completers, ranging from one-
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Table 9.6  Coefficients on Amount Borrowed by Dependent Variable and Completion Status for College 
Attenders (Any College Attended) 
(1) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Denied credit Late payments Bankruptcy Homeowner N 
Panel A 





At least one attender 0.00685 0.00842 0.00559 0.00689 0.0124** 0.0124** −0.00637 −0.0138** 4,047 
fails to complete (0.966) (1.111) (1.021) (1.175) (2.424) (2.324) (−1.016) (−2.182) 
All attenders 0.00229 0.00874 0.00184 0.00400* 0.000823 0.00168 −0.00144 −0.00671 2,921 
complete (0.808) (1.051) (1.443) (1.854) (0.913) (1.132) (−0.558) (−1.640) 
Panel B 




Attender fails to 0.0167 0.0220 −0.00876 −0.00816 0.0396* 0.0387* −0.0399* −0.0562* 1,604 
complete (0.467) (0.575) (−0.449) (−0.400) (1.976) (1.883) (−1.694) (−1.917) 
Attender completes 0.00280 0.00279 0.00686 0.00756 −0.00106 −0.00118 0.0126 0.00909 1,758 
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both attend college 
At least one attender 






0.00571 0.00830 0.0125 0.0201* 0.00665 0.00578 −0.0113 −0.0296** 1,058 
(1.084) (1.102) (1.549) (1.804) (0.648) (0.445) (−1.117) (−2.180) 
0.00170 0.00414 0.00235* 0.00386** 0.00192 0.00244 −0.00226 −0.00574 1,276 
(0.721) (1.210) (1.764) (2.069) (1.480) (1.534) (−0.775) (−1.591) 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
All specifications include the controls for female, black, Hispanic, a quadratic in age, county relative per-capita income, the county 
unemployment rate, the cohort unemployment rate for aged 24–29, the five-year bankruptcy rate, and the age-specific homeowner rate 
(columns [7] and [8]). 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (county income and unemployment rate), the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics using CPS data (cohort-specific unemployment rates), the American Bankruptcy Institute (bankruptcy rate), 
and the U.S. Census (homeownership). 
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DISCUSSION 
Our results indicate that holding student debt is likely associated 
with decreased financial stability, particularly for individuals who accu-
mulate debt but do not complete a bachelor’s degree. Several related 
mechanisms can lead to the observed relationship between student 
loans and financial distress. Further work is needed to provide more 
information about the specific issues caused by education debt. Debt 
repayment has a direct impact on disposable income, which can place 
financial strain on households when combined with liquidity constraints 
that prevent graduates from borrowing against future income. Brown 
and Caldwell (2013) show a recent trend in the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Consumer Credit Panel of 25- and 30-year-old student bor-
rowers having lower credit scores on average than the scores of simi-
larly aged nonborrowers. This comparison, however, does not account 
for correlates of income, financial stability, and good credit rating that 
are linked to student debt, such as educational attainment and occu-
pation. Homeownership can be affected through a higher consumer 
debt-to-income ratio, which mortgage lenders take into account, or the 
ability to save enough for a down payment. Even if student debt does 
not play a role in the rate at which graduates transition into homeowner-
ship, it can affect the value of the homes they purchase or the resources 
that are devoted to other consumption categories. 
Changing aggregate labor market conditions may indirectly lead us 
to observe a relationship between education loans and fi nancial hard-
ship if the ongoing steady increase in student borrowing has coincided 
with continued decline in the returns to postsecondary education. Under 
this scenario, it would not be the case that loans per se cause finan-
cial hardship. Households that obtained schooling in more recent years 
would fare worse financially, owing to the lower returns to their edu-
cation, but such households are also more likely to hold debt because 
of exogenous increases in aggregate borrowing. However, trends from 
the March CPS suggest increasing, not decreasing, high school–college 
wage differential (see, for example, Avery and Turner [2012] and Day 
and Newburger [2002]). 
Given the high uncertainty in the ex post return to a college or 
advanced degree, the observed levels of student borrowing may be 
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ex ante efficient, but the households that are the “lottery losers” are 
observed experiencing financial distress. Student debt generally can-
not be discharged in personal bankruptcy, and therefore borrowers 
who experience bad income shocks after graduation are unable to use 
a major component of the safety net available to holders of other types 
of debt. Borrowers who leave school without completing a degree have 
been identified as a group that is particularly susceptible to being bur-
dened by student debt, and we present evidence that confi rms this. The 
currently existing insurance mechanism that is built into the federal 
loan program includes such options as income-contingent and income-
based repayment plans and deferment options, but private student loans 
come with little borrower protection. Our results may indicate the need 
for more borrower protection, although we draw no conclusions about 
the potential for moral hazard issues with which such policies may be 
associated. 
Notes 
The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate con-
currence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors. The authors 
would like to thank Jesse Rothstein and other participants at the Upjohn/EPI/Spencer 
Conference on Student Loans for their helpful comments. 
1. See Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2012) for an overview of the literature. 
2. For example, Avery and Kane (2004) observe this trend among Boston high school 
students coming from both low-income and more affluent families. Avery and 
Turner (2012) show that in the Beginning Postsecondary Survey 2004:2009, 38 
percent of dependent students entering college in 2003 who expect to attain a BA
degree have not earned any postsecondary degree by 2009; 51 percent of these 
students end up with student loans, with the average borrower holding $14,500 
in student debt. According to analysis of the same data presented by the College 
Board (2012b), 5 percent of students who borrowed $75,000 or more and 10 per-
cent of students who borrowed between $50,000 and $75,000 left school without 
a degree by 2009. 
3. As researchers, we observe an imperfect measure of schooling Si and occupation. 
In our empirical analysis it is used to construct a predicted wage income variable 
that is based on Current Population Survey (CPS) respondents’ earnings. 
4. Since in our data student loans are measured at the household level in our data, for 
respondents with a spouse or partner we use the mean of the two ages. 
5. See Wilson and Smith (1983) and Internal Revenue Service (1992) for a descrip-
tion of the Statistics of Income fi le. The file used for each survey largely contains 
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data from tax returns filed for the tax year two years before the survey takes place. 
See Kennickell (1998) for a detailed description of the selection of the 1998 list 
sample. 
6. For reasons related to cost control on the survey, the geographic distribution of the 
list sample is constrained to that of the area-probability sample. 
7. The evolution of the SCF weighting design is summarized in Kennickell (2000), 
with additional background by Kennickell and Woodburn (1992). 
8. In this chapter we use the term household for simplicity. The SCF actually uses a 
concept of primary economic unit (PEU), which includes family members living 
together in the housing unit who are financially dependent on the respondent. Fam-
ily here includes unmarried partners and their children. Residents of the household 
who do not usually live in the residence or who are economically independent of 
the survey respondent are not considered to be part of the PEU, and any student 
loans they may hold are not included in the SCF. 
9. See, for example, U.S. Census Bureau (2013). 
10. The disability status is not necessarily caused by work but is identified by the 
respondent in a battery of questions about employment status. 
11.  As described in the 2010 SCF documentation: 
For each occupation group, regressions were run separately for males and females 
of the log of annualized wages on a constant, a spline on age [AGE, MAX(0, AGE-
35), MAX(0, AGE-55))], a dummy variable for part-time employment (1 = working 
fewer than 20 hours per week), a dummy variable for self-employment (1 = self-
employed), a dummy for race (1 = Hispanic or nonwhite), and dummy variables 
for years of education (1 = 12 years of education, some college or an associate’s 
degree, bachelor’s degree, higher degree than bachelor’s degree). If there were too 
few people in a CPS three-digit occupation group, either the SCF case was matched 
to a neighboring occupation group, or the match was made at the level of the two-
digit occupation code. Some of the model coefficients may be identically zero where 
there are too few cases in the appropriate cells in the CPS data to identify these coef-
ficients; for example, a coefficient for the (36,55) element of the age spline may be 
identically zero if there are no CPS cases in that age group for the given occupation. 
12. Before taking the natural log of predicted earnings, which is the variable included 
in the regressions below, we add $0.50 to all observations reporting zero predicted 
earnings. Predicted earnings are not adjusted for inflation. 
13. Attendance and completion in the SCF are constructed from two variables. The 
attendance variable asks (separate for respondent and spouse) the highest level 
of school attended, including four possible responses for college (one, two, three, 
or four years of college) and only one for any level of graduate school attended. 
Among those with any college attendance, both respondent and spouse are asked 
the degree completed with 10 options, including associate’s, bachelor’s, master’s, 
and a variety other advanced degrees. 
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In 2012 total student loan debt in the United States reached an all-
time high of $966 billion, with one-third of that debt held by 15 million 
people under age 30 (Lee 2013). Student loans are now the primary 
means through which American families finance postsecondary educa-
tion. With the costs of attendance higher than ever, and grant aid often 
available only for the financially needy or exceptionally talented, nearly 
two-thirds of all undergraduates receive at least some government-
backed credit to cover those costs. That credit is comparatively acces-
sible, requiring a lengthy application but no credit history, and students 
and families can borrow a sizable amount of money. Yet not all students 
and families borrow, even when declining to borrow means that they 
are hard-pressed to afford college, and there is little evidence to help 
account for that apparent aversion. Thus, while there is widespread con-
cern about the amount of borrowing and “overborrowing,” high rates 
of delinquency and default in some sectors of the market, and debate 
about whether the resulting debt-income ratio is appropriate, deepening 
our understanding of the initial borrowing decision itself remains an 
important task. 
Since college attainment is tightly linked to families’ ability to pay 
for college (e.g., Bailey and Dynarski 2011), substantial inequalities 
arise from students’ need to borrow and their decisions about how to 
respond to that need. Two groups of students on opposite ends of the 
income spectrum often find themselves able to avoid borrowing. The 
317 






318 Goldrick-Rab and Kelchen 
first group is exceptionally wealthy, possessing the fi nancial strength 
to cover college costs without credit, while the second group is excep-
tionally poor (and often quite talented), thus receiving suffi cient grant 
aid to cover costs without need for credit. Most students and families 
fall into the great grey middle in between. These people have demon-
strable financial need (as calculated by formulaic federal needs analy-
sis), meaning that there is a gap between their available resources and 
the costs of college attendance. They are nearly always offered loans, 
but a sizable fraction decline to take them.1 This is especially common 
among students from lower-income families; national data suggest that 
as many as 45 percent of the neediest undergraduates do not take up 
loans, even though this leaves them short of the resources required to 
cover their costs of attendance (Cunningham and Santiago 2008).2 
Declining loans that could help meet the costs of college atten-
dance is typically referred to as loan aversion and according to some 
economists constitutes bizarre behavior (Cadena and Keys 2013). But 
aversion is a frequently used but poorly understood term, since it is 
unclear whether these students are actually averse to loans (implying 
a belief about borrowing), have a lack of information about them, or 
are not offered them at all (The Institute for College Access and Suc-
cess [TICAS] 2007). In addition, since data on loan aversion typically 
come from student surveys, it is difficult to know whether stated atti-
tudes translate into action. Finally, there is little systematic information 
about demographic differences in loan aversion and to what they may 
be attributed. 
This generally weak knowledge base means that it is unclear 
whether and what kind of intervention is required and/or appropriate to 
encourage borrowing among (some) students to increase their chances 
of degree completion. In addition, more research is needed to determine 
the processes underlying the decision to forgo student loans, and in par-
ticular whether that decision constitutes loan aversion. 
With these challenges in mind, this chapter contributes to the study 
of loan aversion by drawing on a comprehensive set of information 
about a focal group of students: Pell Grant recipients. The relatively low 
graduation rate of Pell recipients is a national concern and the focus of 
numerous initiatives such as the “Reimagining Aid Design and Deliv-
ery” project funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Since 
the purchasing power of the Pell Grant is at its lowest point in history 
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(covering just 30 percent of the costs of a public four-year university on 
average), even low-income students have to cover as much as $12,000 
of college costs on their own (Goldrick-Rab 2013). Why do some low-
income students accept loans to cover this need while others do not? 
We begin by triangulating evidence from both surveys and admin-
istrative records to get a handle on how differences in the measurement 
of loan-taking decisions might affect conclusions. We next examine 
differences in those decisions among more than 600 fi rst- time under-
graduates receiving the Pell Grant across 10 of Wisconsin’s public uni-
versities. In particular, we attend to demographic variation suggested by 
prior literature, including disparities based on race/ethnicity, parental 
education, and immigrant status. We also consider the role played by 
the institutional contexts where students attend college by examining 
the associations between loan decisions and university characteristics. 
After replicating some key borrowing disparities noted in earlier stud-
ies, we test several explanations for these differences. Specifi cally, we 
consider the moderating effects on loan decisions according to families’
financial resources; perceived returns to education; financial knowl-
edge; attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions; work behaviors; and social 
capital. Finally, we examine the evidence regarding the association 
between loan taking and educational outcomes. 
Overall, our findings strongly suggest that the manner in which loan 
decisions are measured have serious implications about the prevalence 
and antecedents of so-called loan aversion. Some analyses indicate that 
the decision to decline loans may be a strategy undertaken by students 
with strong family commitments and those living in contexts where the 
use of credit for consumption is normalized. We conclude with a discus-
sion of future areas for research and intervention, noting that there are 
still many unknowns regarding the consequences of loan taking, both 
on average and for different groups of students. This chapter suggests 
that loan aversion may not be something to overcome, but that it may in 
fact benefit some students, perhaps while hampering the college attain-
ment of others. 
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TRENDS IN COLLEGE FINANCING AND LOAN TAKING 
The United States has never had a free system of public higher 
education; instead, political goals of equitable opportunity are pur-
sued through a complex price-discounting strategy known as financial 
aid. To induce students from low-income families to choose college, 
government, philanthropy, and educational institutions collaboratively 
frame college enrollment as an affordable decision for all qualifi ed stu-
dents. Families and students are encouraged to embrace the financial 
aid system’s workings, norms, and values, which include the contention 
that higher education yields private and public returns, and individuals 
should therefore feel comfortable taking on debt to invest in their human 
capital development (Baum and Schwartz 2012; Leslie and Brinkman 
1987; Manski and Wise 1983; McPherson and Schapiro 1991). Institu-
tions of higher education are then left to determine the value of their 
services and set their own prices. The return to individual investments 
is expressed in terms of increased earnings observed at some time in the 
future, but it requires significant near-term sacrifice (Carnevale, Rose, 
and Cheah 2011). Concomitantly, because of the social benefi ts accrued 
to an educated populace, the government asserts its authority to help 
ensure that low-income citizens can pursue higher education through 
vouchers (such as Pell Grants) and government-managed loan systems 
(Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance 2012). 
The availability and use of federal loans has changed radically over 
time. Prior to the 1992 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, fed-
eral loans consisted almost entirely of subsidized loans targeting needy 
families. Total federal loan volume was around $22 billion (in 2011 
dollars) in 1991–1992. Over the course of the next year, that number 
grew by almost 50 percent with the introduction of unsubsidized loans, 
which at the time constituted 9 percent of all student loan dollars across 
all sources. The growth of unsubsidized loans was dramatic, swelling 
from about $10 billion (in 2011 dollars) in 1995–1996 to more than $20 
billion in 2005–2006, and to almost $50 billion in 2011–2012. Those 
increases correspond to real declines in family income associated with 
the recession and increasing college costs, including at public colleges 
and universities. Growth in subsidized loans was slower, since they are 
means-tested and less available (Baum and Payea 2012). 
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Currently, dependent undergraduate students can borrow up to 
$5,500 in Stafford Loans (including a maximum of $3,500 in subsi-
dized loans) in their first year of study, and up to $6,500 (including up to 
$4,500 in subsidized loans) in their second year. The limit for the third 
year and beyond is $7,500 (including up to $5,500 in subsidized loans). 
Average total borrowing per full-time equivalent undergraduate student 
rose by 45 percent, from $3,677 (in 2011 dollars) to $5,335 between 
2001–2002 and 2006–2007, and by another 4 percent to $5,540, in 
2011–2012 (Baum and Payea 2012). 
With declining family resources and higher costs of attendance, 
students today by and large cannot forgo loans and instead turn to 
work to fi ll the financial holes. The average unmet financial need of 
Pell recipients is about $12,000 at four-year colleges and universities; a 
student must work, at federal minimum wage, almost 35 hours a week, 
52 weeks a year, to cover those costs, which research suggests is nearly 
impossible if the student hopes to complete college on time (Goldrick-
Rab 2013). Moreover, while many students have an “expected family 
contribution,” (EFC) which suggests that the family should be able to 
pay for college, some families are unable or unwilling to do so, and 
thus students borrow unsubsidized loans to cover that EFC. It is there-
fore unsurprising that over the last decade, the total number of federal 
Stafford Loan borrowers increased by 95 percent, from 5.4 million in 
2001–2002 to 10.4 million in 2011–2012 (Baum and Payea 2012). This 
means that the percentage of undergraduates holding loans grew from 
23 to 35 percent over that 10-year period. Moreover, the percentage 
of undergraduates borrowing both subsidized and unsubsidized federal 
loans grew from 9 percent in 2001–2002 to 25 percent in 2011–2012 
(College Board 2012). 
Borrowing is more common among students at public universi-
ties and less so among students attending public two-year colleges. 
The percentage of students borrowing to attend public universities 
has remained steady at around 55 percent since 1999, but the average 
amount borrowed among bachelor’s degree recipients has grown from 
just over $20,000 to nearly $25,000. In addition, borrowing grew more 
rapidly from 2005–2006 to 2010–2011 than it had during the preceding 
five years. Debt per borrower grew at an average annual rate of 2.1 per-
cent beyond inflation, and average debt per graduate grew at an average 
annual rate of 2.7 percent (Baum and Payea 2012). 
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Students from low-income families are far more likely to borrow 
for college. An analysis of bachelor’s degree recipients graduating from 
public universities in 2007–2008 found that 68 percent of students from 
families earning less than $30,000 per year had an average cumula-
tive debt load of $16,500, while just 40 percent of students from fami-
lies earning $120,000 or more annually held any debt, with an average 
amount of $14,500 (Baum and Payea 2012). The resulting disparity 
in debt-to-income ratio is substantial—low-income families hold debt 
amounting to about 70 percent of their income, while wealthier families 
have debt amounting to around 10 percent of income (a rate deemed 
manageable by the fi nancial industry).3 
Evidence from several waves of the National Postsecondary Stu-
dent Aid Study (NPSAS) suggests that between 40 and 50 percent 
of students borrowing subsidized Stafford Loans took the maximum 
allowable amount over the past two decades, even after two increases in 
the maximum. More than one in four students borrowing the maximum 
amount of federal loans in the 2007–2008 academic year also took out 
a private loan or a federal PLUS loan (Wei and Skomsvold 2011). This 
suggests that more students are borrowing close to the limits and that 
loan caps may contribute to the mistaken appearance of loan aversion. 
There is some evidence that loan limits may hinder the ability of a small 
number of students to complete college; for example, recent work by 
Johnson (2013) found that a simulated $5,000 increase in student loan 
limits would increase bachelor’s degree attainment rates by 0.7 percent-
age points. Thus, even in the face of growing concern about the overall 
amount of borrowing, there is some reason to think that in the current 
context, students from low-income families might face greater odds of 
college success if they were willing or able to borrow more. 
A DESCRIPTIVE PORTRAIT OF LOAN AVERSION 
The body of research on loan aversion is mainly descriptive, with 
a few multivariate studies and laboratory experiments included. These 
provide a broad sense of the characteristics of students who decline 
loans, and some targeted tests of whether that apparent aversion can be 
overcome through intervention. 
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The NPSAS of 2003–2004 can be used to form a portrait of loan-
averse students.4 An examination of this data by Cunningham and 
Santiago (2008) confirms that students who decline to borrow have 
less unmet need—simply put, they do not need to borrow. In addi-
tion, among students with a significant amount of unmet need ($2,000 
or more), loan aversion is more common among students from low-
income families, those who attend part time, and students attending 
public four-year (rather than private four-year) institutions. Loan aver-
sion is less common among black students compared to white students, 
and it is more common among Asian and Hispanic students compared 
to white students. 
After comparing these results to data from the 1992–1993 NPSAS, 
Cunningham and Santiago (2008) note that racial/ethnic differences in 
borrowing seem to be a new phenomenon, emerging with the growth 
of students borrowing associated with the use of unsubsidized loans. 
This raises additional questions about whether the use of subsidized 
and unsubsidized loans differs by race/ethnicity as well.5 It is worth 
noting that research evidence has clearly established racial/ethnic varia-
tion in rates of loan default, with black students at the greatest risk of 
defaulting on their loans (Gross et al. 2009), even as the loans may be 
more effective in increasing completion rates (Jackson and Reynolds 
2013). 
Smaller qualitative studies identify similar patterns. For example, 
Burdman (2005) conducts interviews with students, counselors, out-
reach professionals, and financial aid administrators that suggest that 
aversion to loans may reduce opportunities for a subset of low-income 
and minority students, particularly low-income, first-generation, and 
Mexican-American students. She finds that students whose parents had 
less education appeared more likely to work full time and avoid bor-
rowing than students whose parents have college or graduate degrees. 
Among full-time students, those whose parents did not finish high 
school were more than twice as likely as those whose parents had grad-
uate degrees to work full time instead of borrowing. Among full-time 
dependent students, low-income students were less likely to borrow 
than other students, and when they did borrow, they took smaller loans. 
But debt aversion, she suggested, may also affect the initial choice of 
whether and where to attend college—before students have the oppor-
tunity to actually receive a loan offer and reject it. 
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However, other evidence suggests that students may be mislabeled 
as loan averse when they are actually amenable to borrowing. For exam-
ple, Eckel et al. (2007) study educational finance preferences using an 
experiment in which real money was distributed (e.g., the choices were 
not hypothetical). The sample was drawn from across Canada and 
included 900 students aged 18–55 who were recruited for participation 
in the exercise. Based on the results, the authors conclude that debt 
aversion plays little or no role in the demand for postsecondary educa-
tion finance in the form of a loan. Students with experience carrying 
and managing debt are more willing than others to take on additional 
debt to finance postsecondary education. But presenting students with 
only loan options for postsecondary education is unlikely to negatively 
impact investment in postsecondary education, as long as care is taken 
that the price of the loans is not too high. Johnson and Montmarquette 
(2011) elicit similar findings in another Canadian study with a sample 
of low-income and rural students. They find a greater willingness to pay 
for college with loans among rural respondents, and no systematic loan 
aversion. Finally, in a third Canadian study, Palameta and Voyer (2010) 
find that roughly 5–20 percent of their overall sample of low-income 
high school students was loan averse, depending on the price of the 
offered grant. In their experimental study, as the price of attending col-
lege increased, a higher percentage of students were inclined to choose 
a stand alone grant but not a grant/loan combination. The results show 
that overall some underrepresented groups are slightly but significantly 
more likely to make loan-averse decisions. Of course, it is unclear if the 
Canadian context and student body is sufficiently similar to the United 
States to extrapolate these findings. 
EXPLANATIONS FOR LOAN AVERSION: THEORY 
AND EVIDENCE 
Loan aversion is often described as common, unfortunate, and not 
easily overcome, but these depictions are typically based on conjecture 
rather than evidence. Reports on loan aversion, such as those issued 
by The Project on Student Debt and the Institute on Higher Education 
Policy (e.g., Burdman 2005; TICAS 2007; Cunningham and Santiago 
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2008) tend to point to two explanations for declining loans while pos-
sessing unmet financial need: a preference for using alternative sources 
of financing (e.g., savings or work earnings), or cultural/ethnic perspec-
tives that discourage borrowing. Practitioners suggest that aversion 
may be growing in response to the Great Recession and news about 
rising default rates in some sectors. But there are many more theoreti-
cal explanations for why students and families may choose to decline 
to accept the loans offered to them. In this section we adapt a model of 
understanding the use and effects of financial aid initially described in 
Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and Trostel (2009). 
First, families may vary in their fi nancial strength, and this could— 
in a manner consistent with rational choice theory—lead them to 
decline loans. Families that can afford the net price of attendance, either 
because they have sufficient wealth or receive sufficient grant aid, may 
reject loans offered to them.6 Again, this is a heterogeneous group— 
both the wealthiest and poorest families, those with the highest and 
lowest incomes, the highest and lowest EFCs, and who are facing the 
highest and lowest net prices are the most likely to borrow. But among 
students from low-income families, rational choice theory would lead 
to the expectation that loan aversion is more common among families 
with greater incomes, a higher EFC, or a lower net price. On the other 
hand, families with more debt may also be loan averse. 
Another explanation for loan aversion points to the problem of 
informational asymmetries. Many policymakers, practitioners, and 
researchers highlight a large body of economic theory and evidence 
suggesting that college is an excellent investment for most low-income 
students, even as loan balances increase (Avery and Turner 2012; Baum 
and Schwartz 2012). On average, each additional year of education gen-
erates a payoff in the labor market, and the lifetime returns to degrees 
are substantial, even for groups marginalized by race, class, or ethnicity. 
Even during the recent deep recession, college graduates fared better 
than high school graduates (Carnevale, Rose, and Cheah 2011). Infor-
mational barriers are typically given as the reason why many students 
and families insist that the costs of attendance are too high and unaf-
fordable (Hoxby and Avery 2012; Hoxby and Turner 2013). At least 
one U.S. experiment indicates that providing more information can 
moderately reduce that perception (Hoxby and Turner 2013). However, 
an experiment in the Netherlands suggests the opposite, fi nding that 
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students who receive additional information on the terms of loans do 
not adjust their loan-taking behaviors over time (Booij, Leuven, and 
Oosterbeek 2012). 
Research by McKinney, Roberts, and Shefman (2013) indicates 
that many community college financial aid counselors believe that their 
low-income students do not understand the long-term implications of 
taking out student loans. Similarly, some researchers contend that col-
lege attainment would increase if students had a “payback calculator” in 
hand when assessing the value of taking on another year of college and 
its accompanying debt (Haveman n.d.). In particular, if students could 
compare the value of a government-subsidized loan to the opportunity 
costs of working, they would choose to borrow (Baum and Schwartz 
2012). However, these payback calculators are usually designed to 
inform the initial attendance decision instead of whether to persist in 
college and have not been subjected to rigorous experimental testing. 
Moreover, at least two studies question whether borrowing for col-
lege is inherently rational, noting that students who decline loans may 
be seeking to avoid temptation or trouble. Dowd (2008) posits that stu-
dents with stronger senses of self (e.g., internal locus of control and self-
control) and correspondingly higher educational expectations ought to 
behave more like econometricians when making decisions—presum-
ably increasing their likelihood of borrowing for college. However, 
Dowd is unable to empirically test this hypothesis. Instead, Cadena and 
Keys (2013) indirectly test the hypothesis that loan aversion is driven 
by self-control. They use two waves of federal NPSAS data by compar-
ing the rates of loan rejection among students who are living on and off 
campus and are eligible for the maximum amount of subsidized loans. 
They report that their findings “support a self-control explanation . . . 
students are rejecting the loans, in part, to avoid the temptation to over-
spend out of borrowed money” (p. 1118). 
It may also be the case that the decision to decline loans is related to 
students’ sense of why they are enrolled and what they aim to achieve, 
and particularly to variation in their expected returns. Evidence sug-
gests that students repeatedly revise and rethink their rationales for 
pursuing college degrees, practically on a daily basis, as they proceed 
through college (Armstrong and Hamilton 2013; Clydesdale 2007; 
Deil-Amen and Goldrick-Rab 2009; Manski and Wise 1983). Students 
who are academically prepared for college may perceive borrowing as 
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less risky, perhaps because pursuing college incurs fewer psychic costs. 
To be clear, while this idea expands on theories of college as a “great 
experiment” (Manski and Wise 1983), it is too simplistic to suggest that 
when college feels worthwhile, students will decide to take on loans, as 
other contexts can also offset or mediate these decisions. For example, 
some research indicates that the longer a student is enrolled in college, 
the less likely she or he is to be risk averse (Davies and Lea 1995). The 
increase in a student’s debt load seems to precede a change in their feel-
ings toward debt—in other words the more debt accrued, the greater the 
tolerance for debt. 
One key attribute of many theories of loan aversion, particularly 
those drawn from economics, is that they are methodologically indi-
vidualistic in their approach, assuming that students make borrowing 
decisions independently. But there is a growing body of research sug-
gesting differential responsiveness to financing options according to 
the setting and context in which decisions are made (Armstrong and 
Hamilton 2013; Dowd 2008; Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and Trostel 2009; 
Hossler, Schmit, and Vesper 1999; McDonough 1997; Paulsen and St. 
John 1997; Perna 2006, 2008; St. John, Paulsen, and Carter 2005; Tinto 
1993). Individuals can make decisions in the context of their familial 
needs or their community needs, and the role played by those other 
actors is more important than what is assumed by “preferences” in eco-
nomic models, since the influence of those contexts can be reciprocal. 
For example, loan decisions may be both shaped by and contribute to 
the social and cultural capital students obtain from their relationships 
(Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and Trostel 2009; McDonough and Calderone 
2006; Paulsen and St. John 1997). 
More broadly, a student’s willingness to borrow may be moderated 
by university institutional culture—specifically, how university admin-
istrators, faculty, staff, and students explicitly and implicitly add (or 
reduce) college costs by demanding more (or less) from students in 
order for them to fully engage in college life. Indeed, borrowing behav-
iors vary substantially by institution and how much time students spend 
in college. At schools like most of those in this study—public universi-
ties—56 percent of students who spent a year or less enrolled without 
completing a degree borrowed, compared to 63 percent of those who 
stayed up to two years (Baum and Payea 2012). While such institutional 
differences in loan taking are well documented, explanations for those 
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differences are not always articulated (Cunningham and Santiago 2008; 
Gross et al. 2009). 
In Paying for the Party, Armstrong and Hamilton (2013) document 
the impacts of what Jacob, McCall, and Stange (2013) term the “country-
clubification” of state universities. Responding to the demands of many 
wealthy and out-of-state students for the college experiences that pre-
serve and enhance their existing social advantages, these public institu-
tions are increasingly spending limited resources to create opportuni-
ties and settings for elitist socialization. High-income students respond 
positively to higher sticker prices, seeking out colleges and universi-
ties that cost more, while low-income students prefer institutions that 
cost less (Hoxby and Avery 2012). The expenses associated with higher 
sticker prices crowd out other spending, and the resulting climate has 
the potential to alienate working-class students for whom college is 
meant to be a route out of poverty, not a visit to elite cultures. They can-
not participate without taking on loans, and even with the loans, they 
often still cannot afford full participation. 
On the other hand, loan aversion may be related to the familial 
environments in which students were raised. This would be consistent 
with evidence on risk aversion. For example, Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, 
and Sørensen (2011) provide evidence from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), measuring risk aversion based on a set of survey 
questions probing respondents’ willingness to accept jobs with various 
combinations of income probabilities. Risk aversion is inferred from 
the answers to these questions, and the composite risk-aversion mea-
sure is regressed on a variety of background variables. The authors find 
that the best demographic predictors of risk aversion are age, gender, 
and parental education, as well as whether they lived with both parents 
when they were younger. They find that males and children of more 
educated parents are less risk averse. While they do not find that income 
is a predictor of risk aversion, this is partly because parents’ education 
and income are correlated; they do find a simple (negative) correlation 
with risk aversion as expected. 
Absent sufficient social capital to help them understand student 
loans in particular, students may seek attitude-behavior consistency by 
either refusing loans because they also refuse credit cards, or reframing 
student debt as different from other forms of debt so as to justify accept-
ing it. For example, Davies and Lea (1995) describe students who are 
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averse to taking on debt but maintain consistency between that attitude 
and their behavior (loan taking in college) by not recognizing student 
loans as like credit card debt. The way debt is framed may therefore be 
important to whether or not students accept it. In a laboratory experi-
ment conducted with financial aid recipients in Chile, Colombia, and 
Mexico, Caetano, Palacios, and Patrinos (2011) conclude that debt 
aversion—widely detected in their sample—is due to labeling effects. 
Specifically, labeling a contract as a “loan” decreased its probability of 
being selected over a financially equivalent “contract” by more than 8 
percent. The authors also find that students are willing to pay a premium 
of about 4 percent of the financed value to avoid a contract labeled as 
debt. They conclude that debt aversion exists and may potentially dis-
tort investments. 
Another possibility is that students’ orientations toward loans are 
related to their familial beliefs, particularly their time horizon or future 
time perspective, a measure of the extent to which individuals focus on 
the future rather than the present or past. This time horizon is typically 
measured using a discount rate, which reflects the weight that individu-
als place on events in the future compared to those of today. Individuals 
with a future orientation, which is considered a hallmark of “modern” 
American life, tend to have lower discount rates as they place relatively 
more weight on the future and a longer time horizon. Meanwhile, a 
present orientation, with a higher discount rate and a shorter time hori-
zon, is labeled traditional, and in a sense, “backward.” 
Economists theorize that students who have a long time horizon— 
those who give considerable weight in their thinking to their long-
term well-being—are more likely to make investments with long-term 
payoffs, including investing in retirement savings and borrowing for 
school. There are clear socioeconomic differences in time horizons. 
For example, Lawrence (1991) shows that higher socioeconomic adults 
(those who tend to be white and who have higher incomes) have longer 
time horizons. Specifically, these adults evidently “discount” or reduce 
the value of future costs and benefits at a rate of 12 percent per year, 
whereas economically disadvantaged adults discount the future at a rate 
of 19 percent per year, compared to the 8–9 percent yield of long-term 
Treasury notes during that time frame. Put differently, the time horizon 
of economically disadvantaged people is less than two-thirds as long 
as economically advantaged people. Similarly, a study conducted in 
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Canada examines loan aversion among students from a range of family 
income backgrounds, using a set of lab experiments. The authors find 
that loan aversion was more common for low-income students because 
they had a greater tendency to discount future rewards (Palameta and 
Voyer 2010). 
However, it is also possible that a shorter time horizon is linked 
to variation in expected returns to college, particularly due to the esti-
mated chances of completing degrees and finding employment after 
graduation. For example, Latino students interviewed in focus groups 
in one study expressed an aversion to loans because they must be 
repaid even if degrees are not completed. They also said they would 
prefer to make their college choices based on their current economic 
situations and what they can afford while managing their family and 
personal responsibilities. “They would rather ‘pay as they go,’ and 
they believe they can get a quality education wherever they enroll, 
as long as they are motivated” (Cunningham and Santiago 2008, 
p. 18). This may be related to the disproportionate number of Latino 
(and Asian) students from immigrant families, which tend to operate in 
unbanked cash economies (Teranishi 2010). Very different results were 
obtained from a sample studied at one California university (Brint and 
Rotondi 2008), where the authors report that students no longer think 
of loans as a burden to be avoided or discharged quickly, but rather as 
a means of freedom, which opens up (rather than limits) behavioral 
options. The increased availability of loan repayment options—such as 
income-based repayment, income-contingent repayment, and pay-as-
you-earn—has the potential to reduce the risk of borrowing for college, 
but these programs are only utilized by a small percentage of eligible 
students. Only one-tenth of the 15 million students with Federal Direct 
Loans are enrolled in these income-based options (Chopra 2013). 
A low future time perspective, or a past orientation, appears unre-
sponsive to changes in information possessed by the individual. For 
example, in a study of retirement savings, Jacobs-Lawshen and Her-
shey (2005) find that increasing the knowledge of fi nancial planning 
among those with a past orientation induced no increase in their rates 
of retirement savings. They conclude, “When it comes to savings, it is 
difficult to overcome a short time horizon. Failing to look to the future 
ensures a minimal impact of risk tolerance on saving, almost irrespec-
tive of how much one knows about financial planning” ( p. 339). A criti-
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cal question is whether saving for retirement should be thought of as 
comparable to borrowing for college, given the long-term payoffs, and 
whether or not borrowing for college is a “failure” in the same way that 
not saving for retirement is said to be. Additionally, a study by Norvili-
tis and Mendes-Da-Silva (2013) provides some indication that students 
with a stronger sense of delayed gratification (a future orientation) have 
lower levels debt. 
Another aspect of students’ preferences, which may be grounded 
in the beliefs of their families, relates to their work orientation. More 
than 75 percent of undergraduates work, but according to some studies, 
working during college (especially over long hours), has been linked to 
lower rates of degree completion (King 2002; Pascarella and Terenzini 
2005). Other studies, however, find the opposite (Bozick 2007; Staff 
and Mortimer 2007; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003). A posited 
advantage of loans, therefore, has been the ability to alleviate the need 
to work (or work so much). But a work orientation may go beyond a 
preference, especially when one considers the value that some individu-
als place on working, or what some sociologists refer to as the “central-
ity” of work. Put simply, people have many reasons for working, some 
of which are not plainly economic. For example, ethnographic evidence 
indicates that some students elect to work in order to honor their family 
or culture, or because they have always worked (Mortimer 2003; Weis 
1985). If work is central to the lives of students, serving to connect 
them to others and bring meaning to their lives, then it may well not be 
replaced with loans (Feldman and Doerpinghaus 1992; Lobel 1991). 
It may also be the case that students vary in the social capital they 
can draw on to understand and make sense of loans. One of the primary 
difficulties with current financial aid policy is that it is poorly under-
stood by nearly all of its constituents (Goldrick-Rab and Roksa 2008). 
Most people do not know what opportunities for aid exist, how to access 
the various programs, and what one can expect to receive. Low-income 
parents and students are less likely to receive high-quality information 
about financial aid opportunities, and as a result are less likely to fi le a 
federal application for student aid (FAFSA) or apply to more expensive 
colleges (which may, in fact, offer them a better financial aid pack-
age) (Long 2008). Upper-income students receive information about 
college from a variety of sources, while low-income students rely on 
their high school counselors, largely because their parents and siblings 
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did not attend college (Cabrera and La Nasa 2000). As a result, students 
from poor families who would likely qualify for all or nearly all of the 
aid required to finance college fail to even apply, since they have lim-
ited access to information about how to apply for aid, little assistance 
in filling out the extraordinarily complex application, and substantial 
(and warranted) fears that college is unaffordable. Students from low-
income families who are insufficiently educated as to the variation in 
quality among college financing strategies, and frustrated by the time-
consuming nature of the application process, unwittingly take on high-
interest private loans, credit cards, or off-campus employment without 
complete knowledge of the consequences (Cabrera and La Nasa 2000). 
Thus, the amount of social capital held, as embodied in, for example, 
assistance with the FAFSA, may explain disparities in loan aversion. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Drawing on this wide array of prior economic and sociological 
theory and evidence, we conceive of the choices involved in accepting 
or rejecting student loans as involving both individual-level and family 
or community decisions. We ask the following five research questions: 
1) How does the way loan aversion is measured affect the assess-
ment of which students are loan averse? 
2) What are the key demographic disparities in loan aversion 
among students from low-income families? 
3) Which of the following factors appears to moderate those 
observed disparities in loan aversion: family fi nancial strength; 
perceived returns to degree; financial knowledge; attitudes, 
beliefs, and dispositions; work behaviors; and social capital? 
4) How is the assessment of these moderators affected by mea-
surement of loan aversion? 
5) How is loan aversion related to postsecondary outcomes? 
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METHODOLOGY 
Using survey and administrative records for a sample of Pell Grant 
recipients participating in the Wisconsin Scholars Longitudinal Study 
(WSLS), we examine the incidence and correlates of loan-taking behav-
iors among low-income students—all of whom have unmet financial 
need—and consider a range of potential explanations for observed vari-
ation in these.7 To examine the reasons for loan aversion, we focus on a 
relatively young sample of first-time, full-time undergraduates attend-
ing two-year and four-year colleges in one state’s public higher educa-
tion system. In addition, after exploring institutional differences in loan 
taking, we use college fixed effects to control for any institutional dif-
ferences and focus on student-level differences. 
Setting 
This study takes place in Wisconsin, where more than 80 percent 
of undergraduates are enrolled in the public University of Wisconsin 
(UW) System and Wisconsin Technical College System. As in many 
states, over the past decade state appropriations per full-time equiva-
lent student have declined (State Higher Education Executive Officers 
2013). As a result, the costs of attendance continue to rise, and demon-
strated need unmet through financial grant aid is swelling. For example, 
in 2010–2011, the average family contribution to college costs in the 
UW System was $4,686, the average amount of need-based aid was 
$7,303, and the average amount of unmet financial need was $5,236— 
up from $1,951 in 2002–2003 (Wisconsin Higher Educational Aids 
Board 2012). 
Wisconsin is also typical when it comes to key indicators of college 
access and success. The on-time college-going rate among high school 
graduates is 61 percent (the national average is 62 percent), the average 
ACT composite test score is 22 (the national average is 21), 52 percent 
of undergraduates file applications for financial aid (compared to 50 
percent nationally), the first-to-second-year retention rate at universities 
is 77 percent (76 percent nationally), and the six-year graduation rate 
for bachelor’s students is 58 percent (56 percent nationally) (Goldrick-
Rab and Harris 2010). 
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Data 
Data for this study come from multiple sources, and all details of 
each measure are provided in Table 10.1. We utilize two measures of 
loan aversion. The first is based on a question administered in a survey 
conducted during the students’ first semester of college, in fall 2008. 
As part of a much longer survey about college plans and finances, stu-
dents were asked: “Suppose you could take out a loan up to $10,000 
with a 7 percent interest rate. How much money would you take?” Stu-
dents could choose from the following five choices: $0, $1,000, $2,500, 
$5,000, and $10,000. In fall 2008, the interest rate on subsidized student 
loans was 6.0 percent, and for unsubsidized student loans the rate was 
6.8 percent.8 We did not tell the students this information in the sur-
vey, and the overall responses and level of financial aid knowledge sug-
gested in the study provide little reason to think that they were aware 
the degree to which the rate we inquired about was slightly higher than 
the current unsubsidized rate and a point higher than the subsidized 
rate. At the time data were collected, income-based repayment was not 
available.9 We code students who said they would take none of the loan 
they were offered as loan averse. 
In addition, we used information from students’ financial aid pack-
ages, also obtained in fall 2008, which indicated whether students were 
offered loans, how much they were offered and of what type (subsi-
dized or unsubsidized), and the amount accepted. This is an uncommon 
approach, as few data sets include loan offered, usually only recording 
the loans accepted.10 We code a student as loan averse if she refused 
all loans offered in that term.11 We also include a substantial number 
of demographic characteristics and measures of moderating concepts 
drawn from both survey and administrative data. All details on these 
are found in Table 10.1. 
Sample 
The overall WSLS sample includes 3,000 students. For this chapter, 
we focus on a subsample that includes the 684 students attending 10 of 
the state’s 13 public universities and the 13 public two-year colleges 
for whom we observe both the key survey and administrative measures 
of loan aversion described above. The sample is 58 percent female and 
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74 percent non-Hispanic white, and almost 80 percent of the students 
lack a parent with a bachelor’s degree. About 4 percent of the students 
are first-generation immigrants, 10 percent are second-generation, and 
9 percent speak a language other than English in their homes. On aver-
age, in their first year of college these Pell recipients faced a net price 
of more than $8,000 after taking all grant aid into account. Most of 
them had a substantial amount of unmet financial need, as defi ned by 
the cost of attendance less all grant aid. On average, unmet need was 
$7,700. More specifically, over 85 percent had unmet need exceeding 
$3,500 (the maximum subsidized Stafford Loan for fi rst-year students), 
and 72 percent had unmet need of greater than the $5,500 that first-year 
students may borrow in subsidized and unsubsidized loans. 
Almost 17 percent of these students grew up in poverty, and almost 
one-third qualify for a zero expected family contribution, meaning that 
their families are not expected to pay anything toward their postsecond-
ary education. About 12 percent of students reported providing finan-
cial support to their families when attending school, with more than 
one-third feeling a sense of financial obligation to their families, and 
25 percent drawing no monetary support from their families. They held 
very little credit card debt—just about $150 on average. Fifty-eight per-
cent of students in the sample did not even have a credit card. 
In terms of academic preparation, students had an ACT score of 
just over 21, the statewide average, and nearly three quarters had strong 
high school preparation for college, but only about half said it was 
extremely likely that they would complete a bachelor’s degree, and one 
in five said they were having trouble with college. On average, they 
expected to enter a career paying just over $60,000 per year. Slightly 
more than 60 percent of students answered at least 12 of 15 questions 
regarding financial knowledge correctly, and just under half said they 
were competent at managing their money. 
This sample of Pell Grant recipients exhibits a long time horizon 
and overwhelming willingness to sacrifice today’s needs for their future 
potential. Very few indicate a general averse to all forms of debt. About 
95 percent evidenced an internal locus of control, and 75 percent said 
that debt was not a normative part of today’s lifestyle or that taking out 
loans was a good thing to help you enjoy life. The vast majority worked 
while in high school, and about half worked while in college as well, an 
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Table 10.1  Description of Measures, Sources, and Coding 
Concept/measure Source Question wording (survey) Response categories Coding 
Loan aversion 
Aversion A Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008 
Suppose you could take out 
a loan up to $10,000 with a 7 
percent interest rate. How much 
money would you take? 
$0, $1,000, $2,500, $5,000, 
and $10,000 
Loan averse = $0 
Aversion B Financial aid 
package, Fall 
2008 
Loan averse = accepted $0 of 
loan offered, conditional on 
offer 
Demographics 
Gender Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008 
What is your gender? Female, male Female = 1 
Race/ethnicity Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008 
What is your race/ethnicity? Non-Hispanic White, African-
American, Latino, Southeast 
Asian, Native American 
If multiple categories were 
checked, the underrepresented 





What is the highest level of 
education completed by either 
parent? 
Grade 1–8, some high school, 
GED, high school graduate, 
some college/technical degree/ 
associate’s, bachelor’s degree, 
master’s degree or above 
First-generation student = no 






Were you/your mother/your 
father born in the United 
States? 
Yes/no 1st gen = student born outside 
U.S.; 2nd gen = either parent 





What language is spoken most 
often inside your family's 
home? 
English, Spanish, Hmong, 
Chinese, other 




















   






















Survey, Fall 2009 “When I was growing up there 
wasn’t enough to eat at home.” 
“When I was growing up I had 




Baseline survey, “Since starting college, have 
Fall 2008 you regularly given any family 
or friends (not including 
spouses) more than $50 per 
month? Do not include loans.” 
Baseline survey, “I feel obligated to support my 
Fall 2008 family fi nancially.” 
Baseline survey, “In the past year…my family 
Fall 2008 provided money for my 
education.” 
Baseline survey, “How much do you owe 
Fall 2008 on all of your credit cards 
combined?” 
Indicate if true 
Yes/no 
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement 
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement 
<$100; $100–499; $500–999; 
$1,000–4,999; $5,000 or more 
Difference between 
institutional cost of attendance 
and all grant aid awarded to 
student 
If either answer is yes, 
poverty = 1 
Computed using 2008 FAFSA
and federal formula; both 
continuous measure and flag 
for $0 EFC (lowest) included 
Coded 1 = yes 
1 = Somewhat or strongly 
agree 
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Table 10.1  (continued) 
















Course difficulty Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008 
Expected Baseline survey, 





Overall Baseline survey, 
knowledge Fall 2008 
“How likely are each of the 
following scenarios; you will 
get a bachelor's degree” 
Presence or absence of 
“Academic Competitiveness 
Grant” 
“Classes are more difficult 
than I expected.” 
“For the career you most plan 
to have, how much money do 
you expect to make in a year?” 
“What is the difference between 
a grant and a loan?” “Which 
statement best describes the 
difference between a subsidized 
and unsubsidized loan?” And 
two series of questions about 
financial aid criteria and credit 
scores 
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement 
ACG was a federal grant 
indicating the student had 
completed rigorous high 
school coursework, based on 
an analysis of transcripts 
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement 
Fill in blank 
15 Items testing general 
financial literacy and specific 
financial aid knowledge (see 
notes for more) 
1 = Extremely likely 
1 = ACG present 
1 = Somewhat or strongly 
agree 
Logged earnings 



















   
   
 
Perceived Baseline survey, “How well do you think you 5-point Likert scale 1 = Very or extremely well 




Time horizon Baseline survey, “If you were guaranteed you $75 right now; $100 in 3 Coded as four binary variables 
Fall 2008 would receive the money, months; $250 in one year; ($75 right now omitted) 
which of the following options $500 in 3 years 
would you select right now?” 
Willingness to Baseline survey, “I am willing to sacrifi ce today 5-point Likert scale indicating 1 = Somewhat or strongly 
sacrifice Fall 2008 so that my life will be better agreement/disagreement agree 
tomorrow.” 
Generalized Baseline survey, “Is it ever okay to borrow Yes/no 1 = Yes 
debt aversion Fall 2008 money?” 
Self-control Baseline survey, “Being in debt is part of today's 5-point Likert scale indicating 1 = Somewhat or strongly 
Fall 2008 lifestyle.” “Taking out a loan is agreement/disagreement disagree with either statement 
a good thing because it allows 
you to enjoy life.” 
Internal locus of Baseline survey, “I am responsible for what 5-point Likert scale indicating 1 = Somewhat or strongly 
control Fall 2008 happens to me.” agreement/disagreement agree 
Work behaviors 
Worked in high Baseline survey, “When you were a high school Open-ended Coded 1= if any hours 
school Fall 2008 senior how many hours, on recorded 
average, did you work each 
week?” 
Currently Baseline survey, “Have you been working since Yes/no Coded 1 = yes 
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Table 10.1  (continued) 
Concept/measure Source Question wording (survey) Response categories Coding 
Number of Baseline survey, “In the last seven days how Open-ended Total number of hours recorded 
hours Fall 2008 many hours did you spend 
working working on-campus? Working 
off-campus?” 
Social capital 
FAFSA Baseline survey, “Who helped you fill out your Parent, sibling, spouse, No help; family (parent, 
assistance- Fall 2008 financial aid application? guidance counselor, friend, sibling spouse); other (friend, 
person Check all that apply.” someone else, no one (fi lled it guidance counselor, someone 
out myself) else) 
FAFSA Baseline survey, “Did the person who helped Yes/no Coded 1 = yes 
assistance- Fall 2008 you earn a college degree?” 
level of 
education 
Confi dent help Baseline survey, “How confident are you that, if 5-point Likert scale 1 = Very or extremely 
is available Fall 2008 faced with fi nancial problems, confident 
you could get help from other 
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Credits earned College transcripts 
by term 
On 4-year College transcripts Completed 90 credits within 
degree track by term 3 years 
Semesters Total number of terms enrolled 
enrolled 
Cumulative College transcript 
GPA 
NOTE: The data set includes a measure of religious preference and a measure of work centrality but both lack sufficient variation for inclusion. 
Measures of financial knowledge include A) In your opinion what is the difference between a grant and a loan? (i) Grant comes from Federal gov-
ernment, loans come from Wisconsin; (ii) A grant doesn’t have to be paid back; a loan has to be paid back; (iii) A grant has to be paid back but no 
interest is charged, a loan must be paid back and interest is charged. B) Which of the following describes the biggest difference between subsidized 
and unsubsidized Stafford Loans? (i) A subsidized loan does not charge interest, an unsubsidized loan charges interest, (ii) a subsidized loan is paid 
for by parents, an unsubsidized loan is paid off by students, (iii) a subsidized loan costs students more than an unsubsidized loan, (iv) a subsidized 
loan does not charge interest until the student leaves college, an unsubsidized loan begins to charge interest as soon as the student receives the loan. 
C) Agree/disagree: A government loan is a kind of fi nancial aid. D) Agree/disagree: The money students earn while working in college is used to 
calculate how much aid they get. E) Agree/disagree: If a student earns more than a certain amount from working, their fi nancial aid might be reduced.
F) Agree/disagree: Students receive the same amount of financial aid for every year they are in school. G) Agree/disagree: Students will receive the 
same amount of financial aid if they switch schools. H) Agree/disagree: Students who take time off from school will get the same amount of financial 
aid if/when they return. I) Which of the following factors are used to calculate credit scores? Check all that apply: number of jobs held, amount of 
existing debt, gender, whether payments were made on time, types of credit used, race/ethnicity, recent applications for credits cards or other loans. 
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It is worth noting that Avery and Turner (2012) hypothesize that 
the FAFSA is one of the greatest deterrents to loan taking, but in this 
sample we observe a substantial group of needy students who com-
plete the FAFSA and still decline all loans. Most students in the sample 
(87 percent) got assistance from a family member when completing 
the FAFSA for college, with about 42 percent getting assistance from a 
college-educated person. But only about one-third reported being con-
fident that they could obtain financial help if in trouble so as to avoid 
leaving college. Overall, about 70 percent of these students remained 
enrolled at their initial institution a year after they fi rst began. 
Table 10.2 also compares the characteristics of this sample to the 
characteristics of all students in the WSLS attending those same uni-
versities and colleges. There are some notable differences between the 
analytic sample and the overall WSLS sample, with the analytic sample 
being less racially diverse and by some measures more economically 
advantaged. These are important considerations when thinking about 
the generalizability of the results. 
Analysis 
We use blocked probit regressions with marginal effects to examine 
potential explanations for why students decline loans—we do this first 
using the administrative measure (Table 10.6) and then the survey mea-
sure (Table 10.7). We also use probit regression to examine the associa-
tion between loan aversion and college performance and retention. 
BORROWING BEHAVIORS AMONG PELL
GRANT RECIPIENTS 
Next, we describe the findings regarding the measurement of loan 
aversion, the characteristics of loan-averse students, and the charac-
teristics of institutions where loan-averse students are more or less 
prevalent. 
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Table 10.2  Descriptive Statistics by Sample Inclusion 
Analytic sample 
Characteristic Not in sample difference 
Female (%) 54.6 4.2 
(2.7) 
Race/ethnicity (%) 
Non-Hispanic white 69.4 5.1* 
(2.8) 
Latino 7.3 −1.8 
(1.5) 
Hmong (Southeast Asian) 10.0 −2.4 
(1.8) 
Native American 4.3 −1.3 
(1.2) 
Black 6.8 0.8 
(1.5) 
Parental education < bachelor’s degree (%) 78.6 0.9 
(2.5) 
Immigrant status 
First-generation (%) 6.9 −2.4* 
(1.4) 
Second-generation (%) 12.0 −2.5 
(2.0) 
English not first language (%) 12.4 −3.4* 
(1.9) 
Institutional cost 
Net price ($) 6,199 1,596*** 
(322) 
Family fi nancial strength 
Childhood poverty (%) 9.3 6.8*** 
(1.8) 
Expected family contribution ($) 1,447 280*** 
(107) 
Zero EFC (%) 35.0 −7.6*** 
(2.5) 
Financial reciprocity (%) 12.6 −1.4 
(2.0) 
Financial obligation to family (%) 34.5 −1.3 
(3.0) 
(continued) 
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Table 10.2  (continued) 
Analytic sample 
Characteristic Not in sample difference 
No financial help from family (%) 20.0 5.7** 
(2.6) 
Credit card debt ($) 107 54* 
(29) 
Perceived returns to degree 
Likely to complete bachelor’s degree (%) 51.6 1.5 
(3.2) 
ACT score 21.5 0.2 
(0.4) 
Strong high school coursework (%) 71.9 5.6 
(4.0) 
College diffi culty (%) 20.5 12.8 
(2.4) 
Expected monetary returns to degree ($) 60,362 438 
(3,725) 
Financial knowledge 
Overall knowledge 11.8 0.2 
(0.1) 
High financial knowledge (%) 59.5 3.8 
(3.1) 
Perceived financial competence (%) 42.8 1.7 
(3.1) 
Attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions 
Time horizon (%) 
$75 right now 22.5 −2.4 
(2.6) 
$100 in three months 16.2 −0.4 
(2.4) 
$250 in one year 16.1 0.4 
(2.3) 
$500 in three years 45.2 2.4 
(3.2) 
Willing to sacrifi ce (%) 76.1 7.8*** 
(2.6) 
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Table 10.2  (continued) 
Analytic sample 
Characteristic Not in sample difference 
Generalized debt aversion (%) 5.9 −0.1 
(1.4) 
Self-control (%) 79.7 −3.5 
(2.6) 
Internal locus of control (%) 94.5 2.8** 
(1.3) 
Work behaviors 
Worked in high school (%) 83.8 3.0 
(2.2) 
Currently working (%) 53.2 −0.2 
(3.2) 
Current number of hours working 8.6 −1.0 
(0.8) 
Social capital 
FAFSA assistance—type of person (%) 
No help—filled out alone 9.0 3.4* 
(1.9) 
Family 87.0 −3.0 
(2.2) 
Other person 14.3 −4.0* 
(2.1) 
FAFSA assistance from college-educated 42.3 0.2 
person (%) 
(3.1) 
Confident help is available (%) 34.5 3.3 
(3.0) 
Retention at initial college in year 2 (%) 69.5 2.8 
(2.5) 
Maximum sample size 880 684 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Loan 
aversion categories were defined in the following ways: 1) Administrative: If a student 
accepted none of his/her loan offer (if offered any). 2) Survey: If responded he/she 
would not take any money at a 7 percent interest rate. The sample includes students at 
included UW System campuses only. 
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1. 
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Measurement 
As noted earlier, most research on loan aversion has been conducted 
using either in-depth interviews or surveys. Measuring loan aversion 
in this way inherently relies on student self-reports of attitudes and/or 
behaviors and does not capture their actual behaviors. For this reason, 
we begin with a simple analysis triangulating how these two sources of 
data align when it comes to classifying students as loan averse. In total, 
48 percent of the sample is loan averse according to either the survey or 
the administrative measures. The survey measure classifies 401 of stu-
dents as loan averse, while the administrative measure applies that label 
to just 128 students. As Table 10.3 indicates, we find that the correlation 
between the survey and administrative measures is weak (r = 0.21) and 
aligned for only 64 percent of the sample, with 52 percent agreement 
that a student is not loan averse, and 12 percent agreement that the stu-
dent is loan averse. Fully 29 percent of the sample would be classified 
as loan averse using the survey measure, even though in practice they 
accepted loans. In addition, 7 percent of students who said they would 
not borrow loans according to the survey did accept loans according to 
the administrative data. While these differences could be explained by 
other factors (for example, students might report not wanting to take 
loans but do it anyway), and therefore this evidence is not suffi cient to 
record these as “misclassifications,” the apparent disconnect is worthy 
of further investigation. 
It is possible that some students who expressed loan aversion on 
the survey may have done so because they had already accepted loans 
and did not (or could not) want to borrow more. Nearly 72 percent of 
students whom according to the survey might be loan averse do appear 
Table 10.3  Relationship between Survey and Administrative Data 
Measures of Loan Aversion 
Administrative data (%) 
Survey data Borrower Loan averse 
Borrower 52 7 
Loan averse 29 12 
NOTE: Total sample size = 684; percentaged according to that total R = 0.213. 
SOURCE: Survey data are from the fall WSLS, and administrative data are from the 
University of Wisconsin system. 
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to be in this category, suggesting that loan aversion using survey data 
may be overstated. On the other hand, the survey classified about 7 
percent of students as willing to accept loans, even though the adminis-
trative data indicate that they refused the loans they were offered. This 
may be because students regretted the decision to refuse loans and were 
expressing on the survey a wish to take them, or because on the survey 
the students meant they would take them, but not right now or not under 
the conditions in which they were offered. 
Given the indication of apparently substantial measurement error 
present when loan aversion is measured using survey data, we take 
additional steps in the next analyses to consider which students may be 
mislabeled as loan averse when only survey data are used. 
Student-Level Differences in Borrowing 
Table 10.4 displays the differences in characteristics between loan-
averse students and borrowers using both the administrative data mea-
sure of loan aversion and the survey measure of loan aversion. The 
overall trends in student characteristics are consistent with most prior 
research. We find that Southeast Asian students (predominately Hmong 
in this sample) are greatly overrepresented among loan-averse students, 
while African Americans are substantially overrepresented among loan 
takers. Both first- and second-generation immigrants and students for 
whom English is not spoken at home are far more likely to be loan 
averse. In this sample of students from low-income families, where 
almost 80 percent of students do not have at least one parent with a 
bachelor’s degree, more parental education seems to lead to less loan 
aversion. Students facing higher net prices were also less likely to be 
loan averse. 
Notably, students from families with less financial strength are 
more often loan averse. This is also more common among students who 
grew up in poverty or have lower expected family contributions, and 
among those who report that their families do not provide monetary 
support for their college education and yet feel obligated to financially 
support their family while in college. 
We hypothesized that students who perceive stronger returns to 
their degrees would be more likely to borrow for college, but we find 




















   
   
 
348   
Table 10.4  Descriptive Statistics by Borrowing Behavior
Admin. sample Survey sample Test for 
measurement 
Loan averse Loan averse difference             
Characteristic Borrowers difference Borrowers difference (p-value) 
Demographics 
Female (%) 57.8 5.6 59.8 −2.4 0.167 
(5.2) (4.1) 
Race/ethnicity (%) 
Non-Hispanic White 76.4 −10.9** 74.9 −0.9 0.051 
(4.8) (3.5) 
Latino 5.1 2.5 5.8 −0.7 0.262 
(2.6) (1.8) 
Hmong (Southeast Asian) 5.3 13.5*** 5.2 5.9*** 0.032 
(3.7) (2.2) 
Native American 2.9 0.6 2.8 0.6 0.992 
(2.0) (1.4) 
Black 8.4 −4.8*** 9.0 −3.5* 0.622 
(1.8) (2.0) 
Parental education < bachelor’s degree (%) 79.9 −2.4 80.8 −3.4 0.858 
(4.4) (3.3) 
Immigrant status 
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Second-generation (%) 
















Net price ($) 
Family fi nancial strength 
Childhood poverty (%) 
Expected family contribution ($) 
Zero EFC (%) 
Financial reciprocity (%) 
Financial obligation to family (%) 
No financial help from family (%) 
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Table 10.4  (continued) 
Admin. sample Survey sample Test for 
measurement 
Loan averse Loan averse difference             
Characteristic Borrowers difference Borrowers difference (p-value) 
Perceived returns to degree 
Likely to complete bachelor’s degree (%) 53.5 −1.9 53.2 −0.2 0.774 
(5.3) (4.1) 
ACT score 21.8 −0.7 21.5 0.5 0.014 
(0.4) (0.3) 
Strong high school coursework (%) 78.9 −8.1* 75.9 3.8 0.020 
(4.6) (3.4) 
College diffi culty (%) 34.1 −4.1 37.7 −10.4*** 0.253 
(4.8) (3.8) 
Expected monetary returns to degree ($) 61,510 −4,228 60,844 −108 0.487 
(4,306) (4,442) 
Financial knowledge 
Overall knowledge 12.0 −0.2 12.0 0.0 0.280 
(0.2) (0.2) 
Above average financial knowledge (%) 63.2 0.8 62.1 3.0 0.702 
(5.2) (4.0) 




















   
   
 
Attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions 
Time horizon (%) 
$75 right now 













$250 in one year 
$500 in three years 
Willing to sacrifi ce (%) 
Generalized debt aversion (%) 
Self-control (%) 














































Worked in high school (%) 
Currently working (%) 
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Table 10.4  (continued) 
Admin. sample Survey sample Test for 
measurement 
Loan averse Loan averse difference             
Characteristic Borrowers difference Borrowers difference (p-value) 
Social capital 
FAFSA assistance—type of person (%) 
No help—filled out alone 12.7 −1.6 11.9 1.3 0.493 
(3.4) (2.8) 
Family 84.6 −3.5 84.9 −2.1 0.767 
(4.0) (3.0) 
Other person 8.7 9.4** 10.4 −0.2 0.018 
(3.9) (2.4) 
FAFSA assistance from college-educated 42.0 2.8 40.0 6.0 0.587 
person (%) (5.2) (4.1) 
Confident help is available (%) 38.1 −1.8 32.8 12.0*** 0.016 
(5.1) (4.0) 
Retention at initial college in year 2 (%) 76.2 0.6 72.1 10.2*** 0.055 
(4.4) (3.4) 
Sample size 556 128 401 283 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Difference = difference in means between borrowers and 
loan-averse students. Loan aversion categories were defined in the following ways: Administrative: If a student accepted none of his/her 
loan offer (if offered any). Survey: If responded he/she would not take any money at a 7 percent interest rate. The sample includes UW
System administrative consenters with both survey and administrative data on loan aversion. 
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1. 
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stronger academic preparation and greater expected earnings are more 
likely to borrow. However, unexpectedly, students who find college 
more difficult are also more likely to borrow. 
Perhaps most remarkable given current policy efforts, we find no 
statistically significant evidence that financial knowledge is related to 
borrowing behaviors among these low-income students. There is some 
indication that students who perceived themselves as financially com-
petent were more loan averse, but the finding is sensitive to how loan 
aversion is measured and cannot be said to differ from zero. Thus, it 
does not appear that increasing the financial education of these students 
would alter their borrowing behavior. 
Also contrary to prior studies, we find that in this sample of Pell 
Grant recipients, loan aversion is associated with a longer time horizon. 
The vast majority of students (about 84 percent) reported a willingness 
to sacrifice today for tomorrow, and while this did not differ for loan-
averse students, those who were averse to loans were far more likely to 
choose to receive $500 in three years rather than a smaller amount of 
money sooner. It seems these students may forgo the short-term need 
for resources for what they perceive as a better deal in the future (hav-
ing less debt). This is consistent with the finding that students with self-
control are also overrepresented among loan-averse students. 
Loan aversion appears to be offset by the decision to work dur-
ing college. While not statistically significant, results indicate that stu-
dents who worked in high school are more likely to borrow, while those 
working in college are less likely to borrow. 
Finally, there is some evidence that the form of social capital held 
by students relates to their loan aversion. Students who believe they can 
get financial help if they need it are less likely to borrow, as are students 
who got help from someone other than a family member when apply-
ing for college. In other words, they may have additional supports that 
either help them perceive that loans are unnecessary or are inadvisable. 
The measure used to define loan aversion generally does not seem to 
affect the description of who is loan averse and who is a borrower, with 
a few exceptions. First, and most importantly, if students are classified 
as loan averse using the survey data, then non-Hispanic white students 
are equally represented among loan takers and nontakers. However, if 
loan aversion is measured with administrative data, non-Hispanic white 
students are substantially overrepresented among loan takers. Also, the 
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degree of loan aversion is much larger among Southeast Asian students 
when measured using administrative records compared to surveys. It is 
also possible that the survey and administrative measures may capture 
somewhat different aspects of loan aversion—for example, students 
may be more likely to decline loans in their first semester of college 
because they can gain support from their families while still expressing 
a desire to avoid taking on additional loans. 
While the differences are not statistically significant, the trends 
regarding gender point in opposite directions using different data 
sources. Relying on the survey measure, women are more loan averse 
than men, but relying on the administrative measure, men are more 
averse than women. 
The measurement of loan aversion has implications for some of 
these differences. For example, when aversion is assessed using the 
survey measure, it appears that borrowing is unrelated to whether a 
student is non-Hispanic white, has a lower expected family contribu-
tion, the family does not contribute to their education, or the number 
of hours they are working. However, if the administrative data is used 
to measure loan aversion, we find that non-Hispanic white students are 
more likely to borrow, as are students with higher EFCs, while stu-
dents whose families do not support them and who work longer hours 
are more loan averse. The strength of the relationships between student 
characteristics and loan aversion also vary widely according to how 
aversion is measured. 
Institutional Level 
Financial aid administrators at the colleges and universities initiate 
the process of borrowing for students, and students’ decisions are made 
in the context of their campus affordability climates (Goldrick-Rab 
and Kendall 2013). For this reason, we next explore how loan-taking 
behaviors varied according to the specific college or university students 
attended. Table 10.5 reveals that the percentage of loan-averse students 
varies substantially across these Wisconsin institutions, ranging from 
just 7.8 percent at the most selective institution (University B) to 38.8 
percent at the two-year branch campuses.12 These differences correlate 
with the academic abilities of students (the correlation between ACT





















   
   
 
Table 10.5  Distribution of Borrowing Behavior (Measured Using Administrative Data) by Campus and Selectivity 
Loan averse ACT ACT Net price % Graduation Default Retention % 
Campus (%) 25 75 ($) Pell rate rate rate minority 
UW colleges 38.8 18 23 4,566 24 20 8.5 82.0 9.1 
Four-year 15.7 
Most selective 
University A 8.3 23 26 6,266 17 69 2.2 83.9 6.8 
University B 7.8 26 30 6,246 12 81 1.4 93.8 12.8 
Total 8.0 
Somewhat selective 
University C 11.9 20 24 6,779 21 51 3.5 75.8 7.4 
University D 9.1 20 25 6,225 25 56 4.5 74.0 5.0 
University E 16.7 20 24 6,418 22 55 4.2 74.9 5.9 
University F 9.8 21 25 6,474 25 61 3.8 78.4 5.8 
University G 10.0 20 24 4,657 38 41 9.2 71.6 7.0 
University H 10.9 20 24 5,506 20 56 4.5 78.0 9.5 
Total 11.1 
Least selective 
University I 18.7 19 24 8,578 23 43 5.7 73.3 17.0 
University J 35.9 18 23 7,940 32 27 10.4 64.3 22.8 
Total 24.5 
NOTE: All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Selectivity categories are based on retention rates and ACT scores. All institu-
tional characteristics are from the 2008–2009 academic year, except student loan default rates, which are for the FY 2009 cohort. The 
net price listed is for the lowest-income students ($0–$30,000 per year family income). Student loan default rates listed here are over a 
three-year period. Institutions are not named consistent with the WSLS data agreement. 
SOURCE: University of Wisconsin System campus aid officers (loan offers and acceptances); IPEDS (percent Pell, ACT, grad rate, and 
net price); U.S. Department of Education (default rate); UW System Fact Book (retention rate and percent minority). 
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with the institution’s sticker price and available fi nancial aid—many 
other institutions have similar net prices but different rates of loan aver-
sion. It is also worth noting the range of students rejecting part of their 
loans—this is again most uncommon at selective institutions, but it is 
most common among three of the somewhat selective universities, and 
this is not easily explained by examining the characteristics of those 
institutions. 
Focusing on the 10 universities, the highest rates of loan aversion 
are evident at the least selective schools, where students have the lowest 
ACT scores and graduation rates, face the highest net prices and high-
est default rates, and where the proportion of students on campus from 
racial/ethnic minority backgrounds and/or receiving the Pell Grant are 
among the highest. The lowest rates of loan aversion are found at the 
most selective institutions enrolling the smallest fraction of Pell recipi-
ents on their campuses, and where default rates are exceptionally low 
and graduation rates are exceptionally high. This suggests the possi-
bility that either the institutional context in which students make their 
decisions about loans may contribute to their decisions, and/or these 
variations reflect strong sorting processes of borrowers across schools. 
Again, this merits future investigation. 
EXPLAINING LOAN AVERSION 
We now examine whether the observed differences in loan aver-
sion discussed above persist when taking multiple differences among 
students into account. We also consider whether the observed demo-
graphic differences in loan aversion can be explained by the hypoth-
esized moderating factors described earlier. Finally, we consider the 
variation in explanatory power of these factors, depending on how loan 
aversion is measured. 
Multivariate Analyses 
Net of a wide range of individual characteristics and controlling for 
the institution attended, the analysis of loan aversion measured using 








Making Sense of Loan Aversion: Evidence from Wisconsin  357 
survey data reveals that black students are far more likely than non-
Hispanic white students to borrow, and second-generation immigrants 
are much more likely than native students to borrow as well (see Table 
10.6). Loan-averse students do not view debt as part of today’s lifestyle 
and are unwilling to borrow to pay for a nicer lifestyle now. At the 
same time, they are also more likely to have been assisted by a college-
educated person when completing the FAFSA, and to feel that they can 
find financial help if they need it in order to avoid having to drop out 
of college. Unexpectedly, students who fi nd college more difficult are 
more likely to borrow—and this is after taking into account differences 
in their academic preparation and work behaviors. It may be that stu-
dents who find college more difficult are more realistic and/or aware of 
their academic challenges, and thus are borrowing loans to free them-
selves to focus on school. 
This same analysis also suggests that black and non-Hispanic 
white students vary in how they view debt (termed “self control” in the 
tables), and once that variation is accounted for, black students are more 
likely than non-Hispanic white students to borrow.13 This relationship 
is strengthened after additional differences in work behavior and social 
capital are leveled. Similarly, second-generation immigrant students 
appear more likely than native students to view college as diffi cult, and 
once that difference is ameliorated, differences in immigrant status in 
loan taking appear more prominent. It is notable that first-generation 
immigrants appear somewhat more loan averse than native students, 
while second-generation immigrants are far less loan averse. 
In sharp contrast, the same analyses using administrative data to 
measure loan aversion fail to identify any statistically signifi cant rela-
tionships between these theoretically important factors and loan aver-
sion (see Table 10.7). Using the exact same sample of students but 
measuring aversion as declining a loan offered, none of the observed 
disparities in borrowing behavior (such as those indicated in the admin-
istrative data panel of Table 10.3) persist net of other factors. This may 
be attributable to the much smaller number of students classified as 
loan averse using the administrative measure, which requires students 
to decline loans in a specific term (the same term in which the sur-
vey was fielded). If the estimates were more precise and the observed 
coefficients held, we might observe some similar patterns to the survey 
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Table 10.6  Predicting Loan Aversion Using Student Characteristics: Survey Data 
Dependent variable: Declined to accept any money in hypothetical loans 
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Female 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.006 −0.004 0.001 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Latino −0.009 −0.020 −0.038 −0.065 −0.077 −0.072 
(0.106) (0.103) (0.101) (0.098) (0.095) (0.096) 
Hmong (Southeast Asian) 0.097 0.127 0.186 0.098 0.094 0.130 
(0.167) (0.175) (0.179) (0.177) (0.180) (0.182) 
Native American −0.006 0.029 0.016 0.057 0.064 0.100 
(0.148) (0.157) (0.155) (0.154) (0.159) (0.164) 
Black −0.137* −0.139* −0.176** −0.176** −0.186** −0.183** 
(0.077) (0.082) (0.079) (0.075) (0.076) (0.072) 
Parental education < bachelor’s degree −0.085 −0.091 −0.079 −0.077 −0.075 −0.031 
(0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) 
First-generation immigrant 0.241 0.244 0.233 0.119 0.133 0.145 
(0.167) (0.179) (0.186) (0.178) (0.180) (0.179) 
Second-generation immigrant −0.120 −0.147 −0.153 −0.173** −0.169** −0.161* 
(0.101) (0.098) (0.093) (0.084) (0.086) (0.085) 
English not fi rst language −0.006 0.045 0.021 0.177 0.167 0.164 
(0.156) (0.164) (0.160) (0.174) (0.175) (0.176) 
Net price ($000s) −0.034 −0.037 −0.038 −0.037 −0.038 −0.037 




















   






Financial obligation to family 
No financial help from family 
Credit card debt ($000s) 
Extremely likely to complete BA 
ACT score 
Strong high school coursework (%) 
College difficulty 
Expected earnings from college (log $) 
— −0.020 −0.027 −0.034 −0.052 −0.043 
— (0.067) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) 
— 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.015 
— (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029) 
— 0.063 0.079 0.048 0.052 0.060 
— (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.078) (0.076) 
— −0.020 −0.021 −0.046 −0.074 −0.040 
— (0.083) (0.08) (0.076) (0.075) (0.078) 
— 0.047 0.070 0.078 0.076 0.081 
— (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) 
— −0.035 −0.039 −0.044 −0.039 0.001 
— (0.058) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.061) 
— −0.173 −0.148 −0.153 −0.156 −0.160 
— (0.153) (0.165) (0.190) (0.189) (0.209) 
— 0.005 0.001 −0.011 −0.010 −0.036 
— (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
— — 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 
— — (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
— — −0.109 −0.099 −0.099 −0.106 
— — (0.076) (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) 
— — −0.150*** −0.157*** −0.155*** −0.158*** 
— — (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
— — −0.050 −0.049 −0.042 −0.038 
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Table 10.6  (continued) 
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Financial knowledge (0–15) — — −0.001 0.003 0.003 0.006 
— — (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Above avg fi nancial knowledge — — −0.046 −0.071 −0.077 −0.088 
— — (0.090) (0.090) (0.092) (0.092) 
Perceived fi nancial competence — — 0.062 0.040 0.040 0.039 
— — (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) 
Time horizon: $100 in 3 months — — — 0.045 0.040 0.021 
— — — (0.085) (0.086) (0.085) 
Time horizon: $250 in 1 year — — — −0.077 −0.077 −0.093 
— — — (0.072) (0.074) (0.070) 
Time horizon: $500 in 3 years — — — 0.069 0.070 0.044 
— — — (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) 
Willing to sacrifice today for tomorrow — — — −0.001 −0.012 0.005 
— — — (0.077) (0.080) (0.077) 
Generalized debt aversion — — — 0.139 0.138 0.182 
— — — (0.125) (0.126) (0.127) 
Self-control — — — 0.146*** 0.135** 0.132** 
— — — (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) 
Internal locus of control — — — −0.030 −0.002 −0.038 
— — — (0.183) (0.177) (0.184) 
Worked in high school — — — — −0.028 −0.027 
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Currently working — — — — 0.097 0.084 
— — — — (0.073) (0.073) 
Number of hours currently working — — — — 0.000 0.001 
— — — — (0.004) (0.004) 
Family helped on FAFSA — — — — — 0.002 
— — — — — (0.071) 
Other person helped on FAFSA — — — — — −0.114* 
— — — — — (0.069) 
FAFSA help from college-educated person — — — — — 0.095* 
— — — — — (0.052) 
Could get financial help if needed — — — — — 0.106* 
— — — — — (0.056) 
F-value 2.58 2.27 2.40 2.20 2.06 2.01 
Sample size 472 472 472 472 472 472 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. A missing data flag for childhood poverty is included in the model but not reported (not sig-
nificant). The regression also controls for college fixed effects. All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The coefficients are the result of a probit model with marginal effects. 
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Table 10.7  Predicting Loan Aversion Using Student Characteristics: Administrative Data 
Dependent variable: Declined to accept any loans, if offered. 
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Female 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.007 0.009 0.006 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) 
Latino 0.007 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.004 
(0.018) (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.010) 
Hmong (Southeast Asian) 0.035 0.077 0.081 0.084 0.083 0.064 
(0.052) (0.090) (0.094) (0.096) (0.100) (0.078) 
Native American 0.006 0.015 0.020 0.015 0.028 0.014 
(0.020) (0.034) (0.037) (0.030) (0.045) (0.026) 
Black −0.010 −0.014 −0.014 −0.010 −0.010 −0.007 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
Parental education < bachelor’s degree −0.010 −0.011 −0.011 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
First-generation immigrant 0.016 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.013 0.011 
(0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.027) (0.021) 
Second-generation immigrant −0.000 −0.005 −0.004 −0.007 −0.005 −0.004 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
English not fi rst language 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.003 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) 
Net price ($000s) −0.003 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 




















   





Financial obligation to family 
No financial help from family 
Credit card debt ($000s) 
Extremely likely to complete BA 
ACT score 
Strong high school coursework (%) 
College difficulty 
Expected earnings from college (log $) 
Financial knowledge (0–15) 
— (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
— −0.007 −0.007 −0.006 −0.006 −0.008 
— (0.042) (0.054) (0.051) (0.050) (0.041) 
— −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002 
— (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
— 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.004 
— (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
— 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
— (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
— 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.007 
— (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
— −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
— (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) 
— 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.008 
— (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
— — 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
— — (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
— — −0.002 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005 
— — (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
— — −0.006 −0.004 −0.005 −0.003 
— — (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
— — −0.015 −0.012 −0.010 −0.008 
— — (0.105) (0.091) (0.085) (0.065) 
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Table 10.7  (continued) 
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
— — (0.030) (0.023) (0.030) (0.019) 
Above average fi nancial knowledge — — 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.007 
— — (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) 
Perceived fi nancial competence — — 0.002 0.000 0.001 −0.000 
— — (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Time horizon: $100 in 3 months — — — 0.004 0.007 0.005 
— — — (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
Time horizon: $250 in 1 year — — — 0.021 0.025 0.019 
— — — (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) 
Time horizon: $500 in 3 years — — — 0.018 0.018 0.013 
— — — (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) 
Willing to sacrifice today for tomorrow — — — 0.007 0.006 0.004 
— — — (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Generalized debt aversion — — — −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 
— — — (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Self-control — — — 0.003 0.003 0.002 
— — — (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Internal locus of control — — — 0.007 0.005 0.004 
— — — (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
Worked in high school — — — — 0.001 0.002 
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Currently working — — — — −0.009 −0.008 
— — — — (0.010) (0.009) 
Number of hours currently working — — — — 0.001 0.001 
— — — — (0.007) (0.005) 
Family helped on FAFSA — — — — — 0.003 
— — — — — (0.005) 
Other person helped on FAFSA — — — — — −0.003 
— — — — — (0.005) 
FAFSA help from college-educated person — — — — — −0.001 
— — — — — (0.004) 
Could get financial help if needed — — — — — 0.007 
— — — — — (0.008) 
F-value 3.33 2.65 2.80 2.46 2.22 2.00 
Sample size 472 472 472 472 472 472 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. A missing data flag for childhood poverty is included in the model, but not reported (not 
significant). The regression also controls for college fixed effects. All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The coefficients are the result of a probit model with marginal effects. 
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1. 
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LOAN AVERSION AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 
There are many mechanisms through which aversion to borrowing 
could affect educational outcomes, which could include both positive 
and negative pathways. For example, loan aversion may mean that stu-
dents work harder and invest more energy in school to finish faster. Or it 
may mean that students must attend school part-time in order to afford 
college (Cunningham and Santiago 2008). The most important issue, 
however, is that selection into loan aversion is likely to bias the esti-
mates of impacts. In other words, if loan-averse students are more often 
from families with less overall financial stability, this may overstate the 
negative impact of aversion for educational outcomes. In the present 
analysis we are not able to adequately remove potential biases result-
ing from unobserved characteristics of both students and their schools, 
which correlate both with loan aversion and the chances of college per-
sistence. Thus, our results are best thought of as correlational. 
The way in which loan aversion is measured has implications for 
whether or not it is associated with retention to the second year of col-
lege. As Table 10.8 indicates, if aversion is measured using survey data, 
we find that loan-averse students are 10 percentage points more likely to 
persist in college to their second year, whereas using the administrative 
data we observe no relationship whatsoever. But, net of other observ-
able characteristics, borrowers outperform loan-averse students, enroll-
ing for more semesters, earning more credits, and higher grade point 
averages. The results based on the administrative data indicate that bor-
rowers had somewhat weaker outcomes than loan-averse students with 
regard to enrollment each term and earned a slightly lower cumulative 
grade point average (see Table 10.8). 
DISCUSSION 
Many of our descriptive findings echo those produced by Cunning-
ham and Santiago’s (2008) analysis of the 2003–2004 NPSAS data, 
confirming racial/ethnic variation in loan aversion, for example.14 This 
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Table 10.8  Academic Outcomes by Borrowing 
Administrative data measure Survey measure 
Regressions Regressions 
Measure Loan averse Unadjusted Covariate-adjusted Loan averse Unadjusted Covariate-adjusted 












95.7 −0.5 −0.2 94.4 3.4** 4.2** 
(2.1) (3.1) (1.5) (2.0) 
82.4 0.2 −4.8 78.1 10.5*** 8.9*** 
(3.9) (3.9) (2.9) (3.1) 
76.2 1.4 −1.8 73.5 9.0*** 6.9** 
(4.5) (4.8) (3.4) (3.5) 
70.9 0.2 −3.2 66.9 10.2*** 9.3** 
(4.8) (5.8) (3.7) (4.1) 
70.6 −2.5 −8.3 65.4 7.8** 5.1 
(4.8) (6.2) (3.8) (4.4) 
64.8 2.0 −1.8 63.7 6.3*** 4.6** 
(2.9) (3.1) (2.2) (2.1) 
18.3 5.3 2.5 22.8 −0.2 −2.2 
(4.2) (5.2) (3.5) (3.8) 
4.96 −0.07 −0.18 4.78 0.41*** 0.31** 
(0.17) (0.19) (0.13) (0.12) 
2.58 −0.05 −0.22*** 2.42 0.26*** 0.23*** 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
128 684 678 401 684 678 
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Standard errors are in parentheses. OLS is 
used for continuous outcomes, while a probit model with marginal effects is used for binary outcomes. Covariate-adjusted estimates 
include race, gender, parental education, age, EFC, total grants accepted, and campus fixed effects.  
SOURCE: University of Wisconsin System. 
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dents all received grant aid and attended college full time initially, fac-
tors that the authors found were associated with lower rates of loan 
aversion. However, our data and methods allowed us to dig deeper into 
both the accuracy of the assessment of loan aversion and the meaning 
of it. In particular, the additional examination of variation in borrow-
ing behaviors according to immigration status and language spoken at 
home highlights some additional reasons to attend to variation in bor-
rowing behaviors. The fastest growing segments of the undergraduate 
populations, especially at public two-year colleges, appear more disin-
clined to borrow. 
Our analysis is consistent with recent research suggesting that 
declining student loans may not be irrational, but rather refl ect students’
and their families’ tastes for commitment and preference for making do 
without debt (Cadena and Keys 2013). Students who borrow may not 
share these preferences or may find them outweighed by other needs, 
and they are more likely to find themselves having difficulty in college. 
We find complementary evidence from in-depth interviews conducted 
for the same study with a focal sample of 50 WSLS participants inter-
viewed repeatedly over a fi ve-year period. One student refused to bor-
row, putting great emphasis on his selection of a roommate who would 
support his choices to maximize his time spent working, minimize the 
time spent on leisure, live frugally, and focus on school. Another stu-
dent was far less focused, trying to attend to every relationship in her 
life at the same time, prioritizing school, family, boyfriend, and work to 
the detriment of her physical and mental health, which ultimately drove 
her to take on loans shortly before dropping out of school. 
Perhaps the greatest lesson from this study, however, is that the 
measurement of loan aversion affects conclusions about which students 
refuse to borrow and why. Most studies of loan aversion rely on student 
surveys, which this chapter suggests may overstate the prevalence of 
antiborrowing attitudes. This could mean that loan aversion is less com-
mon than previously estimated. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that the apparent disconnect between students’ preferences and their 
actions does not reveal an inconsistency but rather points to constrained 
choices. It may be that students are borrowing when they prefer not 
to, which could contribute to negative outcomes of borrowing down 
the road. An increasing debt burden held by individuals who strongly 
preferred not to have debt could also have public policy implications. 
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It is possible that these debt holders will push for a policy solution that 
helps reduce the burden immediately after leaving college. Research by 
Ozymy (2012) suggests that lower-income college students are more 
likely to contact their elected officials regarding student loans than 
higher-income students, and self-interest is the likely reason. This could 
result in accelerating the shift in policy toward income-based repay-
ment options from fixed repayment options. 
Limitations 
While this study has several strengths, including the use of multiple 
forms of data to measure loan aversion, detailed information on stu-
dents’ attitudes and behaviors, and the ability to connect loan aversion 
to educational outcomes, it also suffers some significant limitations. 
First and most importantly, the sample is constrained to a fraction of 
all Wisconsin Pell recipients, who likely differ in key ways from the 
national population of such students. Second, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether observed measurement differences in loan aversion are attrib-
utable to the difference between stated preferences and actual behavior, 
timing, or something else. Third, the analyses are relatively small in 
size, limiting statistical power. 
Implications and Future Research 
There is a critical question looming large and unanswered in this 
analysis, essential for how readers think about next steps: Is loan aver-
sion a concern? Some will readily answer yes, thinking that deciding 
not to borrow means that students will be worse off in the long run if 
borrowing would have increased their chances of degree completion 
compared to the alternatives. Loan-averse students, in other words, may 
have a reduced risk of being burdened with unmanageable debt, while 
also increasing their chances of college dropout and reducing their 
expected lifetime earnings. 
On the other hand, there are additional opportunity costs that accrue 
to some students, including those who are most often loan averse. The 
typical calculation for assessing whether debt is manageable and opti-
mal compared to the returns to college relies on a comparison to a stu-
dent’s future earnings. Debt to future earnings ratios are most often the 
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focus of calculations regarding the appropriateness of loans. However, 
not only do students from low-income families face more constrained 
labor markets and employment discrimination than other students, 
thus lowering their projected future earnings, but they also come from 
families with more existing debt and greater fi nancial need—meaning 
that a portion of their future earnings are often already committed to 
their families, as a form of familial debt (Burton 2007). Thus it may be 
more appropriate to focus on debt to household ratio when assessing the 
rationality of loan aversion, and include a student’s natal family (and 
even extended kin network) in that household calculation. 
Today, nearly one in five households has student debt—double the 
share of two decades earlier—with an average balance of more than 
$26,000. While higher education advocates are right to point out that 
college is a good investment, and the price of a new sedan is comparable, 
they miss a critical point: poor families owe 24 percent of their house-
hold income to student debt, compared to 7 percent or less for families 
making more than $60,000 a year (Fry 2012). While the amount of 
debt may be relatively similar across levels of family income, its mean-
ing is quite different. With such a differential impact on poor families, 
loan aversion may be a smart decision. The relevant lack of aversion, in 
other words, could also be viewed as problematic. 
In the future, researchers should think about ways to increase the 
precision of how we measure loan-taking decisions (using both sur-
veys and administrative data) so that it becomes possible to intervene 
to facilitate student decisions consistent with their own preferences and 
intentions. It would also be useful to conduct detailed mixed-method 
ethnographic studies of students and low-income families to examine 
how decisions about loan taking affect the degree to which higher edu-
cation helps to increase their social mobility or perpetuates their eco-
nomic struggles. 
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Notes 
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Great Lakes Higher Education Guaranty 
Corporation, Institute for Research on Poverty, Spencer Foundation, William T. Grant 
Foundation, Wisconsin Center for the Advancement of Postsecondary Education, and 
an anonymous donor provided funding for this study, conducted in partnership with 
the Fund for Wisconsin Scholars, the Higher Educational Aids Board, the University 
of Wisconsin System, and the Wisconsin Technical College System. The authors thank 
Allie Gardner and Kaja Rebane for their help and support. All mistakes reside with 
the authors. Contact the lead author at srab@education.wisc.edu with questions and 
comments. 
1. A small fraction of students attend colleges that do not participate in the Title IV
financial aid program (these are mainly for-profit institutions), or colleges that 
decline to offer loans (most often community colleges and/or minority serving 
institutions). 
2. Estimates vary; one recent study suggests that overall about one in six students at 
public and private four-year colleges and universities declines the entirety of the 
subsidized loans offered to them (Cadena and Keys 2013). 
3. While some argue that the relevant ratio is debt-to-postgraduation income, it is 
important to recognize that among low-income families, money is often shared— 
that is, children continue to contribute to their families postgraduation and receive 
little financial assistance in return—and students more often reside in areas with 
fewer employment opportunities and lower wages. 
4. The latest NPSAS was just released but is unavailable at the time of this writing 
because of the government shutdown. 
5. Samples in this chapter are too small to examine differential patterns according to 
loan subsidization. 
6. Net price is the difference between the institution’s cost of attendance (the sticker 
price, including tuition, fees, room and board, and all other estimated costs) and 
all grant aid students receive. The net price thus includes the family’s expected 
contribution (officially calculated by a federal formula) and all funds they are left 
to earn or borrow to pay for college. 
7. The lead author directs the Wisconsin Scholars Longitudinal Study (WSLS), and 
more details about the study can be found at www.finaidstudy.org and in Goldrick-
Rab et al. (2012). All data included in this analysis were collected over a five-year 
period by the WSLS research team. 
8. Interest rates on unsubsidized Stafford Loans have been fixed at 6.8 percent from 
2006–07 to 2012–13. The interest rate on subsidized Stafford Loans declined from 
6.8 to 6.0 percent for loans issued in 2008–09, 5.6 percent in 2009–10, 4.5 percent 
in 2010–11, and 3.4 percent in 2011–12 and 2012–13. It remains 3.4 percent for 
the 2012–13 academic year. Beginning July 1, 2013, all interest rates are tied to 
the 10-year Treasury note. 
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9. Subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford Loans carry different repayment protec-
tions. Today, under Income-Based Repayment, the government will pay the inter-
est for up to three years for borrowers whose incomes are too low to cover interest 
payments on their subsidized loans, but this is not the case for unsubsidized Staf-
ford Loans. 
10. We thank Dr. Stephen DesJardins for noting in his published papers that requesting 
loan offers when obtaining financial aid data is essential to exploring fi nancial aid 
packages and their impacts. 
11. We also considered defining a student as loan averse if s/he declined at least half 
of all of the loans offered. The correlation between the two measures was weaker 
(0.16), which is unsurprising, since the survey measure required rejection of all 
loans offered. We also considered categorizing a student as loan averse if s/he 
declined all unsubsidized loans, since the interest rate in the survey question was 
more consistent with these. The correlation between the survey and administrative 
measures this way was 0.28, suggesting that at least some students thought of the 
survey question as regarding that type of loan. However, we have a much smaller 
sample of those students compared to all students offered any loans, and declining 
subsidized loans is a behavior worth examining, so we focus on that larger sample 
here. 
12. Consistent with the WSLS data agreement, universities are not named here. 
13. In analyses not shown, we also find that students from three of the poorest areas in 
the state—Milwaukee, Kenosha, and Racine—are more loan averse. 
14. Cunningham and Santiago (2008) found more aversion among Chinese and Viet-
namese students, while we identified substantial aversion among Hmong students. 
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The Institute for College Access and Success 
The need for higher education and training has never been as impor-
tant to individuals and our economy as it is today, yet its affordability 
is seriously in question. College costs have skyrocketed, as family 
incomes and state funding for public higher education have declined, 
leading millions to take on student debt, drop out, or struggle to keep 
up with classes while working many hours per week to pay the bills. 
Even after recent significant increases, the maximum Pell Grant today 
covers the smallest share of the cost of attending a public college since 
the start of the program 40 years ago. It should be no surprise that the 
gaps in college enrollment, persistence, and graduation between stu-
dents from high- and low-income families have widened over the last 
30 years, threatening both the American Dream and our nation’s eco-
nomic competitiveness. 
Although these gaps cannot be closed with financial aid policy 
alone, research shows that it can increase enrollment and completion. 
This chapter focuses specifically on student loan policy at the federal 
level and offers a number of recommendations to reduce complexity, 
improve targeting, contain debt burdens, and encourage completion and 
wise borrowing. These recommendations are part of a comprehensive 
package of reforms to federal student aid, detailed in our 2013 white 
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paper, Aligning the Means and the Ends: How to Improve Federal Stu-
dent Aid and Increase College Access and Success (The Institute for 
College Access and Success [TICAS] 2013). Unless otherwise noted, 
the information in this chapter is drawn from that paper. 
BACKGROUND 
As context for our recommendations, we provide some brief back-
ground information about federal and private student loans. 
Federal Student Loans 
The current federal student loan program is too complex, its ben-
efits are poorly targeted, and its terms are too arbitrary. Much of the 
complexity is a holdover from when banks received subsidies to make 
Stafford Loans with terms set and guaranteed by the government. The 
resulting rules shielded banks—but not borrowers or taxpayers—from 
risk. Now that these federal loans are made directly and more cost-
effectively by the U.S. Department of Education, the entire student loan 
system can and should be streamlined and improved. 
From the myriad types and terms of different loans to the repayment 
process, it can be hard to figure out how federal student loans work. 
Consider, for example, the main source of undergraduate loans since 
July 2010: the Direct Stafford Loan program. There are “subsidized” 
and “unsubsidized” Stafford Loans, each with different eligibility crite-
ria and treatment of interest during school and periods of deferment and 
with separate caps on how much a student can borrow each year and 
cumulatively. The vast majority (82 percent) of undergraduates with 
subsidized loans also have unsubsidized loans, so some of their loans 
accrue interest while they are in school and some do not.1 
Subsidized loans currently provide students with valuable benefits, 
including a low fixed interest rate and no interest accrual while they 
are in school.2 However, these benefits are not well targeted, as high-
income students may qualify just because they attend a high-cost col-
lege, and most students with subsidized loans also have unsubsidized 
loans. 
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All Stafford Loans offer flexible repayment plans, as well as loan 
deferments and forbearances, yet more than one in eight student loan 
borrowers is defaulting within three years of entering repayment.3 The 
consequences of defaulting on a federal loan can follow borrowers for 
the rest of their lives, ruining their credit, making it difficult to buy a 
car or rent an apartment, and limiting their job prospects. They may 
also face garnished wages, seized income tax refunds, and diminished 
Social Security checks. 
Private Loans 
Private educational loans are a much riskier way to pay for college 
than federal student loans. Most private loans have variable, uncapped 
interest rates and require a cosigner (U.S. Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau and U.S. Department of Education 2012). No more a form 
of financial aid than a credit card, private loans typically have interest 
rates that, regardless of whether they are fixed or variable, are high-
est for those who can least afford them. Private loans lack the basic 
consumer protections and flexible repayment options of federal student 
loans, such as unemployment deferment, income-driven repayment, 
and loan forgiveness programs. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Reform is clearly and urgently needed. Our loan recommendations 
aim to better support access and success while containing costs and 
risks for both students and taxpayers. To achieve those goals, we pro-
pose simplifying the loan program, improving the targeting of benefits, 
containing debt burdens, and encouraging wise borrowing. Our recom-
mendations include the following: 
• Provide a single undergraduate student loan with no fees, a 
low in-school interest rate, and a fixed rate in repayment that is 
never much higher than the rate on loans being offered to cur-
rent students. 
• Streamline and improve federal loan repayment options. 
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• Improve the timing, content, and effectiveness of student loan 
counseling. 
• Reduce the number of student loan defaults. 
• Reform the student loan collections process. 
• Strengthen consumer protections for private loan borrowers. 
One Simple, Affordable Undergraduate Loan Program 
We propose replacing the current Stafford Loans with one sim-
ple, affordable undergraduate loan. Our recommended changes are 
designed to simplify the loan program, ensure that loans both appear 
and are affordable for borrowers, and better align the cost of the loan 
for the student with the costs for the government. There is no way to 
perfectly balance all three of these goals. However, what we propose 
is an important step forward on each front, focused on making federal 
student loans a more effective tool for ensuring access and supporting 
success while containing risk for both the student and the taxpayer. 
Specifically, we recommend that there be only one federal loan for 
undergraduate students, in place of the subsidized and unsubsidized 
Stafford Loans available today. A single loan will be much easier for 
borrowers to understand and monitor, and for schools and the Depart-
ment of Education to administer. This loan—which we refer to in this 
chapter as the One Loan—has an interest rate that is lower while the 
student is in school and higher by a set margin, but capped, when the 
borrower enters repayment. The interest rates are tied to the govern-
ment’s cost of borrowing and designed to help offset the cost of the loan 
program, rather than being arbitrarily set by Congress.4 The features of 
One Loans are described in the sections below. 
Fixed interest rates and no fees 
Fixed rates are important to provide certainty, predictability, and 
reassurance to students, many of whom have never borrowed before and 
may not fully understand the consequences of variable rates. The recent 
mortgage crisis demonstrated all too clearly that millions of Ameri-
cans with mortgages did not understand the risks of variable rates, with 
terrible consequences for both them and our nation’s economy. Fixed 
interest rates also further distinguish One Loans, which are a form of 
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financial aid, from other financial products such as credit cards and 
private loans. As mentioned earlier, interest rates on private loans are 
usually variable, like a credit card. The private loans that offer fixed 
rates will almost certainly have higher interest rates than One Loans for 
all borrowers except those who have, or whose cosigners have, pristine 
credit. At the height of the lending boom in 2007–2008, a majority of 
private student loan borrowers had not taken out as much as they could 
have in federal loans first, underscoring the need to clearly distinguish 
federal student loans from private loans (TICAS 2011a). 
The One Loan’s fixed rate is tied to the government’s cost of lend-
ing in the year the loan is disbursed. For instance, the interest rate on all 
loans disbursed in a given school year might be set based on the interest 
rate on the one-year Treasury bill or 10-year Treasury note at the final 
auction preceding June 1 of that year. Students who take out One Loans 
each year that they are in school may end up having loans with different 
interest rates, depending on the market conditions each year. However, 
all the other terms of their One Loans would be the same. 
There is no reason for the new loan to have fees, which are rem-
nants of the bank-based guaranteed loan program and add unneeded 
complexity to the loan. The fixed interest rate will be set to cover the 
cost of One Loans without needing to add supplemental fees. 
Low in-school interest rate 
The in-school interest rate on One Loans is based on the govern-
ment’s actual cost of borrowing when the loans are made. The rate for 
new loans would take effect each year on July 1 and apply to all loans 
issued through June 30 of the following year. The in-school rate applies 
while the borrower is enrolled at least half-time and during a six-month 
grace period after she leaves school, similar to the usual timing of the 
interest subsidy on subsidized Stafford Loans. Having a lower interest 
rate when students are in school is intended to encourage them to stay 
enrolled and complete their education, knowing that their interest rate 
will rise if they stop out or drop out.5 Lower in-school interest rates also 
help encourage the use of federal loans over private loans or other types 
of financing available to consumers with limited or no credit histories. 
Charging a low in-school rate, rather than charging no interest, while 
the student is enrolled is designed to both lower the cost of providing 
the loan and discourage students from dragging out their time in school. 
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Higher, but capped, out-of-school rate 
The One Loan’s out-of-school interest rate is set at the in-school 
rate when the loans were taken out, plus a fixed margin designed to 
cover the cost of the loan program, including the interest-rate insurance 
described below, loan forgiveness and discharge, and administrative 
costs. For example, imagine a One Loan with an in-school interest rate 
of 3 percent based on the government’s cost of borrowing that year. 
If, for illustration purposes only, the repayment rate were set at the in-
school rate plus two percentage points, it would have an out-of-school 
interest rate of 5 percent. The out-of-school rate, while higher than the 
in-school rate, must be low enough to ensure that federal loans are— 
and look like—financial aid in contrast to other types of fi nancing such 
as private loans. 
The out-of-school interest rate on the One Loan will be subject to a 
universal cap, like Stafford Loan interest rates; currently the undergrad-
uate Stafford Loan interest rate is capped at 8.25 percent.6 A universal 
cap protects consumers from extremely high rates in the economy and 
reinforces the differences between federal loans and commercial finan-
cial products. For example, if the universal cap were 7 percent, the 
in-school interest rate were 6 percent, and the repayment rate set at the 
in-school rate plus two percentage points, the loan would have an out-
of-school interest rate of 7 percent because the cap would keep the rate 
from rising above 7 percent. 
Interest-rate insurance 
The One Loan has an important new feature: a form of insurance 
that prevents interest rates from ever being too much higher than the 
rate on loans being offered to current students. This feature addresses 
the major disadvantage of fixed rates for borrowers, without requiring 
refinancing or consolidation. To prevent borrowers from getting stuck 
with high fixed rates when market rates decline significantly, the inter-
est rate on One Loans will reset to a lower fixed rate when interest rates 
in the economy drop substantially from when the loan was issued. 
For example, the interest-rate insurance might prevent outstanding 
One Loans from having a rate that is more than two percentage points 
above the rate on loans being offered to current students. If a borrower 
had a One Loan with an out-of-school interest rate of 6.5 percent, and 
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interest rates dropped so that the One Loans to current students had 
an out-of-school rate of 3.8 percent, the borrower’s interest rate would 
automatically drop from 6.5 percent to 5.8 percent, so that the rate was 
no more than two percentage points above the current rate. 
The interest rate on affected One Loans would not increase, even if 
rates in the economy do. This helps borrowers who go to school when 
interest rates are unusually high, while avoiding the uncertainty and risk 
of a variable rate for all borrowers. We believe this interest rate insur-
ance, which has some similarities to existing financial instruments (e.g., 
swaptions) can be provided at a reasonable cost to both borrowers and 
taxpayers, and incorporated into the fixed margin in the out-of-school 
interest rate.7 The cost of this feature will depend on the selected inter-
est rate margin, universal cap, and the specifics of the insurance. 
Interest-free deferments for Pell Grant recipients 
In addition to the One Loan’s low in-school rate, universal interest 
rate cap, and interest rate insurance, which apply to all borrowers, the 
One Loan provides additional protection to borrowers from low-income 
families. Pell Grant recipients who take out loans would be eligible for 
interest-free deferments during periods of unemployment and economic 
hardship, just as with subsidized Stafford Loans currently.8 
Subsidized Stafford Loans do not accrue interest while the borrower 
is in school, during the six-month grace period, or when payments are 
deferred for certain reasons after the borrower leaves school, includ-
ing periods of unemployment and the first three years in IBR or PAYE 
if income-driven payments are less than monthly interest.9 However, 
as mentioned above, these valuable benefits are not well targeted for 
several reasons: high-income students may qualify for subsidized loans 
just because they attend a high-cost college; and the vast majority of 
students with subsidized loans also have unsubsidized loans, which 
accrue interest during these periods. 
The One Loan better targets these valuable benefits to the borrow-
ers who most need them, when they need them most. Borrowers who 
received Pell Grants, by definition, come from low- and moderate-
income families and are therefore much less likely to have family mem-
bers who can support them during periods of unemployment or low 
earnings. The loans will provide interest relief on all loans held by Pell 
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Grant recipients, rather than just some of their loans, when they are 
unemployed or their incomes are too low to cover their interest in an 
income-driven repayment plan. 
Retain current loan limits 
The loans will have the same aggregate loan limits as Stafford 
Loans: currently $31,000 for dependent undergraduates and $57,500 
for independent undergraduates. Student loans have become a fact of 
life for more and more Americans, and there is widespread and under-
standable concern about high and pervasive debt levels. Federal loan 
limits provide a necessary signal to students and colleges about how 
much borrowing might be too much. The higher loan limits for inde-
pendent students rightly recognize that these students have greater 
financial responsibilities and may need to borrow more to stay and suc-
ceed in school.10 
Some have suggested raising the current loan limits, while others 
have suggested lowering them, but the data do not support either sug-
gestion (TICAS 2012a,b). As mentioned earlier, average debt for 2011 
graduates of public and nonprofit four-year colleges was well below the 
aggregate limits—the average including private loans was $26,600 for 
the two-thirds who borrowed, and one-third of graduates had no student 
debt (TICAS 2012c). The majority of undergraduates who borrow pri-
vate education loans could have borrowed more in federal student loans 
before turning to the riskier private market (TICAS 2011a). Finally, 
colleges already have the authority to limit or deny loans for individual 
students on a case-by-case basis (TICAS 2012d). 
The Department of Education should, however, analyze the poten-
tial effects of prorating federal student loans by attendance status. 
Unlike Pell Grants, federal loans are not prorated based on a student’s 
attendance status. In other words, students enrolled half time receive 
a prorated portion of the Pell Grant that students enrolled full time 
receive, but may receive the same loan amount as a full-time student. 
Students who take out full loans but make only part-time progress may 
be at an increased risk of dropping out and defaulting. Students who 
attend college part time are less likely to complete a degree or certifi-
cate (U.S. Department of Education 2011), and failure to complete a 
degree or certificate is one of the strongest predictors of future default 
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(Nguyen 2011; Gross et al. 2009). They may also be at greater risk of 
exhausting their loan eligibility before completing their degree. Prorat-
ing loans would involve reducing student eligibility for federal loans 
at a time when college is getting harder to afford, but it is possible that 
it could help encourage students to enroll in more courses per term, 
thereby completing a degree and reducing their risk of default. Given 
both the risks and the potential benefits, such a change warrants careful 
analysis and consideration. 
Streamline and Improve Federal Loan Repayment Options 
We have identified several ways to simplify and improve federal 
loan repayment options to help borrowers manage their debt, and 
reduce the financial distress and defaults that undermine the goals of 
increased enrollment and completion. There is even more complexity 
on the repayment side of the federal loan process than on the borrowing 
side. The number of repayment options and the variation in eligibility 
requirements, costs, and benefits can be overwhelming, even for those 
working in the field. With so many choices and variables, comparisons 
can become unwieldy and confusing, and borrowers may be more likely 
to end up in plans that do not fit their needs or goals. However, having 
some well-designed choices, combined with timely and effective coun-
seling, can help borrowers find a good fit for their own situation, stay in 
repayment, and avoid default. 
Let borrowers make one loan payment for all their 
federal loans 
To reduce complexity and make it easier to stay current on their 
loans, we recommend that borrowers be able to make a single pay-
ment that covers all of their federal loans. Currently, this can only be 
accomplished through a separate consolidation process, which is a sig-
nificant bureaucratic hurdle for borrowers and has trade-offs that are not 
in every borrower’s best interest.11 Borrowers should not have to con-
solidate their loans just to avoid making multiple payments to multiple 
servicers on their federal student loans each month. 
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Base repayment plan eligibility on total federal loan debt 
The “standard” repayment plan for unconsolidated federal loans is 
currently a 10-year plan. Borrowers are automatically enrolled in this 
plan if they do not actively choose a different one before their fi rst pay-
ment (U.S. Department of Education 2013a). If borrowers owe more 
than $30,000, they may be able to choose an “extended” 25-year plan 
instead, but only if they owe that much within one loan program.12 For 
example, if they owe $31,000 in the Federal Family Education Loan 
Program (FFELP) or $31,000 in Direct Loans, they may qualify for the 
extended plan. But if they owe $15,000 in Direct Loans and $16,000 in 
FFELP Loans, they do not qualify. In contrast, total federal student loan 
debt, along with the borrower’s income, is used to determine eligibility 
for income-driven repayment plans, in which borrowers pay for up to 
20 or 25 years.13 Meanwhile, borrowers who combine their loans into a 
Direct Consolidation Loan have access to “standard” repayment plans 
that gradually increase from 10 to 30 years depending on the borrowers’
total federal loan debt.14 Any signal to borrowers about optimal repay-
ment periods, if one were ever intended, gets lost in all this complexity, 
and what is optimal to one borrower may not be for another. 
Instead, we recommend that all borrowers have access to repayment 
plans based on their total federal student loan debt, with incremen-
tally longer repayment periods available to those with larger total 
debt. Making these repayment options consistent for all loans would 
greatly simplify the process for borrowers, especially when paired with 
improved loan counseling that helps them identify their priorities and 
see which plan is the best fit. Borrowers who want to reduce the overall 
cost of their debt by paying it down faster will be able to select shorter 
repayment plans and make prepayments without penalty, as they can 
now. Borrowers who want assurance that their monthly payments will 
remain affordable, given their income, will have access to a streamlined 
income-driven plan, as discussed in detail below. Additionally, borrow-
ers who want all their payments to count toward Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness will always be able to choose a 10-year payment plan.15 
Currently, as mentioned above, borrowers who do not select a 
repayment plan are automatically placed in a 10-year plan, making it 
the “default” plan. A 10-year plan has signifi cant benefits for borrow-
ers if they can afford the monthly payments, which are higher than the 
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monthly payments in longer plans. Given the growth in student debt 
levels over the past generation, a 10-year plan may be increasingly 
unrealistic for many borrowers.16 Automatically enrolling borrowers in 
this plan, regardless of their total debt levels, could be setting some bor-
rowers up to fail. 
Nevertheless, there are trade-offs between shorter and longer 
repayment plans. Longer repayment periods provide lower monthly 
payments but also cost borrowers more over the life of the loan. The 
best plan for one borrower may not be the best for another borrower. 
The decision of which repayment plan is most appropriate for any given 
borrower—whether made by the individual or by the Department of 
Education through the selection of a “default” or mandatory plan—is 
important and needs to be considered carefully. As we discuss later 
in the chapter, loan counseling should be improved to help borrowers 
decide which plan is best for them. The Department of Education should 
also carefully analyze data on borrowers’ repayment plan choices and 
outcomes—including their ability to make payments and total amount 
paid—to determine whether a 10-year plan remains the best option for 
borrowers who do not actively select another plan. It should also con-
sider the broader implications of changing the default repayment plans 
for borrowers, colleges, and taxpayers. 
Give all borrowers access to a single, improved income-driven 
repayment plan 
When Congress created the Income-Based Repayment plan (IBR) 
for federal loans in 2007, it was a major step forward for student loan 
borrowers.17 TICAS, through its Project on Student Debt, developed 
the policy proposal that laid the groundwork for IBR (TICAS et al. 
2006). We first consulted with stakeholders on all sides and conducted 
an in-depth analysis of debt burdens and repayment plans. This analysis 
found that protections and options for borrowers with high debt relative 
to their income were inadequate, inconsistent, and inaccessible (TICAS 
2006). With America’s higher education system increasingly reliant 
on student loans, and the consequences of default so severe and long-
lasting, students were bearing too much of the risk to ensure access or 
support success. We developed a “Plan for Fair Loan Payments” that 
called for affordable payments based on income and family size, cover-
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age of both Direct and FFELP Loans, and a light at the end of the tunnel 
with forgiveness after 20 years of income-driven payments. These 
goals were supported by thousands of students, higher education lead-
ers, loan industry representatives, civil rights groups, Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress, and organizations representing parents, college 
counselors, and others.18 
Thanks to the broad coalition that helped make the case for a solu-
tion, IBR became available to all federal loan borrowers in July 2009 
(TICAS 2009). Despite the absence of much publicity or borrower 
outreach in the first few years of the program, more than 1.3 million 
borrowers were enrolled in IBR by the winter of 2012 (U.S. Department 
of Education 2013b). IBR caps monthly payments at a manageable 
share of income and forgives any principal or interest that remains 
after 25 years of payments. To qualify, borrowers must have a “par-
tial financial hardship,” defined as a debt-to-income ratio that makes a 
10-year payment unaffordable. Required payments can be as low as $0 
for borrowers with very low incomes, and payments rise incrementally 
with income. Payments are capped at the lower of the monthly pay-
ment under the standard 10-year plan, or 15 percent of “discretionary 
income,” which is defined as adjusted gross income (AGI) minus 150 
percent of poverty for the borrower’s family size.19 
In recent years, the number of repayment options similar to IBR 
has grown. In early 2010, Congress passed the president’s proposal to 
expand IBR for future borrowers (White House 2010). Starting in July 
2014, new borrowers will be able to qualify for a lower monthly payment 
and shorter forgiveness period than the current IBR program provides: 
10 percent of discretionary income and 20 years, instead of 15 percent 
and 25 years. In the fall of 2010, President Obama announced a new 
Pay As You Earn plan to give an estimated 1.6 million current students 
and recent graduates access to the same lower payment cap and shorter 
forgiveness period, with the goal of offsetting the recession’s effect on 
their job prospects and earnings (White House 2011 and TICAS 2012f). 
To qualify for Pay As You Earn, students must have borrowed their 
first loan after September 30, 2007, and received at least one federal 
loan disbursement after September 30, 2011. Pay As You Earn became 
available to eligible borrowers in December 2012 through regulatory 
additions to a preexisting program called Income-Contingent Repay-
ment (ICR), which is only available for borrowers with Direct Loans.20 









Federal Student Loan Policy 391 
ICR, which is still available, provides less relief than IBR in most cases. 
Direct Loan borrowers in any of these repayment plans who also work 
for public or nonprofit employers may have their loans discharged after 
just 10 years of payments, through the Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
plan Congress created at the same time as IBR.21 
We recommend consolidating the well-intentioned, but highly 
complex, mix of currently available income-driven plans—current 
IBR, IBR for new borrowers in 2014, Pay As You Earn, and ICR—into 
one new and improved income-driven plan. Borrowers would no longer 
have to figure out which plans they qualify for or which of their loans 
will be covered by which payment cap or forgiveness period. Those 
already enrolled in IBR, Pay As You Earn, and ICR would have the 
option of staying put or switching to the new plan. For the purposes of 
this chapter, we refer to the new plan as Pay As You Earn 2 (PAYE2). 
To simplify, strengthen, and improve access to income-driven pay-
ments, PAYE2 will be available to all borrowers, regardless of their 
debt or income level, whether their loans are Direct or FFELP, or when 
they borrowed. This will make it much easier for borrowers who want 
the assurance of manageable payments to enroll whenever it makes 
sense for them, whether it is before they make their first payment, after 
they have hit a rough patch, or when they are concerned about what 
the future will bring. Rather than requiring borrowers to have a certain 
debt-to-income ratio to enroll, borrowers with higher incomes relative 
to their debt will simply make larger payments as determined by the 
plan’s sliding scale. This is already the case for those whose incomes 
rise substantially after they entered an income-driven plan. If borrowers 
have access to even lower monthly payments in another plan, and that is 
more important to them than the assurance of income-driven payments, 
they need not enroll in PAYE2. 
Enabling all borrowers to enroll in PAYE2 will likely require 
adjustments in some aspects of income-driven plan design, such as the 
treatment of accrued interest, when to capitalize interest and how much, 
and whether and how borrowers can exit and reenter PAYE2. Further 
study is needed to determine optimal approaches. These changes will 
affect the benefits and risks of widespread enrollment in PAYE2. 
PAYE2 will ensure that payments never exceed 10 percent of 
income while better targeting benefits. In its current design, Pay As You 
Earn has undeniable benefits for low- and moderate-income borrowers, 
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but it may also result in some high-income borrowers getting substantial 
forgiveness when they could well afford to pay more. PAYE2 includes 
two adjustments that better target benefits while assuring that monthly 
payments never exceed 10 percent of the borrower’s income and avoid-
ing arbitrary cliffs, in which borrowers in very similar situations get 
very different benefits. 
1) Gradually phase out the “income exclusion” for higher-
income borrowers. PAYE2, like IBR and Pay As You Earn, 
calculates monthly payments based on the borrower’s “dis-
cretionary income”—AGI minus an “income exclusion”—to 
protect income needed to cover basic living expenses. Cur-
rently, in IBR and Pay As You Earn, the income exclusion is 
150 percent of the poverty level for the borrower’s household 
size. Based on this definition, a borrower with a family of four 
and an AGI of $40,000 has $34,575 protected for basic living 
expenses. The family therefore has a discretionary income of 
$5,425, or $452 per month, so payments set at 10 percent of 
discretionary income would be $45 per month.22 
However, as borrowers’ incomes rise, it becomes increasingly 
unnecessary to shield a share of their earnings. Borrowers with 
very high incomes are able to devote a larger share of their total 
incomes to loan payments and still have sufficient funds left 
over to cover basic necessities, such as food and housing. As 
a result, PAYE2 gradually phases out the income exclusion for 
borrowers with AGIs between $100,000 and $250,000, so that 
borrowers with AGIs of $250,000 or more would have their 
monthly payments calculated as 10 percent of their total AGI. 
Borrowers with AGIs below $100,000 would not be affected, 
and monthly payments for all borrowers would never be greater 
than 10 percent of their total income. The AGI levels at which 
the phase-out begins and ends would be indexed to infl ation to 
ensure fairness over time. 
2) Cap all monthly payments at 10 percent of income. 
Currently, in IBR and Pay As You Earn, some borrowers can 
end up paying less than 10 percent of their income, owing to 
a certain cap on their monthly payments. This occurs if, after 
entering IBR or Pay As You Earn, the borrower’s income rises 
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high enough that he no longer has a “partial financial hard-
ship” (i.e., his debt-to-income ratio has declined so much that a 
10-year payment is now affordable). When this occurs, his pay-
ments are capped at the monthly amount he would have had to 
pay had he entered a 10-year standard repayment plan when he 
entered IBR. For some high-income borrowers, this cap will be 
lower than 10 percent of their incomes. Removing the current 
10-year-payment cap and instead capping payments at 10 per-
cent of income better targets income-driven repayment benefits 
to those who need them and prevents high-income borrowers 
from receiving substantial loan forgiveness when they could 
have afforded to pay more.23 
Additionally, PAYE2 will provide forgiveness after 20 years of pay-
ments. As we have long recommended, any debt remaining after 20 
years of income-driven payments should be discharged. This will make 
it easier for borrowers to see the light at the end of the tunnel, and 
let them focus on saving for retirement and their children’s education 
before the next generation is in college. The changes to payment deter-
minations described above better target the forgiveness available after 
20 years because higher-income borrowers will be more likely to pay 
off their debts within that period. 
Furthermore, we recommend making it easier for all borrowers 
in income-driven plans to keep their income information up to date. 
Regardless of how many income-driven plans there are, there is a 
need to further improve the process through which borrowers provide 
updated income information to their loan servicers. Currently, borrow-
ers in income-driven plans must provide tax or other income information 
each year to avoid reverting to non-income-driven payments that may 
be much higher than they can afford. Recent improvements require that 
borrowers be notified before they have to submit information and make 
it easier for some borrowers to submit it to their servicer (U.S Depart-
ment of Education 2012a). Additionally, in late 2012, the Department 
of Education launched a user-friendly tool that lets borrowers elec-
tronically transfer their own tax information from the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) into an online form, both to apply for income-driven plans 
and to update their income information (U.S. Department of Education 
2012b). Unfortunately, this process is only available to borrowers who 
have filed an IRS 1040 form. Borrowers with incomes too low to owe 
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federal income tax may not have a 1040 form to draw from, requiring 
them to go through extra steps to verify their incomes. As a result, bor-
rowers with the greatest need for income-driven payments may have 
the hardest time continuing to qualify for them. 
To simplify the process for all borrowers, the income verification 
process for PAYE2 should enable borrowers to draw on earnings data in 
their W-2 and 1099 forms. In addition, borrowers should be able to give 
the Department of Education advance permission to access their AGI 
and W-2 information for some period of time (e.g., five years), as they 
could until recently for IBR and ICR, to reduce the risk of inadvertently 
missing a deadline. 
Finally, any forgiven loan balances should not be treated as taxable 
income. Borrowers currently enrolled in IBR, ICR, and Pay As You 
Earn, as well as those who would be enrolled in our proposed PAYE2 
plan, can have their loan balances forgiven after 20 or 25 years (depend-
ing on the program) of qualifying payments. Treating discharged loans 
as taxable income creates a tax liability that most recipients will be 
unable to afford, discourages enrollment in income-driven repayment 
plans, and is inconsistent with the treatment of other discharged loans.24 
Improve the Timing, Content, and Effectiveness of Student 
Loan Counseling 
Federal law and regulations require entrance and exit counseling 
for any student who receives a federal loan.25 Entrance counseling has 
the potential to help students optimize their borrowing and better under-
stand the risks and benefits, and exit counseling has the potential to help 
students select an appropriate repayment plan and avoid default. How-
ever, the timing and content of required counseling must be improved 
to better help students borrow wisely, complete college without burden-
some debt, and repay their loans. With common-sense modifications 
and more research on what works, loan counseling can more effectively 
inform crucial decisions about borrowing and repayment. 
Loan counseling should be conducted when it is most likely to have 
an impact: before students commit to borrowing. Currently, entrance 
counseling can occur after the promissory note is signed, as long as 
the counseling comes before the first loan disbursement. This timing 
problem can and must be fixed. Also, whereas entrance counseling is 
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only required when students first borrow, interim counseling should 
take place at key points when borrowers are likely to benefit, such as 
when they have borrowed over a certain amount or sought certification 
of a private loan. 
To be more effective, loan counseling must be individualized based 
on the borrower’s specific situation and needs; it should not just dis-
close general information and options. Entrance counseling could give 
students an estimate of their total debt burden if they borrow the amount 
they are seeking in each year they plan to be in school and also provide 
the resulting monthly and total payments under different plans. Exit 
counseling could ask students about their plans and preferences and 
point them toward specific repayment plans based on this information. 
For instance, if a student has borrowed a small amount and has secured 
a job with sufficient pay, the counseling might encourage her to select 
a 10-year fixed payment plan to minimize the total amount she will pay 
over the life of the loan. On the other hand, if the student has borrowed 
a large amount and is unsure how much she is likely to earn, the coun-
seling might highlight income-driven repayment as a way to keep her 
payments affordable. Currently, counseling does not have to be tailored 
to the individual student’s situation and can, for example, use average 
loan amounts rather than the amount the student has actually borrowed. 
Entrance and interim loan counseling should include warnings 
about the risks of private loans and discourage students from consider-
ing them if they have not exhausted their federal loan options. Students 
need to understand the protections and benefits that come from federal 
loans, including set and predictable interest rates, fl exible repayment 
plans, deferment options, and forgiveness programs, before they take 
out a private loan. To the extent possible, exit counseling should include 
any private loan debt so students can select a repayment plan for their 
federal loans based on an understanding of their total debt, including 
any private loans. 
Finally, all loan counseling should be consumer tested and improved 
based on feedback, and ongoing analysis should be conducted of coun-
seling’s impact on student decisions. For instance, existing data systems 
could be used to assess the impact of variations in entrance, interim, and 
exit counseling on student enrollment, persistence, borrowing, repay-
ment, and default rates. Such analysis could be used to continually 
improve the counseling to better support student success, prevent loan 
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defaults and unwise or unnecessary borrowing, and reduce the burden 
of student debt by helping students choose appropriate repayment plans. 
Strengthen Consumer Protections 
We recommend strengthening consumer protections to support 
smart borrowing, to prevent default, and to reduce the fi nancial distress 
of borrowers with federal and private loans. 
Federal loan borrowers 
As a form of financial aid, federal student loans provide many 
important consumer protections that are not required of private edu-
cation loans or other types of financing. Examples include discharges 
under circumstances such as school fraud, school closure, severe and 
permanent disability, or death; income-driven repayment plans that 
help ensure affordable payments and a light at the end of the tunnel; 
deferments and forbearances that let borrowers temporarily suspend 
payments without becoming delinquent or paying additional fees; and 
an opportunity to reenter repayment after default. Such policies are 
supposed to prevent or reduce defaults, unfair treatment, and extreme 
financial distress for borrowers who used federal loans to help pay for 
their own or their child’s education. Unfortunately, the federal loan 
system does not work as well as it should to protect borrowers in chal-
lenging circumstances. The recommendations presented in this section 
are aimed at reducing red tape for distressed, disabled, or defrauded 
federal loan borrowers and reducing and preventing defaults. While far 
from comprehensive, these recommendations touch on several impor-
tant areas for improvement in ways that address the interests of both 
borrowers and taxpayers. 
Respond to signs of financial distress in ways that can 
prevent default. 
• Ensure that borrowers receive key information about their 
repayment options not only before they make their fi rst payment 
but also when their payment patterns indicate likely financial 
distress. For example, in 2012, a dozen members of Congress 
urged the Secretary of Education to alert borrowers to the avail-
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ability of IBR and related plans as soon as those borrowers have 
been delinquent, in forbearance, or in economic hardship or 
unemployment deferment for more than 60 days (U.S. House 
of Representatives 2012).26 Despite efforts to make repayment 
more manageable, default rates have risen even among those 
who entered repayment after IBR became available (TICAS 
2012e). Borrowers struggling to keep up with monthly pay-
ments clearly need this information and related counseling. 
Once distressed borrowers are aware of income-driven repay-
ment and how it could help them, they might also benefi t from 
information about extended repayment plans, deferments, for-
bearances, and conditions for cancellation. 
• Automatically enroll severely delinquent borrowers in an 
income-driven repayment plan. It takes at least nine months 
of nonpayment to default on a federal student loan. The fed-
eral loan promissory note should require borrowers to give the 
Department of Education permission to access their IRS infor-
mation if they miss at least six consecutive payments. Using 
their income and family size, the Department of Education 
could then determine what their income-driven payment would 
be.27 If it were less than their current payment, the Depart-
ment of Education would notify the borrower and, unless they 
chose another plan, automatically enroll the borrower in the 
income-driven plan. For borrowers with very low incomes, 
income-driven payments may be as little as $0, and income-
driven payments will be lower than 10-year payments for most 
borrowers under financial strain. By enrolling them and engag-
ing in follow-up contact and counseling, the Department of 
Education may be able to prevent otherwise very likely defaults 
and the associated costs for both borrowers and taxpayers. 
Notification and ease of use will be essential to this policy’s 
effectiveness, as borrowers need to know that their payment 
has been lowered and how and why to update their income and 
family size at least annually. 
Determine why most delinquent borrowers are not successfully 
contacted before they default. Data show that a significant number 
of borrowers who default were never successfully contacted by their 
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lenders because their lenders did not have current contact information 
(U.S. Department of Education 2010). It will be very difficult to reduce 
default rates and help more borrowers enroll in affordable repayment 
plans if servicers and/or the Department of Education lack accurate, 
up-to-date contact information for federal loan borrowers or functional 
systems for reaching them. The Department of Education should con-
duct a study to determine the main causes of this serious problem, use 
the findings to identify needed changes, make any such changes that 
are within its authority, and recommend that Congress make additional 
changes if necessary. 
Reconsider the use of private debt collectors for federal stu-
dent loans. Currently, the federal student loans collections process is 
almost entirely in the hands of private debt collection agencies (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury 2009). These debt collectors are given the 
authority to act on behalf of the lender or guarantor in everything from 
rehabilitation of a defaulted loan to information about loan discharges 
to negotiating loan compromises. Because their contracts with the 
Department of Education provide bigger rewards for collecting larger 
dollar amounts, these debt collectors have a disincentive to inform 
borrowers of their rights or to set reasonable and affordable payment 
amounts based on the borrowers’ financial circumstances, as required 
by law (Hechinger 2012). Given the commission structure and conflicts 
of interest, it is not surprising that the National Consumer Law Center 
has found a remarkable amount of deceptive, unfair, and illegal conduct 
by private collectors involving federal student loans (Loonin 2012). 
Recent news investigations have also documented such conduct and the 
underlying “boiler-room” business model (Hechinger 2012 and Martin 
2012). 
Collections should prioritize the interests of borrowers and taxpay-
ers, not collection agencies. With the Department of Education spending 
more than $1.4 billion a year on commission-based contracts with pri-
vate debt collectors, an examination of whether outsourcing is the most 
effective or appropriate approach is long overdue (Martin 2012). In 
2009, the IRS conducted an extensive review of its private collections 
contracts and moved to bring the function in-house (IRS 2009). The 
Treasury Department is responsible for the collection of debt owed to 
the federal government but has delegated to the Education Department 
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the authority to collect on defaulted student loans.28 We recommend 
that the Treasury Department withdraw the delegation of its authority 
for a randomly selected number of defaulted loans for the purpose of 
studying whether taxpayers’ and borrowers’ interests would be better 
served by collecting all defaulted federal student loans by trained Trea-
sury employees rather than by private debt collectors. 
Rethink default penalties to ensure that distressed borrowers 
have a way out. While there should clearly be some penalties asso-
ciated with defaulting on a federal student loan, they should not be 
designed to keep borrowers without financial means in default indefi-
nitely, with already unmanageable debt just continuing to mount. For 
example, collection fees of up to 25 percent are currently added to what 
borrowers owe when they default, even if the actual costs of the collec-
tions activities are much less.29 These fees go to the private collection 
agencies discussed above. If a borrower went into default because she 
could not afford her loan payments, high fees make it even less likely 
that she will ever be able to get out of default. Another policy that can 
trap borrowers in default is limiting them to only one chance at rehabili-
tation. It is worth considering whether borrowers who redefault should 
be allowed to rehabilitate their loans more than once after some period 
of successful payments. 
Ensure that borrowers who are abused or defrauded by a col-
lege can get relief. The Department of Education should use its full 
authority to enforce the law that relieves borrowers of debt resulting 
from illegal or abusive school practices. The “false certifi cation” provi-
sions in law are designed to offer relief for harmed students as well as 
to discourage illegal, abusive school practices. The law provides for 
the discharge of loans falsely certified by institutions and for the Sec-
retary to recover the loan amounts from the schools and their affiliates. 
While the statutory authority is broad, the Department of Education 
has interpreted these false certification provisions very narrowly, deny-
ing needed relief to borrowers who suffered harm at the hands of their 
school. Borrowers should be eligible for relief if, for example, a school 
improperly or falsely certifies students’ satisfactory academic progress, 
enrolls students in career education programs that lack the program-
matic accreditation necessary for employment in the occupation, enrolls 
students who do not speak English in programs taught only in English, 
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or enrolls students with criminal records in programs that prepare them 
for employment in professions from which they are barred because of 
their criminal record.30 The regulations must be revised so that borrow-
ers can count on relief from debts resulting from a school’s harmful 
actions when there is reasonable evidence that the harm took place.31 
Private loan borrowers 
As discussed earlier, private education loans are a much riskier way 
to pay for college than federal student loans. Whether private loan rates 
are variable or fixed, lower-income students often receive the worst 
rates and terms, and private loans do not have the important borrower 
protections and repayment options that come with federal loans. The fol-
lowing policy changes would help prevent students from unnecessarily 
taking out risky private loans, ensure that consumers have information 
they need to make wise borrowing decisions, and stop deceptive and 
predatory private lending practices. 
Prevent unnecessary private loan borrowing by requiring 
school certification of private loans. The majority of undergraduates 
who borrow private education loans could have borrowed more in fed-
eral student loans before turning to the riskier private market (TICAS 
2011a). Unfortunately, many students who borrow private loans—and 
the parents who cosign these loans—do not understand the difference 
between federal and private loans until it is too late (TICAS 2011c). 
Requiring private lenders to confirm a borrower’s eligibility with his 
or her school before disbursing the loan ensures the student is eligible 
for that loan and the loan amount. It also gives the school a chance 
to help the student make an informed borrowing decision. Before the 
credit crunch, about a third of all private loans to undergraduates were 
made without such school certification (U.S. Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau and U.S. Department of Education 2012). Currently, 
most lenders voluntarily ask schools to certify their private loans, but 
lenders are not required to do so, and changing credit conditions could 
once again create incentives to cut schools out of the loop. In addition, 
many schools do not take the opportunity to counsel students before 
certifying. Students, schools, and lenders, as well as the U.S. Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Department of Educa-
tion, have all endorsed requiring “school certification” of private loans, 
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including notifying the student of any remaining federal aid eligibility 
before the loan is certified.32 The CFPB could require such certification 
for all private loans, and legislation introduced in 2013 (S. 113 and H.R. 
3612) would do so as well (Durbin 2013; Polis 2013). 
Treat private loans like other consumer debt in bankruptcy. 
Since 2005, it has been much more difficult to discharge private edu-
cation loans than credit cards and other consumer debt in bankruptcy, 
often leaving even the most destitute borrowers with no way out. A joint 
report to Congress from the CFPB and Department of Education found 
that this change coincided with rapid growth in questionable lending 
practices, compounding the risk to student borrowers (CFPB and U.S. 
Department of Education 2012). It also found a lack of evidence to sup-
port industry claims that restricting bankruptcy rights improved loan 
prices or access to credit. House and Senate legislation (the Fairness 
for Struggling Students Act of 2013 and the Private Student Loan Bank-
ruptcy Fairness Act of 2013) would restore fair bankruptcy treatment to 
private loan borrowers and is supported by TICAS and a broad coalition 
representing students, consumers, and colleges.33 
Enable private loan borrowers to refinance or modify their
loans. Borrowers who face unmanageably high payments on their pri-
vate loans do not have access to lower payments through IBR or other 
federal repayment plans, and private lenders are not required to provide 
the types of repayment options and borrower protections that are built 
into federal loans, such as unemployment deferments and forbearances 
without fees. Private loans typically have variable interest rates that are 
highest for the students and cosigners who can least afford them. Those 
who borrowed their loans at a high rate are often unable to refinance 
despite historically low interest rates in the economy, even if their cur-
rent credit score would qualify them for a lower fixed or variable rate 
if they took out a loan today (CFPB 2012). Keeping borrowers locked 
into high rates and high payments poses risks not only to their ability 
to meet basic needs but also to retirement savings and homeownership, 
and to the broader economy as a result (Chopra 2012; CFPB 2012). We
recommend that the CFPB and Congress develop standards for loan 
refinancing and/or modification to make private loan borrowers’ debt 
more manageable.34 
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CONCLUSION 
The American Dream envisions a nation where everyone can fully 
participate in our democracy, and our fates are determined by ability 
and accomplishment rather than circumstances of birth. Ensuring col-
lege access and increasing student success are crucial to achieving and 
preserving that dream and the economic opportunity and mobility on 
which it depends. College education is increasingly the primary path to 
stable employment, higher wages, retirement benefits, and health insur-
ance, as well as a key predictor of civic participation, better health, 
and the next generation’s odds of getting ahead—or at least not falling 
behind. An educated workforce is also essential to America’s economic 
competitiveness; our nation needs more people to get quality training 
and education after high school than ever before. However, as college 
education has become more essential for all these reasons, income gaps 
in enrollment and completion have widened rather than narrowed. 
To meet the broadly shared goal of greatly increasing the share of 
Americans with a college education, federal student aid policies, includ-
ing those related to student loans, must be improved to better support 
access and success for lower-income students. When student financial 
aid works as it should, students who are willing to study hard can afford 
to go to college, which is what we mean by college access, and they can 
complete a meaningful degree or certificate without burdensome debt, 
which is what we mean by student success. 
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27. Income would be adjusted gross income (AGI) or, if no tax form were available 
for the past two tax years, wages from W-2 forms. While the family size definition 
may not be identical to the U.S. Department of Education’s definition, it is a proxy 
under these circumstances and could be amended by the borrower. 
28. As specified in 31 U.S.C.§3711: “For purposes of this section, the Secretary of the 
Treasury may designate, and withdraw such designation of debt collection centers 
operated by other Federal agencies. The Secretary of the Treasury shall desig-
nate such centers on the basis of their performance in collecting delinquent claims 
owed to the Government.” 
29. For more information, see https://www.myeddebt.com/borrower/collectionCosts 
Navigate (accessed June 11, 2014). 
30. For examples of teachers being pressured to manipulate grades in order to retain 
students, see Field (2011). 
31. For more information, see comments on false certification in TICAS (2011b). 
32. For more information, see the December 10, 2009, letter signed by 25 organiza-
tions in support of mandatory certification. See http://bit.ly/Y1qwUN (accessed 
June 11, 2014). Also see the May 7, 2010, letter signed by lenders and others urg-
ing inclusion of mandatory school certification in the Senate financial reform bill, 
referenced in Lederman (2010). 
33. For more information, see the coalition letter to Senator Durbin in support of 
the Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013, available at http://projecton 
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studentdebt.org/pub_view.php?idx=872 (accessed June 11, 2014), and the coalition 
letter to Representative Cohen in support of the Private Student Loan Bankruptcy 
Fairness Act of 2013, available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/pub_view 
.php?idx=871 (accessed June 11, 2014). 
34. The Refinancing Education Funding to Invest for the Future Act was introduced in 
the summer of 2013 and endorsed by TICAS. For more information about the bill, 
see S. 1266 of the act and Brown (2013). 
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Making Borrowing Work for Today’s Students 
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Susan Dynarski and Daniel Kreisman presented a paper that proposes a new system of 
federal student lending based on an income-based model of repayment in which pay-
ments will automatically rise and fall with a borrower’s earnings, just as contributions 
to Social Security do. The paper was commissioned by The Hamilton Project, and while 
this volume provides only a synopsis of it, the full version can be accessed at The Ham-
ilton Project’s Web site, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/ 
THP_DynarskiDiscPaper_Final.pdf. 
Borrowing for college has risen steadily for decades, and student-
loan debt has mounted to $1 trillion, now surpassing credit cards as the 
third-largest form of consumer debt. With 7 million student loans in 
default and rising tuition prices, some are beginning to wonder if the 
costs associated with student borrowing are out of line with the value 
of attending college. 
The evidence, however, suggests we have a repayment crisis, not a 
student debt crisis. Four facts support this interpretation. First, typical 
borrowers have only a moderate amount of debt: 69 percent of stu-
dents in recent cohorts borrow $10,000 or less, and 98 percent borrow 
$50,000 or less. Second, the payoff to a college education is high over 
the student’s lifetime. The typical holder of a bachelor’s degree earns 
several hundred thousand dollars more than a high school graduate over 
a lifetime. Even those who start college but do not graduate experience 
lifetime gains of about $100,000. Third, although default rates have 
been rising, they are not driven by the small fraction of borrowers with 
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large loans. Rather, it is borrowers with typical levels of student debt 
who struggle with their payments, especially in the first few years after 
college. Fourth, default is highly correlated with the age of the borrower, 
with younger borrowers at far greater risk of default and delinquency. 
Many individuals have difficulty repaying loans because, under 
the existing system of federal lending, workers typically repay their 
loans early in their careers, when their incomes are relatively low and 
variable. A college education, however, is an investment that pays off 
over many decades. The mismatch between the timing of the costs and 
benefits of education is especially salient among young borrowers, 
who are most likely to default. A few missed payments, as penalties 
and fees accrue, can lead to rapidly rising loan balances. The damaged 
credit records that result from a few missed student loan payments can 
block young people from borrowing for other purposes, such as for cars 
and homes. Thus, the current system can turn reasonable levels of debt 
into repayment burdens that make financial independence and stability 
more difficult to achieve. Moreover, the current system harms taxpay-
ers because, when delinquency and default rates on loans are high, the 
lender also suffers. 
As an alternative, we propose a single, straightforward, income-
based repayment system called Loans for Educational Opportunity 
(LEO). The main idea of this proposal is that the repayment of loans 
would be automatic and simple, and that repayments would increase 
(and decline) with earnings. Employers would deduct contributions 
in the same way that they deduct payroll taxes. For example, the W-4 
would be modified to include a checkbox that asks whether a worker 
has a LEO. Borrowers could also indicate a higher repayment amount 
than the one that would otherwise be automatically deducted by fil-
ing a W-4 that specifies additional withholding. Self-employment and 
multiple jobs would be handled the same way as Social Security and 
income taxes, with quarterly payments and an annual reconciliation in 
April to correct any over- or underpayment. Contributions would stop 
when the loan is repaid or after 25 years. 
We highlight four key principles: 
1) Contribution rates should rise with earnings. Our simulations 
show that setting rates at 3 percent of earnings up to $10,000, 
7 percent between $10,001 and $25,000, and 10 percent above 
$25,001 would result in the typical loan being paid off in 10–15 
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years. A flat contribution rate of 6–9 percent of earnings would 
achieve similar results but would lead to higher payments (as a 
share of earnings) for many borrowers. 
2) Interest rates should hold the taxpayers harmless. The federal 
government should seek neither to make nor to lose money from 
student loans. Student loans correct a capital market failure: the 
private sector will not provide loans that are secured only by a 
borrower’s future earnings. Interest rates should cover the costs 
of borrowing, credit risk from unpaid loans, and administrative 
overhead, and should adjust annually over the life of the loan 
and not be nominally capped. 
3) Eliminate in-school interest subsidies. The subsidized Staf-
ford Loan, which is limited to students with sufficient financial 
need, does not begin to charge interest until the students are out 
of school. This is expensive for the government and has little 
bearing on either college attendance or persistence because 
it does not put any money into the hands of students. Defer-
ring interest accrual while students attend school serves only 
to shorten the repayment period for those who receive it and 
benefits borrowers with higher incomes more than those with 
lower incomes. 
4) Allow existing borrowers to join the new system. Certain 
borrowers under the old federal loan system will have the 
opportunity to convert their loans to the new system. Only fed-
eral, undergraduate loans can be repaid in this way; loans made 
to parents of students (PLUS Loans) will not be eligible. Exist-
ing borrowers can be brought into the new system by having 
the Department of Education purchase existing loans from the 
private loan companies. There is a precedent for this: during the 
credit crunch, the Department of Education was authorized to 
buy loans from private servicers in order to free up capital so 
that more student loans could be made. 
This is a system of loan repayment designed for the vast majority 
of former students—the 98 percent who borrow a manageable amount 
($50,000 or less). For the few students who borrow unmanageable 
amounts, most of whom borrow through the private market, we advo-
cate the following regulatory reforms. First, private loans should be 
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dischargeable in bankruptcy. The protection from bankruptcy, estab-
lished in 2005, gives lenders incentives to make loans even to students 
who are unlikely to be able to handle the payments, since the lender 
knows the borrower cannot ever escape the debt. Second, private lend-
ers should not be allowed to use the label “student loan” for a loan 
that requires a cosigner or credit history. Removing the student loan 
label ensures that borrowers cannot confuse these loans with federal 
student loans and signals to students that they should borrow with cau-
tion. Third, students must exhaust federal lending options before taking 
out private loans. Some students take out private loans without exhaust-
ing their federal loan options, which reflects a lack of information on 
the part of the borrowers, as Stafford Loans are less costly than private 
loans. 
This proposal can be implemented without adding to the federal 
deficit; in fact, it will likely save money for the federal government. The 
only major costs that the government would bear are those associated 
with administering repayment of the loans, which is currently handled 
by the private sector. These costs, however, can be more than offset by 
three provisions of this proposal. First, the federal deduction of loan 
interest would be eliminated for federal borrowers paying through the 
new system (which, in time, should be all student borrowers), saving 
$1 billion in tax expenditures. Second, the proposal eliminates existing 
contracts with private loan servicers, which currently cost about $360 
million annually. Finally, as discussed above, the proposal eliminates 
the in-school subsidy, which will reduce by billions the cost of the fed-
eral loan program. 
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The federal government has maintained a student loan program 
since the 1960s, and since the early 1990s the program has been avail-
able to all undergraduate, subbaccalaureate, and graduate students 
without regard to family income. Since 2006, graduate students have 
been able to use the program to finance the entire cost of their edu-
cations as determined by the institution they attend (in any program, 
for any credential, and including living expenses) without limit (Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005). 
From a federal policy perspective, a government loan program is 
a logical tool to help ensure that people can obtain a postsecondary 
education. In essence, loans allow students to move some of the future 
earnings that they would gain from that education to the present to 
finance the education itself. The government’s role in sponsoring such a 
program is sound on a theoretical basis as well: A robust private market 
for student lending is unlikely to develop because of information asym-
metries and poor economies of scale (i.e., relatively small loans with 
multiple disbursements and long repayment terms); a private market 
would likely make credit most readily available to those who need it 
least (i.e., students from more affluent families or those attending elite 
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institutions of higher education); and a private lending market would 
restrict credit availability in times of economic stress, the point at which 
demand for higher education tends to surge.  
Despite its appeal, there is a downside to a loan arrangement for 
the student. If his future earnings are lower than expected or erratic, 
he may not be able to repay the loan on time or in full and would incur 
penalties, fees, accrued interest charges, a damaged credit history, etc. 
That problem falls away, however, if the student can repay the loan as 
a share of his income. 
That reasoning led policymakers to add an income-based repay-
ment plan to the federal loan program in the mid-1990s, coupling it 
with loan forgiveness, which was ultimately set in regulations at 25 
years of payments (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993). That 
early version of income-based repayment, which remains available 
today, suffered from a number of limitations and has never been widely 
used.1 Those limitations prompted student aid advocates to argue in 
2006 that the program should be redesigned to make it more widely 
available and offer lower payments to borrowers.2 Ultimately, lawmak-
ers agreed and enacted the Income-Based Repayment program in 2007 
and implemented it in 2009. 
Under this version of the Income-Based Repayment (IBR) program 
(which this chapter refers to as Old IBR to distinguish it from an even 
more recent version of the program), borrowers make payments equal 
to 15 percent of their adjusted gross income after an exemption equal 
to 150 percent of the federal poverty guidelines adjusted for household 
size (see Table 13.1). Remaining debt is forgiven after 25 years of pay-
ments. All borrowers are eligible for the program if it would reduce 
their monthly payments below what they would pay under a 10-year 
fixed amortization, which is also known as the standard repayment 
plan.3 Policymakers also added a new loan forgiveness provision when 
they enacted IBR: public service loan forgiveness (PSLF). Under PSLF, 
borrowers using IBR who work for most nonprofit organizations or any 
government position can have unpaid debt forgiven after 10 cumulative 
years of payments.4 
In 2010, only months after borrowers could first enroll in Old IBR, 
President Obama proposed that Congress modify the program for all 
borrowers by reducing monthly payments to 10 percent of discretionary 
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Table 13.1  Comparing Terms for New and Old Income-Based Repayment (IBR) Plans 





Payment as share of income above 
exemption (annual) 
Maximum payment regardless of 
income 
Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
eligibility 
General loan forgiveness eligibility 
(all enrollees) 
All borrowers with federal student loans 
not in default 
All federal student loans (except Parent 
PLUS loans) 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) on prior 
year federal tax return; can exclude 
spouse’s income if fi ling separately 
150% of federal poverty guidelines adj. 
for household ($17,235 single, plus 
$6,030 ea. additional person, including 
spouse) 
15% 
Payment on original loan balance using 
a 10-year fixed monthly payment 
120 cumulative monthly payments (10 
years) in qualifi ed job 
25 years 
Borrowers who took out first federal loan 
on or after October 1, 2007, and also took 
out a loan on or after October 1, 2011; and 








SOURCE: Based on data from the U.S. Department of Education. 






418 Delisle, Holt, and Blagg 
ments. All other terms under IBR would be left unchanged. Congress 
passed this proposal in early 2010 as part of a larger health care reform 
bill (Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010). While this 
law made the New IBR terms available to new borrowers as of 2014, 
the Obama administration used its authority under a different statute 
to accelerate the start date to December 2012 for new borrowers as of 
October 1, 2007.5 This “bridge” program is called Pay As You Earn. 
This chapter refers to both Pay As You Earn and the IBR that begins 
for new borrowers in 2014 as New IBR. The terms of the two programs 
are virtually identical, with only one minor exception: Pay As You Earn 
includes a limit on how much interest can be capitalized at a certain 
point in repayment, but it does not limit how much interest can accrue. 
This is unlikely to have any effect on most borrowers, and a negligible 
effect on the limited universe of borrowers with high debt balances— 
over $50,000—who experience prolonged low incomes with sudden, 
large increases in incomes that are sustained. 
In summary, the federal government has offered student loan bor-
rowers repayment plans based on income since the early 1990s but later 
added the IBR plan and then modified it shortly thereafter to further 
reduce borrower payments. This chapter focuses on the most recent 
changes to the program. 
UNDERSTANDING NEW IBR 
To better understand how New IBR would affect borrowers over 
their entire repayment terms, in 2012 we developed a calculator that 
incorporates all of the repayment parameters and rules (i.e., income 
exemption, interest accrual, loan forgiveness, etc.) for both New and 
Old IBR to compare how the changes would affect different types of 
borrowers based on various debt and income scenarios. That is, our 
analysis examines how the program would work over a borrower’s
entire 20- or 25-year repayment term. Such an approach is the best way 
to understand how the multiple repayment terms in the program interact 
over many years with other factors such as inflation, interest accrual, 
income changes, and changes in household size. 
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Using the calculator, we analyze hundreds of hypothetical borrower 
scenarios (Delisle and Holt 2012). One of our main conclusions is that 
the changes to IBR made the program much more generous than was 
commonly understood, particularly for graduate students. Borrowers 
with debt from graduate school, despite earning high incomes, stand to 
have substantial debts forgiven. Under Old IBR, such a scenario would 
be highly unusual. (See Table 13.2 for a comparison.) Moreover, New 
IBR can work like tuition assistance for graduate students because a 
borrower can still qualify for substantial amounts of loan forgiveness, 
even when he earns an income that is average relative to national or 
peer incomes. Meanwhile, New IBR provides relatively small increases 
in benefits for undergraduate students and lower-income borrowers 
compared to Old IBR.6 
Those findings are more thoroughly explained in Delisle and Holt 
(2012), but they can be described briefly with the following points. 
Graduate students stand to benefit the most from the changes because 
they can borrow federal student loans to finance their entire educations 
and then repay all federal student loans—from both undergraduate and 
graduate studies—as one balance under IBR, whereas undergraduate 
borrowers are subject to annual and aggregate borrowing limits. Under 
Old IBR, monthly payments and the 25-year term before loan forgive-
ness were sufficient to repay even large amounts of graduate student 
debt, but changes under New IBR reduce borrowers’ monthly payments 
by 33 percent compared to Old IBR, and then shorten the repayment 
time before loan forgiveness by 5 years. Those changes result in a large 
increase in benefits for graduate students because of the rules on what 
they may borrow in federal loans. 
For dependent undergraduates the payment reductions under New 
IBR increase benefits as well, but dependent undergraduate debt levels 
are not high enough such that New IBR results in signifi cantly larger 
amounts of loan forgiveness compared to Old IBR. 
Lastly, lower-income borrowers see little effect from the changes 
under New IBR, because the income exemption is the same under both 
plans, and these borrowers have too little income over that exemption 
such that the changes in the repayment rate and loan forgiveness term 






















   
   
 
Table 13.2  Comparing a Borrower under Old and New IBR Plans 
Starting loan balance: $65,000 at 6.0% interest 
Repayment year Total 
420 
1 5 10 15 20 25 payments Forgiven 
Income ($)  45,000 58,986 82,731  116,034 162,744 228,257 
Old IBR ($) 
Monthly payment  291 259 472 713 722 — 132,459 — 
Loan balance 65,410  67,112 63,815 46,187 12,993 — 
New IBR ($) 
Monthly payment  194 173 315 475 694 — 88,045 55,817 
Loan balance  66,574 72,908 77,210 73,241 55,817 — 
NOTE: Loan balance reflects principal and accrued unpaid interest at the end of the repayment year indicated. Borrower’s
income increases at 7 percent annually. Income reflects total income, but payments are calculated on the baiss of adjusted 
gross income, which is reduced by an assumed amount explained in Note 10 at the end of the chapter. The exemption is 
calculated for a household size of one for the first three years and a size of two each year thereafter to reflect a spouse. 
SOURCE: Delisle and Holt (2012). 
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GRADUATE STUDENTS AND THE “NO MARGINAL
COST THRESHOLD” 
In this chapter, we delve more deeply into the benefits that New 
IBR will provide to graduate and professional students, using our prior 
work as a foundation. Our findings from that initial work suggest that 
the policy and market implications of the New IBR are significant in 
the graduate and professional education arena; namely, New IBR could 
act as a form of tuition assistance, as students borrow knowing that all 
or some of the incremental debt they incur will ultimately be forgiven. 
However, that work relied on somewhat generic (though plausible) debt 
and income scenarios, making it difficult to gauge the size and scope of 
the tuition-assistance effect and what types of degree programs could 
be most affected (Delisle and Holt 2012). Furthermore, our initial work 
did not factor in PSLF. That benefit applies to 25 percent of jobs in the 
economy, owing to the government’s very broad definition of “public 
service” and makes the benefits we highlighted in our initial work sev-
eral times larger because loan forgiveness occurs after only 10 years of 
payments (U.S. Department of Education Office of Federal Student Aid 
n.d.). 
To build on our prior analysis, we develop income projections for 
individuals working in certain professions who have graduate and pro-
fessional credentials. We also include the effects of PSLF in all of our 
analyses. 
For the income estimates, we opt to estimate incomes by profession 
rather than lump together broader categories of graduate and profes-
sional degrees, such as all masters’ of arts or all masters’ of science. 
This allows for more distinctions in probable earnings between dif-
ferent professions. Moreover, many students who seek a graduate or 
professional degree do so to obtain employment or advancement in a 
defined field. For example, a student seeking a Juris Doctor typically 
intends to practice law or work in a field that requires that credential, 
and a student pursuing a master’s of education likely intends to work in 
primary or secondary education. Thus, we can link specialized graduate 
and professional degrees to specific career and income paths. One limi-
tation of this approach, however, is that it does not capture the incomes 
of borrowers who earn a degree in one area but are employed in another. 
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Obtaining complete and reliable information on the amounts 
that graduate students borrow for specific degrees and what specific 
programs cost is more problematic. Programs for the same graduate 
credential can have a range of costs, students can incur debt to finance 
a wide range of living costs, and they can attend part time or full time.7 
In a few cases we located debt figures by profession or specialized 
degree type, but most often those sources report only mean debt levels 
and understate the loan balances that borrowers would actually repay 
in New IBR because they do not include accrued interest or debt from 
undergraduate studies. Thus it is difficult to pinpoint the cost and debt 
incurred for a particular graduate or professional credential. However, 
to provide context for our analysis, we incorporate federal student loan 
debt levels for graduate and professional students by broad degree-type 
category as reported by the federal government in the 2012 National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Survey. (See Table 13.3.) 
Instead of using cost or debt levels as the central focus of our anal-
ysis, we use a “no marginal cost threshold” (NMCT) measure. This 
places the analysis on what students would repay based on their pro-
jected incomes, not necessarily the amount that they borrow. 
Table 13.3  Graduate Degree Categories and Debt Levels ($) 
Degree by Dept. of Educa- Degree-profession Debt level by percentile 
tion survey category profile 25th 50th 75th 
Education (any master’s) K-12 Teacher 23,000 42,000 69,000 




Other master of science (MS) Engineer 23,000 47,000 75,000 
Nurse 
Other health science degree Pharmacist 98,000 132,000 199,000 
Veterinarian 
Law (LLB or JD) Lawyer 86,000 140,000 191,000 
NOTE: Debt figures reflect cumulative federal loan amount owed, principal and inter-
est, from undergraduate and graduate studies for those who completed a degree in 
2011–12, rounded to nearest $1,000. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey 
2012; Authors’ calculations. 
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Because we already know the terms of New IBR and have built 
them into a calculator, we can determine how much an individual would 
repay on her student loans once we have estimated her future income 
over 20 years. That is, what she repays in total is a function of her 
income. We can also find the level of debt at which she ceases to incur 
any increases in her future loan payments if she borrows an additional 
dollar. Taking on more debt at that point increases only how much debt 
she has forgiven after 10 or 20 years, not her monthly or total payments. 
The NMCT concept may best be understood in relation to a tradi-
tional loan. Under a traditional loan arrangement, the more a student 
borrows, the more she must repay. Under New IBR, for a set income 
level and path, there must be an amount of debt where that relationship 
ends, and the more a student borrows, the more she has forgiven. 
This NMCT is a convenient indicator for identifying the implica-
tions of New IBR. If the NMCT is below what a graduate degree costs, 
then most borrowers holding those degrees will receive loan forgive-
ness. Schools could also raise prices with impunity, as those increases 
are borne by the federal government through loan forgiveness, and stu-
dents would be encouraged to borrow for the full cost of attendance. 
Alternatively, an NMCT that is far below the typical cost of a graduate 
degree in a particular field might indicate that the New IBR is doing 
what its supporters wanted—it is subsidizing socially valuable creden-
tials that a student’s future income gains would not justify alone. There 
are a number of other ways to interpret the NMCT, and we highlight 
those in the discussion section of this chapter. 
METHODOLOGY 
Estimating Incomes by Profession and Credential 
We selected 10 professions for our analysis: 1) lawyer, 2) phar-
macist, 3) teacher, 4) accountant, 5) registered nurse, 6) social worker, 
7) reporter (journalist), 8) engineer, 9) speech pathologist, and 10) vet-
erinarian. The selection process aimed partly to present a wide range of 
professions that have varying earnings levels among the employment 
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categories available in the data we used, and partly to capture graduate 
and professional programs that vary in cost. 
To generate a 20-year income trajectory for each profession, we use 
age-based income data reported in the American Community Survey 
(ACS) for 2003–2011 for individuals who indicated that they worked 
in the specified profession and held a master’s degree or higher level of 
education. The data do not allow us to confirm that the respondent held 
a degree that matches that profession; however, we selected professions 
where that would generally be the case (e.g., a lawyer with a Juris Doc-
tor, a social worker with a Master of Social Work). Nevertheless, it is 
the income of individuals in a given profession that matters most for 
our analysis. 
The income model roughly shows what a lawyer earns when she is 
30 years old, when she is 31 years old, and so on. We assume all bor-
rowers graduate and begin repaying their loans at age 27. Therefore, a 
30-year-old lawyer is in her third year of loan repayment.8 We generate 
two categories for each income profile, one at the 50th percentile and 
one at the 75th. Thus, the model roughly shows what a 30-year-old law-
yer earns at the 50th and 75th percentiles for his profession. 
Whereas a longitudinal data set would offer advantages over the 
ACS for developing our income projections, the available longitudinal 
data sets, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, are limited 
to broad profession categories or include too few respondents within a 
specific profession. The ACS data set, on the other hand, includes many 
individual professions with a large number of respondents in each and 
includes an indicator for level of education. That allows us to focus 
on individual professions and individuals with masters’ or professional 
degrees rather than having to use more generic categories. 
We chose to generate income estimates at the 50th and 75th per-
centiles because they give a sense of where the NMCT occurs for what 
might be considered a typical graduate in a given profession, and what it 
would be for a graduate who earns more than most of his peers, respec-
tively. It is important to keep in mind that for borrowers who earn less 
than these amounts, the NMCT is lower. For graduates whom one could 
reasonably expect to earn below the 50th percentile (e.g., a teacher who 
plans to teach in a rural area, or graduates from the lowest-ranked law 
schools), the NMCT is also lower than the figures we stated. 
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Because we use data over the 2003–2011 period, we first adjust all 
figures for inflation and convert them to 2011 dollars. Then we inflate 
them again to match the future year in the borrower’s repayment plan. 
Thus, the income projections begin in 2011, and a borrower’s income in 
his 20th year of repayment is inflated to adjust for those 20 future years. 
We also aggregate the earnings information because of the some-
what limited number of respondents in a given profession at a specific 
age. Therefore, we use five-year age ranges to approximate earnings 
by age and then interpolate and extrapolate income with increases for 
age. For example, we use the income information for veterinarians aged 
30–34 to approximate the earnings of a 32-year-old veterinarian and 
income information for veterinarians aged 35–39 to approximate the 
earnings of a 37-year-old veterinarian. Then we interpolate incomes in 
the intervening years in even, incremental steps, where earlier years are 
lower and later years are incrementally higher. 
That approach tends to produce smoother increases in incomes each 
year in a borrower’s repayment term than individuals are likely to expe-
rience. When combined with the 2.5 percent annual infl ation increases, 
our income projections show borrowers increasing their incomes every 
year in the repayment term based on both age and infl ation. That effect 
also likely overstates borrowers’ incomes because of issues such as neg-
ative income shocks that occur over an individual’s life, although some 
of those effects should be captured in the data we used to build the mod-
els. However, biasing a borrower’s income higher than it is likely to be 
in reality means our analysis overestimates what a borrower would pay 
on his student loans under New IBR, underestimates the amount of debt 
that would be forgiven, and it indicates that the NMCT for borrowing 
an additional dollar is likely below what we present. Table 13.25 (pp. 
436–437) shows all of the income projections. 
New IBR Calculator and Important Repayment Assumptions 
The calculator we use to determine loan payments and the NMCT
reflects all of the repayment rules for New IBR and several important 
assumptions and adjustments.9 Annual payments are equal to 10 per-
cent of a borrower’s adjusted gross income (AGI). However, AGI tends 
to be lower than a borrower’s stated income due to pretax fringe ben-
efits and above-the-line deductions and credits. The calculator adjusts 
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for those benefits by reducing total income to reflect an AGI figure.10 
We assume that all borrowers make IBR payments based only on their 
income, exclusive of any income from a spouse, as is allowed under 
New IBR.11 
New IBR also reduces a borrower’s AGI by an exemption amount 
equal to 150 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, based on 
household size. For this chapter, we assume that all borrowers have a 
household size of one for the first five repayment years and a household 
size of two each year thereafter to reflect a spouse (a larger household 
size increases the exemption).12 The calculator increases the exemption 
by 2.5 percent each incremental repayment year to refl ect adjustments 
for inflation. 
New IBR includes a maximum payment cap based on how much 
debt a borrower has when entering repayment. This monthly payment 
cap is equal to the payment the borrower would make if he were paying 
his initial loan balance off on a 10-year amortization schedule. There-
fore, a borrower’s payment cannot exceed this level while enrolled in 
IBR, no matter how high his income. This payment cap is also the initial
eligibility test for enrolling in IBR. If a borrower’s payments are below 
this cap, he may enroll in New IBR, though if they later exceed it, he is 
not disqualified from IBR’s other important benefit: loan forgiveness. 
Consistent with the rules under New IBR, interest on the loan 
accrues and payments are first credited to unpaid accrued interest before 
principal. Unpaid accrued interest during repayment is not added to the 
borrower’s principal balance (i.e., capitalized or compounded) unless 
and until his payments reach the capped payment discussed above. 
We set the fixed interest rate on the borrower’s debt at the weighted 
average of the rates on federal student loans (unsubsidized Stafford 
Loans and Grad PLUS), which were 6.8 percent and 7.9 percent, 
respectively, in the 2012–2013 school year. Those are still reasonable 
proxies, despite a recent change in law that will reduce those rates in the 
near term, because the rates are projected to rise in the near future above 
the 6.8 and 7.9 percent rates.13 We assume the first $45,000 of debt 
a borrower incurs is unsubsidized Stafford Loans, and any above that 
is Grad PLUS, except for lawyers, pharmacists, registered nurses, and 
veterinarians, for which we assume the first $65,000 is unsubsidized 
Stafford Loans, reflecting the fact that borrowers with those degrees 
likely borrowed unsubsidized Stafford Loans for three, rather than two, 






Measuring the Benefits of Income-Based Repayment 427 
years in their graduate studies. Unsubsidized Stafford Loans have lower 
interest rates, but those loans are subject to annual and aggregate limits. 
Students take out Grad PLUS Loans once they have reached the annual 
or aggregate unsubsidized Stafford Loan limits. 
Outstanding principal and interest on the loans is forgiven after 10 
years of payments for PSLF and 20 years for all other cases. Loan for-
giveness at the 20-year mark is taxable, although estimated tax liability 
is excluded for the purposes of this chapter. We assume that lawmakers 
will make loan forgiveness tax free in the near future. 
ANALYSIS PRESENTATION 
Loan Repayment Tables by Profession and Income Category 
We have arranged the results of our analysis in Tables 13.4–13.24. 
Table 13.4 is a summary table for all of the degree-profession categories. 
There are sets of two tables for each degree-profession category 
(where each profession is linked to the most likely degree they were 
awarded), one for a borrower earning at the 50th percentile and one 
for a borrower earning at the 75th percentile in that degree-profession 
category. The “Debt level for completer” column states the cumulative 
undergraduate and graduate federal debt levels (including capitalized 
and noncapitalized interest) for program completers, of those who bor-
rowed, reported in the 2011–2012 National Postsecondary Student 
Aid Study (NPSAS) database at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of 
indebtedness. The NPSAS data include general categories for graduate 
and professional programs, and we attempted to match the best NPSAS 
category with the degree-profession categories in this analysis. 
The “Debt level for IBR no marginal cost” columns show the level 
of debt at which a student in the stated degree-profession category, 
earning at the percentile indicated in the table title, would bear no incre-
mental cost in repayment if she borrowed an additional dollar. Under 
that heading, PSLF indicates where that point is for a borrower who 
qualifies for loan forgiveness after 10 years of payments under PSLF. 
We assume the borrower makes her qualifying payment consecutively 
and all in the first 10 years of repayment, although eligibility is based 
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Table 13.4  Debt Level for IBR No Marginal Cost Threshold ($) 
Loan Forgiveness Program 
PSLF 20-year 
Earnings percentile Earnings percentile 
Degree/profession 50th 75th 50th 75th 
Accountant 37,000 70,000 52,000 100,000 
Engineer 50,000 74,000 88,000 113,000 
Lawyer 54,000 116,000 86,000 179,000 
Nurse 32,000 49,000 47,000 68,000 
Pharmacist 70,000 82,000 91,000 114,000 
Reporter 20,000 40,000 32,000 58,000 
Social worker 17,000 27,000 26,000 41,000 
Speech pathologist 22,000 31,000 32,000 46,000 
K-12 teacher 16,000 25,000 26,000 41,000 
Veterinarian 31,000 76,000 44,000 114,000 
NOTE: When an accountant earning a master’s degree accumulates $37,000 in federal 
student loans, borrowing an additional dollar does not increase his total payments on 
that debt, if he earns an income at the 50th percentile based on his age and qualifies 
for Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF). If he earns at the 75th percentile, once 
he accumulates $70,000 in federal student loans, borrowing an additional dollar does 
not increase his total payments. 
Borrower’s debt is forgiven after 10 years of payments in IBR. For all other borrowers 
in IBR, debt is forgiven after 20 years of payments, denoted as “20-year” in this table. 
“No marginal cost” is the debt level at which a borrower repaying through IBR incurs 
no cost in borrowing an additional dollar above that debt level, excluding potential 
taxes that apply to amounts forgiven under IBR 20-year. No taxes apply to debt for-
given under PSLF. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
on cumulative payments at any point in the repayment term. The values 
under “20-year” indicate the NMCT for borrowers who do not qualify 
for PSLF and have their debt forgiven after 20 years of payments. 
Lastly, on the left side of the table, “Total payments PSLF” and 
“Total payments 20-year” show the total principal and interest payments 
the borrower in the stated degree-profession category would make for 
the corresponding debt level indicated at the top of the column. The 
payments are discounted to the present at a rate of 2.5 percent. 
As a rule, a borrower’s total payments for a debt level above the 
NMCT will not exceed the payments she would make for a debt level at 
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the NMCT. For example, if the NMCT is $61,000, the borrower’s total 
payments will be the same if she leaves school with a loan balance of 
exactly that amount or any amount greater. 
The following notes apply to Tables 13.5–13.24. 
NOTE: Borrower’s debt is forgiven after 10 years of payments in IBR. For all other 
borrowers in IBR, debt is forgiven after 20 years of payments, denoted as “20-yr” in 
this table. 
a “Low” is 25th percentile, where 25 percent of degree completers finish with the stated 
debt level or less; “Mid” is 50th percentile; “High” is 75th percentile. 
b Borrower incurs no cost in borrowing an additional dollar above the stated debt level, 
excluding potential taxes that apply to amounts forgiven under IBR 20-year. No taxes 
apply to debt forgiven under PSLF.  
c Total payments under each plan are the present discounted value of all principal and 
interest payments made under that plan during the duration of the loan using 2.5 per-
cent discount rate. 
Table 13.5  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Accountant with Master’s Earning 75th Percentile by Age  
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
29,000 49,000 85,000 70,000 100,000 
Total payments PSLFc Ineligible 53,470 59,462 59,462  — 
Total payments 20-yrc Ineligible 64,524 137,032  — 143,267 
Table 13.6  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Accountant with Master’s Earning 50th Percentile by Age     
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
29,000 49,000 85,000 37,000 52,000 
Total payments PSLFc 34,608 37,908 37,908 37,908  — 
Total payments 20-yrc 36,305 73,333 79,444  — 79,444 
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Table 13.7  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Engineer with Master’s Earning 75th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
23,000 47,000 75,000 74,000 113,000 
Total payments PSLFc Ineligible 54,779 66,612 66,612  — 
Total payments 20-yrc Ineligible 59,644 109,300  — 157,066 
Table 13.8  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Engineer with Master’s Earning 50th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
23,000 47,000 75,000 50,000 88,000 
Total payments PSLFc Ineligible 47,715 48,090 48,090 — 
Total payments 20-yrc Ineligible 62,738 112,189 — 115,127 
Table 13.9  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Lawyer with JD Earning 75th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
86,000 140,000 191,000 116,000 179,000 
Total payments PSLFc 92,057 100,435 100,435 100,435 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 115,451 226,611 248,668 — 248,668 
Table 13.10  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Lawyer with JD Earning 50th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
86,000 140,000 191,000 54,000 86,000 
Total payments PSLFc 47,661 47,661 47,661 47,661 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 121,219 122,696 121,696 — 121,219 
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Table 13.11  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Nurse with Master’s Earning 75th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
23,000 47,000 75,000 49,000 68,000 
Total payments PSLFc Ineligible 49,409 49,535 49,535 — 
Total payments 20-yrc Ineligible 61,761 103,546 — 103,546 
Table 13.12  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Nurse with Master’s Earning 50th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
23,000 47,000 75,000 32,000 47,000 
Total payments PSLFc Ineligible 35,112 35,112 35,112 — 
Total payments 20-yrc Ineligible 70,929 70,929 — 70,929 
Table 13.13  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Pharmacist with PharmD Earning 75th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
98,000 132,000 199,000 82,000 114,000 
Total payments PSLFc 88,049 88,049 88,049 88,049 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 140,742 179,107 179,107 — 179,107 
Table 13.14  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Pharmacist with PharmD Earning 50th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
98,000 132,000 199,000 70,000 91,000 
Total payments PSLFc 57,956 57,956 57,956 57,956 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 133,865 133,865 133,865 — 133,865 
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Table 13.15  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Reporter with MA Earning 75th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
29,000 49,000 85,000 40,000 58,000 
Total payments PSLFc 33,595 38,052 38,052 38.052 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 36,904 73,342 82,852 — 82,852 
Table 13.16  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Reporter with MA Earning 50th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
29,000 49,000 85,000 20,000 32,000 
Total payments PSLFc 20,234 20,234 20,234 20,234 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 41,485 41,706 41,706 — 41,706 
Table 13.17  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Social Worker with MSW Earning 75th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
29,000 49,000 85,000 27,000 41,000 
Total payments PSLFc 24,604 24,604 24,604 24,604 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 41,213 56,815 56,815 — 56,815 
Table 13.18  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Social Worker with MSW Earning 50th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
29,000 49,000 85,000 17,000 26,000 
Total payments PSLFc 14,027 14,027 14,027 14,027 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 33,911 33,911 33,911 — 33,911 
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Table 13.19  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Speech Pathologist with Master’s Earning 75th Percentile 
by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
29,000 49,000 85,000 31,000 46,000 
Total payments PSLFc 34,012 34,315 34,315 34,315 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 36,343 68,730 68,730 — 68,730 
Table 13.20  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment 
Speech Pathologist with Master’s Earning 50th Percentile 
by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
29,000 49,000 85,000 22,000 32,000 
Total payments PSLFc 22,726 22,726 22,726 22,726 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 42,737 45,041 45,041 — 45,041 
Table 13.21  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
K-12 Teacher with Master’s Earning 75th Percentile by Age 
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
23,000 42,000 69,000 25,000 41,000 
Total payments PSLFc 23,964 24,149 24,149 24,149 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 30,249 55,443 55,443 — 55,443 
Table 13.22  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
K-12 Teacher with Master’s Earning 50th Percentile by Age 
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
23,000 42,000 69,000 16,000 26,000 
Total payments PSLFc 23,964 24,149 24,149 24,149 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 30,249 55,443 55,443 — 55,443 
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Table 13.23  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Veterinarian with DVM Earning 75th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
98,000 132,000 199,000 76,000 114,000 
Total payments PSLFc 71,166 71,166 71,166 71,166 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 155,593 160,551 160,551 — 160,551 
Table 13.24  Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Veterinarian with DVM Earning 50th Percentile by Age   
Debt level for IBR 
Debt level for completersa no marginal costb 
Low Mid High PSLF 20-yr 
98,000 132,000 199,000 31,000 44,000 
Total payments PSLFc 34,475 34,475 34,475 34,475 — 
Total payments 20-yrc 64,431 64,431 64,431 — 64,431 
KEY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
The NMCT for borrowers who qualify for PSLF is one of the most 
significant findings from the analysis. It is important to understand that 
“public service” under PSLF is quite broad, and borrowers who might 
not be considered employed in traditional public service jobs will qual-
ify for loan forgiveness after 10 years. Employment at any 501(c)(3) 
tax-exempt nonprofi t qualifies, as does any government position (state, 
federal, local, and tribal). This is why the federal government estimates 
that 25 percent of all jobs in the economy would qualify (Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau 2013). 
For borrowers who qualify for PSLF, the point at which they bear 
no incremental cost in borrowing more is low relative to what many 
graduate and professional degrees cost, without even factoring in what 
students may borrow to pay for living costs, what they may have bor-
rowed in undergraduate debt, or the interest they would accrue on their 









Measuring the Benefits of Income-Based Repayment 435 
federal loans while in school. This suggests that through New IBR, 
the federal government has provided a very large source of tuition 
assistance for graduate and professional students who work in the gov-
ernmental or not-for-profi t sectors. 
In fact, this tuition assistance is large enough that it could become 
common for the government to pay for a student’s entire graduate edu-
cation via loan forgiveness under PSLF, especially in some professions. 
Moreover, certain categories of students will pursue graduate degrees 
knowing that they will only work in PSLF-qualified employment, such 
as teachers and social workers. An example using the social worker 
profile helps illustrate this point. 
Imagine a student who, having already accumulated a loan bal-
ance of $29,000 during her undergraduate studies, pursues a Master 
of Social Work and borrows the entire cost of the education, including 
living expenses. Assume she earns at the 75th percentile for a social 
worker with a master’s degree by age for her first 10 years after gradu-
ate school. Because she began the program with debt well in excess of 
the NMCT ($23,000), every dollar she borrows will be forgiven by the 
federal government and will not increase her payments beyond those 
she would make on the debt she accumulated in undergraduate studies. 
This borrower need not earn an income that is unexpectedly low for 
this to be true. In fact, she can earn a relatively high income for a social 
worker with a master’s degree, as this example reflects an income at the 
75th percentile. 
Note that for undergraduate students, the effects of New IBR and 
PSLF are much different. It would be impossible for an undergraduate 
student to fully finance an undergraduate degree through PSLF. Bor-
rowers must incur costs for the initial amounts they borrow below the 
NMCT, and they will take out their initial loans pursuing an under-
graduate degree. Furthermore, annual and aggregate loan limits in the 
federal loan program that apply to dependent undergraduates are gener-
ally set below or near the NMCT for all but the lowest-paid professions 
we profiled. 
Stafford Loans Alone Allow for Significant Loan Forgiveness 
Delisle and Holt (2012) show how high-income borrowers could 
qualify for loan forgiveness by amassing high-debt balances through 
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Table 13.25  Income Projections by Percentile for Degree-Profession 
Categories by Loan Repayment Year ($) 
Repayment year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Accountant with 
master’s 
50th percentile 59,017 62,644 66,415 70,336 74,411 78,647 82,169 85,819 89,599 
75th percentile 73,544 79,842 86,410 93,255 100,390 107,822 114,104 120,632 127,416 
Engineer with 
master’s 
50th percentile 69,747 74,356 79,153 84,142 89,332 94,729 99,776 105,017 110,457 
75th percentile 82,445 88,282 94,360 100,686 107,269 114,119 119,987 126,078 132,398 
Lawyer with JD 
50th percentile 59,065 66,031 73,308 80,908 88,842 97,123 102,786 108,672 114,788 
75th percentile 95,425 106,326 117,712 129,601 142,011 154,961 164,898 175,235 185,986 
Nurse with master’s 
50th percentile 54,842 58,462 62,228 66,146 70,221 74,459 77,197 80,025 82,947 
75th percentile 72,876 77,591 82,496 87,598 92,903 98,419 101,843 105,377 109,023 
Pharmacist with 
PharmD 
50th percentile 58,692 68,269 78,289 88,767 99,719 111,164 116,013 121,034 126,234 
75th percentile 108,019 113,095 118,358 123,814 129,468 135,327 138,952 142,674 146,495 
Reporter with 
master’s 
50th percentile 39,660 42,419 45,293 48,283 51,394 54,631 55,849 57,094 58,365 
75th percentile 53,070 58,167 63,485 69,032 74,817 80,849 85,211 89,741 94,444 
Social worker with 
MSW 
50th percentile 24,131 28,821 33,730 38,867 44,240 49,857 51,586 53,371 55,212 
75th percentile 37,955 42,269 46,774 51,478 56,389 61,512 64,330 67,250 70,276 
Speech pathologist 
with master’s 
50th percentile 49,359 50,373 51,407 52,461 53,536 54,631 55,766 56,923 58,103 
75th percentile 60,729 62,439 64,196 66,003 67,859 69,767 71,772 73,832 75,951 
K-12 teacher with 
master’s 
50th percentile 34,671 36,775 38,964 41,238 43,603 46,059 48,391 50,810 53,321 
75th percentile 43,541 46,126 48,812 51,604 54,505 57,519 60,558 63,713 66,988 
Veterinarian with 
DVM 
50th percentile 62,133 63,551 64,968 66,386 68,128 69,869 71,611 73,352 75,094 
75th percentile 85,585 92,579 99,868 107,465 112,933 118,608 124,496 130,604 136,940 
NOTE: The table shows the 20-year income projections developed and used in this chapter. Loan 
payments under the Income Based Repayment plan are calculated using these income projec-
tions. All figures are in nominal dollars. 
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Table 13.25  (continued) 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
93,515 97,571 100,603 103,726 106,942 110,254 113,665 116,155 118,698 121,297 123,951 
134,463 141,784 146,794 151,966 157,306 162,817 168,506 173,219 178,062 183,040 188,155 
116,104 121,964 126,761 131,721 136,850 142,153 147,636 152,920 158,375 164,008 169,824 
138,955 145,758 151,903 158,265 164,849 171,664 178,717 185,627 192,770 200,154 207,787 
121,142 127,742 133,164 138,778 144,589 150,605 156,830 160,425 164,101 167,862 171,707 
197,164 208,786 219,750 231,131 242,944 255,203 267,924 275,288 282,852 290,623 298,606 
85,965 89,082 91,309 93,592 95,932 98,330 100,788 104,911 109,177 113,591 118,157 
112,787 116,670 119,923 123,266 126,702 130,232 133,859 138,053 142,372 146,821 151,404 
131,619 137,193 140,069 143,002 145,995 149,048 152,162 157,142 162,277 167,570 173,026 
150,418 154,446 158,937 163,555 168,306 173,192 178,216 183,417 188,767 194,269 199,929 
59,665 60,993 62,848 64,758 66,724 68,748 70,831 75,391 80,135 85,069 90,199 
99,326 104,393 106,189 108,010 109,856 111,726 113,621 119,612 125,831 132,286 138,986 
57,113 59,073 61,387 63,779 66,253 68,810 71,454 73,566 75,738 77,974 80,273 
73,411 76,659 79,460 82,354 85,343 88,430 91,618 94,490 97,448 100,495 103,634 
59,307 60,534 63,151 65,860 68,666 71,570 74,577 78,128 81,810 85,627 89,584 
78,130 80,370 83,174 86,067 89,052 92,134 95,313 99,794 104,439 109,254 114,244 
55,925 58,626 60,769 62,982 65,268 67,629 70,067 72,681 75,381 78,171 81,054 
70,387 73,914 76,901 79,991 83,187 86,494 89,913 93,370 96,943 100,637 104,454 
77,079 79,064 81,049 83,034 85,019 86,047 87,075 88,103 89,130 90,158 91,122 
140,829 144,827 148,936 153,161 157,504 166,542 175,933 185,690 195,825 206,351 207,939 
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the federal Grad PLUS Program, which allows graduate students to bor-
row whatever a school charges (plus living costs as determined by the 
school) once they have exhausted the annual ($20,500) or aggregate 
($138,500) Stafford Loan limit. 
Some observers may therefore believe that New IBR only has 
implications for graduate education and borrowing when combined 
with Grad PLUS Loans. This analysis shows, however, that in many of 
the cases we profile, borrowers will reach the NMCT well before they 
would have to access Grad PLUS Loans. This is even more so the case 
if a borrower enters graduate school with a debt from undergraduate 
studies and repays the combined balance through New IBR. 
For example, a student who borrows the maximum in undergradu-
ate loans for a dependent over five years would enter graduate school 
with a balance of about $34,000 (including accrued interest and assum-
ing he did not make any payments), and if he attends graduate school 
for two years and borrows the maximum in Stafford Loans, his com-
bined loan balance (including accrued interest from both sets of loans) 
would total approximately $80,000 in Stafford Loans alone. That figure 
exceeds the NMCT for all but the highest-earning degree-profession 
categories that we profiled. 
Declining Marginal Costs for More Debt 
Even though our analysis focuses on the NMCT, as a borrower’s
debt level approaches that point, it is significant that the incremental 
cost of borrowing an additional dollar begins to decline. This effect 
occurs because some, but not all, of the added cost of borrowing more is 
forgiven. Thus, borrowers face declining costs in borrowing additional 
sums before their debt reaches the NMCT. It is as if the borrower faces 
a declining interest rate (and even a negative interest rate) the more he 
borrows as he approaches the NMCT. 
For example, a lawyer earning at the 75th percentile by age, who 
repays his loans for 20 years under New IBR, pays a total of $226,611 
(present value) and fully repays his loan when he enters repayment 
with a $140,000 balance at 7.65 percent interest; when he enters repay-
ment with a balance of $179,000, or $39,000 more, his total payments 
increase by only $22,000 (present value) over the same 20-year repay-
ment term. That is far less than what would be needed to fully repay the 
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incremental $39,000 in debt plus interest over 20 years. Consequently, 
he has $67,000 forgiven (present value) after 20 years of payments when 
he borrows the additional amount. In short, borrowing more only mar-
ginally increases his costs, because much of the added cost is forgiven. 
Payments for Median and High Debt Levels 
In most of the cases we profiled, borrowers make payments under 
New IBR (PSLF or 20-year forgiveness) that are identical (or nearly 
identical) for median and high debt levels. That is because the NMCT
for most of the cases we profile is close to median federal debt levels for 
borrowers who complete the specified graduate and professional pro-
grams according to federal data. 
For example, a nurse with a master’s degree earning at the 50th 
percentile by age would make the same payments on his loans if he left 
school with the median ($47,000) or the 75th percentile level ($75,000) 
of federal student loans for graduates with masters’ of science. 
This dynamic could have a significant impact on students’ deci-
sions about what schools to attend and how much to borrow. It could 
make attending an averaged-priced program the same cost as attend-
ing the highest-cost program, with the difference subsidized completely 
through loan forgiveness. Alternatively, a student who might consider 
using his own funds to finance some of his education, or work part 
time to finance his education, could decide that on the margin, whatever 
those choices would save him in future loan payments would simply be 
forgiven under New IBR and he should therefore borrow rather than use 
his own resources. 
Schools also face altered incentives when borrower payments are 
the same for median and high debts. If a school is aware that the median 
amount of debt that students graduate with is above the NMCT for 
students who earn at the 75th percentile (or even higher), then any 
incremental price increases will be borne by the federal government 
through loan forgiveness, provided the students use federal loans to 
finance those costs. In such a scenario the school might take steps to 
inform students about this effect, making students insensitive to prices 
that exceed the NMCT, or the effects might simply work their way 
into the graduate school marketplace as schools raise prices without 
any drop-off in demand. If the cost of attendance is already above the 
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NMCT at a given program or school, then New IBR could artificially 
increase supply and demand irrespective of the labor market value of 
that graduate degree. 
Implications for Scholarships and School-Provided Financial Aid 
Some graduate and professional programs provide financial aid to 
certain students. Other organizations also offer scholarships for gradu-
ate and professional studies. New IBR may change whether, how, and 
to whom schools and other organizations provide this aid. Schools and 
scholarship providers may see the aid they are providing as supplanting 
loans that would have been forgiven by the federal government anyway. 
They may then put that money to other uses. 
For example, a student who borrows $10,000 more than the NMCT
for her degree-profession profile effectively receives a $10,000 grant 
from the federal government to finance her education. Her financial 
situation would be unchanged had she received the same amount from 
her school or a third party in the form of a scholarship. 
Examples of Behavioral Changes in the Market 
When scanning the market for examples of school and student 
responses to New IBR, it is important to keep in mind that the pro-
gram has been available only since December 2012, the date at which 
eligible borrowers could first enroll. Moreover, the eligible cohorts of 
borrowers who would be out of school and in repayment—those who 
started borrowing more recently—is limited. Thus, student and school 
familiarity with the program is likely still in its very early stages. Even 
so, some early examples have emerged that illustrate how schools and 
students are responding to the benefits of New IBR. 
Financial planners and consultants are helping clients understand 
the program, how to use it, and how to optimize the benefits it provides. 
This is not completely surprising given that the program is new and its 
benefits are not widely known. Also, many of the terms and rules for 
IBR are complicated and thus lend themselves to fi nancial planning 
services, such as those for federal income tax preparation or retire-
ment savings, where individuals can take actions that will reduce their 
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monthly and total payments, significantly boosting the debt that they 
have forgiven, and thereby justifying fee-for-service fi nancial planning. 
Graduate and professional schools are also starting to inform cur-
rent and prospective students about the benefits of New IBR. Most 
of these are focused on the benefits of PSLF. Many law schools offer 
special repayment programs for borrowers who use New IBR com-
bined with PSLF, whereby the school pays a portion or all of a former 
student’s loan payments as long as he earns below a certain income 
threshold. Georgetown’s law school aggressively markets the benefits 
of its program to current and prospective students with seminars and 
other materials. A video recording of one such seminar includes tes-
timonials from former students enrolled in the program who say the 
program allows them to take jobs with lower salaries and “ignore” debt 
balances, which often exceed $100,000.14 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings in this chapter show that the repayment terms policy-
makers designed for New IBR are unlikely to cause many graduate and 
professional students to fully repay their loans—even if they earn a 
competitive salary in their chosen careers—which will likely provide 
an incentive for graduate and professional students to borrow more 
rather than less, particularly for some professions. It should also make 
graduate students less sensitive to the price of a graduate or professional 
degree, allowing institutions to charge higher tuitions, especially for 
certain programs where borrowers could qualify for PSLF. 
Policymakers need not completely roll back the changes made to 
IBR to mitigate these effects. In our 2012 paper (Delisle and Holt 2012) 
we demonstrated a limited approach to curtailing some of the benefi ts of 
New IBR. Our proposal would allow only the lowest-income borrowers 
(those earning less than 300 percent of the federal poverty guidelines) 
to make payments at 10 percent of income, require all others to pay 15 
percent of their incomes above IBR’s exemption, and require borrow-
ers with higher debt levels to pay for longer before they receive loan 
forgiveness. 
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Alternatively, policymakers could allow all borrowers to pay 10 
percent of their incomes but reduce New IBR’s exemption to $10,000 
for all borrowers from the current level of 150 percent of the federal 
poverty guidelines based on household size ($17,235 for a single per-
son in 2013). All borrowers would qualify for loan forgiveness after 
20 years of payments, except those with more than $50,000 in federal 
loans, who would qualify after 30 years of payments. 
To address the extremely high subsidies and moral hazard issues 
inherent in PSLF, policymakers could simply cap the amount that can 
be forgiven under that benefit. Under current law, there is no limit. 
Without changes like these, New IBR, along with PSLF, could have 
a very large impact on the graduate education marketplace and borrow-
ing behavior in the coming years. 
Notes 
1. The program, called Income-Contingent Repayment, requires borrowers to make 
payments equal to 20 percent of adjusted gross income after an exemption equal to 
the federal poverty guidelines. Borrowers can often obtain much lower payments 
under other repayment options that are fully amortizing and not based on income 
by extending the duration of the loan and by making payments that slowly increase 
over time. Moreover, borrowers must have loans under the Direct Loan Program 
to use Income-Contingent Repayment, which up until about 2010 represented at 
most about 25 percent of loan issuance. The balance of the loans was made by 
private lenders and backed by the federal government but was not eligible for 
Income-Contingent Repayment. 
2. The advocates’ most compelling argument for modifying the program was that 
a borrower who defaulted on his loans and had his wages garnished by the U.S. 
Department of Education would pay roughly the same share of his income as 
under the Income-Contingent Repayment plan. (See Baum and Schwartz [2006], 
which was cited by advocates to make the case for payments based on smaller 
share of income than under the Income-Contingent Repayment option, and Shire-
man et al. [2006]). 
3. For example, if a borrower’s monthly payment based on a 10-year amortization 
schedule is $300, but her payments based on the IBR formula would be $290, she 
qualifies to enroll in IBR. If her income later increases such that her payments 
would exceed the amount she would pay on a 10-year amortization, then her pay-
ments are capped at $300 but she may remain enrolled in IBR and still qualifi es for 
loan forgiveness after the required number of payments. 
4. When Congress debated legislation to enact Old IBR in 2007, lawmakers focused 
exclusively on the loan forgiveness benefits of the program for borrowers in public 
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service jobs, PSLF. They viewed that provision as the main legislative change; 
few mentioned that the program would allow borrowers to make lower monthly 
payments than the Income-Contingent Repayment program in place at the time. 
5. The Obama administration used the authority under a provision added to the 
Higher Education Act in 1993 that allows the Secretary of Education to offer an 
income-contingent repayment plan within certain parameters (20 U.S.C. § 1087e). 
A “new borrower” for purposes of the plan is someone who takes out a federal stu-
dent loan for the first time on or after the specified date. For the Pay As You Earn 
plan, the borrower must also have taken out a loan on October 1, 2011, or after, or 
have become a new borrower on or after October 1, 2011. Someone who borrowed 
initially prior to that date but repaid the earlier loans in full before borrowing again 
on or after that date is also considered a “new borrower.” 
6. Undergraduates face relatively low limits in the federal loan program, thereby lim-
iting the benefits of loan forgiveness. A dependent undergraduate borrower can 
borrow a maximum of $5,500 in her first year, $6,500 in her second, and $7,500 
each year thereafter. The aggregate limit is $31,000. An independent undergradu-
ate can borrow $4,000 more in the first two years and $5,000 more in later years, 
with an aggregate limit of $57,500. Note that borrowers can enter repayment with 
balances higher than the aggregate limit due to interest accrual. Additionally, a 
small share of undergraduate borrowers have federal Perkins Loans in addition to 
Stafford Loans, which may be repaid through New IBR as a consolidation loan. 
Perkins Loans do not count toward the aggregate loan limit for Stafford Loans. If 
eligible, certain students may therefore borrow $5,500 annually through the pro-
gram, in addition to the Stafford limit, with a separate aggregate limit of $27,500. 
Borrowers with persistently low incomes make similar payments under both the 
Old and New IBR plans, owing to the exemption that is the same under both pro-
grams. Both Old and New IBR plans calculate a borrower’s payments on income 
after an exemption equal to 150 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, adjusted 
for household size. If a borrower’s income is below that threshold, then his pay-
ment is $0 regardless of which IBR he is using. Furthermore, borrowers with 
incomes slightly above the threshold make similar payments because 10 percent 
and 15 percent of the nonexempt income translates into only slightly different 
payments. 
7. Students can finance their housing, food, transportation, and other costs using 
federal loans. Those costs are determined by the school itself with little to no 
parameters set by the federal government. A review of a number of graduate school 
programs’ calculations suggests that the typical figure for such costs is $13,000 per 
year, though some schools set the figure as high as $25,000 per year. 
8. IBR calculates a borrower’s payments based on his prior year federal income tax 
return, and the program often updates his payments many months after his most 
recent tax return is filed. Therefore, a borrower will make payments under IBR that 
reflect his income in the prior year or even later, not his current income; that is, 
a 27-year-old borrower would make payments based on his income when he was 
age 25 or 26. Our analysis does not account for this lag and likely overstates the 
income and loan payments borrowers make. 
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9. The version of the New America IBR calculator used for this chapter is avail-
able in Microsoft Excel format at the URL below. Note that the calculator does 
not display loan payments in discounted present value. The analysis in this 
chapter reports loan payments displayed in the calculator in discounted present 
value using a constant discount rate of 2.5 percent. http://edmoney.newamerica 
.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/articles/NAF%20IBR%20Calculator%20with%20 
PSLF%20for%20New%20IBR.xlsx (accessed April 22, 2014). 
10. Income levels entered into the calculator that are less than $68,000 equate to 
an AGI of 90 percent of total income. Income between $68,001 and $100,000 
equates to an AGI of 85 percent of total income. Income between $100,001 and 
$150,000 equates to an AGI of 95 percent of income. Income between $150,001 
and $200,000 equates to an AGI of 98 percent of income. Income of $200,000 
and above is not reduced. The calculator automatically increases those income 
brackets by 2.5 percent each successive year in the calculator. For example, the 
$68,000 income threshold at which point a borrower’s AGI reflects 90 percent 
of total income increases by 2.5 percent per year so that in the second year it 
is $69,700, and so on. The rationale for those brackets is the following. Fringe 
benefits and the student loan interest deduction, even though small on an absolute 
basis, can easily reduce a borrower’s income by a large percentage. The 90 percent 
threshold is conservative. As borrowers earn more, the threshold increases because 
these earners are more able to take advantage of fringe benefits, particularly pretax 
retirement contributions. At high incomes, the reduction is reduced because we 
assume that these borrowers have unearned income that partially or fully offsets 
any pretax fringe benefits or other above-the-line deductions and credits. 
11. Borrowers would have to file a separate federal income tax return from their 
spouses to do this. While this may cause them to pay slightly more in income 
taxes, the reduced loan payments and increase in loan forgiveness far outweigh 
those costs. 
12. Under the IBR rules, borrowers may include a spouse in their household size cal-
culation, even if the couple files separate federal income tax returns. Children may 
be included in a borrower’s household size if the borrower provides for more than 
half of a child’s care, regardless of which spouse claims the child as a dependent 
on his or her tax return. 
13. In 2012, Congress and the president amended the federal loan program such that 
interest rates on newly issued loans are based on the interest rates on 10-year Trea-
sury notes plus a mark-up (Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013). Based 
on Congressional Budget Office estimates in 2013, interest rates on graduate Staf-
ford Loans and Grad PLUS Loans will remain lower than rates in effect prior to 
enactment of the Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act only through 2015, after 
which they will remain above those rates. 
14. Georgetown removed this video from its Web site after we published a post on the 
Higher Ed Watch blog regarding the Georgetown Law loan repayment program. 
The referenced footage can still be viewed on the Ed Money Watch blog. See 
Delisle and Holt (2013). 
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